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1.1 | The Topic
Faith-based organizations in the United States and in Europe have been instrumental 
in assisting migrants at various junctures of their journeys. Since the end of World War 
II, both Catholic and Protestant organizations in the United States have been active in 
their humanitarian efforts to provide resettlement assistance to refugees. In 1943, the 
US Conference of Catholic Bishops formed Catholic Relief Services, whose initial focus 
was the resettlement of refugees in Europe.1 Three years later in 1946, more than thirty 
Protestant denominations joined to form Church World Service (CWS), which, at the 
time, was the largest private agency in the United States distributing foreign relief.  Its 
early focus, too, was refugee resettlement: before the end of 1946, CWS had resettled 
1,488 refugees in 32 cities across the United States, and by the end of 1952, that number 
had risen to over 51,000. By 1980, the number resettled reached over 350,000.2 In 
Europe, faith-based organizations have played and continue to play a critical role in the 
assistance of migrants. During the South-North labor migration in Europe, they played a 
key role in integration, particularly in connecting migrants with economic opportunities 
and inserting them into new social settings. The work of these faith-based organizations 
has been far-reaching and has included pastoral work, intervention in political debates, 
and legal defense. In Europe, the Jesuit Refugee Service, the Protestant Churches’ 
Commission for Migrants in Europe, and Caritas have all done work similar to the CWS 
and Catholic Relief Services in the United States. 
But the role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) is not limited to resettlement efforts. In 
the United States, the fervor of FBOs intensified beginning in the early 1980s as people 
fled from civil wars in Central American countries, particularly Guatemala and El Salvador. 
These people sought asylum in the US, but the vast majority were denied. Knowing 
this, many did not even apply because it would have been futile. The assistance effort 
was focused on individuals and families whose presence in the United States was not 
authorized – in other words, rejected asylum seekers. By contrast to the “lawful” work 
performed by faith communities before 1980 as they aided resettlement efforts, faith 
communities in the 1980s began to practice civil disobedience in aiding people fleeing 
from wars in their home countries whose asylum applications were refused. These efforts 
by churches and private individuals led to the birth of the Sanctuary Movement in 1981. 
Central to the birth of this movement were sentiments that the United States’ immigration 
policy, which made it virtually impossible for Central Americans to be granted asylum, 
was both unjust and contrary to international law on asylum. The movement assisted 
those who had fled their homes by helping them avoid refoulement, and by providing 
the material necessities of life along the way. Additionally, sanctuary churches provided 
transportation for aliens to reach the United States or Canada.3 Sanctuary churches were 
1 Eby, J. (2011, July 29). Faith Community’s Role in Refugee Resettlement in the United States. Retrieved from 
https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-aabstract/24/3/586/1573216. 
2 Id. 
3 Villarruel, K.L. (1986). The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, 
Litigation, And Values. 60 S. Cal. L. Rev.
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knowingly and willfully defying federal immigration law, and some even wrote to the US 
Department of Justice notifying it of their intentions and actions. Following the example 
of these sanctuary churches, cities and colleges declared themselves sanctuaries, 
invoking human rights rather than the traditional religious bases for sanctuary. Sanctuary 
jurisdictions, however, did not provide the full array of services to people without 
authorized residence (unauthorized stayers) as the churches did. Their participation in 
the Sanctuary Movement was generally limited to officially “ignoring” the unauthorized 
status of Central Americans in the ordinary course of activities, and directing municipal 
workers to refrain from assisting the national immigration officers in their investigations 
or arrests of Central Americans.4
As the political turmoil and civil unrest in Guatemala and El Salvador abated in the mid-
1990s, so did the ardor of the Sanctuary Movement. However, the Sanctuary Movement 
saw a resurgence in late 2016 when former television reality show host Donald Trump, 
who repeatedly vowed to deport unauthorized stayers (and keep them out), was elected 
president. In the months following the election of Donald Trump, the number of sanctuary 
churches in the United States increased from 400 to 800.5 Akin to the movement of the 
1980s, various cities, municipalities, and states either re-affirmed their commitment to 
sanctuary or declared themselves sanctuaries. What exactly this means is discussed 
in detail in Part Two of this book. For now, it suffices to point out that the sentiments 
of the Sanctuary Movement continue to grow as federal immigration law, policy, and 
rhetoric threaten people whose stay in the United States is not authorized by the federal 
government.
Similarities and differences can be observed with respect to the efforts of faith-based 
organizations in the Netherlands in the context of migration. The efforts of FBOs in 
the Netherlands have also not been limited to resettlement aid. Since the late 1970s, 
there have been well over 50 documented instances of church asylum. Though these 
instances of church asylum did not amount to a concerted movement like the one the 
United States experienced in the 1980s, in which tens of thousands of people sought 
asylum in churches, it is worth noting that some of these instances of church asylum in 
the Netherlands did involve hundreds of people rather than just an individual or family. 
Moreover, a prominent 2019 case of church asylum resulted in protections for hundreds 
of other similarly situated people in addition to the one family that took refuge in a church 
to avoid deportation. These numbers standing alone are substantial, especially in light of 
the fact that the population of the Netherlands is only about five percent of the population 
of the United States. In the Netherlands, a more concerted movement emerged in the 
early 2000s after substantial changes to asylum law were implemented. By 2001, it was 
no longer possible for rejected asylum seekers to receive most types of governmental aid. 
Also, rejected asylum seekers would now be forced to leave government accommodation 
4 Id. 
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four weeks after a negative assessment of their asylum application. The gaps left by 
the government’s severe curtailment of the provision of basic needs served as the key 
impetus for the efforts of FBOs that immediately followed. In other words, FBOs began to 
fill the gaps left by the central government when it decided to abandon providing basic 
aid to rejected asylum seekers. This basic aid has included – most prominently – the 
provision of food, shelter, and hygiene. In the Netherlands, it has been less a movement 
of providing church asylum to avoid deportation and more a movement about ensuring 
that rejected asylum seekers have access to minimum care to meet their basic needs.
As with the American FBOs involved in these assistance efforts, FBOs in the Netherlands 
also do not operate in a vacuum. The influence of faith-based organizations on Dutch 
municipal governments was catalyzed by drastic changes to immigration law around the 
turn of the century. Essentially, these changes left significant numbers of people homeless 
and without access to government benefits. Municipalities took it upon themselves to 
address the very real situation of the influx of homeless people on their streets, and what 
this could mean for, among others, public order and safety. They addressed this issue 
with the legal and practical advice of faith-based organizations that had been assisting 
migrants for decades. These efforts and roles of faith-based organizations are explored in 
this study from a comparative perspective.
1.2 | Country Selection
For this study, I have chosen to investigate and compare the role of faith-based 
organizations in the United States and the Netherlands. Aside from pragmatic 
considerations, I have chosen to study these countries because they are comparable on a 
fundamental level: over the last four decades, both countries have experienced ongoing 
tensions between faith-based organizations and the national government regarding 
assistance to unauthorized stayers. These tensions were already apparent from initial 
research into churches and migration in North America and Europe. Tensions in the 
American context have continued to develop from the birth of the Sanctuary Movement 
in the early 1980s to the ongoing sanctuary jurisdictions debate that began in the late 
2010s. Tensions in the Dutch context have continued to evolve from the first church 
asylum cases of the late 1970s to the ongoing debate on how to deal with the presence 
of unauthorized stayers that began in the early 2000s. Moreover, similar patterns were 
observed in regard to the tensions. While it was primarily FBOs that pioneered assistance 
efforts, they were soon joined by many subfederal governments in the United States 
and municipal governments in the Netherlands. In other words, what began as an effort 
on the part of FBOs evolved into a broader coalition that also attracted governmental 
actors in both countries. The tension developed to include not only FBOs and national 
governments, but also governments at lower levels.
In addition to this fundamental similarity, there are two other important similarities within 
the scope of this research. First, both countries have tended toward a more restrictive 
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immigration policy throughout the last four decades.6 Second, both Catholicism and 
Protestantism have played a major role in these countries historically, and a significant 
(though diminishing) percentage of people in both still identify as Christians. These are 
important similarities because they define the contours of the tension (and this research). 
That is, the restrictive immigration policies have resulted in the plight of unauthorized 
stayers. The plight of such people includes the omnipresent uncertainty of whether or not 
their basic survival needs will be met. It includes the omnipresent uncertainty or whether 
or not they will be removed from their communities and sent back to their (often unsafe) 
countries of origin. It is these people whom (Christian) FBOs have been assisting, and 
continue to do so.
Of course, there are many differences between the two countries as well: their relative 
sizes, histories, and forms of government. None of these underlying differences, 
however, is an impediment to a meaningful comparison. Rather, the differences between 
the countries on the general level can help to explain the variations within the tensions 
on a more specific level. For instance, the extent to which a country has a centralized 
government informs not only the type of restrictive measures it undertakes regarding 
people it desires to keep out, but also the response of faith-based organizations. In turn, 
the response is justified by arguments, which often overlap between the countries, but 
are also nuanced, as they must be tailored to fit the relevant political and legal framework. 
This is further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The differences provide not only context, but 
also enhance the richness of the study. All things considered, the two countries showed 
to be appropriate candidates for a rich and nuanced comparison. 
1.3 | Terminology
So far, I have mentioned a number of different actors relevant to this research topic: 
faith-based organizations, migrants, asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers, refugees, 
people without authorized residence status, unauthorized stayers, sanctuary churches, 
sanctuary jurisdictions, and municipal governments. I have also mentioned a major 
related concept: church asylum, or sanctuary. Before framing the research questions, it 
is necessary to define the following terms: faith-based organizations, migrants, asylum 
seekers, rejected asylum seekers, refugees, people without authorized residence status, 
church asylum/sanctuary, and sanctuary churches.7 
For purposes of this study, “faith-based organizations” (FBOs) encompass churches as 
well as organizations whose values, mission, and work are based on faith and beliefs. 
“Migrants” are simply people who move from one place to another. “Asylum seekers” 
are people seeking international protection on the basis of a legal instrument, such as 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. A “refugee” is an asylum seeker who has been recognized 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention as a person who is outside his or her country of 
6 This is discussed in greater detail in later chapters.
7 Sanctuary jurisdictions and municipal governments are dealt with in depth in Part Two.
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nationality or habitual residence has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of 
his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of that 
country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.8 A “rejected asylum seeker” is a person 
whose asylum application was denied by the relevant evaluating authority.
With phrases like “people without authorized residence status” or “unauthorized 
stayers”, I refer to people whose presence in a country is not authorized by that country’s 
authorities or is no longer authorized by them. Many phrases are used in the literature 
when referring to people whose presence in a country is not authorized by that country’s 
authorities or is no longer authorized by them. Some of the more common phrases 
used include illegal immigrants, undocumented immigrants, and irregular immigrants. 
Here I explain how I reached my terminological choice. Though each phrase carries with 
it controversial connotations, the use of “illegal immigrants” has garnered the most 
controversy and opposition. This is understandable for a number of reasons.
First, it is critical to examine whether the term “illegal” is an accurate way to describe 
people whose stay in a country is unauthorized. Generally, there are two mechanisms 
through which a person acquires unauthorized status: 1) the person has entered the 
country without having the requisite documentation, or 2) the person had entered 
the country with requisite documentation but no longer has such documentation yet 
remains in the country.9 Persons belonging to the second category are usually those 
who have overstayed their visas. Federal law in the United States makes a distinction 
between these two categories with respect to criminalization. According to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1325, persons belonging to category 1 may face misdemeanor and prison charges. 
People who have overstayed their visas, on the other hand, have committed only a civil 
violation that is handled in immigration court proceedings. A 2006 study showed that 45% 
of people whose stay was unauthorized had initially lawfully entered the United States but 
then remained after their visas expired.10 Thus, at most, it can be said that 55% of those 
without authorization could be charged with committing a crime. However, there are two 
important things to bear in mind. First, no person is a criminal until convicted by a court 
with jurisdiction. Most unauthorized stayers are never charged with and/or convicted of a 
crime. Second, the criminalization of border crossings is a highly disputed idea.11
8  Article I(A)(2) Refugee Convention.
9 Asylum seekers are another substantial group of people who may be qualified as unauthorized stayers. Their 
entitlement to non-refoulement is not an impediment for them to be unauthorized stayers. In other words, just 
because a country’s authorities may be obligated to refrain from sending asylum seekers back, it does not mean 
the authorities must issue authorization for stay. While asylum applications are assessed, the asylum seeker is 
in a state of limbo, after which either his application is granted, and he thus falls outside of unauthorized stayer 
status, or her application is denied, meaning that he falls into one of these two categories of unauthorized 
stayer status. 
10 “Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population.” Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project, 
Pew Research Center, 30 Dec. 2019, www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2006/05/22/modes-of-oentry-for-the-
unauthorized -migrant-population/. 
11 See, e.g., Dauvergne, C. (2008). Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
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Grouping people who have crossed a border without requisite documentation with those 
who have committed offenses against other people or property, such as rape, murder, 
and theft has serious implications on the rights of people so labeled. International 
standards recognize that countries have ongoing obligations to all people on their 
territory, regardless of their status. To define a human being as anything other than one 
with legal personhood is to undermine these international legal obligations. Finally, 
labeling someone as anything other than a legal person seems to suggest that the person 
somehow is no longer a rights holder before the law and calls into question their right 
to, among others, due process. The term “illegal” is rife with inaccuracies and should 
therefore be avoided.
Second, any terminological choice in an academic work should aspire to be neutral. 
The word “illegal”, with its criminal connotation, can be seen as depicting migrants as 
dishonest and undeserving criminals who are a threat to the public order. It can rob 
migrants of their dignity and can have severe implications on their human rights. The 
use of the word actually costs lives because it results in the automatic criminalization of 
people who choose to help migrants at sea, or provide them with basic necessities like 
food and shelter. This, in turn, discourages at least some people from assisting desperate 
migrants and results in a loss of life. Moreover, the word undermines social cohesion and 
gives rise to racial profiling, xenophobia, and hate crimes.
Finally, labeling a human being as illegal is incompatible with values inherent in Western 
democracies. First, it is patently discriminatory as the word is never applied to citizens. 
It is also oppressive because it creates the notion of the “other” and indeed a negative 
connotation of the other. The term “illegal” has been used to define disadvantaged 
groups throughout history, such as Jewish migrants fleeing the holocaust or people 
resisting the segregationist laws of the US that were in place from the end of the Civil War 
to the Civil Rights Movement. The term is also outdated. Historically, prejudiced terms 
have been used to further marginalize marginalized groups including people of color, 
women, the LGBT community, and so on. Society has come to recognize that unbiased 
and precise terminology is important, and have acted accordingly to administer it across 
the board. The battle for terminology is not just about semantics; it is a battle for dignity, 
respect, and humanity.
This is not to say that the other two phrases, “undocumented immigrants” and “irregular 
immigrants”, are without flaws. For instance, the “undocumented immigrants” can be 
interpreted as carrying the connotation that this group of people does not have any 
documentation whatsoever, when in reality, they often lack only a part of the requisite 
documentation to be authorized. Thus, the term is often misleading. The term “irregular” 
is vague and overly broad, begging the question: but what does irregular really mean? 
Moreover, the words migrant and immigrant are often also imprecise, as people who no 
longer have authorization to stay within the country have spent a number of years there 
and have no intention to move again. The reasons for a particular choice of terminology 
range from ignorance of the issues to calculated operation to achieve a political end, and 
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anything in between. The impetus for using a particular phrase, however, is not relevant 
for purposes of this research; rather, it is critical here to use terminology that is as precise 
and accurate as possible.
For this research, I have chosen to use the phrase “unauthorized stayer” to refer to 
people whose presence in a country is not authorized by that country’s authorities or is 
no longer authorized by them. The term “unauthorized” avoids the misleading nature of 
“undocumented” while offering more specificity than “irregular.” The term “stayer” offers 
more precision and accuracy than either “migrant” or “immigrant” because a substantial 
portion of this group of people are no longer on the move or even have an intention to 
be on the move. These people are simply staying in a country without that country’s 
authorization.
Finally, for purposes of this research, “church asylum” and “sanctuary”, unless otherwise 
noted, are used interchangeably. Church asylum, or sanctuary12, comprises one type of 
assistance that faith-based organizations offer to unauthorized stayers. The difference 
between church asylum/sanctuary and shelter/accommodation lies in their purposes. 
Church asylum, while also providing shelter and perhaps other material assistance, has 
an additional purpose: to prevent the expulsion of the unauthorized stayer from the 
country. “Sanctuary churches” are those that have decided to offer sanctuary, irrespective 
of whether they have done so in practice. The origins and developments of church asylum 
in both countries are discussed in more detail in the first part of this study.
1.4 | The Central Question
As explained in Section 1.1, faith-based organizations in the United States and the 
Netherlands have been active in assisting unauthorized stayers in varying capacities. 
This has resulted in tensions with the federal and central governments of these countries. 
However, even the initial exploratory inquiry into the American and Dutch situations 
revealed the difficulty in understanding these tensions by analyzing the FBOs in a 
vacuum. As more data were gathered, it became clear that an inquiry into only FBOs would 
have been a myopic approach resulting in incomplete results and conclusions. This is 
because of the intimate link between FBOs and (subfederal and municipal) governments. 
In the United States, subfederal governments sympathetic to the cause of the Sanctuary 
Movement of the early 1980s followed suit to adopt policies favorable to unauthorized 
stayers. In the Netherlands, municipal governments relied on blueprints for the shelters 
they set up following the promulgation of restrictive immigration and asylum measures. 
The close relationship between FBOs and governments is discussed further in Part Two.
12 In the American context, the tendency is to use “sanctuary” while “church asylum” (or kerkasiel in Dutch) is the 
more common terminology in the Dutch context. 
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As will be revealed in later chapters, there are also nongovernmental, nonreligious 
organizations that are relevant and involved in the assistance of unauthorized stayers. 
However, they are mentioned only incidentally in discussions on assistance networks in 
Chapters 7 and 8; they are not central components of this study. Because of time and 
resource limitations, I have not analyzed them in depth in this study. I have decided to 
focus here on FBOs and (subfederal and municipal) governments, due primarily to their 
close relationship, which becomes more and more apparent throughout this study.
Though FBOs and (subfederal and municipal) governments are fundamentally different 
(belonging to the “church” and “state”, respectively), they share something important 
in common. What they have in common is that neither is a “regular” player in the field of 
immigration. That is, the legal competence over immigration is relegated to the federal 
and central governments. Perhaps it is this shared outsider status that inspires them 
to work together and become involved in immigration matters. But perhaps not. What 
drives their actions? How do their actions relate to their faith? How do they interact with 
the state? How does the state respond? There are plenty of questions surrounding FBOs’ 
involvement in immigration matters. Put more succinctly, the central question that this 
research endeavors to answer is the following: 
How and why do Christian faith-based organizations in the United States and the 
Netherlands, in the expression of their faith and in conjunction with local governments, 
challenge the central government’s legal monopoly over migration? 
There is a lot to unpack in the central question. There are a number of actors mentioned: 
faith-based organizations, the state (which includes multiple levels of government), and 
unauthorized stayers. Because the study focuses on FBOs and (subfederal and municipal) 
governments, I have formulated sub-questions to address each.
In Part One, I examine faith-based organizations. The sub-question of Part One is the 
following: why do certain Christian faith-based organizations become involved in the 
assistance of unauthorized stayers, and to what extent does their involvement impact 
church-state relations? In Part Two, I examine the subfederal and municipal governments. 
The sub-question of Part Two is the following: why do certain subfederal and municipal 
governments become involved in the assistance unauthorized stayers, and to what extent 
do Christian faith-based organizations play a role in the tensions between different levels 
of government? Part Three provides conclusions and a new framework of resolving the 
tensions raised in Parts One and Two.
1.5 | Methodology
To answer the central question and sub-questions presented above, I utilized a mixed 
qualitative research methodology that included conducting interviews, analyzing 
case law, and reviewing existing literature. To answer the core question of Part One, I 
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interviewed twenty-six representatives of faith-based organizations in the United States 
and the Netherlands. With the exception of one FBO, all had made the decision to assist 
unauthorized stayers in some capacity.13 Due to the sensitive nature of the work that 
these FBOs perform, many prefer to avoid publicity and can therefore be reluctant to be 
interviewed. Moreover, even those that are less concerned about publicity tend to accept 
speaking to people who come recommended through trusted sources. Thus, word of 
mouth was the primary mechanism by which I found the majority of organizations for this 
research. This mechanism could call into question the representativeness of the sample. 
With respect to the United States, I focused on FBOs in the Chicago area. Chicago was and 
continues to be one of the two major “camps” of sanctuary in the United States.14 However, 
because I did not wish to exclude the other major sanctuary “camp” (Tucson, Arizona), I 
interviewed a key leader of that movement as well. In the Netherlands, it was less difficult 
to strive toward a representative sample. First, the country itself is considerably smaller, 
both by population and area, making it practically easier to interview FBOs from all over 
the country. Second, my colleagues’ networks of researchers and practitioners allowed 
me to access to interview various FBOs’ representatives throughout the entire country. 
The aim of the interviews was to extract the arguments relied upon by members of FBOs 
as to why their FBOs assist unauthorized stayers. The interviews were audio recorded and 
subsequently analyzed. I borrowed principles from grounded theory as I analyzed the 
responses to the questions asked during the interviews. Fundamentally, grounded theory 
employs inductive reasoning. Grounded theory was pioneered by Glaser and Strauss in 
their 1967 book The Discovery of Grounded Theory.15 It describes a process of conducting 
research that may lead to a new theory. Grounded theory calls for the collection of 
data as the initial step, and theory building can start with the very first data collected. 
A question does not necessarily need to be posed to begin collecting data. According 
to Glaser and Strauss, there are three fundamental steps: data collection, coding, and 
analysis.16 I generally followed these steps in my research. As I reviewed the interviews, 
certain words and ideas emerged repeatedly. I organized these into arguments. At first it 
appeared that there were many arguments, but further analysis revealed that there were 
actually a substantial number of arguments that were only slightly different from others. 
Thus, at this time it made sense to devise categories of argumentation. Once I had the 
argumentation organized categorically, it was possible to compare the arguments and 
draw further conclusions and implications in Chapter 4.
To answer the core question of Part Two, I analyzed relevant case law in the two countries 
to extract the arguments used by subfederal and municipal actors in legal cases. For 
Part Two, I focused on subfederal jurisdictions (United States) and municipalities 
(Netherlands) that had already taken the position that they would assist unauthorized 
13 One FBO in the United States did not (yet) have a position on sanctuary and assisting unauthorized stayers. 
14 The Sanctuary Movement camps are discussed in Section 2.2.2.
15 Glaser, B.G., & Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New 
York: Aldine Publishing Co.
16 Id. at 18, 36.
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stayers in some capacity. To that end, in addition to comparing relevant case law, I 
reviewed existing literature that had already analyzed subfederal and municipal actors’ 
arguments vis-à-vis assisting unauthorized stayers outside of court. In the Dutch context, 
I also examined articles published by the scientific bureau of the Dutch political party of 
Christian Democrats (CDA) that dealt with migration.17 Though political parties explicitly 
affiliated with religion do not exist in the American context, I found it important to consider 
their argumentation in the Dutch context nonetheless. Similar to Part One, I again arrived 
at categories of argumentation through inductive reasoning. I was then able to compare 
arguments used in the American context to legal arguments in the Dutch context, and the 
American out-of-court arguments to their Dutch counterparts in Chapter 7. In other words, 
while the data collection procedure differed in Part Two, the same methodology was used 
as in Part One.
1.6 | Thesis Structure
As mentioned above, the thesis is divided into three parts. Part One, which focuses on 
faith-based organizations as the actors, opens with a discussion of how the migrant and 
migration are treated generally in the Old and New Testament, and how more specific 
topics, such as church asylum, are linked to scripture. The scriptural discussion is 
structured around three core principles: equality, solidarity, and liberty. As explained 
in more detail in the introduction to Part One, this decision to organize the discussion 
around these three principles was made because both the United States and Netherlands 
are signatories to the landmark document which espouses these ideals: The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In other words, the scriptural discussion is linked to the 
core shared ideals of the countries. Moreover, this scriptural backdrop serves to highlight 
some of the tensions that faith-based organizations face when the exercise of their 
religious beliefs with respect to unauthorized stayers does not conform with state law. 
Despite the fact that every denomination within Christianity bases its beliefs to some 
degree on the Old Testament and the New Testament, faith-based organizations of 
different denominations, and indeed sometimes even within the same denomination, 
take varying positions on immigration, broadly, and the extent to which assisting 
unauthorized stayers is appropriate, specifically. Again, the core research question of 
Part One is the following: why do certain faith-based organizations become involved in 
the assistance of unauthorized stayers, and to what extent does their involvement impact 
church-state relations? This question is answered by analyzing FBO assistance to these 
groups of people in the United States and the Netherlands. The question is answered 
through qualitative research in the form of interviews with representatives of both 
Protestant and Catholic FBOs in these two countries. Following the introductory note to 
Part One, one chapter will be dedicated to each country (Chapters 2 and 3) to discuss the 
results of these interviews. Part One closes with an additional chapter (Chapter 4) that 
 
 
17  The methodology for this task is further described in Section 6.4.5.
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offers a comparative discussion of the results, and what implications the results have on 
the church-state relations and the related principle of the separation of church and state.
Part Two focuses on governments as the actors. More specifically, it focuses on 
governments subordinate to the federal level in the United States, and governments 
subordinate to the central level in the Netherlands. In practice, this means municipalities, 
counties, and states in the American context, and municipalities in the Dutch context. 
Structurally, Part Two is similar to Part One. It opens with an introductory note that 
explains the relationship between the work of FBOs and the actions of the subfederal and 
municipal governments. Again, the core research question of Part Two is the following: 
why do certain subfederal and municipal governments become involved in the assistance 
unauthorized stayers, and to what extent do Christian faith-based organizations play a 
role in the tensions between different levels of government? Methodologically, it differs 
from Part Two in that it relies on data gathered from court cases, news articles, academic 
articles, and parliamentary documents, rather than interviews with stakeholders. As with 
Part One, one chapter is dedicated for each country (Chapters 5 and 6) to discuss the 
answers to the core research question. Part Two then closes with an additional chapter 
(Chapter 7) that analyzes the results from a comparative angle. Also, functionally, 
Part Two mirrors Part One. Part One focuses on the factors that explain faith-based 
organizations’ assistance of unauthorized stayers; in a similar vein, Part Two focuses on 
the arguments advanced by (subfederal and municipal) governments in support of their 
actions vis-à-vis unauthorized stayers. Part Three comprises Chapter 8. Chapter 8 of the 
dissertation discusses conclusions that can be supported by the findings of Part One and 
Two. In addition to the conclusions, it explores the potential utility of a new framework to 
resolving tensions arising from religious free exercise. 
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Introduction to Part One
Part One of this book deals with faith-based organizations’ assistance to unauthorized 
stayers in the United States and the Netherlands. Before moving onto that discussion, 
it is useful to examine what the Christian biblical canon teaches regarding migrants and 
migration, as this discussion pertains to Christian faith-based organizations in both 
countries. It is particularly useful in light of the wholly divergent positions on migration 
that Christian leaders in different parts of the world have taken. 
Despite the fact that the same texts form the backbone for virtually every denomination 
of Christianity, there is little unity and much incoherence when it comes to deciding just 
what is concretely required of the faithful and its leaders as it relates to the assistance of 
unauthorized stayers. By way of example, even within one denomination of Christianity, 
Roman Catholicism, leaders have taken positions patently at odds with one other on the 
topic of immigration broadly, let alone on the nuanced topic of sanctuary. Outspoken 
Hungarian Bishop of Szeged-Csanad, Laszlo Kiss-Rigo, has rejected migrants from 
the Middle East, stating that they are not actually asylum seekers and that “this is an 
invasion.”18 Similarly, Archbishop of Valencia, Antonio Canizares, has warned that “this 
invasion of migrants” could transform into a “Trojan horse in European societies.” Still 
other leaders, including Pope Francis, have taken a much more inclusive stance regarding 
migrants and what the host society ought to do: “a merciful heart opens up to welcome 
refugees and migrants”.19  Commenting on the Trump administration’s decision to repeal 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), Father Timothy Kesicki, president of 
the Jesuit Conference of Canada and the United States, stated “We call upon Congress to 
act without delay in enacting a lasting solution, but more than ever, we commit ourselves 
to living out God’s law, which calls on us to love the stranger, remembering that our 
ancestors in faith were once strangers in a foreign land.”20 Archbishop John C. Wester 
of Santa Fe expressed a similar sentiment: “As Catholics, we believe the dignity of every 
human being, particularly that of our immigrant and refugee children and youth, must be 
protected.”21 On February 27, 2018, dozens of nuns, priests, and laypeople were arrested 
 
 
18 Witte, G. (2015, September 7). Hungarian bishop says pope is wrong about refugees. Retrieved from https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/hungarian-bishop-says-pope-is-wrong-about-refugees/2015/09/07/
fcba72e6-558a-11e5-9f54-1ea23f6e02f3_story.html?utm_term=.b7cbe496c92d. 
19  Pope Francis speech during a visit to Krakow, Poland in July 2016.
20 Blumberg, A. (2017, September 5). Catholic Leaders, Long On The Side Of Immigrants, Condemn Trump’s 
DACA Decision. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/catholic-clergy-condemn-daca-
decision_us_59af2475e4b0b5e53101d190. DACA is an immigration policy that allows unauthorized stayers who 
have been brought to the United States as children to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action 
from deportation. It also allows for work permits. It does not provide a path to eventual citizenship, and not 
everyone is eligible. For example, those with serious misdemeanors or felonies are not eligible.
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at the Capitol for unlawfully “crowding, obstructing, or incommoding” as they protested 
Congress’ inaction regarding DACA.22 
The incoherence is striking: how can people whose beliefs are grounded in the same 
fundamental principles take such contradictory positions? The starting point is to 
examine what religious doctrine teaches regarding migration. In the remainder of this 
Introduction to Part One, I discuss migration in a biblical context, and illustrate how the 
exercise of religious obligations based on religious teachings may come into conflict 
with immigration laws, and how this could result in divergent positions. In order to relate 
these teachings to modern times, I place them in the context of modern international 
human rights. 
The idea of the migrant and the concept of migration pervade the Christian biblical canon. 
In fact, the Hebrew word ger, the closest to the contemporary concept of the immigrant, 
appears 92 times in the Old Testament. The New Testament is similarly equipped with a 
vast array of teachings relating to the treatment of the migrant; indeed, the gospels tell 
the story of Jesus Christ, Christianity’s most influential habitual migrant.23 The migrant is 
a prevalent figure in the Old Testament and New Testament. Though scholars may debate 
and assign varying interpretations of instructions contained in the Christian biblical 
canon, there is little debate regarding the general instructions requiring host societies to, 
at a minimum, receive the migrant with a fair and inclusively hospitable attitude. There 
is a minority of scholarship that argues that the Old Testament differentiates categories 
of migrants. This is discussed below. First, I summarize the view of majority scholarship.
Rather than tracing the migrant chronologically from the early chapters of the Old 
Testament onward, this Part is organized thematically around three core principles: 
Equality, Solidarity, and Liberty. It is these three principles that lie at the core of the 
majority of the migration discussion within the Christian biblical canon. Additionally, 
these three principles are enshrined in various domestic and international documents on 
human rights, including Article 1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to 
which both the United States and the Netherlands are signatories. It reads:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.24
22 Dozens of Nuns and Other Catholics Arrested Advocating for Migrants. Retrieved from https://pantheon-live.
religionnews.com/2018/02/27/dozens-of-nuns-other-catholics-arrested-advocating-for-immigrants/. 
23 But the importance placed on the migrant does not end with those texts: by way of example, just in the 
last seventy years, the Catholic Church, the largest denomination of Christianity, has published a litany 
of additional ecclesiastical documents that deal specifically with migration, starting with the regarded 
Exsul Familia Nazarethana Apostolic Constitution written by Pope Pius XII in 1952, followed by De Pastorali 
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Thus, these principles are relevant not only in the biblical context, but also shape 
and inform modern standards of human rights, including the rights of migrants. The 
final section of this Part brings together the teachings discussed under the three core 
principles to explain, through a biblical lens, how religious free exercise and state law 
may conflict.
Equality
The Old Testament instructs that “[w]hen the alien resides with you in your land, you shall 
not oppress the alien. The alien who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen among 
you.”25 Legally speaking, the same law applies to the resident alien and the native.26 The 
text calls for an equal treatment of the migrant in the law, but mere equal treatment of 
migrants in the law is not the ending point. The text goes a step further: “you shall love 
the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt.”27  Not only are laws to be 
drafted and applied in a non-discriminatory way, but people are also to love the migrant 
or alien just as they would themselves and their own. This includes, inter alia, providing 
basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter. “For the Lord your God...loves the 
strangers, providing them food and clothing.”28 It should then come as no surprise that 
doing wrong or violence to the alien is strictly forbidden.29 Indeed, the “mark of the true 
Christian” is “extend[ing] hospitality to strangers.”30 
Outside of the biblical context, equality and non-discrimination are central principles in 
a number of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1951) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). The principles of 
equality and non-discrimination appear multiple times in these documents. For instance, 
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: “All are equal before the 
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.” Article 
26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads “All persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the 
law.” Moreover, both of these UN documents provide that everyone has the right to reside 
and move freely within the borders of each country, and the right to leave any country 
(including his own), and return to his country.31  Taken together, it is difficult to imagine 
how a person can be guaranteed the right to leave any country without the reciprocal right 
25 Leviticus 19:33-34. See also Nagy, D., & Reuver, R. de (2018). Van migrant tot naaste: plaatsmaken voor jezelf. 
Utrecht: KokBoekencentrum Uitgevers, at 13.
26 Numbers 9:14; 15:15-16; Exodus 12:49; Leviticus 24:22.
27 Exodus 22:21. See also Nagy, supra Note 25, at 14. See also Nagy, supra 25
28 Deuteronomy 10:18-19. See also Deuteronomy 24:19-22 – “Leave sheaf, olives, grapes for the alien.” See also 
26:11 – “Then you, together with the Levites and the aliens who reside among you, shall celebrate with all the 
bounty that the Lord your God has given to you and your house.” See also Leviticus 19:9-10; 23:22 – “You shall 
not strip your vineyards bare.  Leave them for the poor and the alien.”
29 Jeremiah 22:3-5.
30 Romans 12:13. See also Nagy, supra Note 25, at 18-21.
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to enter another country. In a world in which unclaimed land is virtually non-existent, how 
can a person leave a country without entering another? And if a person is denied entry 
into a country, is that not unequal treatment as compared to the citizen of that country 
who has the right to enter and leave that country?32
Nonetheless, the legal reality in the United States and the European Union is different. 
The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution reads 
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States.” What “privileges and immunities” entails was expounded in, among 
others, the case of Paul v. Virginia, in which Justice Field in 1868 wrote:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each 
State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages 
resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the 
disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against 
them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and 
egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by 
the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the 
pursuit of happiness.33
The privileges and immunities clause has been examined by courts in cases where a 
state’s authorities are either 1) discriminating against citizens of other states with respect 
to fundamental rights, or 2) discriminating against citizens of other states with respect to 
important economic activities, usually relating to employment and the ability to earn a 
livelihood. Important to note here is that the clause’s protections do not extend to non-
citizens (or legal residents) of the United States. Similar limitations apply in the European 
Union context.
Citizens of member states of the European Union enjoy similar rights when moving around 
other member states of the EU. Title IV of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) deals with the free movement of persons, services and capital. Article 45 
TFEU deals specifically with the free movement of workers, declaring that “Freedom of 
movement for workers shall be secured within the Union.” Even more broadly, Articles 
20 and 21 TFEU ensure free movement and residence within any member state for 
every Union citizen. Pursuant to Articles 46, 50, and 59 TFEU, the European Parliament 
and Council were required to pass legislation to ensure that all member states have 
implemented changes in their national laws to comport with the requirements set forth 
32  For an excellent consideration of these questions, see Spijkerboer, T. (2018). The Global Mobility 
Infrastructure: Reconceptualizing the Externalization of Migration Control. In European Journal of Migration 
and Law. Brill.
33 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868). Though this landmark case was decided about 80 years before the 
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in the TFEU. Directive 2004/38/EC34 is the EU measure currently in force to provide the 
modalities of this right. EU citizens automatically enjoy free movement rights by virtue 
of their citizenship, while family members’ access should be automatically granted by 
national authorities as long as they fulfill the relevant conditions. 
Despite the fact that the US and all EU member states have ratified the UN treaties (which, 
at the very least, call into question the extent to which states may discriminate between 
citizens and others), the reality is that both continue to curtail the rights of non-citizens 
and non-residents based on the artificial distinction they have created.
Solidarity 
The New Testament portrays Jesus as a habitual migrant. Though Jesus made Capernaum 
his home, he spent much of his time traveling with his disciples and spreading his 
teachings. In the course of these travels, he sought shelter and food from people along 
the way. Based on his experiences during his travels in the homes of various hospitable 
strangers, he set forth perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of caring for the 
stranger. He bestows the inheritance of the kingdom on those who cared for him, stating:
“…for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to 
drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you gave me clothing, 
I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me… Truly I tell you, 
just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it 
to me.”35
In his teachings, Jesus strived to break down the barrier between friend and enemy, 
urging people to love even their enemies. This effort can broadly be understood as a 
means to break down the distinction between “us and them.”36 When asked how the 
notion of a “neighbor” should be understood, Jesus replied by reference to the Good 
Samaritan. The famous parable of the Good Samaritan is a prime example of how one 
should treat even his enemies. In that exemplary story, a wandering Samaritan comes 
upon another man, an outsider, who has been robbed and badly beaten. Despite the 
likelihood that the non-Samaritan’s own people would not have welcomed the Samaritan 
in their land, the Samaritan nonetheless extended a helping hand to the stranger, caring 
for him with compassion despite the likelihood that the stranger would have considered 
him an enemy. By defining a “neighbor” in the broadest terms to include even the enemy, 
Jesus has clarified that a person’s duty to assist the stranger is difficult to qualify. Going 
perhaps a step further, Ralston argues that placing value on an individual dependent 
34 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States. The implementation date for this directive was April 29, 2006. The 
directive applies to citizens of the European Economic Area, which comprises the EU member states plus 
Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.
35 Matthew 25:35-41.
36 Nagy, supra Note 25, at 17-18.
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on that individual’s status must be avoided because neither God’s love nor mercy is 
conditional.37
The Old Testament provides insight regarding what level of solidarity is required. The 
stranger is frequently grouped with orphans and widows: “For the Lord your God… is 
not partial and takes no bribe, executes justice for the orphan and the widow, loves the 
strangers, providing them food and clothing.”38  There is an implicit recognition that there 
are fundamental similarities that the stranger shares with the orphan and the widow that 
make it appropriate for grouping them together. Just as the orphan and widow are often 
left without financial means, companionship, and support, so too is the migrant who 
finds himself in a foreign land, unaccompanied, and often without a means to obtain 
financial resources on his own. Sharing similar vulnerabilities, it follows logically that the 
stranger be afforded the same level and type of solidarity as these two other groups of 
people. And this is not just spiritual solidarity; this is solidarity with respect to physical 
needs, including food, water, clothing, and so on.
The story of Jesus’ life and that of the Good Samaritan serve as confirmations that the 
instructions given in the Old Testament regarding migrants, whose plight is sufficiently 
recognized and appreciated to justify their grouping with other vulnerable cohorts such 
as orphans and widows, are still valid. Solidarity is the core principle underlying both the 
story of Jesus’ life and the parable of the Good Samaritan, and the instructions regarding 
widows, orphans, and strangers clarify the type of solidarity that is called for. 
Liberty
With respect to the migrant, the concept of liberty manifests itself in two principal ways. 
The first manifestation is freedom from oppression, an idea closely linked to the liberation 
theology, which is discussed in Chapter 2. The instruction to refrain from oppressing 
vulnerable populations is very explicit: 
“Don’t oppress the widow, the stranger, the orphan, and the poor; don’t plan evil 
against each other!”39
The second manifestation is the person’s physical freedom of movement, and can be 
succinctly illustrated by reference to the story of Christianity’s namesake migrant, Jesus. 
According to the Gospel of Luke, Joseph and Mary traveled to Bethlehem to register 
 
 
37 Id. at 20.
38 Deuteronomy 10:17-19; see also Deuteronomy 14:19 – “The Levite, because he has no portion of inheritance 
among you, and the alien, the orphan and the widow who are in your town, shall come and eat and be 
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pursuant to a census ordered by Caesar Augustus.40 Tradition has it that Jesus Christ was 
born in a stable or a manger, similar to contemporary migrants’ children who are born 
today along the road, during the trip, to a new destination.  But Jesus’ stay in Bethlehem 
was short-lived, no longer than two years. According to the Gospel of Matthew, when 
Jesus was about two years old, an angel appeared in one of Joseph’s dreams instructing 
him to take the family to Egypt to avoid persecution by Herod.41 Thus, Jesus, Mary, and 
Joseph fled to Egypt and essentially became asylum seekers there. Following Herod’s 
death, the family returned to their native land, settling in Nazareth. Still, this was not 
Jesus’ last move; he would spend the rest of his life traveling and spreading his teachings, 
with help from people, often strangers, whom he would meet along the way. Though 
Jesus’ migrations were not always the result of his own volition, the point remains that 
he and his family were able to, for instance, seek asylum in Egypt when the authorities 
persecuted them in their native land.
Hoffmeier’s Argument
As mentioned earlier, there is minority literature arguing that in interpreting and applying 
biblical text regarding the migrant, one must pay attention to the word used for the 
migrant. Hoffmeier argues that there is a major distinction between two words used for 
the migrant: ger and nekhar. Ger, he argues, is used to refer to a person who entered 
Israel with permission and followed the legal procedures to become a “resident alien.”42 
However, this interpretation is contested. Carroll argues that “there is no way to know 
if there were formal procedures that they had to go through to be accepted as a [ger], 
or whether their integration into the community simply was part of a natural process 
over time.”43 In other words, Carroll argues that Hoffmeier’s interpretation assumes too 
much: there is little historical foundation for the view that there were standardized legal 
procedures for becoming a ger.
The term nekhar, according to Hoffmeier, did not refer to a resident alien but rather to 
other groups of people, including invading enemies, squatters, temporary workers, and 
those passing through the territory.44 In essence, Hoffmeier hints that undocumented or 
unauthorized migrants are more like nekhar than ger and therefore do not enjoy the same 
protections as the ger. However even those designated as nekhar were protected by the 
law, though they may have been excluded from religious practices.
40 According to Luke 2:1-7, Caesar Augustus issued a census to ensure that the Roman Empire was correctly 
collecting taxes. In Palestine, this census required registration in one’s tribal town. For Joseph, this town was 
Bethlehem, as he belonged to the House of David, which had its origins there.
41 Matthew 2:13-15.
42 Hoffmeier, J.K. (2009). The Immigration Crisis: Immigrants, Aliens and the Bible. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 
at 52.
43 Carroll, M.D. (2010). Immigration and the Bible. Retrieved from https://www.mennonitemission.net/resources/
publications/MissioDei/6/Immigation and the Bible, at 4.
44 Hoffmeier, supra Note 42, at 51.
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Church Asylum
In addition to the foregoing, there is a biblical basis for church asylum in the Old 
Testament. Exodus 21:13 provides for a place of temporary refuge for a person who has 
killed another if the killing was not premeditated.45 Contemporary commentary on this 
passage posits that such a place of temporary refuge was necessary in a time when it was 
commonplace (and indeed expected) that the next of kin of the victim avenge the victim’s 
death.46 The goal was to ensure a fair procedure for the accused.
The Potential Conflict
Tensions may arise when a country enacts a law that outright prohibits, or at the very least 
calls into question the legality of, obeying the above instructions in practice. The question 
then becomes: “do I follow my faith, or do I follow my state?” There is biblical guidance on 
the topic of the relationship between the person and the country’s authorities. Romans 
13 – “Submission to Governing Authorities”, states, in relevant part:
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: 
the powers that be are ordained by God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, 
resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves 
damnation.47
But what if following Romans 13 and obeying the country’s authorities nullifies the 
instructions contained in other parts of the Christian biblical canon? Could this 
nullification of other biblical teachings truly have been the intent of Romans 13, or was 
this nullification an unforeseen or unforeseeable consequence?
The flexibility of this text is debatable: is it absolute or qualifiable? One can argue that the 
text is clear and contains no exceptions and therefore must be read literally and absolutely. 
One can also take a more liberal approach and posit that a certain level of deviance from 
the text should be permissible. This approach can find support in historical examples, 
most notably the capture and execution of millions of people during the Second World 
War. One could argue that any governing authority aimed at the systematic execution of 
millions of people could not have been ordained as the will of God, as it goes against the 
entirety of Christianity’s moral code. And assuming civil disobedience is permitted, the 
question of degree arises. Is peaceful resistance the upper limit of disobedience, or are 
there exceptional situations in which a stronger form of resistance is justifiable?  
45 “And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand; then I will appoint you a place where he shall 
flee.”
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The stronger argument is that a certain level of civil disobedience is permissible. It seems 
unlikely that Paul could have predicted the atrocities of World War II as he formulated the 
text of Romans. It seems even more unlikely that he would have intended the command 
of submitting to authorities to extend to the Nazi and Fascist powers during the war, as 
they mercilessly murdered millions of people. After all, this is forbidden by the very first 
of the Ten Commandments. Regardless of which side has the stronger argument, the 
reality is that national and supranational courts in the United States and Europe do not 
have jurisdiction to interpret religious doctrine. The critical difference between religious 
laws and state laws is that only the latter lends itself to further legislative and judicial 
remedies, including amending the law and adjudicating cases. By contrast, the former 
situation that presents issues of biblical interpretation does not lend itself to resolution 
by amendment by lawmakers or adjudication by a state court. Nonetheless, state courts 
are called upon to resolve issues stemming from people informed by their religious 
beliefs. Thus, the courts are called upon to opine on the applicability of biblical texts, 
albeit indirectly.48 However, before courts get involved in the process, the faithful reach 
decisions with the resources that they have, and act accordingly.
Of course, Romans 13 is not prima facie incompatible with other biblical passages: a 
potential conflict does not arise unless governing authorities enact and enforce a law or 
practice that is (arguably) incompatible with the instructions contained in Matthew 2549, 
among others.50 If government authorities do enact and enforce such incompatible laws 
and practices, then a person of faith may have to make a decision between following 
Romans 13, or obeying other biblical instructions in defiance of the governing authorities. 
In other words, in obeying Romans 13 (and therefore also governing authorities), 
the person does not have to worry about sanctions by the state. However, he may be 
conflicted about not giving credence to other biblical instructions. On the other hand, by 
obeying Matthew 25 or other (possibly incompatible) instructions, the person now has 
to worry about sanctions by the state. In other words, it can be a question of whether to 
submit to governing authorities, or obey the instruction to love the stranger.
This scriptural discussion has only begun to scratch the surface of the divergence among 
Christians vis-à-vis migration. Perhaps a part of the divergence can be explained through 
varying interpretations of scripture, but there must be other considerations relevant 
to the position-taking process. Part One examines how faith-based organizations in 
both countries have responded to the presence of unauthorized stayers with the goal 
of uncovering and explaining the considerations relevant to faith-based organizations’ 
decisions to assist unauthorized stayers. Chapter 2 examines the American case, Chapter 
3 examines the Dutch case, and Chapter 4 compares and analyzes the American and 
Dutch cases. Chapter 4 also analyzes the impact of FBOs’ efforts on broader notions of 
church-state relations. 
48 Judicial resolution is addressed in later chapters.
49 For the relevant text of Matthew 25, see discussion on “Solidarity” above.
50 Just before the instructions in Romans 13, Romans 12:13 calls for the extension of hospitality to strangers.
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2.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
This chapter deals with Christian faith-based organizations’ assistance to unauthorized 
stayers in the United States. Though faith-based organizations have been, and continue 
to be, involved in various debates on the topic of immigration, their positions have been 
far from consistent. The central question that this chapter addresses is the following: 
what are the motivations and limitations that explain why faith-based organizations 
assist unauthorized stayers?
In deciding whether to assist unauthorized stayers, faith-based organizations are 
influenced by a number of motivations, which are considered alongside a number of 
limitations. In the American context, I identify three motivations and two limitations that 
inform a faith-based organization’s decision to assist unauthorized stayers. The three 
motivations are founded in scripture, government accountability, and confrontation. 
The two limitations are resources and organizational structure. These are defined 
and discussed later in this chapter. First, it is useful to understand the origins and 
development of church asylum in the United States. Church asylum in the United States, 
on a large scale, began with the Sanctuary Movement in the early 1980s.
The origins of the Sanctuary Movement can be traced back to the early 1980s when the 
United States began to experience an inflow of Central American asylum seekers, primarily 
from Guatemala and El Salvador, fleeing civil conflict. The movement was a response to 
restrictive immigration policies that made it nearly impossible for Central Americans to 
successfully claim asylum in the United States.51 As the Central American wave of asylum 
seekers stabilized and decreased, the fervor of Sanctuary Movement also diminished.  It 
was not until the prospect of a new administration hell-bent on deporting unauthorized 
stayers that the United States began to see a renewal of the Sanctuary Movement. This 
administration was that of Donald Trump. Between the 2016 United States Presidential 
Election and the end of 2018, the number of churches that have expressed willingness 
to function as sanctuaries increased from about 400 to over 1100.52  Broadly speaking, 
sanctuary churches are those that have taken the position that they will in some capacity 
protect unauthorized stayers who have sought refuge from deportation by federal 
immigration authorities. 1100 churches represent only a small fraction of a percentage 
point of all of the churches in the United States, but their visibility is substantial, and 
numerous churches have taken a position on whether sanctuary policies are appropriate 
and desirable.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss church asylum in the US through the lens 
of the Sanctuary Movement. I focus on its development from its inception in 1981 until 
51 Rabben, L. (2016). Sanctuary and asylum: a social and political history. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press. See also Cunningham, H. (1995). God and Caesar at the Rio Grande: sanctuary and the politics of 
religion. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, at 131.
52 Sanctuary in the Age of Trump. Church World Service. Retrieved from https://www.sanctuarynotdeportation.
org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary_in_the_age_of_trump_january_2018.pdf
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the end of 2018. From there, I briefly describe the organizations interviewed, and then 
discuss the results of the interviews. The bulk of this section deals with the results of 
the interviews, which shed light on motivations and limitations that appear to influence 
faith-based organizations’ decisions to assist unauthorized stayers. 
2.2 | Church Asylum in the United States
2.2.1 | Events Leading to the Birth of the Sanctuary Movement
In the 1980s, the United States experienced the largest inflow of asylum seekers since 
the World War II era. This time, the majority of those seeking asylum were people 
fleeing from civil wars in the Central American countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua.53 The United States, under the leadership of the ardently anti-communist 
Republican President Ronald Reagan, was heavily involved in the overthrow of socialist 
and communist regimes in Central America. For instance, in Nicaragua, the United States 
provided training and funding to military groups to overthrow the controlling socialist 
party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front.54 In El Salvador, the United States 
provided similar support to military groups fighting against the left-wing Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front. The US-backed military groups aimed at overthrowing leftist 
political groups were known for their brutality, which included torture, murder, and forced 
military conscription.55 
News of these atrocities began to reach the public in the southwest United States in a 
personal way as asylum seekers crossed the border and told their stories. In addition 
to stories of the brutalities experienced in their home countries, conditions during the 
journey north were often horrendous. One particularly harrowing incident occurred 
near the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in southern Arizona in July 1980, when 
more than 30 Salvadorans were found in the scorching desert on their way to the United 
States.56 Ultimately, thirteen died from the effects of hyperthermia, and the rest were 
transported to detention facilities.57 This incident, among others, was a major catalyst 
that led certain people of faith and conscience to begin organizing a response to assist 
people fleeing Central America, despite the US government’s policy against granting 
asylum.58 They did so because of, and despite, the US government’s position that these 
 
53 Lehoucq, F. E. (2012). The politics of modern Central America: civil war, democratization, and 
underdevelopment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
54 Rose, A. (2012). Showdown in the Sonoran Desert religion, law, and the immigration controversy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, at 26.
55 Id. 




58 Rose, supra Note 54, at 26.
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people did not qualify for asylum because they had allegedly fought in the wars they were 
fleeing from.59 The clergy and parishioners in Tucson argued that returning the survivors 
of the Organ Pipe Cactus incident, among others, to El Salvador would be a breach of 
their human rights because they are protected under both international law (the 1951 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol) and domestic law (Refugee Act of 1980).60
2.2.2 | The Birth of the Sanctuary Movement
The birth of the Sanctuary Movement can be traced back to shortly after the Organ Pipe 
Cactus incident. Reverend John Fife and rancher Jim Corbett brought together clergy 
groups from the Tucson area to form the Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force on Central 
America (TECTF).61 The Task Force’s initial assistance involved helping the asylum seekers 
get released from detention.62 Then, the focus shifted to providing legal assistance to 
asylum seekers, assisting them with preparation of the applications submitted to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and accompanying them to deportation 
hearings.63 These actions were lawful and thus did not garner much controversy. It was 
not until the members of the Task Force decided to provide shelter to asylum seekers in 
churches and homes that the federal government began to intervene.64
Members of the TECTF drew their inspiration from Liberation Theology, a theological 
movement focused on helping the oppressed, and from the Underground Railroad, a 
network of shelters designed to smuggle slaves to freedom before and during the United 
States Civil War.65 One critical difference between the Underground Railroad and the 
Sanctuary Movement, however, is that the latter’s participants were openly practicing 
civil disobedience, rather than engaging in a clandestine operation. This open and vocal 
civil disobedience is seen in the March 23, 1982 letter that Reverend Fife wrote to the 
United States attorney general66 notifying him of the Southside United Presbyterian 
Church’s intentions:
59 Under the UNHCR Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1, Section F(A), a person 
who has “committed a crime against peace, a ware crime, or crime against humanity” cannot be a refugee. 
The United States routinely used this argument to deny asylum to asylum seekers from Central America. The 
statistics illustrate this tendency: in 1984, only 2.45 percent of Salvadoran asylum applicants and 0.39 percent 
of Guatemalan asylum applicants received asylum. Rabben at p.131.
60 Rose, supra Note 54, at 26.
61 Id. at 28.
62 Campbell, K.M. (2017), Operation Sojourner: The Government Infiltration of the Sanctuary Movement in the 




66  The United States attorney general is the head of the Department of Justice. The attorney general is the 
government’s top lawyer. He or she is also a member of the Cabinet of the United States. The Cabinet is a part 
of the federal executive branch, and is composed of the president, vice president, state secretary, and various 
other heads of the executive branch’s departments. The attorney general is a central figure in Part Two of this 
book in the context of the sanctuary jurisdiction litigation. 
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We are writing to inform you that Southside United Presbyterian Church will publicly 
violate the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 274(A)… We take this action 
because we believe the current policy and practice of the United States Government 
with regard to Central American refugees is illegal and immoral… The current 
administration of United States law prohibits us from sheltering refugees from Central 
America. Therefore, we believe the administration of the law is immoral as well as 
illegal… Until such time [deportations are stopped], we will not cease to extend the 
sanctuary of the church to undocumented people from Central America. Obedience to 
God requires this of us all.67
In July of 1982, the TECTF approached the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America 
(CRTF)68 about becoming a national coordinator for the Sanctuary Movement.69 That same 
month, the CRTF convinced the Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ (WAUCC) in 
Chicago to become the second sanctuary church in the United States. Following the 
example of the Southside United Presbyterian Church, it too decided to practice open 
and vocal civil disobedience. On July 18, 1982, leaders of the church sent a letter to the 
attorney general notifying him of their intentions. The relevant portion is reproduced 
below:
Dear Sir: We are writing to inform you that today our congregation voted to declare our 
church as a sanctuary for undocumented refugees from El Salvador. On Saturday, July 
24, we will openly receive a refugee family into the care and protection of the church. 
We realize in so doing that we will be in violation of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act Section 274(A). 
This action, which we take after months of prayer and deliberation, reflects our belief 
that the current policy and practice of the United States Government with regard to 
Central American refugees is illegal and immoral. We believe our government is in 
violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and International Law by continuing to arrest, detain 
and forcibly return refugees to the terror, persecution, and murder in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. 
Our Faith calls us to provide sanctuary to those fleeing from this torture and 
persecution. We ask you to do all within your power to bring justice to these desperate 
people. Grant these refugees Extended Voluntary Departure status and stop the 
current atrocious deportation proceedings that returns these people to death and 
government retribution. 
We pray that you will bring the power of your office to address this most desperate 
need.
67 Rose, supra Note 54, at 29.
68 The CRTF was a coalition of religious and social-action groups formed in response to the murder of American 
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As the Sanctuary Movement gained momentum and more churches began offering 
sanctuary, a rift grew between the TECTF and CRTF on ideological grounds. The main 
area of contention was due to the divergent views on the concept of civil disobedience.70 
The Tucson group began to classify its actions as “civil initiative” rather than civil 
disobedience.71 Civil disobedience is commonly understood as willful violation of the 
law. However, the TECTF argued that its efforts were effectively upholding international 
treaties, while the United States government was the one violating the law.72 Some 
members of the Chicago group did not find the “civil initiative” appealing, and felt that 
only civil disobedience could make a powerful enough political statement.73 A second 
area of contention stemmed from the two groups’ disagreement regarding who ought 
to be helped. The Chicago group argued that only those fleeing right-wing violence and 
repression should be helped, while the Tucson group did not wish to exclude anyone from 
sanctuary.74 However, whether classified as “disobedience” or “initiative”, the Sanctuary 
Movement did not evade a governmental response.
2.2.3 | The Government’s Response to the Sanctuary Movement
The letters and actions of churches were ultimately successful in getting the government’s 
attention. In December of 1983, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) partnered up 
with the INS to infiltrate the activities of those involved in the Sanctuary Movement, and 
in particular those who had been sheltering unauthorized stayers.75 The Southside United 
Presbyterian Church in Tucson and the Arizona Lutheran Church in Phoenix were prime 
targets of the Operation Sojourner investigation.76 However, the first indictments related 
to assisting unauthorized stayers occurred outside of Operation Sojourner.
In February of 1984, Stacey Lynn Merkt, a Methodist refugee worker for Casa Romero (a 
hospitality house for Central Americans), Dianne Muhlenkamp, a Catholic sister, a reporter 
for the Dallas Times Herald, and two Salvadorans were stopped by U.S. Border Patrol in 
Texas.77 Muhlenkamp pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge and was released with one 
year probation, while Merkt was indicted and convicted in May of 1984 on three felony 
charges: two of aiding and abetting the unlawful transportation of undocumented aliens, 
and one of conspiracy to transport undocumented aliens.78 In June, she was sentenced 
to ninety days in custody, but the court suspended execution of her sentence and placed 
her on supervised probation for two years.79 Merkt appealed to the United States Court of 





75 Campbell, supra Note 62, at 479-80.
76 Id. at 481.
77 Cunningham, supra Note 51, at 43; U.S. v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 1985).
78 Cunningham, supra Note 51, at 43.
79 U.S. v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit80, which would reverse and set aside the convictions on June 
18, 1985.81 However, before that occurred, she was arrested in December of 1984 while 
transporting Salvadorans.82 This time, she was convicted on one count of conspiracy 
and was sentenced to an eighteen-month prison term and three years’ probation.83 She 
appealed again, but this time to no avail.84 She was the first person in the United States 
to be imprisoned for her work with undocumented Central Americans.85
I return now to December of 1983 when Operation Sojourner began. Operation Sojourner 
was a ten-month program during which the FBI and INS recruited individuals to pose 
as Sanctuary Movement sympathizers with the purpose of gathering evidence against 
sanctuary workers to build a case for what the government purportedly believed to be an 
alien-smuggling conspiracy.86 The evidence gathered in this ten-month period ultimately 
culminated in a grand jury indictment of sixteen individuals–including Reverend Fife 
and Jim Corbett—in January of 1985.87 Collectively, these individuals were charged with 
seventy-one criminal charges under 8 USC § 1324, which deals with the harboring and 
transporting of aliens.88 The case that followed the indictments was captioned United 
States v. Aguilar.89
The sixteen people who stood trial in the Aguilar case ranged from the Sanctuary 
Movement leadership to occasional volunteers.90 To a considerable degree, the outcome 
of the case was predictable from the outset, when United States District Judge Earl H. 
Carroll ruled in favor of the majority of the prosecutor’s pretrial motions to bar evidence. 
The judge barred evidence related to 
1) international law, 
2) persecution suffered by asylum seekers in their home countries, 
3)  comparative statistics of asylum policies for aliens from communist countries or those 
undergoing communist or socialist revolutions, 
80 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is one of thirteen federal appellate courts in the United 
States. It has jurisdiction to hear appeals from federal district court (trial court) cases that originate in Texas, 
Louisiana and Mississippi.
81 Id. at 275.
82 Cunningham, supra Note 51, at 43.
83 Id. 
84 U.S. v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986). The opinion I cite here is usually referred to in the literature as Merkt 
II because the first federal appellate opinion was published in 1985 (and referred to as Merkt). The 1985 Merkt 
opinion did not deal with religious free exercise. Merkt II, however, did deal with religious free exercise and is 
discussed further in Section 8.4.1.
85 Cunningham, supra Note 51, at 43.
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 482.
88 Id. 
89 U.S. v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
90 Campbell, supra Note 62, at 484.
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4)  comparative statistics related to Central American aliens who had applied for or been 
granted asylum under the Refugee Act of 1980, 
5) and religious convictions.91 
As a result, defendants were left with few options regarding viable defenses. Defendants 
moved for dismissal on the grounds that the government had violated their First 
Amendment92 rights and their Fifth Amendment93 rights related to due process, but were 
ultimately not successful.94 On May 1, 1986, the jury convicted nearly every defendant 
of alien smuggling, conspiracy, and harboring.95 Ultimately, Judge Carroll sentenced the 
convicted defendants with suspended sentences of three to five years with probation.96 
Some have argued that the judge’s decision to issue suspended sentences was partly the 
product of public perception that the Aguilar prosecutions were selective prosecutions 
and political in nature, and the countless letters she received from the public pleading 
for mercy.97
There appears to be a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to imprison people who 
help others without a material gain. None of the Aguilar defendants actually served time 
in prison. And, while Stacey Merkt did eventually serve a prison sentence, it was after 
she had already been convicted of arguably similar conduct and received a suspended 
sentence and a reversal by the appellate court. In other words, perhaps the court felt 
it was appropriate to impose a prison sentence now that Merkt had been sufficiently 
warned to refrain from such conduct.
The fervor of the Sanctuary Movement began to diminish in the early 1990s for a number 
of reasons. For one, 1990 and 1992 saw the end of the civil wars in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. Thus, the number of asylum seekers from Central America to the United States 
began to decrease. 
91 Id. 
92  The First Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
93  The Fifth Amendment reads: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” In simple terms: in a criminal case, it guarantees 
the right to a grand jury, prohibits double jeopardy, and protects against self-incrimination. It also guarantees 
due process generally.
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 486.
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 487.
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Second, the ABC case resulted in a settlement agreement granting hundreds of thousands 
of Salvadorans and Guatemalans Temporary Protected Status, the possibility to reapply 
for asylum, deportation stays, and work authorizations.98 The case was filed in 1985 as a 
class action lawsuit by faith-based organizations and human rights organizations against 
various federal governmental entities, including the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the United States Department of 
State. There were two groups of plaintiffs in the case: faith-based organizations suing on 
their own behalf and on behalf of their members, and Central American refugee service 
organizations also suing on their own behalf and on behalf of Central American asylum 
seekers.99 Each brought independent and distinct causes of action.100 The FBOs argued that 
the federal government’s prosecutions of FBOs’ members who assisted Central American 
asylum seekers violated the members’ free exercise of religion rights.101 The court did 
not rule on the merits of their claims, but did find that they had standing to bring these 
claims.102 On the other hand, the court ruled that the refugee service organizations did not 
have standing to sue because they themselves had not suffered harm, and they cannot 
bring claims on behalf of third parties (Central American asylum seekers) not party to the 
litigation.103 The next major decision in the case came in 1989 in which the court dismissed 
many of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, but retained some, including those of two asylum 
seekers.104 The case continued until 1991 when the settlement agreement was reached.
Third, by the late 1980s, public support for President Reagan had diminished due to his 
continued support for murderous right-wing regimes in Central America along with the 
Iran-Contra Affair in 1987.105 The incoming George H.W. Bush administration began to step 
away from overt involvement in the politics in Central America.106
By the end of the 1980s, it is estimated that about 70,000 people in 34 states were involved 
in perpetuating the Sanctuary Movement’s ideals in some capacity.107 While it is difficult 
to pinpoint the exact number of people they helped, due largely to the clandestine nature 
of the help, the number is likely in the hundreds of thousands. According to a prominent 
figure of the Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona, that church alone aided 
between 13,000 and 15,000 people. He stated that the numbers for another border church 
in Brownsville, Texas were “even higher”. Due to the developments discussed above, the 
Sanctuary Movement diminished and would lie relatively dormant until the mid-2000s.108
98 American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F.Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
99 American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 666 F.Supp. 1358, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
100  Id.
101  Id.
102  Id. at 1361-1366.
103  Id. at 1367.
104  American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
105 Rabben, supra Note 51, at 145.
106 Id. 
107  Cortés, C.E. (2013). Multicultural America: A Multimedia Encyclopedia. Los Angeles: SAGE, p. 1865.
108 From about 2000 to 2007 and onward, humanitarian groups have been leaving water, food, and clothing in 
places in the Sonoran Desert where migrants were traveling to assist them with the harsh desert climate. 
Actions like these led to the 2020 decision in Hoffman, discussed in Chapter 8.
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2.2.4 | The Situation Today
In 2007, the so-called the New Sanctuary Movement began receiving media coverage.109 
This new movement “…has been less about physical sanctuary than about providing a 
new means of telling the story of the human costs of current US deportation policy…. 
Participating churches believe that providing humanitarian assistance does not violate 
the law as long as it is done openly and they do not hide illegal immigrants.”110 However, 
it was not until 2014 that the “new” movement began to take a similar shape (namely, 
the offering of physical refuge) as its 1980s predecessor. In September of 2014, the New 
Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia, composed of eighteen religious congregations, 
joined other churches groups in more than a dozen cities to announce their intention to 
defy government deportation orders by providing refuge for immigrants facing imminent 
expulsion.111 This group of churches sent a letter to President Barack Obama Secretary 
of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, as well as US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) officials, notifying them that fifteen congregations around the country would offer 
sanctuary.112 At the time, churches in Illinois and Arizona had already been providing 
sanctuary to unauthorized stayers, as they had done in the 1980s.
In 2016, Donald Trump’s rhetoric and subsequent election marshaled faith-based 
organizations and subfederal jurisdictions into action in support of unauthorized stayers. 
This is perhaps unsurprising, given the harsh rhetoric he and his campaign employed 
on the topic of immigrants and immigration. For instance, during a debate with other 
Republican presidential candidates in February of 2016, Trump stated “We have at least 
11 million people in this country that came in illegally. They will go out.”113 In the months 
after his election in November of 2016, the number of sanctuary churches in the United 
States doubled from about 400 to 800.114 The number of sanctuary churches continues to 
grow as the Trump administration scrambles to make good on its campaign promises. The 
number of subfederal jurisdictions aligned with the cause of the Sanctuary Movement 
has also grown substantially in the last decade. This is the topic of Part Two of the study, 
and will be discussed in detail therein. For now, I focus on the efforts of faith-based 
organizations and turn to the interviews conducted for this study.
109 Rabben, supra Note 51, at 244.
110 Caminero-Santangelo, M. (2013). “The Voice of the Voiceless: Religious Rhetoric, Undocumented Immigrants 
and the New Sanctuary Movement in the United States.” In Lippert and Rehaag, eds., Sancutary Practices in 
International Perspective, at 92.
111 Rabben, supra Note 51, at 252.
112 Id. at 253.
113 Fix, T. (2019, April 29). The CNN-Telemundo Republican debate transcript, annotated. Retrieved from https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/25/the-cnntelemundo-republican-debate-transcript-
annotated/?utm_term=.798b53ad92a3.
114 Borter, G. (2017, August 1). Under Trump, more churches offer sanctuary but few seek refuge. Retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-immigration-sanctuary/under-trump-more-churches-offer-sanctuary-but-
few-seek-refuge-idUSL1N1KN0DN.
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2.3 | The Faith-Based Organizations
Before discussing the results of the interviews, it is useful to introduce faith-based 
organizations. The majority of the faith-based organizations whose representatives were 
interviewed for this research had aligned themselves with the Sanctuary Movement. 
One organization’s representative who was interviewed belonged to a church which, at 
the time of the interview, had not taken a stance on sanctuary. Brief descriptions of the 
organizations are set forth below.
Southside Presbyterian Church
In March of 1982, Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona publicly declared 
itself a sanctuary church. It was the first to do so. The Presbyterian Church is a mainline 
Protestant Christian denomination founded in 1983 as part of the Reformed tradition.  It 
is difficult, and perhaps irrelevant, to classify the Presbyterian Church as progressive or 
conservative because the church seems to promote pluralism of ideas and practices. For 
instance, while it does not condone the practice of abortion as an alternative to birth 
control, it also does not expressly forbid it, acknowledging that the choice is an “intensely 
personal” one that humans are empowered to make.115 On the topic of homosexuality, 
the church “has decided that strongly differing convictions about sexuality and faithful 
sexual relationship are granted equal standing within this denomination, honoring the 
historic principles of freedom of conscience in the interpretation of Scripture, and mutual 
forbearance. Permission is granted, but practices are not to be required.”116
The Clerics of Saint Viator (or Viatorians)
The Clerics of Saint Viator is an international Roman Catholic religious congregation 
of priests, brothers, and laypeople headquartered in Illinois.117 Their Vision Statement 
includes addressing contemporary social issues, with a particular focus on helping 
the youth.118 They embrace diversity and care for those who are “accounted of little 
importance” by certain segments of society.119 In Chicago, they work specifically with 
unaccompanied asylum seeker youth that ages out of government youth detention 
centers upon turning 18 years old. They provide a wide array of services, including 
housing and job search assistance, to such people.
115 Abortion/Reproductive Choice Issues. Retrieved from https://www.presbyterianmission.org/blog/abortion-
issues-2/. 
116 Sexuality and Same-Gender Relationships. Retrieved from https://www.presbyterianmission.org/what-we-
believe/social-issues/sexuality/.
117 Who We Are. Retrieved from http://www.viatorians.com/who-we-are. 
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The Resurrection Project (TRP)
The Resurrection Project was founded in 1990 by six Catholic churches in Chicago’s Pilsen 
neighborhood.120 Its initial mission statement included empowering community leaders 
to stand up for their rights such as clean and peaceful streets, quality education, and 
affordable housing.121 A substantial portion of TRP’s work was to rehabilitate buildings 
and convert them into affordable housing for, among others, unauthorized stayers 
residing in the Pilsen neighborhood. Over time, the role of the organization expanded, 
and just after the election of Donald Trump, TRP founded Protected by Faith. Protected by 
Faith is an ecumenical organization that lobbies on behalf of migrants’ rights. They were 
instrumental in the passage of the Illinois Trust Act in 2017, which limits state and local 
law enforcement participation in federal immigration enforcement.122 
Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTF)
The CRTF was a coalition of religious and social-action groups formed in response to 
the murder of American churchwomen in El Salvador in 1980. It was a key coordinator 
of the Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s, instrumental in persuading churches to offer 
sanctuary. For more context, see Section 2.2.2.
Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ (WAUCC)
On July 18, 1982, the WAUCC in Chicago, Illinois became the second church (after Southside 
Presbyterian Church) in the United States to declare itself a sanctuary church for migrants. 
The United Church of Christ (UCC) is a mainline Protestant Christian denomination 
founded in 1957. The UCC emphasizes both ecumenical and interfaith relations.123 The 
UCC has favored progressive views on social issues, including immigration, civil rights, 
LGBT rights, women’s rights, and abortion.124 UCC congregations are independent from 
the national UCC in matters of doctrine and ministry, and may diverge with the national 
body’s stances on theology and morals. The UCC describes itself as “an extremely 
pluralistic and diverse denomination.”125
120 Our story. Retrieved from https://resurrectionproject.org/about-us/our-story/. 
121 Id. 
122 TRUST Act. (2019, November 7). Retrieved from https://www.aclu-il.org/en/cases/trust-act.  
123 December 05, 2019 at 1:04 P. M., & December 03, 2019 at 12:00 A. M. Ecumenical and Interfaith Partners. 
Retrieved from http://www.ucc.org/ecumenical.
124 April 13, 2018 at 11:45 AM, & April 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM. (n.d.). Understanding the Issues. Retrieved April 14, 
2018, from http://www.ucc.org/justice_issues
125 Zikmund, Barbara B. Hidden Histories in the United Church of Christ – Volume I. 1987, ISBN 0-8298-0753-5. 
Web: 16 December 2009.
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Lake Street Church of Evanston
Lake Street Church is a sanctuary church located just north of Chicago in Evanston, Illinois. 
It describes itself as a “dynamic, open, inclusive” congregation of “lifelong Baptists as 
well as those who personally eschew that or any label.”126 They welcome spiritual seekers 
of all ages, racial, sexual, or religious orientations.127 One of the church’s main causes is 
welcoming the excluded and caring for the vulnerable.128 The church is a member of the 
American Baptist Churches, which is a mainline Protestant denomination.129 The central 
tenet of this denomination “strives to live out the principles of individual soul liberty130, 
local church autonomy and voluntary association with those of like and different mind.”131
City Church Chicago (CCC)
The CCC was founded by Kent Munsey and his wife Alli in 2010. In 2014, the CCC became 
a member of the Hillsong Family, a group of “like-spirited, forward thinking, kingdom-
building visionaries and ministries.”132 The CCC and the Hillsong family are contemporary 
Pentecostal churches. Pentecostalism is a form of evangelical Protestantism that 
emphasizes direct personal experience of God through baptism with the Holy Spirit. The 
CCC is not a sanctuary church.
Lincoln United Methodist Church (LUMC)
The LUMC is a sanctuary church located in Chicago’s Lower West Side neighborhood. 
It is located in an immigrant neighborhood, with over three-quarters of its population 
being Hispanic.133 The United Methodist Church (UMC) is a mainline Protestant Christian 
denomination that was created on April 23, 1968, when the Evangelical United Brethren 
Church and the Methodist Church united to form a new denomination.134 The UMC’s 
website explains the church’s position on certain social issues. The UMC is against 
assisted suicide, takes a nuanced position on abortion, and does not permit homosexual 
ministers or the use of the funds for the promotion of the acceptance of homosexuality, 
while allowing openly gay members to join the church.135 It appears to take a progressive 
stance on immigration, focusing on the welcoming of the stranger, and also appears to 
take a progressive stance on gun control.136 Thus, it cannot be said that the UMC takes an 
 
126 FAQ. Retrieved from https://lakestreet.org/about/frequently-asked-questions/. 
127 Id. 
128 Our Covenant. Retrieved from https://lakestreet.org/about/who-we-are/our-covenant/. 
129 Affiliations. Retrieved from https://lakestreet.org/about/who-we-are/affiliations/. 
130 Soul liberty is discussed later in this chapter.
131 Affiliations. Retrieved from https://lakestreet.org/about/who-we-are/affiliations/. 
132 Hillsong Family. Retrieved April 14, 2018, from https://hillsong.com/family/. 
133 MetroPulse. “Community Data Snapshot - Lower West Side”. Retrieved from https://www.cmap.illinois.gov. 
134 History United Methodist Church. Retrieved from http://www.umc.org/who-we-are/history. 
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overall progressive stance on key social issues. Rather, it appears to take a progressive 
stance on certain issues, while remaining more conservative with respect to others.
Lincoln Park Presbyterian Church (LPPC)
The LPPC in Chicago, Illinois became a sanctuary church in 2017. For more information on 
Presbyterianism, see Southside Presbyterian Church above. 
2.4 |  Motivations and Limitations Relevant to the Decision-Making 
Process
This section examines the motivations and limitations that influence faith-based 
organizations’ decisions on whether to assist unauthorized stayers. FBOs were 
motivated by various biblical passages (scripture), government accountability137, and 
confrontation138. These motivations can be viewed as the normative considerations 
concerning whether unauthorized stayers should be helped. The motivations were 
considered in conjunction with certain limitations. These included resources as well as 
considerations related to the organizational structure of the FBO. They can be viewed as 
practical considerations that weigh on the question of whether a given FBO can actually 
do what it desires to do from its normative stance. The motivations and limitations are 
discussed in detail below. The last part of this section explains the utility and importance 
of considering the motivations and limitations holistically. 
2.4.1 | Motivations
2.4.1.1 | Scripture
The manner in which FBOs’ leaders and members interpreted scripture affected their 
stances on sanctuary. I organize this section into four categories: 1) scripture relating to 
the foreigner, 2) scripture not explicitly referencing the foreigner, 3) viewpoints regarding 
Romans 13, and 4) liberation theology.
Scripture Relating to the Foreigner
Matthew 25 and its instruction to love the stranger139 was repeatedly cited by representatives 
of FBOs that have decided to assist unauthorized stayers. Representatives from the 
137 With “government accountability”, I refer to a collective sentiment felt by an FBO’s members that the 
government is not abiding by a variety of domestic and international laws, and should be held accountable for 
its actions.
138 With “confrontation”, I refer to any communication that brings the person of faith closer to the plight of 
unauthorized stayers. This includes, first-person meetings with unauthorized stayers, hearing stories about 
unauthorized stayers’ experiences, and biblical teachings retold during weekly worship services in church.
139 Matthew 25 is discussed in the Introduction to Part One.
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WAUCC cited it as a key motivation to their church’s decision to become a sanctuary 
church back in 1982. It was also cited by the representative from the LPPC who relied on it 
as a foundational and core principle relevant to any discussion on migration. Matthew 25 
tended to be the first specific passage mentioned by the FBOs’ representatives. 
In addition to Matthew 25, the theme of Exodus was referenced by multiple representatives 
of different faith-based organization. A representative of the WAUCC who was a member 
of the church in 1982 when it became a sanctuary church recalled the Exodus story as 
an inspiration to many church members when they had first considered becoming 
a sanctuary. She mentioned the exodus of Mary, Joseph, and Jesus, who traveled to 
Bethlehem for the birth of Jesus as a result of Caesar Augustus’ census decree. She and 
others at the church found this exodus experience to mirror countless stories of migrants 
traveling in search of a better life. The representative from the LPPC referenced a different 
exodus story – that of the Jewish people escaping captivity in search of freedom. 
Scripture Not Explicitly Referencing the Foreigner
Other representatives were inspired by the teachings of Jews, who in their view stood up 
for justice and had no problem with breaking the law if it meant achieving justice. In other 
words, compassion trumps the law. These representatives relied on moral theology and 
its parabolic question: if a widow is walking by a bakery and her child is starving, can she 
steal a piece of bread? The answer for proponents of this theology is a resounding “yes”. 
At least one representative extrapolated this parable to justify helping the poor as well as 
those fleeing from war, despite the government’s position that they ought not be helped.
Viewpoints Regarding Romans 13
Matthew 25 and Romans 13 were cited in conjunction by multiple FBOs’ representatives. 
One representative of the WAUCC identified Matthew 25 (loving the stranger) as a 
particularly important passage for him. He acknowledged that while at first glance, Romans 
13 (submission to governing authorities)140 may appear to conflict with Matthew 25 in certain 
situations, he offered two explanations as to why this is not the case. First, he posited that 
those arguing for a strict interpretation of Romans 13 tend to emphasize Romans 13:1-7 
while they ignore 13:8-14, and in particular 13:8. Romans 13:8 reads “Owe nothing to anyone 
except to love one another, for he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law.” This passage 
is consistent with Matthew 25’s command to love the stranger. Moreover, he argued that 
Romans 13:1-7 should be read in light of 13:8, which states that everyone who loves his 
neighbor has indeed fulfilled the law. From this we can deduce that if he has fulfilled the law, 
then he has not broken it. The second explanation is historically contextual. At the time when 
Romans was written, the political system was a dictatorship whose governing authorities 
were the emperor and his subordinates. In today’s world, he argues, the political system 
we live in is a democracy, whose governing authorities are really the people, though their 
 
140 Romans 13 is discussed in the Introduction to Part One.
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will is channeled through elected representatives. Thus, to submit to governing authority 
in today’s world is to submit to the will of the people, and if the people support helping 
unauthorized stayers with basic provisions, then Romans 13, even without 13:8, is not a 
source of tension. For this representative, the interpretation of scripture through the lens of 
liberation theology played a substantial role in his stance on sanctuary.
The representative of the LPPC also cited Romans 13 in conjunction with Matthew 25. After 
citing Matthew 25 in support of her position on sanctuary, she added that Romans 13 is 
also relevant. However, the inquiry into Romans 13 does not end with a cursory overview 
of its text. Rather, the applicability of Romans 13 must be answered by reference to the 
following question: who is deemed to be the governing authority? 
Another representative of the WAUCC argued that Romans 13 actually supported her 
ultimate decision that the church ought to provide sanctuary to unauthorized stayers. 
She stated that the United States government and its policies were responsible for 
causing the hardship and bloodshed in El Salvador, and this was the reason people were 
fleeing. Because the US government and policies caused this influx of asylum seekers, it 
was now incumbent on the US to remedy, at least in part, its wrongdoings by assisting the 
people negatively affected.
Liberation Theology
One representative of the WAUCC stated that the liberation theology he studied in 
seminary played a crucial role in shaping his view on the Sanctuary Movement. In his view, 
liberation theology is a Christian theology that focuses on liberating the oppressed. Thus, 
he became increasingly inclined to interpret scripture in a way that is consistent with 
helping marginalized groups. Liberation theology was cited as a motivation by another 
representative of the WAUCC. She mentioned that there are numerous instructions within 
the Christian biblical canon that advocated for preferential treatment of the poor. To 
her, liberation theology included freedom from any form of oppression, including that 
resulting from severe economic inequality.
Liberation theology was also at the forefront of the decision made by leaders at the LPPC. 
According one leader of the LPPC, “the overall lens is liberation, being on the side of the 
oppressed and marginalized.” 
However, not all representatives of faith-based organizations found personal inspiration 
in religious teaching. The representative from the Viatorians acknowledged that the 
Catholic church has been pro-immigrant in recent times, stating that people have the 
right to migrate, but it has simultaneously acknowledged the sovereignty of each country 
to maintain its borders unless people are suffering. In his view, many church documents 
support the work he does. However, he does not do the work he does because his faith 
tells him it is the right thing to do; he does this work because “it is the right thing to do.” 
Following up on this statement:
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Q: So how do you figure out what the right thing to do is?
A: […] I believe we all came from the same place, we’re all going back to the same 
place, and it’s up to us to help each other along the way. That’s what I believe. […] It’s 
as simple as that. If you see somebody hurting, you respond to that. You don’t walk 
away.
Despite not being personally inspired by the Catholic faith, he does use certain biblical 
passages, including Matthew 25, when speaking to people who do go to church but are 
generally hostile toward migration. He uses biblical passages in hopes that it resonates 
better with people who, at least in theory, are guided in some capacity by their faith, 
which, according to this representative, has much more grounded force than “humanistic 
mumbo jumbo.”141 In other words, he references scripture to bridge the gap among 
audiences of different political persuasions.
2.4.1.2 | Government Accountability
As the theme of civil disobedience emerged during the interviews with both representatives 
of the WAUCC, so did the idea of government accountability. Certain representatives 
felt that the faith community had a duty to step in when the government was failing to 
discharge its duty under domestic and international law and norms. The leaders and 
members of the WAUCC believed that the federal government should be held accountable 
for what they believed were infractions of domestic and international law and norms. A 
1982 letter from the church to then-Attorney General William French Smith states: “We 
believe our government is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and International Law by 
continuing to arrest, detain and forcibly return refugees to the terror, persecution and 
murder in El Salvador and Guatemala.” From this act of civil disobedience, it appears that 
the concern is not only with following what is believed to be the correct interpretation of 
relevant scripture, but also ensuring that the government abides by what is believed to be 
the correct interpretation of relevant international law.
This letter illustrates at least one church’s willingness to partially insert itself into the role 
of the judicial and legislative branches of government. Acting as a quasi-judicial body, 
the church engaged in a kind of judicial review when it found that the law and policy of 
the federal government was contrary to the Refugee Act of 1980 and other international 
law. Then, it effectively struck down the federal immigration law in favor of an approach 
it believed to be consistent with international law. After “striking down” the law on 
grounds akin to international public law, it assumed the role of a quasi-legislative body 
by re-writing the law. Of course, it did not actually re-write any laws in the legal sense: it 
adopted a policy it believed was consistent with what international public law required. 
 
141 “Humanistic mumbo jumbo” does not represent the representative’s views on humanism. This was a term that 
he used to describe the general sentiment of certain audiences toward humanism.
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The church’s willingness to insert itself into different branches of the trias politica142 is 
particularly noteworthy given the long-standing principle of separation of church and 
state.143
Not all faith-based organizations that agree with the notion that the government 
should be held accountable follow the same philosophic means to achieving this end. 
The Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, and the Tucson group of the Sanctuary 
Movement began to adopt a “civil initiative” means to holding the government 
accountable. What this meant is that rather than viewing themselves as violating the 
law under a traditional notion of civil disobedience, they were actually following the law, 
while it was the government who was in violation. The WAUCC and the Chicago group 
rejected this view, arguing that “civil initiative” does not connote a strong enough sense 
of urgency and capability to effectuate change. Nonetheless, both groups agreed that the 
government should be held accountable for its actions.
2.4.1.3 | Confrontation
The extent to which FBOs’ members and the community are confronted with unauthorized 
stayers and their stories serves as a third motivation for assisting such people. The 
confrontation could be first-hand or second-hand accounts of unauthorized stayers’ 
stories, or simply daily interactions with such people (particularly in immigrant 
communities). An example of this was observed at the Lincoln United Methodist 
Church. There, the pastor has substantial support for sanctuary and unauthorized 
stayers’ rights both within her congregation and the broader community. The church is 
located in an immigrant Hispanic community that understands the issues surrounding 
federal immigration policy of unauthorized stayers on an intimate level: members of 
the congregation and community are often unauthorized stayers themselves, or at the 
very least personally know someone who is. Moreover, when she became pastor of that 
church, there were only four families that attended church services there. That number 
has grown to over 160 families.  
With respect to FBOs located in communities with lower numbers of migrants, members’ 
exposure to immigrant stories and communities is particularly relevant with respect to 
the decision-making process. When speaking to a representative of the WAUCC about 
her initial position on sanctuary when the topic was introduced within her church in the 
early 1980s, she indicated that she was not immediately in favor. Elaborating further, 
she stated that her initial concerns regarding the budget made her very skeptical about 
the feasibility of offering shelter, food, and other supplies to families seeking refuge. 
However, as she began to meet some of the families from El Salvador and Guatemala, she 
was left asking herself the question “how can we not [help them]?” The stories she heard 
 
142 Trias politica refers to the separation of powers in a government. Typically, the division is into three branches: 
the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.
143 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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served as links between her and communities of migrants to which she had previously 
not been exposed.
A representative of the CRTF advocated for allowing DACA recipients to speak in area 
churches to audiences that include Republican politicians who are generally in favor 
of restricting immigration. However, in his experience, the churches were reluctant 
to take such an activist position publicly. The representative had no doubt that if the 
congregations heard stories from real people, especially children, affected by their (lack 
of) residence status, this exposure alone would increase pressure on politicians to 




The resources available to the faith-based organizations and their members are concerns 
voiced by every representative who was interviewed. These resources related to concerns 
over not only the faith-based organization’s financial and logistical resources, but also 
the leaders’ and members’ own livelihoods. These limitations impacted how many 
people could be helped and in what capacity. 
Financial Limitations
Taxation was a primary concern at the City Church Chicago. After speaking with CCC’s 
pastor regarding the Sanctuary Movement, he wrote a policy statement on sanctuary 
which he published within his church. When speaking with him, he did not have a clear 
answer on his or his church’s position regarding sanctuary, but the policy statement he 
released two days after the interview helped to clarify his and his church’s stance.  In 
relevant part, the policy statement reads “we shall continue to obey the laws in place 
and not do anything that may cause or jeopardize our tax-exempt non-profit status. We 
owe that much to our specific body of believers.” His position on sanctuary seemed to 
be informed and limited by the potential consequence of his church losing its favorable 
tax-exempt status.
Concerns about the budget were voiced when the WAUCC considered declaring itself a 
sanctuary in the early 1980s. There was initial resistance linked to where the funding 
would come from, but the resistance abated once leaders and members of the church 
became involved in the process of hearing stories from families seeking help. In the 
wake of the New Sanctuary Movement, the WAUCC considered whether to reaffirm 
its commitment as a sanctuary church. This time, the vote for sanctuary did not pass. 
According to an associate pastor from the WAUCC, the vote did not pass because the 
church had lost a substantial portion of its members and is therefore weaker financially, 
as its funding is primarily obtained through member contributions.
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The conditions of the employment relationship between a church leader and a church, 
to the extent one exists, are relevant with regard to the degree of liberty that leader has 
to make major decisions regarding his or her church. When the pastor of the LUMC was 
asked about whether she had disagreements with the bishop of the church regarding 
her decision to declare her church a sanctuary church, she stated that she did because 
the United Methodist Church (UMC) had not adopted such a sanctuary policy. When 
asked how she was able to make such a decision without approval from the organization, 
she stated that she felt less constrained to abide by all of the rules and policy of the 
organization because she did not receive remuneration from the UMC for her services. In 
other words, because she did not take a salary from the UMC, she did not feel as inclined 
to follow the rules and policies of the organization.  Rather than taking a salary from 
the organization, she and her church are funded by donations from the congregation. 
Through their donations, constituents of the church begin to shift the money power 
dynamic from the umbrella organization to themselves, thereby eroding the influence 
of the umbrella organization on the leader’s decision-making powers. In doing so, it is 
also not inconceivable that it now becomes the congregation rather than the organization 
which the pastor is required to “answer to.”  
Other representatives mentioned own employment concerns as an important factor in the 
decision of whether to support their church becoming a sanctuary church. For instance, 
one WAUCC representative was wary of the implications of her civil disobedience and 
potential arrest on her then-position as Director of the Early Detection Department at the 
American Cancer Society. The representative from the LPPC also understood this concern. 
She noted that while she was not in danger of losing her position as pastor at the church 
because she was very much aligned with the rest of the leadership team on the topic of 
sanctuary, she recognized that she may have a difficult time finding employment as a 
pastor elsewhere given her very progressive and sometimes controversial track record. 
She acknowledged that she had friends who played the “middle of the road” game to stay 
safe professionally, even if they may personally have been in support of sanctuary.
Logistical Limitations
Lake Street Church in Evanston and WAUCC shared similar logistical concerns when 
considering sanctuary. When the leaders of Lake Street Church were discussing the idea 
of becoming a sanctuary, the biggest concern that was voiced was physical space and 
staff. At that church, there was a sexton’s apartment in which no one had lived in some 
time, but it had been used for youth programs. Though the church had been struggling 
to maintain a viable youth program, but people still did not completely want to close the 
doors on the program. Thus, the leaders asked the youth whether they would support 
using the space for sanctuary, and they agreed. Once the youth gave their blessing, the 
leadership board and minister supported the initiative, and there was little opposition.
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2.4.2.2 | Organizational Structure
The way an FBO is organized has the capacity to limit what it can do. A high level of 
hierarchy can make it difficult for the decision-makers of an FBO to actualize what their 
motivations instruct them to do. Hierarchy in the church context is defined as “a ruling 
body of clergy organized into orders or ranks each subordinate to the one above it.”144 
While there are different levels of hierarchy, for the purposes of this analysis, it is sufficient 
to distinguish strong hierarchical structures, with well-defined vertical ranks, roles, and 
rules from weak hierarchical structures, which tend to follow a grass-roots, horizontal 
structure not bound by higher ranking authorities within the church. The leadership 
structure of some churches within the Protestant denomination falls under the horizontal 
structure. Churches with these structures are referred to as congregational churches. One 
example of such a church is the LPPC, the representative of which explained the structure 
in the following way:
Q: Is there a hierarchy in your church’s organization? 
A: No. The church operates on the basis of a leadership team that includes about 
ten elders, 60 active members, and me. This team is theologically and politically 
homogenous.
Prior to holding the January 2017 meeting with the leadership team to determine whether 
the church would become a sanctuary church, there was no prior vote or position on 
sanctuary. After the January 2017 vote, the leadership team was immediately able to 
present the results to the congregation because there was no authority to report to or 
receive permission from. Thus, the homogeneity of the leadership team, combined with 
the absence of a duty to obtain approval from higher ranking authorities, allowed this 
particular congregation to quickly and easily take a position on sanctuary. The political 
and theological homogeneity of the leadership team paved the way for a smooth transition 
for the church to become a sanctuary church because she, and a sizeable portion of her 
congregation, were fully aligned on this issue.
A low level of hierarchy was also observed with respect to the Lake Street Church, an 
American Baptist Church, in Evanston, Illinois. The central theology of the American 
Baptist Church, Soul Liberty, made it impractical and perhaps impossible to structure the 
church in a hierarchical manner with established rules, as that theology teaches that each 
individual has his own relationship to the divine, and essentially it is not the church’s (or 
pastor’s) prerogative to dictate what someone ought to believe and how someone ought 
to act.145 This theology results in a heavily lay-led church which is governed by a quasi-
democratic but informal group of people (both clergy and lay), and decisions, such as 
144 Hierarchy. 2019. In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
hierarchy. 
145 For further discussion on Soul Liberty and other principles of the Baptist tradition, see Francis Wayland, Notes 
on the Principles and Practices of Baptist Churches (New York: Sheldon, 1857).
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sanctuary in this case, are taken by a majority vote after discussion and without reference 
to higher ranking officials.
However, neither of the above examples should be interpreted as implying that a leader 
within a hierarchical as opposed to congregational structure is always going to take an 
unfavorable stance on sanctuary, or, conversely, that a leader within a congregational 
structure is always going to take a favorable position on sanctuary. The importance of 
considering organizational structure in relation to the other motivations and limitations 
discussed herein cannot be understated. Organizational structure is but one part of the 
equation, and, absent the presence of other factors, will not always dictate a particular 
result. The next section highlights the importance of considering the motivations and 
limitations holistically.
2.4.3 |  The Importance of Considering the Motivations and Limitations 
Holistically
In the American context, I have identified three motivations and two limitations that 
can provide some insight as to why a faith-based organization takes or does not take a 
favorable position on sanctuary and assisting unauthorized stayers. However, as briefly 
mentioned above, these motivations and limitations should not be considered in a 
vacuum; they should be considered in relation to each other. There is no precise formula 
as to which motivation or limitation carries more weight with respect to predicting the 
stance an FBO will take, but generally, the strength and predictive value of one motivation 
or limitation depends on the presence and strength of another motivation or limitation. 
For instance, in the case of the LUMC, the existence of a high level of hierarchy, standing 
alone, could be expected to result in its pastor taking a position consistent with the 
bishop. However, this was not the case because another motivation and limitation 
weighed in the pastor’s favor. First, she had significant support from her congregation 
and community, both of which had experienced the plight of unauthorized stayers first 
hand. Second, because the pastor did not rely on a salary from the UMC (the receipt of 
which would have been conditional on the pastor’s acquiescence to the bishop’s stance), 
she was not limited by that organizational structure and therefore had more liberty to 
make a decision that is contrary to what the hierarchy demanded. The ultimate decision 
was a product of the interaction of different motivations and limitations.
Another clear example of this interdependence can be seen with respect to one 
representative of the WAUCC. On the one hand, she was initially reluctant to support 
the church becoming a sanctuary church because of both logistical concerns, including 
budget and physical space, as well as personal concerns, including the potential impact 
her willful disobedience of the law could have on her job with the American Cancer 
Society. On the other hand, as she met families and heard their stories, and began to 
consider how people in these circumstances should be treated according to scripture 
from the lens of liberation theology, she ultimately decided that helping these families 
was warranted. In the end, her decision came down to a balancing act. It appears that 
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situations in which only one motivation or one limitation is relevant in the decision-
making process are uncommon.
To complicate matters further, an FBO’s concerns over one limitation may impact how 
it interprets multiple motivations. An example of this situation will clarify what I mean. 
In the case of the CCC, its concern that it may lose tax-exempt status if it becomes a 
sanctuary church may have impacted how it interpreted relevant biblical passages. 
It relied on Romans 13 (submission to governing authorities) to arrive at the decision 
that it will not become a sanctuary church because that would be against the law. If it 
was not concerned with losing funding, then perhaps it would have focused on other 
biblical passages in conjunction with Romans 13. But perhaps it was only looking for a 
biblical justification to reach its desired end. Thus, it appears that the existence of certain 
limitations can impact how certain motivations are ultimately interpreted and applied.
2.5 | Conclusions
In the Introduction to Part One, I pointed to the inconsistent positions vis-à-vis migration 
taken by various Christian leaders. Curiously, though they were all followers of the 
same faith, based on the same religious texts, they took vastly divergent positions on, 
in particular, irregular migrants and irregular migration. The initial assumption was that 
an examination into how these leaders interpret scripture, and what they rely on most 
heavily, would be the critical factor that could help explain the discrepancies. However, 
the results of the interviews with representatives of various Christian faith-based 
organizations quickly began to chip away at this assumption.
Scripture did not appear to play as critical or clear a role as one may expect from faith-
based organizations and people of faith. Though some reference to scripture did surface 
in nearly every interview, it did not always emerge unprompted. That is, it was not until 
the representative was specifically asked about whether he or she was motivated by 
biblical passages that this came up. Even then, in some instances there were only vague 
references to a general message of love that pervades the Christian biblical canon. 
One representative even admitted that scripture itself was not particularly influential 
in his work with assisting people. However, he did use scripture when speaking to 
certain conservative religious audiences in an attempt to find common ground. A 
similar approach was employed by another FBO’s leaders who ultimately decided 
against providing sanctuary. For instance, it is possible that the pastor of the CCC was 
primarily concerned with maintaining his church’s tax-exempt status. To justify that end 
to his congregation, he emphasized and gave substantial credence to Romans 13, while 
ignoring other instructions found elsewhere in the Christian biblical canon. It seems that 
in some circumstances, scripture was thus used as a means to reach a predetermined 
end – an end determined by personal convictions which may or may not be grounded in 
religion or religious teaching.
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While scripture is undoubtedly a motivation for faith-based organizations, two other 
motivations emerged as important additional normative considerations. The first is the 
conviction that the government must be held accountable for its actions, particularly 
when it offends domestic and international law and norms. Some FBOs pursued this 
end through traditional civil disobedience, while others took a more nuanced approach: 
civil initiative. The second motivation is confrontation. This refers to FBOs’ confrontation 
with first- and second-hand accounts of unauthorized stayers’ stories, as well as their 
interaction with such people within their communities. The closer FBOs’ members were 
brought to these stories and people, the stronger this motivation became. 
FBOs are limited in what they can do by two major practical considerations. The first 
limitation is the amount of resources – both financial and logistical – that a given FBO 
has to spend on this cause. Concerns about FBOs’ members jobs were also voiced when 
FBOs were deciding whether to assist unauthorized stayers. That is, members were 
worried about keeping their jobs should their employer find out that their congregation 
is engaging in potentially unlawful conduct. The second major limitation arose from the 
organizational structure. FBOs that were part of a hierarchical structure were often under 
considerable pressure to abide by the rules coming from the higher-ranking officials. 
FBOs that were organized horizontally were generally more easily and quickly able to 
implement new policies generally.
To begin to understand why faith-based organizations become involved in assisting 
unauthorized stayers, these motivations and limitations must be considered together. 
Failing to consider one motivation in conjunction with other motivations and limitations 
would paint an incomplete, and likely inaccurate, picture. Limitations also have the ability 
to alter how a given motivation is interpreted, or how much weight it is given. Sometimes 
a limitation is so outcome-determinative that an FBO’s leader interprets the motivational 
sources in a different way that allows him or her to both give credence to the limitation, 
and to appease the members of the FBO.   
The motivations discussed in this chapter also give clues as to when faith-based 
organizations become involved in this type of work. For instance, the desire to hold the 
government accountable usually arises at times when the government is behaving in a 
way that is perceived as unlawful or immoral. Similarly, confrontation with unauthorized 
stayers, and in particular rejected asylum seekers, also usually comes at times of 
political turmoil when governmental conduct is questioned and scrutinized. The threat of, 
or actual infringement of, fundamental rights such as safety, food, shelter, and hygiene 
is usually a reliable indicator of when FBOs become involved in this type of work. This is 
discussed in Chapter 8.
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3.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
This chapter deals with the topic of Christian faith-based organizations’ assistance to 
unauthorized stayers in the Netherlands. More specifically, it addresses the following 
research question: what are the motivations and limitations that explain why faith-based 
organizations assist unauthorized stayers?
In deciding whether to assist unauthorized stayers, faith-based organizations are 
influenced by a number of motivations, which are considered alongside a number of 
limitations. In the Dutch context, I identify three motivations and three limitations that 
inform a faith-based organization’s decision to assist unauthorized stayers. The three 
motivations are founded in scripture, government accountability, and confrontation. The 
three limitations are resources, organizational structure, and the unauthorized stayer’s 
religious conviction. These are defined and discussed later in this chapter. Before delving 
into these, some background information on FBOs in the Netherlands, immigration law, 
church asylum, and the government is useful.
In the United States, church asylum saw its apex during the 1980s Sanctuary Movement. 
The Netherlands has not experienced such a movement, but churches’ provision of 
asylum is not unheard of, and has been seen as recently as 2019. In the Netherlands, 
FBOs have been particularly active in assisting unauthorized stayers since significant 
changes to Dutch immigration law in the late 1990s and early 2000s. One significant 
change conditioned the receipt of social benefits on a person’s authorized residence 
status. Another significant change terminated government accommodation to asylum 
seekers four weeks after an asylum application is rejected. These changes catalyzed FBOs 
and local governments to address the existing reality of rejected asylum seekers living 
on the streets. However, as with the American case, not all FBOs have been assisting 
unauthorized stayers. This chapter explores why those FBOs that have chosen to assist 
unauthorized stayers have done so.
This chapter is structured similarly to the previous chapter. First, I explain what church 
asylum means in the Dutch context and provide an overview of instances of church asylum 
in the Netherlands. I then trace the development of church assistance to unauthorized 
stayers, focusing on the substantial changes to the Dutch law that were promulgated in 
1998 and 2000. I then discuss the interviews. I briefly describe the organizations whose 
representatives were interviewed for this research. Then I focus on the results of the 
interviews, identifying the motivations and limitations determining FBOs’ decisions on 
whether to provide assistance to unauthorized stayers. 
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3.2 | Church Asylum in the Netherlands
3.2.1 | Conditions for Granting Church Asylum
In the Introduction to Part One, I discussed the origins of church asylum. In this section, 
I discuss church asylum (kerkasiel) in the Dutch context. Before providing an overview 
of the instances of church asylum in the Netherlands in the last 40 years, it is useful to 
first understand which conditions, generally, are required or at least considered before 
a church decides to offer asylum in the Dutch context. It is also critical to understand 
how the concept of church asylum interacts with certain state law. The importance of 
this interaction will become apparent in the most recent case of church asylum in the 
Netherlands, discussed at the end of this section. But first, what conditions are relevant 
in the church asylum decision-making process? 
On May 24, 1993, the members of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands (Raad van 
Kerken in Nederland) agreed that churches have the right to offer church asylum in cases 
of extreme need.146 According to the Council, four conditions must be respected: 
1)   there must be a fundamental threat or a fundamental injustice affecting the totality 
and the scope of a human life. An objective standard cannot be given for this. In 
addition to the own judgment of experts, church leaders and responsible members of 
the church community on this subject, the conscience is ultimately decisive,
2)   the asylum may only be temporary, 
3)   there must be real expectation for the granting of a residence permit, and
4)   clear agreements must be made between asylum seekers and asylum seekers 
regarding the conditions for the term of the church shelter and the manner of 
implementation and dismantling thereof.147
On January 16, 2019, the Waalse kerk in Amsterdam hosted a discussion that dealt with, 
among other things, church asylum. At that meeting, a high-ranking representative of 
the Protestant Church gave three conditions under which the Protestant Church of the 
Netherlands (PCN) would support church asylum:
1)  there must be an extremely urgent case or situation, 
2)   the local church providing asylum must be willing to play an active role and have the 
resources to support the asylum (willing and able), and
3)  a dialogue must be initiated with the relevant politicians.148
146 Wiel, C. V. (2000). Liber IV: Het recht van de kerk met betrekking tot handelingen van goddelijke eredienst, 
gewijde plaatsen en heilige tijden: Kerkelijk Wetboek 1983, boek IV, delen 2 en 3, canones 1166-1253. Leuven: 
Peeters, p. 194.
147 Id. 
148 These conditions are also published on the PCN website. See De Protestantse Kerk, het kinderpardon en 
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At first glance, the PCN conditions appear to have one considerable difference: there is 
an additional condition that a dialogue must be initiated with the relevant politicians. 
However, in an additional document that was produced as a result of another meeting 
of the Council in 1999, there is explicit reference to the idea of using church asylum as a 
means of exerting political pressure.149 The document reiterates the original conditions 
from the 1993 document. It then observes that church asylum has been used as a means 
of exerting political pressure, but does not take a position on it immediately. However, 
the document closes with a final consideration in which the Council makes clear that it is 
not against taking a political position in a case of church asylum, but will do so only on a 
case-by-case basis.150 
How does church asylum interact with state law? The concept of church asylum and the 
accompanying conditions, while relevant in canon law and interpretation, are not codified 
in state law. State law does not recognize the right of church asylum as such. However, 
there are at least two relevant norms that bear on the effectiveness and viability of church 
asylum. The first is the general understanding that the immigration service generally will 
not enter a church. However, there is no legal prohibition against doing so. The second 
is a law that prohibits entry into a space intended for religious or reflective meetings of a 
philosophical nature during the worship or reflection meeting.151 What these norms would 
suggest in the context of church asylum is that it can only be legally effective so long as 
a worship meeting is in session. Absent an ongoing worship meeting, the immigration 
service can legally enter the church despite the general understanding that they usually 
would refrain from doing so.
3.2.2 | Church Asylum before the Aliens Act 2000
Unlike the church asylum offered by networks of many churches to many people across the 
United States during the 1980s Sanctuary Movement,152 church asylum in the Netherlands 
has been an incidental, rather than a concerted, effort. According to the Protestant 
Church of the Netherlands, there were 52 instances of church asylum in the Netherlands 
between 1978 and 2000.153 Here, I provide a (non-exhaustive) overview of church asylum 
in the Netherlands, highlighting several cases that received substantial media attention. 
Generally, those seeking refuge in a church can be divided into two groups. The first 
consists of those who had entered the country legally but no longer have authorization to 
149 Raad van Kerken. (March 1999). Overwegingen rond Kerkasiel, nr. 17.
150 Id. 
151 Article 12(b), Algemene wet op het Binnentreden (Dutch General Law on Entry).
152 According to the representative from the Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson, between 13,000 and 15,000 
people were helped by that church between 1982 and 1992. He stated that a church in Brownsville, Texas 
assisted more than that. According to the New York Times, between 20,000 and 30,000 church members 
participated in the movement by September of 1983 alone. See Austin, C. (1983, September 21). More Churches 
Join in Offering Sanctuary for Latin Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/21/us/more-
churches-join-in-offering-sanctuary-for-latin-refugees.html. 
153 Kerkasiel is een eeuwenoud fenomeen. Retrieved from http://live.protestantsekerk.nl/verdieping/kerkasiel-is-
een-eeuwenoud-fenomeen. 
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remain. The second is asylum seekers whose applications for asylum have been rejected. 
An example of the first group’s use of church asylum can be found in 1975. On November 
1, 1975, the new “legalization scheme” deadline expired.154 The scheme allowed workers 
who were in the Netherlands without a residence permit to apply for one if they could 
prove that they had been employed lawfully for at least six years. Because employers 
refused to provide any such proof of taxes paid, such workers could not “legalize”. About 
one hundred Moroccans took refuge in the Mozes en Aäronkerk in Amsterdam to avoid 
deportation and lobby for residence permits. They attempted to strengthen their position 
with a hunger strike. However, years went by before any residence permits were granted. 
In 1978, 182 Moroccans sought asylum in the Duif, a church in Amsterdam, and embarked 
on yet another hunger strike. After negotiations, all 182 were able to leave the church with 
residence permits.155 
Another very prominent instance of church asylum occurred between April 13 (Good Friday) 
and July 20, 1979, in the Sint-Janskathedraal in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, when approximately 
250 Assyrian Christians156 from Turkey took refuge.157 There were at least two more 
instances of Turkish Christians seeking refuge in Dutch churches, but in smaller numbers. 
In the same year, 41 Turkish Christians sought asylum in the Grote Kerk in Almelo. In mid-
1981, 120 Turkish Christians sought asylum in the Church Hall of the Free University of 
Amsterdam.158 In the same year, Syrian Orthodox Christians, a religious minority group 
that claimed religious persecution in their country of origin, took refuge in a church in 
Lochem, as well as the Helperkerk in Groningen.159 In 1984, certain churches in Rotterdam 
also opened their doors to groups of Eritrean asylum seekers. In 1985, a Moroccan took 
refuge in the San Salvatorkerk in Groningen.160 In November of 1986, Armenian and 
Tamil asylum seekers sought asylum in two churches in Groningen.161 In 1988, a group 
of 30 Kurdish hunger strikers sought refuge in the Pauluskerk in Rotterdam.162 In 1988, 
Tamils from Sri Lanka sought refuge in the Mamrehoeve Kerk in Groningen, and Armenian 
Christians from Turkey took refuge in the Doopsgezinde Kerk, also in Groningen.163 
154 Steen, P. V. (2016, September 05). Kerk-Marokkanen mochten uiteindelijk toch blijven. Retrieved January 28, 
2019, from https://www.trouw.nl/home/kerk-marokkanen-mochten-uiteindelijk-toch-blijven~ae4a6fd0/. 
155 NRC. (1991, December 18). Eeuwenoud kerkasiel nog springlevend. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://www.
nrc.nl/nieuws/1991/12/19/eeuwenoud-kerkasiel-nog-springlevend-6991104-a190384. 
156 Assyrian Christians are an ethno-religious group from modern-day Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Assyrian 
Christians who claim asylum in the Netherlands do so on account of religious persecution in their country of 
origin.
157 Bronkhorst, D. (1990). Een tijd van komen: De geschiednis van vluchtelingen in Nederland. Amsterdam: 
Federatie VON.
158 Id. 
159 Source: INLIA representative.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 NRC. (1991, December 18). Eeuwenoud kerkasiel nog springlevend. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://www.
nrc.nl/nieuws/1991/12/19/eeuwenoud-kerkasiel-nog-springlevend-6991104-a190384
163 Source: INLIA representative.
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In 1989, about 60 Assyrian Christians sought protection in ten churches across the 
country.164 At this time, one case that received extensive attention from the media involved 
a Syrian Orthodox family that had sought asylum in the Netherlands. In January of 1989, 
that Syrian Orthodox family of eight was separated following the arrest of the mother 
during a routine check-in with the immigration service.165 The father, who was also in line 
at the immigration service, saw what had happened and fled. He took his five children 
from the neighbors’ house and sought refuge in the Open Hof chapel in Groningen. The 
mother and the one child who was with her at the time of the arrest were sent back to 
Syria. Following the deportation, the Groningen-based faith-based organization INLIA 
sent a research team into Syria to conduct an inquiry.166 Based on the findings of this 
research, the father re-applied for asylum in the Netherlands and was finally granted it. 
Ultimately, the family was granted asylum and residence, along with other families of 
Assyrian background who had sought asylum in the mid to late 1980s.167
In April and May of 1991, a Palestinian family took refuge in Het Anker church in Borger. 
Between 1991 and 1992, a Romanian family took refuge in the Schore church in Zeeland. 
In the same period, two stateless Palestinians took refuge in the Open Hof church in 
Groningen. Instances of families and individuals seeking church asylum continued 
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.
3.2.3 | Church Asylum (and more) after Promulgation of the Linking Act
In the years leading up to the passage of the Linking Act in 1998, the Dutch government 
undertook various measures to control immigration to the Netherlands. These measures 
consisted of visa obligation extensions, residence permit application fees, the reduction 
of remedies in immigration cases, a more restrictive asylum policy and family reunification 
policy, and the introduction of rules prohibiting so-called marriages of convenience.168 
Generally, these measures constitute a broader “discouragement policy” that aims 
to combat illegal stay and illegal labor.169 More specifically, the policy takes a stricter 
approach to employers who illegally hire employees, an intensifies the inspections of 
the immigration service and other agencies, advances an effective expulsion policy, and 
introduced an obligation to present identification documents.170 Around the time of its 
passage in 1998, the Linking Act was viewed as a capstone on these discouragement 
policy measures.171 The Linking Act had a profound effect on certain aliens’ access to 
 
164 See Note 162
165  NTR. (2004, February 17). Vluchtelingen. Retrieved from https://anderetijden.nl/aflevering/476/Vluchtelingen. 
166  More information on INLIA follows in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.
167 Id. 
168 Minderhoud, P. (2000). The Dutch Linking Act and the Violation of Various International Non-Discrimination 
Clauses. European Journal of Migration and Law, 185-201, at 185.
169 Id. at 186.
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
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social security, housing, education, and health care. In a nutshell, an alien’s access 
to secondary or higher education, housing, rent subsidy, facilities for people with 
disabilities, health care and all social security benefits, including national assistance, 
depended on their residence status.172 Entitlement to these public services would now be 
restricted to aliens with lawful residence status. The only things that remained available 
to all aliens regardless of lawful residence status were legal aid, emergency health care, 
and education for minors.173 The rights of aliens with lawful residence status, however, 
remained largely unchanged.174
So, starting in 1998, so-called Dublin claimants would not be entitled to accommodation 
by the state.175  At this time, INLIA and its network of churches and FBOs began to arrange 
shelter for asylum seekers who were awaiting transfer to the country in which they first 
arrived, as is the protocol under the Dublin regulation. This effort to arrange shelter was 
primarily that of INLIA and other faith-based organizations, but municipalities were also 
involved in this process because they had to acquiesce to the use of old buildings (usually 
those ordered for demolition) for this purpose. The homelessness that resulted from the 
inability of Dublin claimants to secure shelter was, according to INLIA representatives, 
a harbinger for what was to come in 2001, when an even larger group of asylum seekers 
would be automatically denied shelter. This knowledge, combined with the experience 
of organizing austere shelters in old vacant buildings, paved the way for a blueprint that 
would be adopted by municipalities in the early 2000s. 
Around the turn of the millennium, the passage of certain amendments to Dutch asylum 
laws further marshaled more faith-based organizations into action. The Aliens Act 2000 
came into force on April 1, 2001. According to the Ministry of Justice, the main goal of 
the new legislation was to shorten the asylum procedure and provide clarity regarding 
the rights and obligations of asylum seekers.176 One highly controversial amendment 
contained in the new legislation terminated accommodation for asylum seekers in 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 186-187.
174 Id. at 187.
175  “Dublin claimants” is a common phrase among migration scholars and even members of the public in 
Europe. American audiences may not be as familiar with this term. The term stems from the Dublin Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) No 604/2013). This regulation sets forth the considerations relevant in determining which 
country is responsible for processing a person’s asylum claim. The most general rule is that the first country 
that the asylum seeker has entered is responsible for processing his application. Asylum seekers do not always 
stay in the first country they enter; they sometimes end up applying for asylum in another country that they 
enter after the first one. This is done for a number of reasons – including family considerations, and varying 
perceptions on a country’s willingness to grant asylum. Once a person applies for asylum in a country other 
than the port of entry, that country will see that another asylum application was lodged in another country. It 
then has a certain amount of time to arrange for transportation back to the port of entry. The people who are in 
this waiting period are referred to Dublin claimants.
176 Lovett, D., & Schimmer, B. (2001). City of Utrecht Undermines National Asylum Law: A Humanitarian Initiative. 
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asylum seeker centers four weeks after their applications for asylum are rejected.177 
For those rejected asylum seekers who could not leave the country, this had the effect 
of putting them on the streets less than a month after they were denied asylum. This 
unfortunate reality of asylum seeker homelessness garnered a response from faith-based 
organizations, which recognized that failing to address the basic needs of destitute 
homeless asylum seekers would threaten the public order and implicate serious 
humanitarian concerns. This response was seen even before the Aliens Act 2000 came 
into force.
INLIA had already engaged in conversations with 10-20 municipalities months before 
the Aliens Act 2000 entered into force. When the Central Agency for Reception of Asylum 
Seekers178 in fact began ending accommodation for rejected asylum seekers in asylum 
seeker centers, INLIA contacted many more municipalities, bringing the number of 
municipalities in conversations with INLIA to about 70. Besides having a legal team 
that was well-apprised of the impending amendments to immigration laws and their 
consequences, INLIA has had experience with asylum seekers since the late 1980s. As 
mentioned above, INLIA was involved in coordinating cases of church asylum in the late 
1980s through the mid-1990s. At the time, it was also heavily involved with the legal 
aspect of the asylum-seeking procedure. In other words, the focus was to gather all of the 
relevant facts of each asylum application to ensure that immigration authorities can fairly 
assess the merit of each application. A key to this process were fact-finding missions to 
the countries of origin of asylum applicants. Rather than relying on government reports 
regarding the safety of a certain country of origin, INLIA would send its own independent 
team to investigate the realities of that country. On numerous occasions, this resulted in 
a positive second asylum application.
INLIA representatives observed that the focus of their work changed between the early 
1990s and early 2000s. At the beginning of the 1990s, the focus was the legal aspect of 
asylum procedure and ensuring each application is assessed with comprehensive and 
correct supporting factual background. As a result of the decision that Dublin claimants 
would no longer receive accommodation, the work of INLIA and other faith-based 
organizations shifted, and their organization began to feel more like a homeless shelter 
than a legal support network. In any case, the work was varied, and given the experience 
throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, it is no surprise that INLIA was at the forefront of 
the response to the new immigration legislation in the early 2000s. In this endeavor, 
INLIA was not alone. Also involved in the discussions between INLIA and the municipality 
177 See Sections 45 and 60 of the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000 of 23 November 2000; 
translation by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Documentation Center; 
available at ˂http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4680>).
178  The Central Agency for Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is an independent administrative body under the 
state secretary of justice. According to the COA, its mission is to “offer[] asylum seekers a livable and safe 
reception” and to “support[] them in preparing a future in the Netherlands or elsewhere.” Once an asylum 
seekers lodges an application with the IND’s central application center in Ter Apel, he then registers with the 
COA which will house him, usually in several locations, throughout the asylum procedure.
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of Utrecht were the Utrecht Council of Churches,179 the Ecumenical Missionary Diaconal 
Utrecht Workgroup,180 the Dutch Refugee Council in Utrecht,181 and the Utrecht Foundation 
for Illegals.182 In fact, it was these four organizations that came together to establish 
the Foundation for Emergency Reception of Homeless Aliens in Utrecht.183 The SNDVU 
was the first step in Utrecht’s realization of its response to the homelessness resulting 
from the changes to immigration law. According to SNDVU, its existence is a “necessary 
consequence of the failing Dutch asylum policy of the government.”184
Utrecht’s initiative recognized that the termination of shelter would “lead to an 
increasing pressure on local organizations and the municipal government to make sure 
temporary reception shelters are provided for those finding themselves in deplorable 
circumstances.”185 The initiative argued that in addition to the humanitarian crisis that 
will result from the termination, failing to provide people with the basic necessities of 
existence would also threaten social order and safety. The Utrecht Board of the Mayor 
and Aldermen voted in favor of the initiative, and funding was set aside to establish 50 
shelters that would accommodate 125 people per year.186 The aim was for the shelters to 
provide temporary lodging and provisions for a period of four to five months.187 Though the 
initiative acknowledged the plight of all rejected asylum seekers, it focused on assisting 
three specific groups of people: 1) asylum seekers who are filing a second claim, 2) asylum 
seekers who are legally residing in the Netherlands, such as Dublin claimants, and 3) 
asylum seekers who are willing to return home but are unable to do so.188 According to the 
Service of Societal Development of the City of Utrecht, of the 125 people intended to be 
assisted in a given year, the majority (about 100) fall into the third group.
At this juncture, one might wonder why the actions of a municipality are being discussed 
in a section dedicated to faith-based organizations. This is because the very blueprint 
for the shelters that Utrecht decided to organize was developed by INLIA. The municipal 
government of Utrecht drew inspiration from the experience of INLIA regarding the 
realities of the asylum-seeking process and its duration.189 One reality of the asylum-
seeking process is that, given the lack of a viable infrastructure in many of the countries 
from which asylum seekers to the Netherlands come from, the new four-week limit is 
highly unrealistic.190
179 Utrechtse Stedelijke Raad van Kerken.
180 Oecumenisch Missionaire Diaconale Utrechtse Werkgroep.
181 Vereniging Vluchtelingenwerk Utrecht.
182 Stichting Illegalen Utrecht.
183 Stichting Noodopvang Dakloze Vreemdelingen Utrecht, or “SNDVU”.
184 Achtergrond. Retrieved from http://sndvu.nl/?page_id=994. 
185 Municipal document: New Asylum Legislation and rejected asylum seekers for the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen (2004).
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The Utrecht initiative was not without opposition. The Ministry of Justice of the 
Netherlands was among the first to voice its stark disapproval of the initiative. According 
to the Ministry’s spokesperson, the initiative was a clear evasion of the law and a 
frustration of the national return policy.191 In her view, the provision of shelter to asylum 
seekers after centrally-mandated termination of accommodation sends an erroneous 
message of welcome to asylum seekers.192 Additionally, she states that the Central Body 
for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is the institution which is charged with the 
provision of shelter and support for asylum seekers, and there is no need for additional 
assistance from municipalities, especially for groups of people who have no basis for 
shelter under national law.193 The Ministry of Justice believes that a return policy has many 
advantages, including reserving the scarce relief center space for truly desperate cases, 
as well as providing clarity for asylum seekers, Dutch society, and anyone intending to 
seek asylum in the Netherlands. Moreover, a return policy, according to the Ministry, 
sends the message that the Netherlands will not admit “economic refugees”.194 At the 
end of the day, the spokesperson for the Ministry maintains that the Netherlands follows 
the Geneva Convention guidelines and admits only “real refugees.”195 
Among the first to voice their opinions regarding the initiative were the people 
who encounter asylum seekers on a regular basis: the Utrecht police department, 
humanitarian organization workers, and church workers. In contrast to the Ministry of 
Justice, the Utrecht police department believed that the initiative is a “good plan” that 
will hopefully help to relieve the conditions of asylum seekers who are forced to live in 
the streets. The police department added that the national government, and not separate 
local entities, should be focused on standardizing how asylum seekers are to be treated. 
The Spokesperson for the City of Utrecht agreed that the initiative is commendable with 
respect to its focus on helping primarily people who wish to repatriate, but expressed 
doubt regarding its overall effect, reasoning that most asylum seekers do not want to be 
repatriated.196 He added that there should be more funding for police sensitivity training 
with respect to their interactions with asylum seekers.
Beside the police, humanitarian organization workers and church workers are the 
people who have first-hand experience with the realities facing asylum seekers. These 











the dutch case 75
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 76
responsible for drafting more humane asylum laws. A worker from STIL197, an organization 
that helps unauthorized stayers find work, stated that the initiative was well-intentioned 
but would likely be “woefully inadequate.”198 According to her, the majority of asylum 
seekers will be neither granted asylum nor qualify for accommodation in the shelters 
under the initiative, and the few who do will often need more than just a temporary 
shelter because second asylum claims and Dublin claims can take a year.199 The worker, 
however, was pleased that Utrecht is trying to do something; still though, according to 
her, the bottom line is that something must be done on the national level regarding the 
position of unauthorized stayers.200
A member of a church in Utrecht works voluntarily with members of his church to help 
asylum seekers. He and his church were dismayed when an alderman of the Christian 
Democratic Party voted against the initiative. In his experience with asylum seekers, 
asylum can take three to five years, and without any support, asylum seekers have no way 
to sustain themselves, often resorting to criminal activity. Thus, he believes that allowing 
them to work during the claim processing would reduce crime. He seconds the views of 
the Spokesperson for Utrecht in saying that most people who are seeking asylum do not 
want repatriation. He, too, hopes that the national government will follow the example 
set by Utrecht to support asylum seekers on a nationwide basis.201
Throughout the next decade, faith-based organizations remained instrumental in 
the provision of assistance to unauthorized stayers. In varying capacities, they were 
supported by municipal resources. Throughout this time, the central government and 
municipalities continued to disagree on what the government should provide to people 
without authorized residence status. This conflict is the subject of Chapter 6 in Part Two 
of this book. Aside from the FBOs’ continued role in supporting unauthorized stayers 
materially in cooperation with municipal governments throughout this decade, the faith 
community undertook a principal role in a court case that advocated for unauthorized 
stayers’ rights in 2013.
On January 17, 2013, the Conference of European Churches (CEC) filed a complaint against 
the Netherlands, alleging that the termination of accommodation four weeks after 
197 The acronym STIL stands for Steunpunt Illegalen Utrecht.” STIL is a resource center for unauthorized stayers. Its 
primary task is to help unauthorized stayers find “black work,” but it also helps them find shelter, secure basic 
medical necessities, and gain access to legal counsel. STIL was founded in 1998 when a broad group of people 
came together and decided that a support center for unauthorized stayers was urgently needed. STIL was 
born from members of local churches in Utrecht as well as church leaders from the Netwerk Religieuzen voor 
Vluchtelingen (Religious Network for Refugees). The organization is a non-profit and accepts donations from 
individuals and churches. For more information, see http://www.stil-utrecht.nl/over-stil/geschiedenis/ 
198 Lovett, D., & Schimmer, B. (2001). City of Utrecht Undermines National Asylum Law: A Humanitarian Initiative. 
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asylum rejection violates the European Social Charter (ESC or Charter).202 Specifically, 
the CEC argued that the Dutch law violated both Article 13, Section 4, guaranteeing the 
right to social and medical assistance, and Article 31, Section 2, guaranteeing the right 
to housing. This case is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.3.203 Between 2013 and 2018, 
several domestic court cases expounded on what the decision meant for the Netherlands. 
This is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.3 through 6.3.8.
The most recent case of church asylum in the Netherlands occurred between September 
2018 and March of 2019. It concerned an Armenian family of five (the Tamrazyans) that 
first took refuge in a church in the town of Katwijk, some 50 kilometers southwest of 
Amsterdam. In September of 2018, the family moved into the Vrijgemaakt Gereformeerde 
kerk in Katwijk from the asylum seeker center because they were threatened with 
deportation after their asylum applications were ultimately rejected.204 The family had 
been in the Netherlands since 2010. They took refuge in a church because, in addition to 
being members there, there is an understanding that the immigration service usually will 
not enter a church. The hope was that the family could enjoy some protection within the 
church until an agreeable solution for all parties was reached. According to theologian 
and activist Rikko Voorberg, “church asylum is meant to give the government a last 
chance to think about impending injustice.”205 He added, “we do not want to undermine 
the rule of law. We are a church community, not a political party. We therefore do not 
issue a political statement with this.”206 However, the family relocated to another church 
after several weeks because they had “heard from the immigration police and the return 
and departure service that staying in a church was not enough to prevent expulsion.”207 
There were some back and forth discussions among church leaders on the topic of 
whether a continuous service or a vigil would be more appropriate, but it was ultimately 
decided that the continuous service is the better option because it is unclear whether a 
vigil would qualify as a service and therefore enjoy the protection of the law that prohibits 
202 The complaint was lodged via the Additional Protocol of 1995 providing for a system of collective complaints, 
which the Netherlands ratified in 2006. Article 1 of this protocol permits national and international non-
governmental organizations and organizations of employers or trade unions to file such complaints. The 
European Social Charter is a treaty adopted by the Council of Europe that guarantees social and economic 
rights. It broadly guarantees rights relating to employment, housing, health, education, social protection, 
and welfare. It places special emphasis on vulnerable people, including children, the elderly, those with 
disabilities, and migrants. See https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter. 
203 Though the case was filed by a faith-based organization, it concerned the obligations of the state rather than 
private entities. I mention that case here for sake of completeness and to illustrate the willingness of FBOs to 
employ the legal system to achieve desired ends.





207 Huisman, C. (2018, October 27). Estafette-kerkdienst in Den Haag om uitzetting Armeense familie te 
voorkomen. ‘Ik heb nog twee meter preken op de plank liggen’. Retrieved from https://www.volkskrant.nl/
nieuws-achtergrond/estafette-kerkdienst-in-den-haag-om-uitzetting-armeense-familie-te-voorkomen-ik-heb-
nog-twee-meter-preken-op-de-plank-liggen-~b85071a6/. 
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entry during a service.208 The family relocated to the Bethelkerk in the Hague where 
Reverend Theo Hettema, chairman of the General Church Council (Algemene Kerkenraad), 
initiated an uninterrupted church service in the afternoon of October 26, 2018. According 
to Hettema, they have “never held a continuous church service like this before.”209
From the beginning, religious leaders from various denominations offered to hold 
sermons during this continuous church service. On October 30, Bishop Gerard de Korte 
(diocese ‘s-Hertogenbosch) and the scribe of the PCN210 René de Reuver held services at 
the church. These high-profile figures were only two of the hundreds that offered to lead 
worship services. In fact, between October 26 and January 11, there were 11 full weeks of 
church service.211 During these 77 days, the PCN has counted a total of 765 pastors and 
9,830 churchgoers.212 The case received coverage not only from dozens of Dutch media 
outlets but also major international outlets, including CNN, BBC, and the New York Times. 
But what was the end goal of this continuous service? 
Perhaps the most obvious and immediate objective was to bring the plight of the family 
to the public eye and exert additional pressure on the state secretary to grant the family 
a residence permit so that they can lawfully reside in the Netherlands. But perhaps 
there was a broader policy-based objective that, if achieved, could grant residency to 
hundreds of other children and their families in similar situations in the Netherlands. A 
very explicit iteration of this goal can be found on a website that appears to have been set 
up at the start of the Tamrazyans’ church refuge. At the top of the website kerkasiel.info, 
there was a new year’s wish that read: “Let 2019 be the year we make a children’s pardon 
that works!”213 This goal seemed to call into question the assertion made by theologian 
Rikko Voorberg that the church does not intend to make a political statement by offering 
asylum. In the end, it is fair to say that at least some proponents of church asylum 
view it as a vehicle through which to challenge state authority and possibly effectuate 
policy change. Whatever the exact goal, the State Secretary for Asylum and Migration 
Affairs, Mark Harbers, declined to use his discretionary power to grant residency to the 
Tamrazyans on December 20, 2018. 
208 See Houten, M. V. (2018, October 18). Geen estafette-kerkdiensten, maar wakes als steun voor Armeense 
Hayarpi. Retrieved from https://www.trouw.nl/home/geen-estafette-kerkdiensten-maar-wakes-als-steun-voor-
armeense-hayarpi~a4a46066/. 
209 See Note 207, supra.
210  The scribe of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands is the “face” of the church. The scribe provides spiritual 
leadership to the church and represents the PCN in ecclesiastical and social contexts. The scribe is also 
charged with writing policy documents for the church. See Nieuwe scriba: De Reuver. (2016, April 21). Retrieved 
from https://live/protestantkerk.nl/nieuws/nieuwe-scriba-de-reuver. 
211 Kerkasiel Bethel. Retrieved from https://www.protestantsekerkdenhaag.nl/kerkasiel. 
212 Id. 
213  In 2013, a children’s pardon (known as the Definitieve Regeling or Final Regulation) came into effect that would 
allow long-term resident children in the Netherlands to apply for residence permits.  One controversial criterion 
was that children would have to cooperate on their departure while awaiting their decision on whether they 
would receive a residence permit. This was seen as unworkable and contradictory by many: how does one 
cooperate with return while applying to stay permanently? This is discussed further below.
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Debate regarding how to deal with the church asylum case continued among the coalition 
parties of the national government (also known as the cabinet). The cabinet was aware 
that the church asylum case implicated more than just the Tamrazyans; a positive decision 
vis-à-vis the Tamrazyans’ ability to stay in the Netherlands would provide similarly-situated 
families a compelling argument for their own cases. Any decision would have much 
broader implications than just those for the one family in church asylum. Of course, if the 
Tamrazyans were to be granted residence permits, this would be because of relaxed rules, 
as the Tamrazyans did not qualify for residence under the so-called Final Regulation.214 
What was really at stake here was whether the government would allow a broader children’s 
pardon that would impact hundreds of children and parents in the country.
At the time of the church asylum case, the ruling coalition of the national government 
comprised four parties. These were the VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), the CDA (Christen-Democratisch Appèl; 
Christian Democratic Appeal) D66 (Democraten 66; Democrats 66), and the ChristenUnie 
(Christian Union). All parties lie somewhere between center-left and center-right on the 
political ideological continuum. Despite the seemingly relatively homogenous political 
stances, the parties did not always see eye to eye, even those whose platforms are 
ostensibly rooted in shared Christian values. The latter point deserves some attention 
given the focus of this book.
There was considerable disagreement regarding the children’s pardon between the CDA 
and the ChristenUnie. The CDA (and the VVD) were initially opposed to expanding the 
children’s pardon, while the ChristenUnie (and D66) were in favor. To better understand 
what was causing the discord between two Christian-aligned parties, I reviewed 
transcripts of proceedings in the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer). While I did 
not find a great deal of discussion on expanding the children’s pardon in 2019, I was able 
to identify a theme from transcripts detailing discussions on the children’s pardon back 
in 2013.
It appears from the 2013 discussions that the CDA was more concerned about pragmatic 
issues: is the availability of a children’s pardon criteria likely to serve as a pull factor for 
more families to attempt to seek asylum in the Netherlands?215 The ChristenUnie, on the 
other hand, seems to have taken a more principled approach. For instance, Member of 
Parliament Voordewind (ChristenUnie) applauded the Labor Party’s efforts in securing a 
pardon, and even quoted Matthew 25 in support of its position. In the 2019 discussions 
on expanding the children’s pardon, there was also discord within the CDA. A poll of 
21,000 CDA voters revealed that 45 percent were in favor while 49 percent were against.216 
214  See preceding Note.
215  See March 12, 2013 speech by MP van Hijum (CDA), available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-
tk-20122013-60-26.html. 
216  EenVandaag. (2019, January 21). CDA-kiezers verdeeld over versoepling kinderpardon. Retrieved from https://
eenvandaag.avrotros.nl/panels/opiniepanel/alle-uitslagen/item/cda-kiezers-verdeeld-over-versoepeling-
kinderpardon/. 
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Moreover, former CDA senator and Bethel Chapel chairman Rein Willems labeled the 
CDA’s position “merciless”.217 Adding to the pressure, a group of 38 professors published 
a report suggesting that children under threat of impending expulsion can suffer brain 
damage.218 Ultimately, the CDA in parliament gave in to pressure from these various 
sources, and came out in favor of an expanded children’s pardon. 
In January 2019, the coalition parties of the government came to an agreement known 
as the Closure Regulation. The main difference between the Final Regulation of 2013 
(mentioned above) and the Closure Regulation of 2019 is that the latter jettisoned the 
criterion that children must have cooperated with their return in order to apply for a 
pardon.219 Now it sufficed that children were merely available. Between January 29 and 
February 25, 2019, children and their accompanying adults could apply or reapply for 
residence on the basis of this regulation. Those who reapplied were generally those 
who were rejected the first time because they had not cooperated with their departure. 
Those who applied for the first time were generally those who did not apply because they 
thought it would be futile as they had not fulfilled the cooperation criterion.
At the end of March 2019, the Tamrazyans learned that their case had been positively 
reassessed meaning they could stay indefinitely in the Netherlands.220 The Tamrazyans 
were just one family that benefited from the Closure Regulation. In February 2020, it was 
reported that a total of 1,071 people (569 children and 502 accompanying adults) were 
positively assessed or reassessed.221 
3.2.4 | The Situation Late 2019
The discussion above shows that FBO assistance to unauthorized stayers has had a place 
within Dutch society. Church asylum appears to be less prevalent than other forms of 
assistance. While the most recent case of church asylum occurred in between late 2018 
and early 2019 and was successful in securing authorized residence status for the family 
involved and potentially other similarly situated people, other types of assistance, such 
as food, shelter, legal aid, medical care, and spiritual care, seem to be at the forefront of 
FBOs’ assistance efforts. This can be chiefly attributed to the passage of new laws around 
the turn of the century which have effectively aimed to exclude unauthorized stayers from 
217  Kinderpardon: warrom het CDA van gedachten veranderde. (2019, January 29). Retrieved from https://nos.nl/
nieuwsuur/artikel/2269680-kinderpardon-waarom-het-cda-van-gedachten-veranderde.html. 
218  Id.
219  Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst. (2019, April 23). Kinderpardon: Alles over de Afsluitingsregeling langdurig 
verblijvende kinderen. Retrieved from https://ind.nl/over-ind/Paginas/Alles-over-de-Regeling-langdurig-
verblijvende-kinderen.aspx. 
220 Huisman, C. (2019, March 26). Hayarpi en familie hebben verblijfsvergunning gekregen op grond van ruimer 
kinderpardon. Retrieved from https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/hayarpi-en-familie-hebben-
verblijfsvergunning-gekregen-op-grond-van-ruimer-kinderpardon~ba6663da/. 
221  Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2020, March 9). Vreemdelingenbeleid; Brief regering; Afhandeling 
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nearly all facets of society. Understandably then, since the passage of the Linking Act in 
1998 and Aliens Act in 2000, these types of assistance have been the focus of the efforts of 
faith-based organizations in the Netherlands. Today, the efforts of FBOs in the assistance 
of unauthorized stayers are ongoing as the central government and municipalities have 
been unable to agree on a course of action. The conflict between the central government 
and municipalities is dealt with in depth in Part Two of this book. 
3.3 | The Faith-Based Organizations
Before analyzing the interviews in Section 3.4 below, it is useful to introduce the relevant 
faith-based organizations. The faith-based organizations whose representatives were 
interviewed for this research are those that in some capacity assist unauthorized stayers. 
Representatives from various parts of the country with both Catholic and Protestant roots 
were interviewed. Brief descriptions of the organizations are set forth below.
Vluchtelingen in de Knel222
Vluchtelingen in de Knel is an organization that helps rejected asylums seekers in 
Eindhoven, North Brabant. Originally founded by a small group of Catholic nuns in the 
early 1990s, it has grown to include employees and volunteers of various religious and 
nonreligious backgrounds. The organization supports rejected asylum seekers in their 
legalization efforts as well as social services.223 This includes facilitating the provision of 
reception facilities, Dutch language lessons, psychological healthcare, daytime activities, 
and financial support, among others.224 To these ends, it communicates with many other 
people and organizations, including lawyers, medical practitioners, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and NGOs.225 
VLotteam (Raft Team)226
The VLotteam was founded in 2003 and now operates as a division of the Salvation 
Army.227 The VLotteam provides shelter and assistance to rejected asylum seekers who 
may have a chance at a positive asylum application with the right legal aid.228 If asylum 
is not possible, then the organization looks for documents in the country of origin that 
would aid in returning the rejected asylum seeker back to his country of origin.229 The 
Salvation Army in the Netherlands is known as the Leger des Heils, and was officially 
222 There is no decent translation of this organization.
223 Over ons // About us. Retrieved from https://www.vluchtelingenindeknel.nl/wie-we-zijn/over-ons/. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 This is a reference to a raft on the water as a salvation device.
227 Over VLotteam. Retrieved from https://vlotteam.nl/index.php/over-ons/over-vlotteam. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
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recognized in 1946 as a Protestant denomination.230 It is a Christian religious community 
that places emphasis on relief and helping other people.231
Justice and Peace Netherlands
According to its website, this organization “is a non-profit organization based in the 
Hague that is dedicated to defending and promoting respect for human rights and 
social justice, worldwide and in the Netherlands.”232 It strives for a world in which the 
safeguarding of human rights does not depend on origin, religion, political opinion, race, 
gender, or sexual orientation.233 Justice and Peace Netherlands was founded in 1968 as 
part of a worldwide movement initiated by the Catholic Church.234 Today, it is operated by 
full-time staff members as well as interns and volunteers.235 The board is made up largely 
of representatives from religious organizations.236
Toevlucht (Refuge)
Founded in 2013 in Utrecht with the help of funding from local churches, Toevlucht 
provides shelter and food to unauthorized stayers. It is operated by a team that includes 
part-time and full-time employees, as well as volunteers. Initially funded solely by 
churches, the organization was able to secure funding from the municipality of Utrecht 
after the decision of the European Committee of Social Rights, discussed above.
Stem van de Goede Herder (Voice of the Good Shepherd)
Founded in 2014, the Stem van de Goede Herder is an evangelical church in Limburg 
with about 60 members as of 2018. About a third of those members are people who 
have moved from the north of the Netherlands to the south. Another third are native 
Limburgers. The last third, or about 20 people, are people who have successfully sought 
asylum and those who have been rejected. Thus, some people in the last category are 
unauthorized stayers.
Roman Catholic Diocese of ’s-Hertogenbosch
The Roman Catholic Diocese of ’s-Hertogenbosch, or Bisdom den Bosch, is one of six 
suffragan dioceses of the Metropolitan Archdiocese of Utrecht. With just over one million 
 
 
230 Zingeving. Retrieved from https://www.legerdesheils.nl/zingeving. 
231 Id. 
232 Justice and Peace Nederland: Non- Profit - About us. Retrieved from https://www.justiceandpeace.nl/about-us/. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Meet Our Team: Change Makers. Retrieved from https://www.justiceandpeace.nl/about-us/meet-our-team/. 
236 Members Of The Board. Retrieved from https://www.justiceandpeace.nl/about-us/meet-the-board/. 
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Catholics and 166 parishes, the Diocese of ’s-Hertogenbosch is the largest diocese in the 
Netherlands.237 
Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden (Full Gospel Church of Leiden)
According to an elder of the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden, the idea of this branch of 
evangelical Christianity is to introduce people into the heavenly kingdom and to accept 
and know Jesus as a personal savior. In 2008, an elder of the church began a program to 
help unauthorized stayers. This help included shelter, food, judicial advice, and spiritual 
care. In 2014, however, this help reduced substantially due to a court ruling that required 
local governments to provide bed, bath, and bread shelters to homeless rejected asylum 
seekers. Today, the help offered is mostly limited to spiritual care and judicial advice. 
This church is a member of the United Pentecostal and Evangelical Churches (UPEC), or 
Verenigde Pinkster- en Evangeliegemeenten. The UPEC is the largest Pentecostal and 
Evangelical Christian denomination in the Netherlands. It was founded on February 16, 
2002, as the merger of the Brotherhood of Pentecostal Churches and the Full Gospel 
Churches of the Netherlands. In 2008, the membership was estimated at 26,000 
members in 180 churches.238 
De Vuurhaard (The Hearth)
This organization temporarily houses asylum seekers whose asylum applications have 
been rejected by the national immigration authorities, but have been deemed by the 
Dutch Refugee Council (VluchtelingenWerk), a non-governmental organization, to have 
a likelihood of positive assessment by the immigration authorities upon reapplication. 
The people that this organization helps include those affected by war violence, poverty 
in their home country, oppression, or discrimination. In addition to shelter, the people 
staying here receive food, pocket money, and assistance in accessing dentists and 
doctors. The organization also finds activities for the people it takes in, which tend to be 
limited because of the unauthorized status of the people staying there. It was founded 
by members of the Congregation of the Brothers of Our Lady (Brothers CMM), Mother 
of Mercy, or the Congregatie van Onze Lieve Vrouw, Moeder van Barmhartigheid. As the 
name suggests, the Brothers CMM is a congregation with mercy at the forefront of its 
mission.239 
237 Cheney, D. M. Diocese of ‘s Hertogenbosch (Bois-le-Duc). Retrieved from http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/
diocese/dshen.html. 
238 Kantoor VPE naar Driebergen. (2013, April 17). Retrieved from https://www.digibron.nl/search/
detail/6db5494080d93e5d66dbc6ce3624f4ee/kantoor-vpe-naar-driebergen. 
239 The CMM Brothers website cites the Gospel of Matthew 25 for a list of merciful deeds: “feed the hungry, 
instruct the ignorant, give drink to the thirsty, counsel the doubtful, care for the sick, comfort the afflicted, 
clothe the naked, admonish sinners, shelter the strangers, bear wrongs patiently, visit the imprisoned, forgive 
offenses willingly, bury the dead, and pray for the living and the dead.” See Brothers CMM and the Vincentian 
Family. Retrieved from https://www.cmmbrothers.org/spiritualiteit/mercy-a-way-of-life/?lang=en. 
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Wereldhuis (Worldhouse)
This organization focuses on helping unauthorized migrants who are searching for new 
opportunities. It is a center for culture, education, information, and counseling. Since its 
founding in 2008 in Amsterdam by the Diaconie of Amsterdam and Luthers Amsterdam, 
this organization has been educating and assisting rejected asylum seekers regarding 
their basic rights, including access to health care, legal aid, and education. It also holds 
daily language classes, yoga classes, drawing classes, etc. 
The Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PCN)
The Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PCN), or Protestantse Kerk in Nederland, is 
the largest protestant church in the Netherlands by membership.240 It was founded on 
May 1, 2004 by the merger of three former churches: the Netherlands Reformed Church, 
the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Today, the PCN has roughly 1.9 million members with nearly 
2500 local congregations and more than 2200 ministers.241 Two representatives of the 
PCN from different cities in the Netherlands were interviewed for this research. One 
representative is from Utrecht and works for Kerk in Actie (Church in Action), which is a 
diaconal organ of the PCN. The other representative is a pastor from Nijmegen.
The PCN is organized according to the principles of the presbyterial-synodical system.242 
This system means that the PCN’s government is entrusted to ecclesial assemblies, 
which are bodies consisting of ministers, elders, and deacons. There are no bishops 
or superintendents to govern personally – the PCN is governed by collegial rule. Each 
local congregation elects members to its Church Council, which typically consists of one 
or two ministers, elders, and deacons, and these numbers depend on the size of the 
congregation. Each Church Council, in turn, has the right to appoint two representatives 
in a regional ecclesial assembly, known as the classical assembly. There are 75 classical 
assemblies in the Netherlands, but their governing powers are limited, and whatever can 
be done locally should be done locally. Each of the classical assemblies appoints two 
delegates to the General Synod, which is the governing body of the PCN on the national 
level. The General Synod’s responsibilities include theological education and ministry 
training, international missionary, diaconal and ecumenical cooperation, and legislation. 
Finally, to safeguard the position of the Lutheran minority, there is an Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod which has the right to delegate five representatives to the General Synod.243 
240 Protestant Church in the Netherlands. Retrieved from https://www.protestantsekerk.nl/over-ons/protestant-
church. 
241 Id. 
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Internationaal Netwerk van Lokale Initiatieven met Asielzoekers (INLIA) (International 
Network of Local Initiatives with Asylum Seekers)
This organization was founded in 1988 in the city of Groningen in the Netherlands. It was 
founded by representatives of local religious communities who felt that Europe’s asylum 
policies were unduly harsh, and that there was a subsequent need to work together and 
commit to giving concrete support in combating Europe’s harsh policies.244 Today, its 
network is composed of about 500 local faith communities. The organization’s work has 
consisted of providing legal aid, conducting research, supporting sanctuary, providing 
accommodation to certain categories of asylum seekers, and assisting asylum seekers in 
their resettlement efforts. 
With regard to legal aid, INLIA focuses its efforts on examining cases of rejected asylum 
seekers to determine whether there is a basis to reapply for asylum. To determine whether 
a basis to reapply exists, the asylum seekers must introduce new facts or circumstances, 
and this often requires research into the situation in the home country of the asylum 
seeker, which INLIA undertakes. Between 1987 and 1996, INLIA assisted in organizing 
sanctuary for more than 200 individual asylum seekers. Today, INLIA concentrates its 
resources on providing accommodation for asylum seekers who are no longer receiving 
support from the government. This includes, broadly, three categories of people: 1) those 
who are staying legally in the Netherlands because their procedure is still in process, 
but who are denied accommodation from the central government, 2) those who are in 
the process of gathering documents for repatriation, and 3) those with cases of serious 
humanitarian implications or medical problems. Finally, INLIA works with NGOs and 
churches to remove barriers that exist with respect to repatriation and resettlement.
3.4 |  Motivations and Limitations Relevant to the Decision-Making 
Process
This section examines the motivations and limitations that influence faith-based 
organizations’ decisions on whether to assist unauthorized stayers. FBOs were 
motivated by various biblical passages (scripture), government accountability245, and 
confrontation246. These motivations can be viewed as the normative considerations 
concerning whether unauthorized stayers should be helped. The motivations were 
considered in conjunction with certain limitations. These included resources, the 
organizational structure of the FBO, and the unauthorized stayer’s religious conviction. 
244 Source: INLIA representatives.
245 With “government accountability”, I refer to a collective sentiment felt by an FBO’s members that the 
government is not abiding by a variety of domestic and international laws, and should be held accountable for 
its actions.
246 With “confrontation”, I refer to any communication that brings the person of faith closer to the plight of 
unauthorized stayers. This includes, first-person meetings with unauthorized stayers, hearing stories about 
unauthorized stayers’ experiences, and biblical teachings retold during weekly worship services in church.
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They can be viewed as practical considerations that weigh on the question of whether a 
given FBO can actually do what it desires to do from its normative stance. The motivations 
and limitations are discussed in detail below. The last part of this section explains the 
utility and importance of considering the motivations and limitations holistically.
3.4.1 | Motivations
3.4.1.1 | Scripture
Various biblical passages were relevant motivations for most of the FBOs’ representatives 
with regard to their decisions to assist unauthorized stayers. Representatives cited 
passages explicitly relating to foreigners as well as those that did not specifically deal 
with foreigners. Various viewpoints regarding the interpretation of Romans 13 were 
expressed, and liberation theology was a core principle in several organizations’ work. 
Each is discussed in turn below.
Scripture Relating to the Foreigner
In the case of the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden, one representative stated that the 
instructions of Matthew 25247 were particularly important with regard to his decision to 
begin helping unauthorized stayers in 2008. Another representative from that church 
added that the books of Moses248 were an additional source of inspiration because of 
their repeated instructions to help and welcome the stranger. Additionally, in his view, 
people are required to obey God before they are required to obey governing authorities, 
especially if the government has failed. According to him, the government has failed 
when people are living on the streets. He then gave a concrete example of what he meant 
by government failure. Approximately 24 hours before this interview, he received a phone 
call regarding a man who was wandering the streets of Leiden, without money or other 
support. The city of Leiden refused to help him, stating that he was not the municipality’s 
responsibility because he had no connection with the city. City officials stated the man 
would have to go to the Hague if he wanted a shelter, food, or water. At this point, the 
representative’s assistant decided he would drive to Leiden, pick the man up, and drive 
him to the Hague where he would receive at least some basic needs from the municipal 
government there.
The representative of the Vuurhaard stated that the Bible generally, and Matthew 25 
specifically, influenced his and his organization’s decision to help unauthorized stayers. 
He also has meetings with volunteers at which they talk about this and other texts 
through their own personal lenses. In a similar vein, the representative of the PCN stated 
that the duty to care for people who do not have anything is “all over the Bible.” He then 
 
247 Matthew 25 (help the stranger) is discussed in the Introduction to Part One.
248 The books of Moses are the first five books of the Old Testament – Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and 
Deuteronomy. These five are also sometimes referred to as the Torah or the Pentateuch.
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mentioned that Matthew 25 and the seven works of charity are particularly influential 
in his ongoing assistance of unauthorized stayers. He mentioned also the parable of 
the Good Samaritan to explain the type of compassion and care he believes people owe 
one another, irrespective of legal status; that is, one must help the other irrespective 
of individual status. The representative of Vluchtelingen in de Knel simply said “When I 
was a stranger, you welcomed me.”249 She then added, “from my heart, in the first place, 
and from myself, I felt that I have a good life, and other people need a good life as well”, 
regardless of color.
The representative of Toevlucht stated that this type of work flows logically from what is 
preached. In his view, there are many scriptural words that either defend or inspire these 
kinds of actions. He cited the Books of Moses, which has laws relating to the treatment of 
the foreigner, and in particular the idea that the foreigner should not be taken advantage 
of. In his view, the teachings of Jesus Christ in the New Testament build on this principle, 
as can be seen in Matthew 25.
Scripture Not Explicitly Referencing the Foreigner
Not all representatives who were interviewed mentioned scriptural references that discuss 
treatment of the stranger specifically. The representative from the Stem van de Goede 
Herder stated that John 4 was a “jewel, a diamond” in its instructional capacity in guiding 
and inspiring him to do the work he does. John 4 tells the story of a Samaritan woman who 
meets Jesus at a well where he asks her for a drink of water, despite the non-association 
between Jews and Samaritans. Surprised at his request, the woman responds saying 
that Jews and Samaritans do not associate. This leads to a dialogue in which the woman 
discovers that this man knows a great deal about her life despite the fact they have never 
met before, and concludes that he must be the Messiah. Notwithstanding this knowledge 
of the woman’s good and bad, Jesus offers her a place in the heavenly kingdom. In this 
representative’s view, this story is powerful because it exemplifies the concept of grace: 
the woman has met somebody who knows everything about her, the good and the bad, 
but still loves her nonetheless. This is the guiding principle that this representative works 
under. Another “special text” for him is 1 Peter 1:1-12, which, in his view, inspires hope 
through God to all people, especially those who have left their homelands and struggle 
with depression, as they strive to build a new life in a foreign land. 
The PCN representative from Utrecht argued that in Romans, the state does not carry 
the shield “for nothing”, suggesting that it owes its people certain protections and 
provisions in return for their obedience of the laws. He followed this by referencing Psalm 
72, contained in the Book of Psalms in the Old Testament, stating that a country in which 
the king cares for the poor is a blessed one.
249 Some representatives who mentioned Matthew 25 and its specific reference to the stranger also mentioned its 
call to help the poor and the sick.
the dutch case 87
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 88
Viewpoints Regarding Romans 13
Several of the representatives interviewed found that there was a tension between Romans 
13 (submission to governing authorities) and Matthew 25, among others. When asked 
about the significance of Romans 13 and whether it stands in tension with Matthew 25, 
the PCN representative from Nijmegen stated that, in his view, it is used mostly by people 
who want to get rid of their responsibility. Additionally, it is more important to him to obey 
God and the teachings of Jesus than it is to obey the government. This sentiment of higher 
importance was also expressed by the representative of the Roman Catholic Diocese of 
‘s-Hertogenbosch. In his view, the moral obligation to help people in dire circumstances, 
regardless of the fact that their presence in the country is unauthorized, is higher than the 
obligation to obey the governing authorities and their laws. He added that politicians on 
the local level also agreed with this stance. The representative of the PCN from Utrecht 
did not expressly comment on whether there is a hierarchy of importance because, in his 
words, he is not a trained theologian. However, he did say that in cases of tension, one 
must look to the “narrative that binds all scriptures together.” In his view, promoting the 
wellbeing of all humans is one of the central binding themes of both the Old and New 
Testament, and laws that jeopardize this theme must be carefully scrutinized.
The representative of the Stem van de Goede Herder also stated that the very text of 
Romans 13 subordinates the government authorities to God. When asked about whether 
he saw a tension between Matthew 25 and Romans 13, he stated that he did, and his 
solution is to just “do what’s right.” In arriving at “what’s right”, his background in 
his congregation, at which mercy is the focal point, is very instructive. Finally, the 
representative of Toevlucht agreed that there is a tension, but he felt that he was not 
sinning against the law because he was not defying the democratic system. He added 
that he respects the government, but does not believe the words of Paul necessarily mean 
that one should blindly follow everything the government decides, especially in light of 
the fact that many other scriptural words oppose his idea. Ultimately, according to him, 
it cannot be the purpose of these words to defend yourself from something bad that you 
have done. Thus, it appears that, at least in certain contexts and with respect to certain 
members of the Christian community, one biblical instruction can take precedence over 
another, and they are not always to be applied unequivocally.
However, not all representatives who were interviewed believed that there was a tension 
between Matthew 25 and Romans 13 in the context of assisting unauthorized stayers. One 
representative of INLIA argued that in his view, there is no necessary tension between 
the instructions of Matthew 25 and Romans 13. He stated that he can simultaneously 
respect the authority of the state and act his conscience under Matthew 25 to help a 
person in need. To his mind, there is no contradiction between these two instructions for 
a person who is truly a believer. Though Matthew 25 surfaced in almost every interview as 
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Liberation Theology
The representative from the Vuurhaard stated that he was inspired and guided by 
liberation theology and its focus on aiding the oppressed. The representative from 
the Wereldhuis was also inspired by liberation theology, but stated that she could not 
distinguish, in her mind, whether she was more influenced by scripture and theology, or 
by her conscience. She found it difficult to separate conscience from theology, and so she 
was unsure what the underlying catalyst was that motivated her to assist unauthorized 
stayers. In addition to these two representatives, one other interviewee in the Netherlands 
referred to liberation theology as a guiding force in inspiring her to do this type of work. 
The representative of Toevlucht stated that, in her view, the key message of liberation 
theology is to involve the people you are trying to help in the process of trying to help 
them, because this is the only way to truly see what their needs are. To her, liberation 
theology gives a lot of emphasis to the identification of Jesus with the poor, and that if 
one truly desires to follow Jesus and identify with the poor, then he must go outside of the 
community to find such people because they are often marginalized or completely shut 
out of society.
3.4.1.2 | Government Accountability
The idea that the government should be held accountable when it does not fulfill its 
obligations was voiced by representatives of several faith-based organizations. However, 
merely vocalizing disapproval of government actions was not enough. Recognizing that 
unauthorized stayers often find themselves in emergency situations without access to 
support, FBOs decided to step in to patch the holes in the social safety nets.
The majority of funding that the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden received came from 
other churches whose members believed that no one should be living on the streets. 
Then, once the courts ruled in 2014 that the government must finance these basic 
necessities250, the donations halted. In other words, churches stepped into the shoes 
of the government when they felt the government had neglected its duties by failing to 
finance the basic necessities of life for everyone, and stepped out of them when the 
judicial system mandated the government to provide financing. The representative of the 
Stem van de Goede Herder also believes that it is appropriate for churches to step in 
when the government does not fulfill its duties. As an example of such church action, he 
alluded to a case of church asylum in Groningen, in which a Syrian family took refuge in a 
church for a period of months.
The representative of the Vuurhaard stated that he, as an individual, believes he should 
do what he can when he thinks that the government is not doing its job. For instance, he 
vocalizes these viewpoints via television, website, and newsletter. Moreover, he does 
not fear being arrested for taking actions that contravene the government; in fact, at 
 
250 See Sections 6.3.3 to 6.3.8.
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one point he hoped that he would be arrested just so he could raise more awareness 
regarding the government’s misdoings. In a similar vein, the representative of the PCN in 
Utrecht stated that although it is the government’s and not the churches’ responsibility to 
ensure that the basic needs are met for all of the people within the country’s territories, 
it is task of the churces and of everybody to step in when the government does not do 
so. The representative of the PCN in Utrecht agreed with this sentiment, adding that the 
European Committee of Social Rights’ decision251 concluded that “every state in the world 
is responsible for giving the elementary facilities which human beings need to survive 
irrespective of whether they have status or not.”
The representative of the Toevlucht stated that it is the government’s responsibility to 
provide the basic necessities to people within its territory, regardless of their residence 
status. He stated that although immigration laws are needed, there is a certain minimum 
that must be guaranteed to everyone no matter what. He argued that, just as we agree 
that prohibition against torture is unequivocal, so too must be the provision of the basic 
necessities of life to all people.
3.4.1.3 | Confrontation
First-hand exposure and interaction with asylum seekers had a profound impact on at 
least one interviewee with respect to his sentiment regarding the assistance of such 
people. The representative from the Roman Catholic Diocese of ‘s-Hertogenbosch stated 
that confrontation with a concrete person, such as a child, is much more powerful than 
hearing or reading about numbers of people seeking asylum. In the case of the Tamrazyan 
family discussed above, the vast media coverage was a catalyst in that family’s eventual 
receipt of asylum in the Netherlands. Media coverage as a catalyst to halting expulsions 
is not a new phenomenon. Over thirty years ago, an article about Syrian Christians and 
their journey to securing successful asylum applications opened with the words “when 
a refused asylum seeker gets a face, and often appears on television, there is such a 
heavy pressure that it is almost impossible to let the deportation proceed.”252 While 
these words may sound bold, the empathy evoked through first-hand exposure, coupled 
with the political implications, undoubtedly made the asylum decision more delicate and 
challenging. The representative of the Toevlucht stated that if she did not see the faces 
of migrants when she worked in predominantly migrant neighborhoods in Utrecht, she 
would think only in numbers. By this, she meant that the mainstream media tended to 
portray migration as a problem and refer only to numbers to support its stance, while 
ignoring the backgrounds and stories of real migrants, real people with faces and 
personalities, in the Netherlands. In the experience of several organizations, people who 
initially did not understand or connect with asylum seekers and their plight changed their 
views when actually meeting people face to face and listening to their stories. To facilitate 
more of this understanding, those organization arranged meals from time to time, to 
251 Id.
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which members of local governments as well as people from the community would be 
invited to “break bread” with asylum seekers.
Another representative of Toevlucht expressed his view that, in addition to meeting an 
asylum seeker in person, the confrontation that people experience when they attend 
church services and hear the teachings every week inspire them to help. He added that 
with regard to nonreligious people, it is easier for them to ignore the plight of unauthorized 
stayers because they are not confronted with teachings regarding migrants and migration 
on a regular, more or less weekly, basis.
3.4.2 | Limitations
3.4.2.1 | Resources
The resources available to the faith-based organizations and their members were a 
concern voiced by every representative who was interviewed. These concerns related to 
both financial limitations, which impact the ability to offer all types of assistance, and 
logistical limitations, which most profoundly impact the ability of an organization to 
offer shelter. The limitations seemed to have a bearing on both the decision of whether 
to assist an unauthorized stayer at all, and then in what capacity assistance would be 
provided. Specifically, these limitations dictated how many people could be helped and 
which types of assistance would be offered. 
Financial Limitations
The financial constraints of an organization have implications not only on the type of 
help offered and the amount of people who can be helped, but also on structure of 
the organization itself. The amount of funding and the source of funding can dictate 
the type of help an organization can offer, and the number (and types) of people it can 
help. Financial limitations can also have a profound effect on the overall viability of 
the organization, and may pressure an organization to merge with another if it wishes 
to continue performing the type of work it does. The amount of funding, the source of 
funding, and the organizational implications are discussed in turn below.
Amount of Funding
In the case of the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden, the type of help offered shifted 
after the 2014 court ruling253 that the government must provide overnight shelter, food, 
and a shower to homeless asylum seekers. Prior to the so-called Bed, Bath, and Bread 
ruling in 2014, the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden received donations from other 
churches. These donations were sufficient to sustain between five and ten people at a 
 
 
253  See Sections 6.3.3 to 6.3.8.
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time, providing them with shelter, food, judicial advice, spiritual care, and necessities of 
everyday life. After the ruling, the donations from other churches ceased, and the budget 
became severely limited. Thus, between 2014 and 2018, the type of assistance that this 
church has been able to provide is limited to spiritual care, legal advice, and helping 
people gain access to the food bank.
In another part of the country, the PCN is involved in running a Bed, Bath, and Bread 
shelter. The PCN representative from Nijmegen established a foundation to operate such 
a shelter in that city. The shelter is heavily subsidized by the local government. According 
to the representative, it would not be possible for him and the foundation to run the 
shelter solely through PCN funding and without these government subsidies. Thus, the 
local government is financing the provision of the namesake requirements: shelter, a 
bath, and food. However, the PCN finances a weekly allowance of about ten Euros for 
the people staying at the shelter. So, while standing alone, the PCN would not be able 
to finance the entire operations of the shelter, working with local government, they are 
together able to meet the basic needs of people staying at the shelter.
Source of Funding
The source of financing for an organization can be just as limiting as the monetary amount 
an organization has at its disposal. Above, I discussed examples in which organizations 
were limited by the amount of money they had, and they often had to pick and choose 
which types of help to offer from a finite pool of financial resources. However, there are 
situations in which it is not the amount but rather the source that determines whom the 
organizations help and in what capacity. According to the representatives of Toevlucht, 
there has been an ongoing battle of finances since the Toevlucht was opened in December 
of 2013. At the time it was opened, churches were the main source of funding, but they 
were funding under protest, meaning that they believed it was the government who should 
be providing shelter to these people.254 Afterward, the municipality agreed to fund it, also 
under protest, and later threatened to shut it down. This threat was extinguished when a 
large group of people from various backgrounds protested this threatened action. In 2018, 
the municipality continues to fund Toevlucht, but they have since attached conditions, or 
criteria, as to who constitutes the target group. For instance, the municipality has ended 
support for people in the Dublin procedure, and people who have no tie to Utrecht. 
Justice and Peace Netherlands relies on a wide-ranging, diverse group of people and 
entities for its funding. This includes the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European 
Union and its various organs, private funds, and donations from individuals. The 
organization has experienced situations in which the first two of these, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the European Union, have refused to fund certain projects while 
continuing to fund others. He did not provide more details on this issue. 
254 Opvang voor ongedocumenteerde mannen in Utrecht. Retrieved from http://toevluchtutrecht.nl/. 
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Organizational Implications
Financial limitations do not dictate only the capacity of an organization to perform its work. 
The risk of losing financing have had broader organizational implications on at least one 
organization. As mentioned above, the VLotteam was founded around 2003 by a small 
group of volunteers aspiring to help unauthorized stayers. They did not have a religious 
motivation for starting this work. Without reference to religious obligation, they were 
responding to what they believed was a societal problem that needed to be remedied. 
However, due to certain developments in 2015 and onward stemming from the conflicts 
between the central government and municipal governments, the team reconsidered the 
sustainability of its work with an eye to financial commitments. Specifically, the VLotteam 
was concerned that if the central municipalities accepted the central government’s 
proposal of closing all shelters except for a certain number of shelters in eight large Dutch 
cities in exchange for the central government’s funding of these shelters, the VLotteam 
would lose funding commitments from two major cities in the south of the Netherlands 
which were not chosen as one of the eight. Thus, to continue to do its work, the VLotteam 
believed that it had to merge with a larger organization with a stable source of funding, 
and this organization happened to have very prominent religious roots.
Logistical Limitations
Logistical concerns regarding space have been a significant limitation at the Vuurhaard. 
According to the representative of the Vuurhaard, they have had to turn people away 
and send them to Bed-Bath-Bread shelters simply because there were no more rooms 
available. The number of people that can be helped at one time is limited by this very 
practical consideration of space. The same concern is shared by INLIA, whose ability to 
shelter people is limited by the physical space of the two properties they are able to use 
for this purpose. Physical space is also a limiting factor at the Stem van de Goede Herder, 
whose representative stated that the small size of the congregation (about 60 members) 
makes it difficult to offer shelter to all of those in need. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
about a third of the members are present or former asylum seekers with limited means. 
Notwithstanding, there have been limited instances in which shelter was offered. For 
instance, the representative who was interviewed housed an underage rejected asylum 
seeker for several days after he was kicked out of the asylum seeker center. Another 
member of the church, an asylum seeker whose application was positively assessed, 
provided shelter to an elderly man whose accommodation in the asylum seeker center 
was terminated after his application for asylum was rejected. Logistical limitations appear 
to concern primarily those who do not have substantial amounts of financial resources, 
because if they did, they could likely rent or buy buildings to use for this purpose.
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3.4.2.2 | Organizational Structure
As already mentioned above, the lack of financial resources may require an FBO to merge 
with a larger organization with more funding, thus changing its own structure. With such 
structural changes often come new rules. One such rule that at least two organizations 
were required to follow was that only a person who had a likelihood of securing authorized 
residence status would be helped. For instance, the Vuurhaard would accept only people 
who were recommended to it by the Dutch Refugee Council. The Dutch Refugee Council 
engaged in independent reassessments of asylum applications that were denied. It did so 
to determine whether, in its view, the applicant would have a chance at a positive decision 
if he or she would reapply and include, for instance, more supporting documentation 
regarding the asylum request. The Dutch Refugee Council would then recommend people 
who were positively reevaluated by it to the organization. The Dutch Refugee Council thus 
served as a vetting mechanism for the organization sheltering unauthorized stayers. 
VLotteam also assists rejected asylum seekers who wish to reapply for asylum. VLotteam 
helps them with housing and also connects them with immigration lawyers to determine 
whether a second application is worth pursuing. If so, then lawyers work with the asylum 
seekers in building the case for asylum. If not, then the focus of the help shifts from 
second asylum application to figuring out a return strategy. This involves, among other 
things, obtaining documentation in the country of origin that would enable the individual 
to return. At times, though, this process reveals certain details about the situation in the 
country of origin that may be beneficial in the asylum application, and then the second 
application procedure is started or resumed. For the severely mentally or physically 
ill, the organization makes an exception to its “likelihood of obtaining authorized 
residence” policy and allows them to remain there under care, acknowledging them as an 
exceptionally vulnerable group that deserves utmost care and attention. 
3.4.2.3 | The Unauthorized Stayer’s Religious Conviction 
With regard to two churches, the unauthorized stayer’s religious conviction or desire 
to alter his religious conviction played a critical role in the church’s assistance. Both 
representatives of the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden stated that while they did not 
seek to assist only people of a certain ethnic or national background, they did seek people 
who were either already Christian or desired to convert to Christianity, and in particular 
Pentecostal Christianity. However, rather than the church finding such people, the people 
tended to find the church by word of mouth. Nonetheless, the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten 
Leiden limited its assistance to those who were Christian or wished to complete the 
conversion process.
Word of mouth was also the primary mechanism by which asylum seekers found their 
way to the Stem van de Goede Herder. When the church was founded, some of its first 
members visited four asylum seeker centers in the south of Limburg and invited asylum 
seekers to the church. This is how the initial connection was fostered. Afterward, new 
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people were brought to the church by the first group of asylum seekers who were invited 
by the first members, and so on. As mentioned before, some of the asylum seekers had 
already been granted authorization to stay, while some were unauthorized stayers as 
a result of their asylum applications being denied. The unauthorized stayers who are 
helped by the church are primarily asylum seekers who are in the process of reapplying 
for asylum on a new ground. This new ground is that they wish to convert to Christianity, 
but Christians are persecuted in their countries of origin. Despite the fact that the 
majority of unauthorized stayers whom the members of the Stem van de Goede Herder 
have helped desired to convert to Christianity, the representative stated that they “want 
to help anyone.” According to the representative, it was not a criterion for aid that the 
person desires to convert to Christianity. However, asylum seekers who were brought to 
the church knew that it was a Christian place of worship they were visiting. To what extent 
this is a signal that these people were genuinely interested in Christianity apart from its 
perceived benefit in aiding a second application for asylum can only be speculated.
The situation of the Stem van de Goede Herder is comparable to at least one portion of 
the people that the VLotteam helps in the south of the Netherlands. According to the 
representative of the VLotteam, the basic principle is that all vulnerable people are to 
be helped, irrespective of their religious conviction. In practice, however, a substantial 
group of the people are those who have once (or more) been rejected asylum and are 
now in the process of lodging a second asylum application with the IND, many relying 
on a conversion to Christianity as a basis for the second asylum application. Thus, while 
religious conviction, or a desire to convert, is not a criterion for the VLotteam to help 
unauthorized stayers, many of them are recent converts or in the process of converting.255
3.4.3 | The Importance of Considering the Motivations and Limitations Holistically
In the Dutch context, I have identified a number of motivations and limitations that can 
provide some insight as to what influences a faith-based organization’s position on 
assisting unauthorized stayers. However, these should not be considered in a vacuum; 
they should be considered in relation to each other. Again, there is no precise formula 
as to which motivation or limitation carries more weight with respect to predicting the 
stance an FBO will take, but generally, the strength and predictive value of one motivation 
or limitation depends on the presence and strength of another motivation or limitation.
For instance, while VLotteam was able to independently secure the financing for its 
operations, it helped a wide range of people in need, without reference to formal rules 
or criteria. It was able to actualize its motivation to help all people in need. However, 
concerns over financing led the organization to merge with a larger one with more 
255 This final limitation that was observed in the Dutch context could potentially be also viewed as a motivation. 
That is, it could be said that the FBOs that exclusively, or almost exclusively, help those with a conviction in 
Christianity are motivated by a desire to increase their membership. However, because no representatives 
have expressly stated this, it is more safely viewed as a limitation rather than a motivation. In other words, 
viewing it as a limitation is more objective and does not require speculation on the part of the researcher.
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funding. With this merger came new criteria as to who could be helped. So originally, 
the motivation to help all in need was more or less fully realized; subsequently, due to 
funding problems that led to merging with a larger organization, it could only help people 
who fulfilled criteria of that larger FBO. A similar situation was observed with respect to 
the Vuurhaard. While its representatives believe that mercy should be the underlying 
theme of helping all people, the Vuurhaard is bound to serve only those who are pre-
approved by the Dutch Refugee Council. It is critical to consider both the motivations 
and limitations when trying to understand the delicate contours of FBO assistance to 
unauthorized stayers.
3.5 | Conclusions
The interviews with representatives of Christian FBOs in the Netherlands have revealed 
three motivations and three limitations that help explain why FBOs assist unauthorized 
stayers. The motivations include scripture, government accountability, and confrontation. 
The limitations include resources, organizational structure, and the unauthorized stayer’s 
religious conviction.
Scripture appeared to have a more limited role in influencing FBOs’ work in assisting 
unauthorized stayers than may have been assumed. Scripture was not a motivation for 
every representative. Some were motivated by general humanistic ideals to help those in 
need, while others had found inspiration from various religions from all over the world. 
One FBO may not even have qualified as an FBO until several years ago when it joined a 
larger FBO to maintain its operations afloat. Notwithstanding, the references to scripture 
were numerous, but the exact impact of scripture on a person’s or FBO’s decision is 
difficult to gauge. Representatives tended to be well-versed in scripture, but could not 
always identify whether it was scripture that influenced them, or a broader notion of doing 
“what’s right” from a humanistic viewpoint. This begs the question: should it matter 
whether they draw their inspiration from scripture, or humanistic ideals? The question is 
relevant because contemporary human rights law expressly protects (to a certain degree) 
thought and conducted rooted in religion, while not offering the same explicit protection 
for conduct not readily attributable to religion. This is explored in Chapter 8. 
Finally, it is worth noting that several of the FBOs have experienced their own micro-
secularization. By this I mean that the older members who are beginning to retire are 
religious, while the newer ones who are replacing them do not identify with a religion at 
all. Nonetheless, they continue to do the same work with the same passion. This offers 
further support for the idea that common principles underlie work that is deemed to be 
grounded in religion, and work that is unaffiliated with religion.
In addition to scripture, FBOs found motivation in notions of government accountability 
and confrontation. While most FBOs acknowledged that it was the government’s 
responsibility to ensure anyone within its borders is taken care of, they felt they had to 
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step in when the government was not doing so. This was especially the case when their 
members saw the homelessness that resulted in the streets of their municipalities as a 
result of the government’s new immigration laws and policies. FBOs were limited by their 
access to resources. Where funding came from was at times as important as how much 
funding there was available because the provider of the funding dictated the criteria for 
who could be helped and in what capacity. The way an FBO is organized has the similar 
effect of applying criteria as to who could be helped. Finally, two FBOs interviewed were 
effectively limited to helping only those unauthorized stayers who were Christian or 
desired to convert to Christianity. 
Whatever the exact argument articulated by an FBO, the work done by FBOs has had a 
profound impact not only on the lives of unauthorized stayers, but also on migration 
policy and the balance of power among different layers of government. For instance, 
the willingness of police officers to accept INLIA registration documents as a form of 
identification (and therefore forgo issuing a fine) illustrates a level of deference afforded 
to a non-governmental faith-based organization by a government employee, in this case a 
police officer, who is responsible for the execution of the law. The police officer, however, 
is also responsible for maintaining the public order, and if it is maintained despite the lack 
of a formal identification document, Dutch practicality suggests this response. Another 
way in which FBOs affected migration policy is through the provision of church asylum. 
Not only does the practice of church asylum call into question the central government’s 
(constitutional) monopoly over immigration matters, it has produced results that affected 
a wider segment of the population than just the individuals taking refuge in a church. 
Indeed, as recently as January 2019, the children’s pardon’s criteria were relaxed to 
allow over 1,000 people to stay in the Netherlands. Additionally, fact-finding missions in 
countries of origin are essentially a fact-checking mechanism that pressures the central 
government to vigilantly and thoroughly assess situations in origin countries before 
considering them in asylum applications.
Faith-based organizations are not regular actors in migration, at least not from a legal 
perspective. However, they are not shy to become involved when they disagree with 
the government’s actions. From recent events, we see that FBOs in the Netherlands are 
marshaled into action when the government passes laws that jeopardize unauthorized 
stayers’ access to minimum care (food, shelter, and hygiene), or when a particular family 
or group is threatened with deportation (as in the 2018-2019 case of church asylum). 
Often, they act together with municipal governments. FBOs’ collaboration with municipal 
governments in assisting unauthorized stayers is examined in Part Two.
the dutch case 97
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 98
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 99
chapter 4
The American and Dutch Cases 
Compared
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 100
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 101
4.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
This chapter analyzes the themes emerging from the American and Dutch faith-based 
organizations’ assistance to unauthorized stayers (that is, people whose stay in the 
country is not authorized or is no longer authorized by that country’s authorities). This 
chapter addresses the broader implications of the motivations and limitations that were 
discussed in the previous two chapters. Specifically, I discuss their bearing on church-
state relations and the related principle of separation of church and state.
Section 4.2 opens with a discussion on the different models of church-state relations 
that have been advanced by scholars in both countries in an attempt to conceptualize 
this relationship. Then, drawing on the results of the research conducted in Chapters 2 
and 3, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 explore how these models of church-state relations could 
be improved. Section 4.3 explains the utility of disaggregating the actors “church” and 
“state”. In other words, it elucidates how the accuracy of existing models on church-state 
relations can be improved: by thinking of the church and state each as entities comprising 
many diverse parts and actors, rather than as conglomerations. Section 4.4 stresses the 
dynamic nature of church-state relations. The relationship between the two changes, 
sometimes frequently, in response to certain stimuli. These stimuli can be understood 
through the lens of the motivations and limitations identified in the previous chapters. 
In this section, the motivations and limitations are analyzed comparatively to explain 
how they contribute to the dynamic nature of church-state relations. Finally, Section 4.5 
provides a number of concluding remarks.
4.2 | Models of Church-State Relations
Faith based organizations’ assistance to unauthorized stayers invites discussion on 
church-state relations. The principle of separation of church and state is recognized in 
some form in both the United States and in the Netherlands. In the United States, this 
principle is enshrined in the so-called Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion.” In a landmark US Supreme Court case, the Everson court declared, “[t]he 
First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept 








256 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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the federal government and the state governments.257 In the Netherlands, the principle 
emerged around 1796 when the Dutch Reformed Church ceased to be the established 
church of the country. Though the separation of church and state is not explicitly 
mentioned, it is implicitly embodied through a combination of guarantees codified in the 
Dutch Constitution. These include mainly Article 1258, which prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of religion, and Article 6259, which guarantees the free exercise of religion.
While this principle may seem straightforward in the abstract, the reality is much more 
nuanced and complex. The reality is that the degree of separation between church 
and state varies along a continuum. Legal scholars in both countries have attempted 
to model church-state relations. In the American context, the idea that there ought to 
be an “impregnable wall” between church and state represents one theory on church-
state relations – strict separation. This theory is one of three main theories informing the 
church-state debate. Chemerinsky credits the birth of this approach to the Jeffersonian 
understanding of the Establishment clause, explained by Justice Rutledge in his dissent 
in the Everson case:
The Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a 
single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in 
England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. 
But the object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It 
was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity 
and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support 
for religion.260 
The basic idea is that if religion becomes intertwined with government at all, the result is 
always the coercion to participate in that faith. And, in a country of different faiths or no 
faiths, people are excluded on this basis, which in turn divides a country ostensibly built 
on pluralistic ideals. 
257 “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax 
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice 
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a 
wall of separation between Church and State.’” Id. at 15-16.
258 “All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds 
of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.”
259 “1. Everyone shall have the right to profess freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community with 
others, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law.
  2. Rules concerning the exercise of this right other than in buildings and enclosed places may be laid down by 
Act of Parliament for the protection of health, in the interest of traffic and to combat or prevent disorders.”
260 Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 31-32.
102 chapter 4
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 103
The second approach to the Establishment Clause is known as the neutrality theory. 
Under this approach, the government cannot favor one religion over another, and it 
cannot favor religion over non-religion. Kurland has described this approach, stating 
“the clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize 
religion as a standard of action or inaction because these clauses, read together as 
they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to 
impose a burden.”261 To evaluate the neutrality of a government action, several justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States have used a “symbolic endorsement” test. 
Under this test, the Establishment Clause is violated if the government has symbolically 
endorsed a particular religion, or generally endorsed either religion or secularism. Other 
justices reject this approach due to the difficulty of its application.
The third approach is known as the accommodation approach. This approach permits 
the loosest degree of separation between church and state. Under this theory, courts 
should recognize the importance of religion historically and socially by accommodating 
it on equal footing with non-religion. This approach posits that the government violates 
the Establishment Clause only if it establishes a church, coerces religious participation, 
or favors some religions over others.262 
In the Netherlands, Vermeulen has identified five models of church-state relations. 
According to Vermeulen, the totalitarian secularism model, which subscribes to atheism 
as the official doctrine, lies on one end of the spectrum.263 Under this model, schools 
and other institutions are seen as organs of the state that must propagate the official 
doctrine, usually displaying also unconditional obedience to a supreme leader or party. 
Religious freedom is completely absent or relegated to the limited private sphere of 
family life. On the other end of the spectrum is the theocracy model, under which the 
state strictly endorses one religion at the exclusion of others. Religious minorities are 
oppressed and sometimes persecuted while the state religion is actively propagated 
in schools and public spheres. Neither of these two models has significant support in 
the Netherlands because of their incompatibility with the basic principles and values 
of Western Democracy. Thus, the relevant models are three that fall between these two 
extremes.
The first of the three is the strong “separationist” model, similar to the American “strict 
separation” approach, summarized by Vermeulen as follows:
261 Kurland, P. (1961). Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 96.
262 Chemerinsky, E., & Choper, J. H. (2019). Constitutional Law: principles and policies. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 
1263-64.
263 Vermeulen, B.P. On Freedom, Equality and Citizenship: Changing Fundamentals of Dutch Minority Policy and 
Law (immigration, integration, education, and religion. In: Foblets, M.-C. (2010). Cultural Diversity and the 
Law: State Responses from around the World. Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 45-143.
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[it] seeks to exclude religion from the sphere of the government, the school system 
and the public sphere in general. It presumes a strong separation of church and state. 
Religion should remain a private matter, belonging to the realm of purely individual 
choices, while only the state is concerned with public affairs. Religion and politics 
should be kept apart. When they are mixed – the state dictating or favoring religious 
beliefs, or religion using the state for its purposes – both of them suffer. Therefore, the 
state should be neutral on religious matters, and this neutrality is best maintained 
by keeping religion and politics separate, and by keeping religious views outside the 
public sphere.264
The second model, similar to the American neutrality approach, has been termed the 
pluralist-cooperationist view. According to it, government should not take sides among 
different religions and secularism, and should treat them evenly. Religious freedom 
under this model can mandate active state involvement in its assurance.265
The third model is the established or privileged church model. While in some ways similar 
to the American accommodation approach, it goes further and permits the government to 
favor a church or group of churches to partner with and advance both church and state 
causes. Religious freedom is guaranteed in the private sphere, but established churches 
have a favored status in the treatment by the government.266
4.3 | Disaggregation of Church and State
While these models are useful to illustrate that church-state relations are better 
understood on a continuum, they tend to describe systems too generally, which can 
lead to inaccuracy. To more accurately conceptualize and model church-state relations, 
it is useful to disaggregate the church and the state. The state can be functionally 
disaggregated into three branches: the judicial, legislative, and executive, bearing in 
mind also that these exist on local and central levels. For purposes of this research, I 
use the commonly understood definitions of these terms. Judicial refers to people and 
entities with the power to decide cases and controversies, legislative refers to lawmakers, 
and executive refers to law enforcers. The church, for purposes of this research, can first 
be broadly disaggregated into Catholicism and Protestantism. Within each, there are 
substantial differences between the work of churches, the work of religious orders, and 
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4.3.1 | Disaggregation of the State
The utility of this disaggregation becomes apparent when discussing the ways in 
which certain faith-based organizations interact with different levels and branches of 
government. As mentioned above, faith-based organizations’ assistance to unauthorized 
stayers includes some combination of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and legal 
advice. In their efforts to ensure these are provided to unauthorized stayers, FBOs 
navigate different avenues and implicate, in varying capacities, the three branches of 
government mentioned above. Starting with the judicial branch, there is a distinction 
to be made between the work of certain churches, which navigate the regular legal 
procedure that starts with a complaint and follows with adjudicative procedures, and 
that of other churches, in which the church assumes the role of an independent judicial 
body outside of the judicial system. In other words, in the former, a church may file a 
complaint against a party and await the relevant court’s adjudication of the case. In the 
latter, rather than availing itself of the legal procedure to determine whether the law has 
been violated, the church itself decides the issue. An example of both should clarify this 
significant distinction.
The case of CEC v. the Netherlands267 provides an example of the former. In that case, Kerk 
in Actie (the diaconal organ of the PCN in Utrecht), along with a group of churches, lodged 
a complaint against the Netherlands, alleging that it has failed to fulfill its obligations 
under the European Social Charter by failing to provide unauthorized stayers with food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical assistance. Kerk in Actie and the other FBOs in that case 
thus availed themselves of the established judicial system to present their case and 
ultimately prevail on the issue of whether these basic necessities must be provided 
for everyone, including unauthorized stayers.268 By contrast, Southside Presbyterian in 
Tucson and WAUCC in Chicago did not file a complaint against the United States when 
its members believed the government had failed to fulfill its obligations by systemically 
denying asylum to thousands of Central Americans fleeing wars in the 1980s. Rather, 
they, along with other churches around the country, decided that they would provide 
shelter to people who have been, according to them, improperly denied asylum by the 
 
267 This case is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.3 through Section 6.3.8. In short: a group of FBOs lodged a 
complaint against the Netherlands before the European Committee of Social Rights. This committee is an organ 
of the Council of Europe and is charged with the task of deciding cases originating under alleged violations of 
the European Social Charter. In this case, the committee found that the Netherlands had violated two articles 
of the charter when it passed a new law that ended accommodation of asylum seekers four weeks after their 
claims for asylum were rejected. Essentially, people were thrown out into the street after the government 
refused to grant their asylum applications. This, the plaintiffs alleged, violated articles include Article 13, 
guaranteeing the right to social and medical assistance, and Article 31, guaranteeing the right to housing. 
According to the committee, these rights belong to all people residing in the territory of a signatory state.
268 Also relevant to note here is that Kerk in Actie did not avail itself of the Dutch courts. Rather, it utilized a 
supranational organ of the Council of Europe who is tasked with adjudicating claims arising from the European 
Social Charter.
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US government authorities (in particular the executive branch).269 This stance was then 
memorialized in letters to the United States attorney general, which stated that they would 
be sheltering people because asylum seekers were being illegally denied asylum and 
illegally deported. Rather than relying on an established judicial system for resolution, 
these churches themselves adjudicated the question of whether the US government was 
in conformity with domestic and international refugee law. They concluded it was not.270
The WAUCC’s independent “adjudication” of the executive branch’s conduct was the 
first step in its response to its perceived failures on the part of the government. After 
“striking down” the law on grounds that the government (again, in particular the 
executive branch) failed to fulfill its obligations arising from international asylum and 
refugee law, it assumed the role of a lawmaking body by “re-writing” the law. Of course, 
the church did not actually re-write any laws in the legally-binding sense, but it did 
adopt a policy it believed was consistent with what international public law mandated 
– providing asylum to people fleeing their countries of origin on account of certain types 
of persecution. Other churches implicate the legislative branch through cooperation 
rather than assuming the role of a lawmaker. For instance, the unauthorized stayers 
who live at the Vuurhaard regularly host dinners to which they invite members of the 
community, including politicians. Among others, they have hosted at least one local 
politician from the GroenLinks (Green Left) party, who, at the conclusion of the event, 
expressed approval and general positivity regarding that organization’s work. Though 
the organization did not explicitly lobby the politician for amending the law, it believed 
that simply bridging the gap between the local politicians and unauthorized stayers 
through physical exposure and verbal communication would reduce bias and prejudice 
from both sides. By doing so, the organization hoped that politicians would then legislate 
with a real person in mind, rather than the idea of a person.  Vluchtelingen in de Knel 
employed a similar strategy that produced similar results: it hosted politicians from the 
municipality for dinners with the aim of bridging the gap between these groups of people. 
As time went on, the municipality started to support the organization with funding for 
food, shelter, and other forms of assistance.
When the WAUCC adopted the policy it believed to be consistent with international asylum 
and refugee law obligations, it engaged in its own policy-making, a task traditionally 
relegated to the legislative branch of government. And, when it provided asylum in its 
members’ homes (consistent with its policy), it engaged in a task traditionally relegated to 
the executive branch of government: enforcement of the policy. This legislative/executive 
function was observed with respect to churches in the Netherlands as well. The Volle 
Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden provided unauthorized stayers with, among other things, 
shelter, when the government refused to do so, believing the government’s decision was 
wrong. This effort was funded by local churches until the government began to fulfill its 
269 The churches that sent letters to the attorney general did not tend to take issue with the law as it was written 
but rather the manner in which it was (or was not ) properly effectuated.
270 Some members of these churches that chose to engage in their own independent adjudication, however, did 
not escape the wrath of the government in court. Recall U.S. v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
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obligations as a result of the CEC v. the Netherlands. Representatives of both the PCN 
and the Catholic Church in the Netherlands stated that although it is the government’s 
responsibility to provide the basic necessities to everyone, someone must step in and do 
so when the government shirks its obligations. That “someone” includes the faith-based 
organizations. 
4.3.2 | Disaggregation of the Church
A disaggregation of “church” is also useful in depicting a more accurate representation of 
church-state relations. As a starting point, there are substantial differences between the 
Catholic tradition and the Protestant tradition regarding church asylum. Catholic churches 
and their (high-ranking) members in both counties tend to avoid being associated with 
church asylum. For instance, a Dutch bishop in den Bosch who was interviewed stated 
that no Catholic church in a Dutch parish has ever engaged in the practice of church 
asylum. In a similar vein, an American cardinal in Chicago has recently stated “we have not 
named our churches as ‘sanctuaries’ solely because it would be irresponsible to create 
false hope that we can protect people from law-enforcement actions, however unjust 
or inhumane we may view them to be.”271 By contrast, Protestant churches tend to be 
more transparent regarding their role in church asylum. Indeed, hundreds  of Protestant 
churches across the United States joined efforts to provide shelter to Central Americans 
fleeing wars during the 1980s in what came to be known as the Sanctuary Movement.272 
Similarly, Protestant churches in the Netherlands in the 1980s served as sanctuaries for, 
among others, Turkish, Eritrean, and Tamil asylum seekers.273 Still, it would be inaccurate 
to say that the Protestant tradition is more amenable to the practice of  assisting 
unauthorized stayers than is the Catholic tradition. A further level of disaggregation of 
both reveals why.
The Catholic Church is organized hierarchically with defined roles for its leaders. Put 
simply, the structure of the Catholic Church includes the Pope at the top, the bishops 
below him, and the priests below them. Each tier of leadership is supervised by, and 
bound to, the rules set by the tier above. Historically, the Catholic Church has generally 
been a law-abiding institution, wary of stepping on the toes of the government. This is 
seen in the above example of the American bishop, who refused to open up the doors 
of Catholic churches for asylum because he did not want to stand in the way of law 
enforcement actions. His view appears to be that it is not the appropriate role of (Catholic) 
churches to stand in the way of the law and challenge law-enforcement actions, at least 
with respect to church asylum. So, while a priest within that diocese could theoretically 
271 Cardinal: No Immigration Agents On Church Property Without Warrant. (2017, March 01). Retrieved from https://
chicago.cbslocal.com/2017/03/01/blase-cupich-no-immigration-agents-on-church-property-without-warrant/. 
272 For an excellent analysis of the Sanctuary Movement from an anthropological-legal angle, see Rose, A. (2012). 
Showdown in the Sonoran Desert religion, law, and the immigration controversy. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
273 Bronkhorst, D. (1990). Een tijd van komen: De geschiedenis van vluchtelingen in Nederland. Amsterdam: 
Federatie VON.
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declare his church a sanctuary, he faces a threat of removal by his superiors if he chooses 
to do so. Perhaps understandably then, local priests have not been very outspoken about 
church asylum. 
There is, however, a distinction to be made between parish priests and deacons, on 
the one hand, and members of religious orders, on the other hand. Religious orders 
(communities and organizations of religiously-devoted people) are centered around a 
particular mission, such as working to help the youth, the poor, the sick, etc. Religious 
orders, while part of the Catholic Church, are less confined to its policy and the rules 
within the hierarchy because they exist outside of the hierarchy in two key aspects. 
First, congregations (of religious orders) are financed primarily through donations from 
benefactors, and interest earned on investments that the congregations make. They 
also receive money from their members who earn salaries for the work they do. Second, 
members of congregations do not report to, or need approval from, the diocesan bishop; 
rather, they report to the president of their respective congregation (whose goal is also 
fulfilling the particular mission of the congregation). Religious orders thus tend to display 
a greater willingness to engage or interact with the branches of government.
Protestantism is generally less centralized (after all, a chief tenet of the Reformation 
was its rejection of papal primacy274), but there are distinctions to be made among its 
denominations. The operational and governing structure of most Protestant denominations 
can be classified into three “ecclesiastical polities”: congregational, presbyterian, and 
episcopal.275 The congregational polity is, in theory, the least centralized, while the 
episcopal polity is the most centralized (and also the polity of the Catholic Church). To 
complicate matters further, it cannot be readily said that a Protestant church organized 
under one polity is more amenable to the plight of unauthorized stayers than a Protestant 
church organized under another polity. This is because many denominations exist under 
each of the polities, and each church within each denomination has its own (nuanced) 
tendency to a particular political stance on migration. But the deeper the disaggregation 
goes, the more accurate observations and statements regarding church-state relations 
and the separation principle become. 
4.4 | The Dynamic Nature of Church-State Relations
The models discussed above do not stress the dynamic nature of church-state 
relations. While scholars who have described the church-state models discussed above 
acknowledge that many countries’ systems do not fit precisely into one model, they fail to 
emphasize also the fluidity of church-state relations. There appears to be a presumption 
that although models vary from country to country, the model within a country remains 
more or less constant. The reality, however, is that the relations between divisions within 
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churches and branches of government can change quickly in response to a presence 
or absence of certain conditions and circumstances. That is, the role of church (and its 
divisions) and the role of state (and its branches) blur when certain conditions change.
An example of this fluidity was observed with regard to the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten 
Leiden, mentioned above. In that case, the church continuously offered a wide array 
of assistance – including shelter, food, and legal advice – up until the Dutch Central 
Appeals Tribunal opined that the CEC v. the Netherlands decision was binding, and that it 
is the Dutch government that must provide these things to all people within its borders. 
While it was providing this help, the church received donations from other faith-based 
organizations around the country, which is what enabled it to continue its work. However, 
as soon as it was determined by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) that the 
Dutch government is the responsible entity, donations from other FBOs stopped, and the 
church in Leiden no longer had adequate funding to continue this work. As a result, it 
could now offer only spiritual care.
A similar situation, though on a larger scale, occurred in the United States in the early 
1990s. As explained in Chapter 2, churches all over the United States provided sanctuary 
for Central American asylum seekers throughout the 1980s. However, their provision of 
sanctuary all but ceased in the early 1990s because the number of people requiring it 
decreased. This was largely due to the settlement reached in the ABC case, which, among 
others, resulted in hundreds of thousands of Central American asylum seekers being 
allowed to stay.276 Here, the involvement of the faith community decreased because a 
court settlement stipulated that the government is legally obligated to reevaluate asylum 
claims and grant Temporary Protected Status, thereby allowing more asylum seekers to 
stay in the country.
However, it is not always the case that churches’ activities cease when the responsibility 
is assumed by another entity. The CEC v. the Netherlands case277 is sometimes referred 
to as the “BBB decision”. “BBB” stands for Bed (bed), Bad (bath), and Brood (bread), 
and is often used as a shorthand way of describing the basic provisions the government 
must ensure for all people as the result of the case. Members of the Vuurhaard believe 
that the BBB does not go far enough; in their representative’s view, there is a fourth “B” 
missing: Barmhartigheid (mercy). For this organization, the ECSR’s declaration that the 
Dutch government must provide certain basic necessities had little or no practical impact 
on its continued work with unauthorized stayers because the ECSR had nothing to say 
about provisions that go beyond the three B’s. 
The declaration of a supranational judicial body (the ECSR) that a country must provide 
basic life necessities to all within its borders is just one event that can contribute to the 
dynamic nature of church-state relations. There are additional considerations relevant in 
 
276  See Section 2.2.3.
277  See Section 4.3.1 and accompanying footnotes.
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a church’s motivation and decision to become involved in the assistance of unauthorized 
stayers. These considerations lead to a decision, which, when acted upon, has the 
capacity to alter and influence church-state relations. The considerations relevant in 
an FBO’s decision to become involved in this type work can broadly be separated into 
motivations, which are the normative considerations, and limitations, which contemplate 
the practical dimensions of effectuating the motivations. The normative considerations 
address the question of whether an FBO should assist unauthorized stayers. The 
practical considerations address the related questions of can an FBO, from a pragmatic 
standpoint, assist unauthorized stayers, and how will it do so. 
4.4.1 | Motivations
The question of whether an FBO should, in some capacity, assist unauthorized stayers was 
answered by FBOs’ representatives in both countries by reference to some combination 
of the following: scripture, government accountability, and confrontation. 
4.4.1.1 | Scripture
Scripture played a role in almost all of the FBO representatives interviewed. A small 
number, however, did not seem to rely at all on it. For instance, a representative of the 
Viatorians in Chicago stated that he does not do the work he does because his faith tells 
him it is the right thing to do, but because “it is the right thing to do”. When asked what 
this means concretely, he stated that “doing the right thing” simply means helping those 
who have less than you have.278 Similarly, a representative of the Stem van de Goede 
Herder in Maastricht stated that the concept of mercy is instructive in deciding what the 
right thing to do is in these situations.
For the majority of representatives interviewed, by far the most commonly cited passage 
was Matthew 25279 and its command to love and welcome the stranger. One representative 
identified migrants with Jesus’ own habitual migrations. Several representatives cited 
the parable of the Good Samaritan to show that even one’s enemy deserves love. From 
the Old Testament, the books of Moses280 were cited to illustrate the biblical preferential 
treatment for the stranger.281 Some representatives cited passages and theologies that 
do not deal specifically (or necessarily) with the stranger or migration. For instance, 
1 Peter 1:1-12 was cited for inspiring hope to all who find themselves in precarious 
 
278 This idea was instilled in him by his mother during his upbringing.
279 Matthew 25:35-41.
280 The books of Moses refer to the first five books of the Old Testament – Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, 
and Deuteronomy. These five are also sometimes referred to as the Torah or the Pentateuch.
281 See, e.g., Exodus 22:21 - “You shall not wrong or oppress a resident alien; for you were aliens in the land 
of Egypt”; Deuteronomy 24:19-22 – “Leave sheaf, olives, grapes for the alien.” See also 26:11 – “Then you, 
together with the Levites and the aliens who reside among you, shall celebrate with all the bounty that the Lord 
your God has given to you and your house”; Leviticus 19:9-10; 23:22 – “You shall not strip your vineyards bare. 
Leave them for the poor and the alien.”
110 chapter 4
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 111
circumstances, and John 4 was cited for the exemplification of grace for all people. The 
passages that do not deal specifically with the stranger were cited by representatives 
of Dutch FBOs. One representative mentioned the oft-cited parabolic question of moral 
theology: if a widow is walking by a bakery and her child is starving, can she steal a piece 
of bread? Finally, a number of representatives in both countries cited Liberation Theology 
 
as a central influence. Rather than focusing on a specific segment of the population, the 
goal of Liberation Theology is, more generally, to liberate the oppressed.
Church-state relations and the principle of separation did not evade discussion when 
considering scripture. Biblically, the separation principle can be framed as the interaction 
between Matthew 25 (along with the other passages mentioned above), and Romans 13. 
Romans 13:1-3 reads as follows:
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the 
powers that be are ordained by God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth 
the ordinance God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.282
Some representatives in both countries believed that 1) separation is generally desirable, 
and 2) there can be a tension between the instructions of Matthew 25 and those of Romans 
13. The principal justification offered in support of their decision to follow the instructions 
of Matthew 25 knowing that doing so may be against the law and therefore potentially in 
violation of the instructions contained in Romans 13 deals with moral precedence. Put 
simply, there is a hierarchy of importance with respect to biblical passages, and some 
biblical passages take moral precedence over others in certain situations, particularly 
those in which the dignity of human life is threatened. So, in situations where human 
dignity is threatened, it is permissible for FBOs to derogate from the separation principle 
and take the steps they believe necessary to remove this threat, regardless of the 
government’s law or policy.
Still others did not believe that their work had the capacity to offend the principle of 
separation. While also acknowledging that separation is desirable, they argued that their 
work actually abided by it. Their notion of the separation of church and state was informed 
by Matthew 22:22 “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and 
unto God the things that are God’s.” Those representatives interpreted this to mean that 
biblical imperatives, such as the duty to help the stranger, are the word of God; therefore, 
their fulfilment is rendering unto God what is God’s. So, in helping the stranger and 
following other biblical passages that were relevant to their work, these representatives 
felt they were working purely outside of the government’s sphere. Overall, there did not 
seem to be large variations in the scripture that was cited by the representatives who were 
interviewed. The only difference was that no American representatives cited scripture 
 
 
282 Romans 13:1-3 (New International Version).
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that did not deal with the stranger specifically. This is likely not significant, however, as 
a larger pool of interviewees in the American context may have yielded such references. 
4.4.1.2 | Government Accountability 
Government accountability refers to a collective sentiment felt by an FBO’s members 
that the government is not abiding by a variety of domestic and international laws, and 
 
should be held accountable for its actions. In the discussion on disaggregating the state 
above (Section 4.3.1), I explained how various FBOs interact with state actors when they 
disagree with their actions. While numerous FBOs in both countries are motivated by 
their belief that the government must be held accountable when it fails to abide by the 
law, the strategies employed are different.
In the United States, Southside Presbyterian, the WAUCC, and other churches across the 
country were completely transparent regarding their belief that the government is failing 
to fulfill its legal obligations. These churches notified the attorney general of the United 
States in writing that they intended to violate the Immigration and Nationality Act. In the 
Netherlands, FBOs have provided material assistance and spiritual care. They have also 
hosted dinners with unauthorized stayers and local politicians. They have thus filled the 
literal gaps created by central government’s laws and policies, and tried to bridge the 
figurative gap between politicians and unauthorized stayers. However, what they have 
not yet done is openly declared to any government figure that they intend to violate the 
law or frustrate the central government’s stated policy vis-à-vis unauthorized stayers. 
Such bold transparency is not apparent in the Dutch context. 
Though the strategies may differ, the underlying objective is essentially the same: 
exert some level of pressure on the federal and central governments to stimulate them 
to change their practice, policy, or law. In the meantime, the FBOs provide what these 
governments are failing to provide. 
4.4.1.3 | Confrontation
Confrontation, again, is the umbrella term I use to refer to the communication or 
interaction with unauthorized stayers that brings (authorized) people closer to the plight 
of unauthorized stayers. These can include first-hand communication, such as hearing 
stories directly from unauthorized stayers, or even just day-to-day interactions with 
unauthorized stayers in the community. It can also include second-hand communication, 
such as stories that are told through media. Finally, it can be confrontation with biblical 
teachings that relate to modern situations, such as the parable of the Good Samaritan. 
To provide an example of just how powerful even second-hand communication can be, I 
recount a recent tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea.
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In September of 2015, a photo of the body of a small boy who had washed ashore in the 
Mediterranean filled the front pages of newspapers worldwide, and shocked the world. 
The photo of three-year old Aylan Kurdi mobilized worldwide empathy and concern, 
bringing in record donations to charitable organizations.283 The photo was able to bring 
much more attention to the Syrian humanitarian crisis than any numerical statistic had 
been able to do: in the week following the publication of the photo, the Swedish Red 
Cross received 55 times more in donations than the previous week.284 These astounding 
results were the motivation for a study aimed at explaining the psychological processes 
underpinning the public response.285 
Confrontation has been a key motivation in mobilizing faith-based organizations in 
the United States since the birth of the Sanctuary Movement. As described in detail in 
Chapter 2, the incident at Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument which claimed the lives 
of dozens of Salvadoran asylum seekers mobilized the churches at the southern border 
into action, and started the Sanctuary Movement. Soon after, the WAUCC in Chicago voted 
to become a sanctuary partly as the result of its members hearing the stories from asylum 
seekers from Central America. And, in the words of the bishop of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 
“when you see the face of a child, that’s more [expressive] than a lot of numbers. You 
have a concrete person.”
But why does this sort of communication have such a strong power to mobilize? Without 
going into psychological technicalities and using psychological jargon, Dr. Slovic, the 
head researcher of the study mentioned above, offers an explanation with reference to 
Aylan Kurdi. First, the child is very young, well-dressed, and looks like he could be “one of 
our own kids.” Adding to this is the fact that the face is unexposed, leaving the observer 
the liberty to impose anyone’s face, perhaps someone the viewer knows, onto this child’s 
face. Further appealing to empathy is that this child was just so close to a new life, but did 
not quite make it. What all of these have in common is that they minimize the distance 
between the observer and the observed by exposing common fundamental features 
and aspirations that unite all people. In the context of the authorized – unauthorized 
stayer dynamic, confrontation tends to dissolve the legal and conceptual divide, creating 
a stronger bond of shared identity. It is then no longer an authorized – unauthorized 
divide, but a person to person convergence. In a nutshell, confrontation minimizes 
the importance placed on differences and accentuates the fundamental similarities of 
mankind.
283 Cole, D. (2017, January 13). Study: What Was The Impact Of The Iconic Photo Of The Syrian Boy? Retrieved, 
August 30, 2018 from https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/01/13/509650251/study-what-was-
the-impact-of-the-iconic-photo-of-the-syrian-boy.
284 Id. 
285 See Slovic, P., Västfjäll, D., Erlandsson, A., & Gregory, R. (2017, January 10). Iconic photographs and the ebb 
and flow of empathic response to humanitarian disasters. Retrieved from http://www.pnas.org/content/
early/2017/01/09/1613977114. 
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4.4.2 | Limitations
4.4.2.1 | Resources
By contrast to the previous sections that analyzed the question of whether a particular 
faith-based organization should do this type of work, this section focuses on the practical 
considerations to answer the question of whether the FBO can do this type of work. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the major practical consideration for FBOs in both countries 
is resources. FBOs’ accessibility to resources can determine the type of help offered, 
the number of people who can be helped, and the types of people who can be helped. 
The more resources that are available, the more an FBO can effectuate its motivations 
and become impactful in arenas usually relegated to the state, such as migration and 
welfare, as relevant in this context. A greater availability of resources can thus add to 
the dynamic nature of church-state relations. Conversely, a lack of resources, despite an 
FBO’s intentions, can contribute to more static church-state relations. 
Concerns with budget and/or physical space were voiced by nearly every representative 
interviewed for this research, including those from the CCC, Justice and Peace Netherlands, 
Lake Street Church in Evanston, the LPPC, the LUMC, the PCN, the Stem van de Goede 
Herder, Toevlucht, Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden, the Vuurhaard, and the WAUCC.286 
Though the details regarding each FBO’s concerns with resources differed, these bottom-
line considerations impacted the extent to which FBOs could actualize their resolutions 
vis-à-vis assisting unauthorized stayers. 
For instance, the WAUCC decided not to reaffirm its commitment to sanctuary in the mid-
2000s because it had lost a substantial number of members and therefore a substantial 
amount of funding. From a financial standpoint, the WAUCC could not offer sanctuary. 
In the case of the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden, the leaders decided in 2014 they 
could now offer only spiritual care to unauthorized stayers after donations from other 
FBOs ceased. The donations halted due to the 2014 decision that obliged the Dutch 
government to provide minimum care to unauthorized stayers in the Netherlands.287 
While the lack of funding each of these two churches experienced was the result of 
different circumstances, their ability to actualize their resolutions to assist unauthorized 
stayers was severely limited by the lack of funding.
The Lake Street Church in Evanston, the Stem van de Goede Herder, and the Vuurhaard 
all experienced a lack of physical space to house people. The Evanston church ended up 
using a sexton’s apartment as a space for sanctuary, while some members of the Stem 
van de Goede Herder opened up their own apartments to house unauthorized stayers. The 
Vuurhaard was not able to find any additional space beyond the house of the congregation, 
which has a capacity of 13 people (including 5 brothers of the congregation).
286  For full names of these faith-based organizations, see Sections 2.3 and 3.3.
287  See Section 6.3.3.
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The lack of resources (along with the conviction that it is the government that should 
provide minimum care for people) pushes FBOs to ask local government for funding. 
The PCN representative from Nijmegen explained that the foundation he established 
would not be able to fund its assistance efforts alone. Rather, the foundation is heavily 
subsidized by the municipality of Nijmegen. This has certain implications. The source 
of financing for an FBO can be just as limiting as the monetary amount an organization 
has at its disposal. Above, I discussed examples in which organizations were limited 
by the amount of money they had, and they often had to choose which types of help to 
offer from a finite pool of financial resources. However, there are situations in which it is 
not the amount but rather the source that is more outcome-determinative with respect 
to whom FBOs help, and in what capacity. In the case of Justice and Peace Netherlands 
and Toevlucht, their ability to provide assistance was limited by strings attached to the 
funding they received. Justice and Peace Netherlands has received earmarked funding 
from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Union. In other words, it is 
these institutions rather than Justice and Peace Netherlands that decide what the latter 
may do with the funding received. When the shelter operated by Toevlucht first opened, 
it was funded (under protest) by other FBOs. The municipality agreed to provide the 
funding, also under protest, but then threatened to shut the shelter down. This threat 
was extinguished when a large group of people from various backgrounds protested 
this threatened action. Since then, the municipality has defined the target group which 
excludes a number of people, such as those in the Dublin procedure and those who have 
no ties to the city of Utrecht. These examples suggest that even if the source of funding 
is plentiful and sufficient to provide the full ambit of help for unauthorized stayers, 
the conditions attached to the money can limit just what type of help is offered. They 
also show that restricted funding can come from a wide variety of both domestic and 
international institutions and governments. 
However, the source of funding (and the strings attached to it) is not always insurmountable. 
For example, the pastor of the LUMC was aware of the fact that she would be required to 
adhere to certain rules if she received a salary from the UMC. She chose not to receive a 
salary, and therefore had more flexibility vis-à-vis the rules she had to follow. In the case 
of the LPPC, the pastor was aware that her (and her church’s) stance on sanctuary may 
not be well-received by the umbrella organization. She was equally concerned with her 
ability to secure a job in the event she left the church. Nonetheless, she and her church’s 
elders decided that they would offer sanctuary.
4.4.2.2 | Organizational Structure 
The way in which an FBO is organized can add additional criteria regarding who may 
be assisted. One criterion that a number of FBOs in both countries adhere to is a rather 
nebulous one: the likelihood of the unauthorized stayer eventually obtaining authorized 
residence status. The FBOs adhering to this criterion limit their work to helping only those 
unauthorized stayers who, by someone’s judgment, have a chance of securing authorized 
status. The entity making the judgment, however, varies: some FBOs rely on experts from 
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NGOs, some rely on governmental entities, and others solicit outside counsel to assess 
cases. This criterion was relevant to the work of the Viatorians in Chicago, the VLotteam 
near Maastricht, and the Vuurhaard near Tilburg.
The Viatorians assist people whose cases have been recommended by the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, a federal program under the Department of Health and Human 
Services. These are people who the experts from the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
believe to have a likelihood of securing status. This criterion also played an explicit role 
with respect to the Vuurhaard: only those who received a positive evaluation by the Dutch 
Refugee Council as having a likelihood of securing status would be helped. In these 
cases, the governmental entity as well as the NGO served as vetting mechanisms: people 
who did not receive a green light from them would have to find assistance elsewhere. The 
VLotteam near Maastricht took a broader approach to assistance. While it also relied on 
outside advice (in this case, from immigration lawyers), its assistance did not end upon 
the lawyers’ advice that a case does not have a likelihood to secure authorized residence. 
Rather, in these cases, the type of assistance offered by VLotteam changed: the strategy 
switched from building a new case for asylum to finding a permanent solution (usually 
the unauthorized stayer’s return to the country of origin). To that end, the VLotteam would 
work with the unauthorized stayer to obtain the requisite documentation from the country 
of origin. The VLotteam also has an exception for people who are severely ill. For such 
people, the “likelihood of obtaining authorized residence” criterion is relaxed, and they 
are allowed to remain under the VLotteam’s care.
The fact that this likelihood is a relevant consideration (for at least some FBOs) adds 
another layer to the discussion on church-state relations. These FBOs have engaged 
in line-drawing and determined that it is permissible for them to help only those who 
are currently unauthorized to remain in the country, but have a likelihood of obtaining 
authorization. The current lack of authorized status is seen as the product of a mistake 
by an immigration officer or judge, or the product of a lack of relevant information in the 
asylum case. The idea is that once the mistake or lack of information is remedied, the 
person receives authorization, and actually should never have been unauthorized in the 
first place. So, in its view, the organization has not frustrated the state’s immigration 
law and policy; it has actually added a layer of scrutiny to ensure that the government 
immigration authorities and judges are discharging their duties according to the law. 
Another possibility is that due to limited resources, certain FBOs have chosen to focus 
only on the cases they believe can have a positive outcome.
4.4.2.3 | Religious Conviction of Unauthorized Stayers
With regard to at least three FBOs in the Netherlands, the unauthorized stayer’s religious 
conviction or desire to alter his religious conviction played a role in the FBOs’ assistance. 
These FBOs included the Stem van de Goede Herder in Maastricht, the VLotteam near 
Maastricht, and the Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden.
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Word of mouth was the primary mechanism by which asylum seekers found their way to 
the Stem van de Goede Herder and Volle Evangelie Gemeenten Leiden. In the case of the 
former, new people were brought through a sort of chain. The first asylum seekers who 
arrived at that FBO were brought there by the first members who had visited the nearby 
asylum seeker center. After that, these initial asylum seekers became members and 
then brought more and more asylum seekers in, expanding the membership.  VLotteam 
near Maastricht is also engaged in assisting unauthorized stayers, primarily rejected 
asylum seekers, in lodging a new application for asylum. According to a representative 
of the organization, the basic principle is that all vulnerable people are to be helped, 
irrespective of their religious conviction. What this actually means in practice, however, 
is that two main groups of people are helped: 1) rejected asylum seekers who wish to 
convert to Christianity and reapply for asylum on religious persecution grounds, and 2) 
immigrants, including rejected asylum seekers, who have serious mental or physical 
problems.288 None of the three FBOs’ representatives stated explicitly that the FBO would 
only help those who are Christian or desire to become Christian. However, this was often 
the case because of the mechanism by which the initial contact was fostered between the 
unauthorized stayers and these FBOs.
This consideration (the religious conviction of the unauthorized stayer) did not emerge 
during the interviews that were conducted in the United States. Of course, this is not 
to say that there are no American faith-based organizations for which an unauthorized 
stayer’s religious conviction is relevant. Probably the main reason that this did not come 
up in the interviews in the United States is because until very recently, the vast majority 
of unauthorized stayers who were helped were of the Catholic faith. Indeed, nearly all of 
the people helped during the Sanctuary Movement that started in the 1980s were Central 
American Catholics. Even today, over 2/3 of unauthorized stayers in the United States 
are from Mexico and Central America, and about 90% of people in Mexico and Central 
American countries identify as Christians.289 Thus, the affinity to Christianity, if relevant to 
an FBO’s decision, was likely just presumed. 
4.5 | Conclusions
American and Dutch scholars have attempted to model church-state relations, but 
not through the lens of migration. Moreover, the models leave room for improvement. 
First, they suffer from an overgeneralization of church-state relations, which can lead 
to inaccuracies. Second, the models do not stress the dynamic nature of church-state 
relations, and do not explain what contributes to it.
288 Those whose who belong to this second category are helped irrespective of their possibilities to have asylum 
granted.
289 Profile of the Unauthorized Population - US. (2020, January 1). Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US. 
the american and dutch cases compared 117
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 118
One way to remedy the first shortcoming is to disaggregate both the church and the 
state. Each level of disaggregation provides increased accuracy. For instance, stating 
that “religious orders within the Catholic tradition are more likely to step into traditional 
government functions than are churches within the same tradition” is more accurate than 
saying “the Catholic Church remains separate from the government, and supports the 
separationist model of church-state relations.” Still more accurate would be to say that 
“certain religious orders are more likely to work cooperatively with legislators with regard 
to immigration issues.” An even higher level of accuracy is achieved when clarifying which 
specific areas of immigration law religious orders are prepared to engage with legislators 
regarding. Rather than debating which broad model is the most accurate for describing 
church-state relations in a country, perhaps it is more useful to think about nuanced 
models at different levels of disaggregation. This is not to say that we should strive for 
levels of disaggregation that run all the way to the individual. Indeed, this would run 
counter to the concept and purpose of a model. However, modeling church-state relations 
as broadly as they are currently modeled adds very little to explaining, understanding, or 
predicting the principle of separation as it applies to concrete situations.
Regarding the second criticism, I provide a couple of examples from this research that 
demonstrate the dynamic nature of church-state relations. There are normative and 
practical considerations that contribute to the dynamic nature of church-state relations. 
The normative dimension answers the should question and includes consideration 
of scripture, government accountability, and confrontation. The practical dimension 
answers the questions of can and how, and boils down to a consideration of resources, 
organizational structure, and the unauthorized stayer’s religious conviction. While anyone 
is free to address and decide on the normative question, effectuating a practical effect 
based on that normative decision depends heavily on the availability of, and conditions 
attached to, resources. It also depends on the organizational structure and who the target 
group of help is. As shown above, the type of help, and the type of person who can be 
helped, are both influenced by the amount and source of funding. So, while a church can 
decide to offer the full array of assistance to anyone it deems worthy after its consideration 
of the normative question, its ability to do so is limited by conditions attached to the 
funding it receives. Further limitations include rules set forth by the organization. 
Furthermore, a layered approach to help was observed in both countries. It is useful to 
visualize FBO assistance to unauthorized stayers in three layers. First, there is the ground 
layer. This is the layer closest to the unauthorized stayer and refers to FBOs’ provision of 
minimum care directly to unauthorized stayers. The next level, or mid-level, can be viewed 
as the advocacy and networking layer. Examples of organizations at this level include INLIA 
in the Netherlands and CRLN (Chicago Religious Leadership Network on Latin America) 
in the United States. These mid-level FBOs perform a variety of tasks: providing legal 
and practical advice to churches, connecting to churches for information and resource 
sharing, advocating on behalf of the unauthorized community within different spheres, 
and so on. Then, there are the top-level organizations. These organizations work directly 
with the legal system to ensure that the government abides by the law. Examples of these 
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organizations include Kerk in Actie and the American Baptist Churches. The former, Kerk in 
Actie, was instrumental in the CEC v. the Netherlands case which resulted in the European 
Committee on Social Rights’ decision that the Netherlands must provide housing, social 
assistance, and medical care to unauthorized stayers.290 The latter was the plaintiff in 
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh. That case resulted in a settlement agreement 
that would give hundreds of thousands of (unauthorized) Salvadorans and Guatemalans 
Temporary Protected Status, the possibility to reapply for asylum, deportation stays, and 
work authorizations.291 
Finally, a trend toward increased secularization has been observed in some aspects 
in both countries. In the Netherlands, a number of faith-based organizations have 
experienced a tendency toward secularization in their membership. They were founded 
by religious people, most of whom also had a stated religious motive for doing this work. 
Not all religious people who founded these organizations had a strictly religious motive; 
as discussed, some merely did “what is right” without reference to scripture or religious 
social teaching. These people identified as religious but used general principles from 
religion only as background as they contemplated this work. Even some people who, 
at the start of their work with unauthorized stayers, identified themselves as religious 
people with religiously-based motives experienced a sort of “personal secularization.” 
For instance, a representative of Toevlucht identified as Catholic but during the course 
of her life moved away from that identification and now is influenced by principles of the 
Buddhist faith. This “personal secularization” trend was observed with representatives 
of FBOs in both countries. However, despite this personal secularization, the people 
continued this work. In other words, becoming less religious or religiously motivated over 
time did not seem to influence their desire to assistant unauthorized stayers.
As time went on, people who never identified with religion began to work for these 
organizations. These people drew their inspiration from humanistic ideals rather than 
religious teachings. So, the people working at FBOs are quite diverse from a religious 
standpoint: there are religious people working out of religious motives, religious people 
working out of “what’s right” motives, formerly religiously people becoming no longer 
identifying with religion (or identifying with a different religion) but still doing this work, 
and people who have never identified as religious working for these organizations. This 
diversity suggests a universality of certain basic rights. 
The trend of secularization can also be observed in the legal sphere in the United States. 
While the mid-1980s saw the tension between the federal government and religiously-
motivated people play out in the courtroom, the mid-2010s is seeing the tensions between 
the federal government and subfederal governments play out in the courtroom. Scripture 
is no longer a key basis of argumentation to allow for the assistance of unauthorized 
stayers. Different legal arguments are at play between the federal government and the 
 
290 This is discussed further in Chapter 6.
291 See Section 2.2.3.
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(subfederal) sanctuary jurisdictions. While the actors in the courtroom have changed, and 
while the legal arguments are different, the same idea underlies much of the sanctuary 
jurisdiction litigation: let people stay whose only “crime” is not having authorized 
status. This tension between different levels of government can also be observed in the 
Netherlands. For the past two decades, the central government and municipalities have 
been deadlocked over the issue of what the latter may or should do vis-à-vis unauthorized 
stayers. Certain aspects of this tension have reached the courts. This intragovernmental 
tension is the topic of Part Two. Part Two explores the tension between the federal and 
subfederal government in the United States, and the central government and municipal 
governments in the Netherlands. It looks at which arguments are informing this 
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Introduction to Part Two
As explained in Part One, faith-based organizations are not constant or consistent actors 
in the field of immigration. The actors that have jurisdiction over immigration in the 
United States and the Netherlands are the federal and central government, respectively. 
Rather, the involvement of FBOs in immigration, and in particular in the assistance of 
unauthorized stayers, tends to increase when there is a perception that the government 
is behaving in a way that threatens fundamental rights. These include the basics of 
survival: safety, food, shelter, and hygiene.  
When FBO involvement in this arena does surge, it does not do so in a vacuum. A major 
second set of actors are governments at levels below the federal and central government 
levels. These are the subfederal governments (state, local, county, etc.) in the United 
States, and the municipal governments in the Netherlands. These governments, though 
not regular immigration actors from a legal perspective, also become involved in 
immigration matters, often at similar times, and as the result of similar triggers, as faith-
based organizations. Below I discuss parallels between FBOs’ and subfederal/municipal 
governments’ involvement in the area of immigration.
The United States
In the United States, subfederal jurisdictions began to align themselves with the 
Sanctuary Movement shortly after it was branded as such by a church’s letter to the INS 
on March 23, 1982.292 On June 3, 1983, the Madison, Wisconsin, City Council passed a 
resolution in support of local churches providing sanctuary to Central Americans.293 The 
resolution specifically commended the “St. Francis House . . . for their compassion and 
moral courage in providing sanctuary to refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.”294 
Between the time this first resolution was passed and the end of 1987, over twenty 
municipalities and four states had aligned themselves with the Sanctuary Movement in 
some way.295
292 This is the date on which Reverend John Fife sent a letter to the INS indicating that his church, which was 
providing sanctuary, had been breaking the law. See Cunningham, H. (1995). God and Caesar at the Rio 
Grande: Sanctuary and the Politics of Religion. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 40. Some 
argue, however, that that the first sanctuary jurisdiction was actually Berkeley, California in 1971, or Los 
Angeles, California in 1979. See, e.g. O’Donoghue, L. (2017, February 17). Berkeley Is The Original Sanctuary 
City. Retrieved from https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/berkeley-the-original-sanctuary-city/
Content?oid=5306164; McManus, J. F. (2015, November 5). Sanctuary City Policy Invites Trouble. Retrieved 
from https://www.thenewamerican.com/reviews/opinion/item/21901-sanctuary-city-policy-invites-trouble. 
However, these bear no relation to the church Sanctuary Movement that started in the early 1980s at Reverend 
Fife’s church as a response to the violence in Central America. Moreover, the sanctuary jurisdictions that came 
about starting in 1982 were in solidarity with the plight of those churches, not with Berkeley or Los Angeles.
293 Madison, Wis., Res. 39,105 (June 7, 1983).
294 Carro, J.L. (1989). Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 
Pepperdine L. Rev. 297, 310, FN 87.
295 For a full list, see id. at 305.
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Municipalities
Most American municipalities that sympathized with the Sanctuary Movement showed 
their support through municipal declarations. These declarations were in the form of 
either resolutions (which tend to be of a temporary nature) or ordinances (which tend to 
set a permanent rule of conduct).296 In a few municipalities, such as the City of Chicago, 
the initial alignment with the Sanctuary Movement came in the form of a municipal 
executive order by the mayor, rather than a municipal declaration by a municipal counsel. 
On March 7, 1985, Mayor of Chicago Harold Washington issued Executive Order 85-1, 
which opened with the following:
IN ORDER to assure that all residents of the City of Chicago, regardless of nationality or 
citizenship, shall have fair and equal access to municipal benefits, opportunities and 
services, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
SECTION 1. The policy of the Office of the Mayor is declared to be to encourage equal 
access by all persons residing in the City of Chicago, regardless of nation of birth 
or current citizenship, to the full benefits, opportunities and services, including 
employment and the issuance of licenses, which are provided or administered by the 
City of Chicago. To that end, the provisions of this Order shall be liberally construed to 
provide such access to the extent consistent with applicable legislative and common 
law provisions.297
Not all municipalities that sympathized with the Sanctuary Movement adopted the label 
of “sanctuary city”. Some chose “city of refuge” or “a city of peace”.298 Substantively, 
however, their declarations shared many similarities. In their preambles, they referred 
to the city’s or nation’s immigration heritage, the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights, the low percentage of asylum seekers who are granted status, and the number of 
civilians killed in El Salvador and Guatemala.299 Sanctuary municipalities justified their 
declarations, generally, with some permutation of the following arguments: 1) the United 
States was breaking international law by denying Salvadorans and Guatemalans asylum 
and deporting them, 2) those who were providing sanctuary to these people were actually 
adhering to the law, their conscience, and the nation’s heritage, and 3) the Sanctuary 
Movement deserved municipal encouragement support.300 The operative clauses of 
the declarations, which follow the preambles, also shared common elements. Many 
296 Id. at 306-10.
297 Chicago, Ill., Exec. Order No. 85-1 (Mar. 7, 1985). This executive order was later codified in 2006 in the Chicago, 
Illinois Municipal Code under §2-173-005, and is known today as the Welcoming City Ordinance. This is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. For other examples of municipal executive orders, see Detroit, Mich., 
Exec. Order No. 26 (Sept. 30, 1987); Kerr, P. (1985, October 18). Koch Memo Directs City Workers Not to Report 
Illegal Aliens to U.S. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/18/nyregion/koch-memo-directs-city-
workers-not-to-report-illegal-aliens-to-us.html.
298 Carro, supra Note 294, at 311.
299 Id. at 308.
300 Id. at 310.
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of them prohibited city employees and departments from requesting or disseminating 
information related to citizenship or residence status of any person.301 As with the 
Chicago mayor’s executive order, numerous declarations prohibited conditioning of 
municipal benefits or services on authorized residence status.302 Some even called for the 
INS to notify sanctuary organizations in the event an alien is arrested within a sanctuary 
jurisdiction.303 Municipal executive orders tended to be similar in tone and substance to 
municipal declarations.304
Moreover, some jurisdictions, including the city of Madison mentioned above, explicitly 
commended the work of churches within their declarations. For instance, the Davis, 
California resolution from March of 1986 resolved that the “City of Davis commend the Davis 
Religious Community for Sanctuary.”305 Similarly, the “City and County of San Francisco 
commend[ed] the Congregations and Religious Orders who have declared sanctuary.”306
States
In this time period (1983-1987), at least four states –Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
New York, and Oregon—aligned themselves with the Sanctuary Movement. As with 
the municipalities, states did so through their legislative and/or executive bodies. On 
October 4, 1985, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts signed an executive order 
containing clauses similar to those found in municipal declarations, including references 
to Massachusetts’ history immigration and refugee history, as well as the Refugee Act 
of 1980.307 It prohibited employees and agents of Massachusetts from “request[ing], 
information about, investigat[ing], or assist[ing] in the investigation of the citizenship 
or residency status of any person” absent legal authority.”308 Similar to other municipal 
declarations and executive orders, such as the Chicago Executive Order referenced 
above, it also prohibited the conditioning of benefits, opportunities, and services on 
lawful residence status.309
At least one state, New Mexico, voiced its support through both its legislative and 
executive bodies. In the same year as the Massachusetts’ governor’s order, New Mexico’s 
state legislature passed a sanctuary resolution.310 This resolution reiterated many of the 
301 Id. at 311.
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 312-13. Some municipal executive orders even used the same phraseology as that found in municipal 
declarations.
305 Id. at 310, FN 87.
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 314.
308 Executive Department of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Refugee Policy, Exec. Order No. 257 (Oct. 4, 
1985), art. IV, § 4.1.
309 Carro, supra Note 294, at 315.
310 State of New Mexico, A Memorial Requesting Consideration for the Refugees from El Salvador, 37th Legis., 1st 
Sess., (House Mem. 5, 1985)
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municipal sanctuary declarations in noting the number of people killed in El Salvador.311 
However, it focused exclusively on Salvadoran asylum seekers who are under threat of 
deportation from the United States.312  The following year, in 1986, New Mexico Governor 
Toney Anaya issued a Sanctuary Proclamation that New Mexico would be a “State of 
Sanctuary” for Central Americans fleeing their home countries.313 Again, like many of 
the sanctuary declarations, it referenced the nation’s immigration heritage and drew 
inspiration from the underground railroad.314 It also cited domestic and international 
refugee law, including the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Geneva Convention.315
On June 3, 1986, New York’s State Assembly passed a sanctuary resolution titled 
“Sanctuary for Guatemalans and Salvadorans.”316 As evident from the name, it supported 
both Guatemalans and Salvadorans, unlike New Mexico’s resolution, which referenced 
only Salvadorans. Like New Mexico’s resolution, though, it referenced the Geneva 
Convention and the obligations stemming therefrom.317
In 1987, Oregon passed a sanctuary law.318 Despite the fact that the other three states 
discussed above passed their resolutions and issued their proclamations and executive 
orders before Oregon passed its law, Oregon is widely regarded as the first sanctuary 
state. This is because it was the first state to pass a law (rather than a resolution, 
proclamation, or executive order) limiting the role of state and local law enforcement in 
matters of immigration enforcement:
“No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision of the 
state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or 
apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign 
citizenship residing in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.319
Though the wording was later changed, and there have been numerous attempts to 
repeal it, the spirit of the original law has been retained.320 
As with the municipalities, states also commended and mentioned the work of faith 
communities. For instance, the New York State Assembly “[r]esolved, that the State of 
New York commend the congregations, religious orders and citizens who have provided 
311 Carro, supra Note 294, at 314.
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 315.
314 7. 
315 Id. at 315-16.
316 New York State Assembly, Resolution: Sanctuary for Guatemalans and Salvadorans, Res. 95147-03-6 (June 3, 
1986).
317 Carro, supra Note 294, at 313, FN 109.
318 Originally printed in Oregon Laws 1987, Chapter 487. An Act, HB 2314, Relating to law enforcement. Now 
codified at Oregon Revised Statutes 181A.820.
319 Oregon Laws 1987, Chapter 487. An Act, HB 2314, Relating to law enforcement, Section 1 (1).
320 See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 181A.820 (West).
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asylum for Salvadorans and Guatemalans.”321 Additionally, the Sanctuary Proclamation 
issued by New Mexico governor Toney Anaya, mentioned above, stated that the 
“Governor has been asked to declare New Mexico a ‘Sanctuary State’ by New Mexico 
religious leaders of many denominations and by many other citizens of our State.”322 
The Proclamation found it “certainly appropriate to consider The Bible when addressing 
the moral question of sanctuary for Central American refugees” and even went on to cite 
biblical passages. First, it found that Proverbs 31:8 and 9 relate to the issue of sanctuary:
Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all who are 
destitute. Open thy mouth, judge righteously, and plead the cause of the poor and 
needy.
The Proclamation also argued that Deuteronomy 10:19 seemed to speak directly to the 
plight of Central American asylum seekers: “Love the sojourners, for you are sojourners 
in the Land of Egypt.”
In addition to explicitly commending the work of churches, states and municipalities 
used similar language to that found in letters that were sent by some of the first sanctuary 
churches. In a July 18, 1982 letter to the attorney general, a Protestant church in the 
Chicago area wrote: “We believe our government is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act 
and International Law….”323 References to both the Refugee Act and international law 
can be found in, among others, New York State’s Assembly resolution, Sacramento, 
California’s resolution, and Olympia, Washington’s resolution.324 Thus, some of the same 
arguments were used by churches and subfederal governments alike.
As illustrated above, the link between the churches that initiated the Sanctuary Movement 
went beyond subfederal governments’ adoption of the term “sanctuary” or similar terms. 
Sanctuary jurisdictions commended the work of churches, adopted the same or similar 
language found in church letters and documents, and employed some of the same 
arguments grounded in international law. At least one, Toney Anaya, even used biblically-
grounded argumentation in his Sanctuary Proclamation. 
Developments
In addition to these links between churches and sanctuary jurisdictions, groups of 
faith-based organizations have taken explicit stances on the sanctuary jurisdictions 
debate, even inside the courtroom. As explained above, the church-initiated Sanctuary 
Movement inspired subfederal governments to voice their disagreements with the 
federal government and enact resolutions, ordinances, and laws to protect immigrant 
communities. While the number of sanctuary churches has continued to grow across 
321 Carro, supra Note 294, at 313, FN 109.
322 Sanctuary Proclamation, Office of the Governor (N.M. Mar. 28, 1986) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
323 See Chapter 2 for the text of one of the first church letters to a United States attorney general.
324 For more examples, see Carro, supra Note 294, at 313, FN 109. See also 308-09, FN 78-79.
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the United States in the last several years, the number of people actually helped by said 
churches is minimal compared to the number of people helped in the 1980s. This relatively 
low number of people in public sanctuary (about 50 at the time of this writing) is likely 
a part of the reason that there has not been a repeat of a case like Aguilar (in addition 
to the bad publicity that case received at the time).325 While the modern courtroom 
debate focuses on the disagreement between subfederal sanctuary jurisdictions and 
the federal government, the lawsuits that were filed beginning in 2017 as a result of this 
disagreement did not evade the attention and input of churches. When the case of City 
and County of San Francisco v. Trump, which challenged the executive order threatening 
to cut funding to sanctuary cities, was appealed by the Trump administration, dozens of 
faith-based organizations came together to file an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff, 
with the following opening to the brief:
Judaism teaches: “Defend the weak and the fatherless; uphold the cause of the poor 
and the oppressed. Rescue the weak and the needy; deliver them from the hand of 
the wicked.” Psalm 82:3-4. “If there is a poor man among your brothers in any of the 
towns of the land that the LORD your God is giving you, do not be hardhearted or 
tightfisted toward your poor brother.” Deuteronomy 15:4-7.
Christianity teaches: “When he had finished washing their feet, he put on his clothes 
and returned to his place. ‘Do you understand what I have done for you?’ he asked 
them. ‘You call me Teacher and Lord, and rightly so, for that is what I am. Now that I, 
your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also should wash one another’s 
feet.”’ John 13:12-14. “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” Leviticus 19:18.
Islam instructs: “(The righteous are those) who feed the poor, the orphan and the 
captive for the love of God, saying: We feed you for the sake of God Alone; we seek 
from you neither reward nor thanks.” Qur’an, 76:8-9. “None of you believes until he 
loves for his brother what he loves for himself.” Hadith 13.
Under the Executive Order, those most in need - the weak, the poor, the oppressed, the 
orphans - will bear the weight of cuts in federal funding if cities and counties refuse to 
be coerced into leaving their immigrant brothers and sisters isolated and subject to 
crime and exploitation. And if cities and counties buckle to the coercion, immigrants 
will suffer.326
Albeit indirectly (as amici of the court), FBOs have once again entered the courtroom 
to express solidarity with immigrant communities. And, they have again placed some 
reliance on scripture. What is unknown, of course, is to what extent a court’s members 
are likely to entertain an argument stemming from scriptural reference. However, the 
325  Recall that the Aguilar case resulted in (suspended) sentences of Sanctuary Movement workers in the mid-
1980s. For more information, see Section 2.2.3.
326 Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellees (2018 WL 986584), filed in 
City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018)
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decision to include such references was made nonetheless. And, it will be interesting to 
see how an increasingly conservative Supreme Court navigates through the viability of 
religious exemptions in the area of migration for years to come.
The Netherlands
Although the Netherlands has not experienced a “Sanctuary Movement” in name, 
faith-based organizations have been active within the immigration debate in varying 
capacities. FBOs have advocated for the rights of unauthorized stayers by providing 
church asylum327 to those threatened with imminent deportation, as well as providing 
the basic necessities to those who, although not under imminent threat of deportation, 
are without means, often due to exclusionary legal measures. And, while “sanctuary 
jurisdictions” also do not exist in name, municipal governments have followed in the 
footsteps of FBOs by, for instance, providing shelter to asylum seekers who were removed 
from asylum seeker centers shortly after their asylum applications were rejected. 
As discussed in Part One, the conflict between the municipal and central government 
began to intensify in the early 2000s as the result of two landmark changes in 
immigration law. While these changes did not create higher numbers of unauthorized 
people, they significantly restricted or outright prohibited such people’s access to nearly 
everything. This is when municipal governments began to be involved in the assistance 
of unauthorized stayers. Despite the fact that FBOs had been active in assisting 
unauthorized stayers since at least the mid-1970s328, municipal governments had stayed 
largely out of the debate on these issues until the aforementioned legal changes. Put 
another way, municipalities’ standpoints did not become apparent until they were faced 
with the impending reality of homeless rejected asylum seekers who were also excluded 
from nearly all government benefits. The municipalities’ views on whether assistance to 
unauthorized stayers is permissible or desirable became apparent in how municipalities 
responded to the changes in law that would leave many rejected asylum seekers homeless 
and essentially excluded from society. The Utrecht initiative, discussed in Chapter 3, was 
one such municipal response.329 The Utrecht initiative can be seen as a collaborative 
effort between INLIA, the municipality of Utrecht, and a number of other organizations 
such as the Dutch Refugee Council and the Utrecht Council of Churches. The Utrecht 
initiative is just one example of the interaction between the faith-based community and 
municipal governments.330
The relationship between FBOs and municipalities emerged in some capacity during 
nearly every interview conducted in relation to Part One of this book. For instance, the 
representative from Vluchtelingen in de Knel mentioned that the mayor from about 1996 
to 2000 was a frequent visitor and supporter of that organization’s work, both before and 
327 See Chapter 3.
328 Id. 
329 See Section 3.2.3.
330  Id.
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after the passage of the new laws. Similarly, the representative of the Vuurhaard stated 
that one member of the local Green Left (Groenlinks) party was a strong supporter of that 
organization’s work with unauthorized stayers.
The Aim of Part Two
Part Two examines the roles of the subfederal and municipal governments in the 
United States and the Netherlands, respectively. It examines the ongoing conflict 
between subfederal and municipal governments on the one hand, and the federal and 
central government on the other. This conflict concerns primarily the question of what 
unauthorized stayers should have access to, and who should facilitate this access. In the 
United States, this conflict has manifested itself not only on the public stage, but has also 
navigated its way through the judicial system. In the Netherlands, while less prevalent 
in the courts, the conflict has dominated the public stage. The conflict has intensified 
substantially in recent years in both countries due to changes in immigration law and 
practice, and the accompanying political rhetoric. Part Two follows a similar structure as 
Part One. Chapter 5 examines the American case, Chapter 6 examines the Dutch case, 
and Chapter 7 provides a comparison and analysis of the cases.
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5.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
Since the prosecution of the individuals in the Aguilar case331 and related cases in the so-
called sanctuary trials of the mid-1980s, the federal government has steered clear from 
pursuing similar suits (that is, suits against individuals). This could be for a number of 
reasons. First, the negative publicity surrounding the trials and sentencing, stemming 
from notions that the prosecutions were selective, has been proposed as one contributing 
factor.332 A second possible contributing factor relates to the very low numbers of people 
actually in public sanctuary333 today, as compared to the 1980s numbers. Though there 
were over 1,100 sanctuary churches in the United States in January of 2018, only 36 
people in 26 U.S. cities were actually in public sanctuary at that time.334 It is possible 
that the combination of these factors has a deterring effect on immigration authorities, 
as they may not wish to risk negative publicity over just a handful of people. In addition 
to this risk of negative publicity, a “sensitive locations” policy is still in force. Essentially, 
this policy strongly discourages immigration authorities from entering, among other 
places, schools, hospitals, places of worship, religious or civil ceremonies, and public 
demonstrations, absent exigent circumstances.335
On the other hand, there is evidence that calls into question just how concerned the 
Trump administration’s immigration authorities are about negative publicity and 
sensitive locations. In 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested 
nearly 38,000 people who did not have criminal records, a number twice that of the 
previous year.336 Critics argue that the arrests of “noncriminals” are carried out to boost 
ICE statistics and provide evidence that the administration is carrying out its promises 
vis-à-vis removing unauthorized stayers.337 In that same year, U.S. Border Patrol agents 
escorted an ambulance that was carrying a couple (both without authorized residence 
status) and their son to a hospital for emergency surgery.338 From the hospital, the parents 
331  See Section 2.2.3.
332 Rabben, Linda. “Sanctuary and Asylum: A Social and Political History.” University of Washington Press. 
2016. See also Hilary Cunningham. God and Caesar at the Rio Grande: Sanctuary and the Politics of Religion. 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995, p. 141-47.
333 Public sanctuary refers to people who have taken refuge inside of a church for purposes of avoiding 
deportation, and have not intended to conceal this fact from the immigration authorities. The number of 
people who have taken refuge for said purpose but have concealed this fact is unknown.
334 These numbers are taken from a report compiled by the Church World Service, available at https://www.
sanctuarynotdeportation.org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary_in_the_age_of_trump_january_2018.pdf. 
335 See ICE FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, available at: https://www.ice.gov/ero/
enforcement/sensitive-loc. 
336 Miroff, N., & Sacchetti, M. (2018, February 11). Trump takes ‘shackles’ off ICE, which is slapping them on 




338 Burnett, J. (2017, October 20). DHS Under Pressure Over Alleged Violation Of Policies On Sensitive Locations. 
Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2017/10/20/559113178/dhs-under-pressure-over-alleged-violation-of-
policies-on-sensitive-locations?t=1550835903256. 
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were brought to the police station to be arrested and booked.339 In this example, the 
immigration authorities ignored the policy and entered a hospital to remove aliens they 
believed to be deportable. So far, however, there is no evidence that the policy has been 
ignored regarding places of worship. ICE has not yet entered churches to arrest or deport 
unauthorized stayers, or to arrest those helping them. Rather than pursuing the people 
and organizations who are offering protection to people through public sanctuary, the 
federal government has targeted sanctuary jurisdictions: subfederal governments340 that 
have adopted policies or laws that in some capacity limit their authorities’ cooperation 
with federal immigration authorities.341 The executive branch of the federal government 
has targeted sanctuary jurisdictions in at least two primary ways, the latter of which has 
invoked the courts. First, ICE has conducted raids in sanctuary jurisdictions across the 
country, arresting hundreds of people. Second, both the president and attorney general 
have threatened to withhold federal grants to sanctuary jurisdictions. It is the latter of 
these that this chapter addresses. The withholding of funds has catalyzed a litany of 
lawsuits between subfederal governments (with sanctuary policies in place) and the 
federal government across the United States. Indeed, the modern legal battles are waged 
between different levels of government, rather than between the government and private 
citizens, as in the 1980s sanctuary trials. At its core, the conflict in the courtroom setting 
between the subfederal and federal government focuses less on the content of the law 
or policy, and more on which level of government has legal competence to conclude it in 
the first place. 
In the sanctuary trials, those assisting unauthorized stayers relied on, among others, First 
Amendment free exercise rights in support of their actions, when the federal government 
prosecuted them for violating immigration law. The First Amendment – Freedom of 
expression and religion reads as follows: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.
The rights guaranteed in the First Amendment are of a substantive nature. By contrast 
to the sanctuary trial defendants who relied on the First Amendment, the proponents of 
sanctuary jurisdictions rely on, among others, the Tenth Amendment, when the federal 
government threatens to cease funding. The Tenth Amendment – Reserved Powers reads 
as follows:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
339 Id. 
340 The phrase “subfederal governments” denotes any level of government below the federal government, 
including state, county, city, local, and so forth.
341 The concept of a “sanctuary jurisdiction” is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
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By its very name, the amendment indicates that it deals with powers. This amendment is the 
cornerstone of American federalism. What it essentially means is this: the states are given 
all powers except those specifically delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. 
This chapter discusses the development of subfederal-federal conflict, and in particular 
the most recent development of that conflict: the defunding litigation. This chapter 
addresses the following central question: why do subfederal governments become 
involved in the assistance of unauthorized stayers? To that end, the chapter identifies 
and analyzes arguments made by the subfederal actors in two different arenas: in-court 
and out-of-court. First, I discuss some basic aspects of governance in the United States 
that are necessary to grasp before being able to fully comprehend the source of the 
conflict. Then, I trace the development of the subfederal-federal conflict. In tracing this 
development, I cite to court cases but do not yet discuss them in detail. This discussion is 
reserved for the following section in which I extract the arguments that have been used in 
the federal courts. Following the legal argumentation section, I look to the argumentation 
and rationale that has been used outside of litigation, primarily in policy documents. 
Finally, I provide concluding remarks.
5.2 | The Basics of Governance and Immigration in the United States
The authority over immigration matters is bestowed upon Congress in the Constitution 
of the United States of America. Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress “to establish 
a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted this 
clause broadly. The Court has held that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative 
power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.”342 Succinctly, 
the “Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens 
shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their 
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.”343 
From a constitutional standpoint, it is the federal government that has sole competence 
over matters of immigration. With a seemingly monopolistic authority over immigration, 
what leads to conflict between the federal government and the governments of states and 
municipalities? To understand this, it is necessary to understand the basic underpinning 
of American federalism.
Governance in the United States is founded on principles of federalism. In simple terms, 
this means that the federal government is vested with certain powers, while others 
are relegated to the state and local domain. The federal government’s powers are said 
to be quite limited; that is, all powers not specifically (constitutionally) enumerated 
as being those of the federal government are reserved to the states. Again, the Tenth 
Amendment enshrines this separation: “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
342 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
343 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
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respectively, or to the people.” One such power that the states enjoy is the police power. 
The police power of a state is broad and “extends beyond health, morals and safety, 
and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being 
and tranquility of a community.”344 Moreover, the “promotion of safety of persons and 
property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police power.”345
Conflict arises when the federal government’s broad immigration powers intersect with 
the subfederal governments’ broad police powers. By this I refer to situations in which 
both the federal and subfederal governments have, at least arguably, the competence 
to govern a particular field. A concrete example is, of course, the subject at hand. One 
main stated goal of the Trump administration is to decrease the number of unauthorized 
stayers in the United States.346 Deportation of such people is one obvious way to achieve 
this goal. In its view, the federal government requires cooperation and communication 
from state and municipal law enforcement to identify and detain people who may be 
deportable. However, communication and cooperation are not compatible with how 
sanctuary jurisdictions interpret their duty to ensure safety and protect the well-being and 
tranquility of their communities. Thus, sanctuary jurisdictions have placed limitations 
on said communication and cooperation. Unsurprisingly, the federal government views 
jurisdictions that have done so as undermining and frustrating its immigration policy. 
So, the federal government has attempted to ensure their cooperation by withholding 
funding to them. I will first discuss the development of this conflict that has led to the 
threats to withhold funding. I then take an in-depth look at the arguments relevant to this 
conflict and debate.
5.3 | The Development of the Conflict
The concept of sanctuary jurisdictions is not new – it has been around since around the 
same time as churches began offering sanctuary in the early 1980s. At the time of this 
writing in early 2019, there were numerous sanctuary jurisdictions across the United 
States: from the city of New York to Chicago to Los Angeles, dozens of counties in about half 
of the states, and even some entire states, including the most populous one – California. 
The conflict between sanctuary jurisdictions and the federal government stemming from 
the federal government’s attempts at withholding funding to such jurisdictions, however, 
is new. Section 5.3.1 discusses the development of the subfederal-federal conflict prior to 
the cases filed in early 2017. Section 5.3.2 onward chronicles the specific acts of federal 
government that led to the cases. A detailed discussion of the cases, in particular the 
arguments advanced by subfederal arguments, follows in Section 5.4. 
344 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 84 (1949).
345 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).
346 See, e.g., Trump calls for deporting migrants ‘immediately’ without trial, available at: https://www.nbcnews.
com/politics/immigration/trump-calls-deporting-migrants-immediately-without-trial-n886141. “When 
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they 
came.” – Donald J. Trump
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5.3.1 | The Time Before Defunding Litigation 
As mentioned in the Introduction to Part Two, sanctuary jurisdictions have been around 
since at least 1983. Lai and Lasch classify the 1980s as the first wave of sanctuary 
policies.347 Between this first wave and the defunding litigation that began in early 
2017 (which they classify as the fourth wave), they identify two more waves, each 
catalyzed by pieces of legislation aimed at curbing immigration through state and local 
immigration enforcement participation. The second wave was a result of two major 
additions to the Immigration and Nationality Act brought about by the passage of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). One major 
addition was IIRIRA Section 133, which is also referred to as the 287(g) program.348 
That program permitted the attorney general to enter into agreements with subfederal 
governments whereby subfederal law enforcement would carry out immigration 
enforcement. Another major addition was IIRIRA Section 642. Section 642, codified at 8 
U.S.C. 1373, prevents restrictions on communication between subfederal governments 
and the federal immigration authorities. The third wave began with the introduction 
of the Secure Communities program in 2008.349 This program’s cornerstone was the 
information-sharing of biometric data between local law enforcement and the federal 
immigration authorities. These legal developments of 1996 and 2008 are discussed later 
in this chapter. The purpose of Section 5.3.1 is to explain the development of sanctuary 
jurisdictions in light of these and other legal and historical developments. But before 
doing so, it is important to recognize that a lack of a consistent definition of sanctuary 
jurisdictions among sources inevitably leads to inconsistences in understanding and in 
numbers of such jurisdictions. 
Judges and scholars alike have noted the difficulties associated with the term. In an 
April 2018 opinion, a federal judge stated that “localities which have concluded that 
cooperation in federal civil immigration efforts is counterproductive or simply offensive 
are labeled ‘sanctuary’ cities or states, but that term is commonly misunderstood.”350 The 
commonly understood definition of sanctuary as a place of refuge into which a person 
flees and is generally shielded from law enforcement “has no correlation to the so-called 
sanctuary cities at issue here” because sanctuary jurisdictions “[do] not interfere in 
any way with the federal governments lawful pursuit of its civil immigration activities, 
and presence in such localities will not immunize anyone to the research of the federal 
347 Lai, A. & Lasch, C.N. (2017). Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 539, 547.
348 Codified at 8 U.S.C. 1357(g). U.S.C. stands for United States Code. Federal laws are codified in the United States 
Code. The number “8” here refers to a title within the United States Code. Title 8 is “Aliens and Nationality.” 
The number “1357” refers to the specific section with title 8. Section 1357 is titled “Powers of immigration 
officers and employees.”
349 For ICE’s “Strategic Plan” regarding the program, see: https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/
securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf 
350 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 281 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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government.”351 Additionally, Pham takes issue with the media’s blanket use of the term 
to describe very different policies of different jurisdictions:
Media outlets, in their coverage of this controversy, reported that hundreds of 
subfederal jurisdictions also have sanctuary policies. In doing so, these media 
accounts lumped together San Francisco’s very strict noncooperation policy with 
other jurisdictions that have much more moderate policies. This lumping together has 
important implications because it glosses over the differences in [law enforcement 
agency] practices and frames the debate as all or nothing—either [law enforcement 
agencies] cooperate wholesale with federal immigration enforcement, or they become 
“sanctuaries” like San Francisco, avoiding any type of immigration cooperation 
whatsoever. In fact, however, [law enforcement agencies] have taken a variety of 
paths, with some implementing fairly nuanced cooperation policies.352
In an attempt to avoid having to choose an imperfect definition, some sources do not 
explicitly state a definition, while others define sanctuary jurisdictions broadly as those 
that limit local law enforcement’s cooperation with federal immigration authorities. To 
complicate matters further, even those that seem to use the same definition, such as 
“jurisdictions that limit cooperation with federal immigration authorities”, may have a 
different idea as to what exactly qualifies as “limit[ing] cooperation”. Others, perhaps 
cognizant of considerations like those of Pham, opt for a scale rather than a definition. 
For instance, the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, a pro-immigrant organization that 
strives for a diverse society, utilizes a scale rather than a definition. The scale measures 
the cooperation of local law enforcement with federal immigration authorities. The scale 
ranges from “0” to “7” where “0” is ascribed to jurisdictions that “go out of their way to 
spend local resources on immigration enforcement, and “7” is ascribed to jurisdictions 
that offer the most comprehensive protections to unauthorized stayers.353 Organizations 
on the other end of the immigration policy spectrum seem to also recognize that 
sanctuary could be understood by reference to different tiers or levels. The Center for 
Immigration Studies, a think-tank in favor of restrictive immigration law and policy, is 
one such organization on the other end of the policy spectrum. In a January 2019 article, 
the term “super-sanctuary” was used to refer to jurisdictions that go beyond limiting ICE 
access to courthouses and jails.354 According to the author, those jurisdictions that, in 
351 Id. 
352 Pham, H. (2017). A Framework for Understanding Subfederal Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 13 U. St. 
Thomas L.J. 508, 509.
353 See ILRC’s report titled “The Rise of Sanctuary”, available at:  http://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/
resources/rise_of_sanctuary-lg-20180201.pdf. Importantly, the ILRC report acknowledges that even in 
jurisdictions that have policy statements and laws that can be considered sanctuary, it is important to 
recognize that “within each policy may lie nuances, exceptions, and loopholes that law enforcement may 
exploit to funnel immigrants to ICE.” The focus of this section is not to compare policy to practice but to gain 
some understanding of how sanctuary may be defined, and how many sanctuary jurisdictions exist at least in 
stated law and policy.
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addition to limiting this access, also provide free legal services, discounted housing, 
healthcare, and allow unauthorized stayers to vote are super-sanctuaries. It is unclear 
from the article, however, how or if these jurisdictions should be treated compared to 
“regular” sanctuary jurisdictions.
That said, to ascribe any meaning to the changes in the number of sanctuary jurisdictions 
over the years, it is indispensable to use the same source that has applied the same 
threshold when identifying sanctuary jurisdictions. It is important that it is the same 
source and same criteria because even if two sources purport to use the same threshold, 
their interpretations of that threshold may differ, as in the above example of what 
qualifies as “limiting cooperation”. The numbers that I reference in this chapter are, 
unless otherwise stated, taken from an online database of the Westminster Law Library 
at the University of Denver.355 I have chosen this resource because it is the only one that 
has endeavored to sort the policies by dates of enactment, which is useful in identifying 
patterns. At this juncture, it is worth pointing out that the numbers I refer to in this 
section are of sanctuary laws and policies, rather than jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions, 
however, have more than one law or policy, so the number of sanctuary jurisdictions is 
lower than the number of laws and policies on record. For instance, a jurisdiction which 
has already issued a policy may be inclined to do so again in response to the passage of 
a new law or program. The list on record at the Westminster Law Library was compiled by 
reference to the following threshold question: does the policy attempt to disentangle the 
local criminal function from the federal immigration function? 
In the Introduction to Part Two, I explained the link between the church Sanctuary 
Movement that began in early 1982 and the nearly immediate genesis of sanctuary 
jurisdictions. I discussed several different laws and policies through the late 1980s to 
illustrate how they were crafted, and to what extent they mirrored the letters penned by 
church leaders, both in form and content. I did not go through each one, one by one, line 
by line. I will not do that here either, but I will pick up from the year 1990 and discuss the 
major developments from that year onward. 
The church Sanctuary Movement lost much of its vigor around 1990. As explained in Chapter 
2, this was due primarily to three developments: 1) the end of civil wars in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, 2) hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans received 
temporary protected status, and 3) the incoming George H.W. Bush administration began 
to step away from over involvement in Central America. These developments indeed 
reduced the need for churches to offer sanctuary to people. There seems to be a parallel 
development of sanctuary jurisdictions as well: in the years between 1983 and 1989, no 
fewer than 37 sanctuary laws and policies were enacted; in the years between 1990 and 
1996, only 5 were enacted. The numbers began to change as a result of the passage of 
355 The full list of sanctuary jurisdictions can be found at http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.
php?g=705342&p=5008711. I take this opportunity to express sincere gratitude to Christopher N. Lasch, R. 
Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick, Juliet P. Stump, and all 
of their student assistants for compiling this list.
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IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) in 1996. It produced 
two major changes to immigration law enforcement: Section 133 and Section 642. 
Section 133, codified at 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), is commonly referred to as the 287(g) program. 
The 287(g) program allows the attorney general to enter into agreements with subfederal 
law enforcement, whereby police officers essentially assume tasks of immigration 
officers:
(g) Performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees
(1) …the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any 
political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State 
or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform 
a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or 
detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens 
across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense 
of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local 
law.356
In performing the tasks under (g)(1), subfederal law enforcement officers are subject to 
the “direction and supervision” of the attorney general357, and they must have received 
“adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws”.358 
The 287(g) program has two main models: a “task force model”, which deals with street-
level policing, and a “jail model”, which deals with identifying and transferring inmates 
from subfederal to immigration custody.359 287(g) programs are optional and subfederal 
law enforcement cannot be required to participate.
Section 642, commonly referred to as 8 U.S.C. 1373, prohibits subfederal governments 
from restricting communication between subfederal government agencies and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.360 The key provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1373 are found 
in parts (a) and (b). Essentially, the first part prohibits subfederal governments (both 
government entities and officials) from enacting laws or policies that prohibit any of their 
government entities from communicating with the federal immigration authorities. The 
second part prohibits any person or agency from prohibiting or restricting the subfederal 
governments’ communications with the federal immigration authorities.
IIRIRA took effect on April 1, 1997. This means that both 8 U.S.C. 1373 and 287(g) became 
immediately effective. However, it was not until July 2, 2002 that the first 287(g) agreement 
356 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(1).
357 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(3).
358 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(2).
359 Lasch, C.N., Chan, R.L., Eagly, I.V., Haynes, D.F., Lai, A., McCormick, E.M. & Stumpf, J.P. (2018). Understanding 
“Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C.L. Rev. 1703, 1725-26.
360 For text of section 642, see annex.
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was signed. On that date, the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement in which it opted for the “task force” model under 287(g). 
From the day on which IIRIRA took effect until the first 287(g) agreement was actually 
concluded in 2002, only 14 policies were enacted. None of them mentioned 8 U.S.C. 
1373 explicitly, and only one mentioned 287(g). The number of sanctuary policies did not 
begin to increase until after the September 11th attacks. From 2002 until the first pilot 
of the Secure Communities program (discussed further below) was launched in October 
of 2008, over 120 policies were enacted. Lai and Lasch credit the drastic increase in 
sanctuary policies to the increased subfederal involvement in immigration enforcement 
following the September 11th attacks.361 Such involvement was explicitly sanctioned 
in a 2002 memorandum by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the U.S. Department of 
Justice.362 The key points are summarized at the end of the memorandum:
We summarize our conclusions: (1) States have inherent power, subject to federal 
preemption, to make arrests for violation of federal law. (2) Because it is ordinarily 
unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to deprive the federal government 
of whatever assistance States may provide in identifying and detaining those who 
have violated federal law, federal statues should be presumed not to preempt this 
arrest authority. This Office’s 1996 advice that federal law precludes state police from 
arresting aliens on the basis of civil deportability was mistaken. (3) Section 1252c 
does not preempt state authority to arrest for federal violations.363
This memorandum indicates that subfederal law enforcement may make arrests for 
violations of civil immigration law. It does not require subfederal enforcement to do so. 
The memorandum cited above, along with the increasing number of 287(g) agreements364, 
signaled the arrival of a more decentralized system of immigration enforcement. While 
the vast majority of the sanctuary policies enacted in the 2002-2008 time period did 
not specifically reference the OLC memorandum or 287(g) agreements by name, they 
expressed disagreement with elements of both. What many did specifically reference 
were the September 11th attacks, and the subsequent passage of the Patriot Act. The 
Patriot Act essentially decreased constitutional protections in favor of national security 
concerns. The Patriot Act was seen by many subfederal jurisdictions as incompatible 
with civil rights. For instance, the City of Ashland, Oregon passed a resolution to protect 
civil liberties in light of various provisions of the Patriot Act, which it believed had a 
strong potential to infringe on civil rights.365 In its recitals, it listed what it saw as the 
361 See Note 347, supra. 
362 See OLC Memo on State and Local Law Enforcement of Immigr. Laws, ACLU (July 22, 2005), available at: https://
www.aclu.org/legaldocument/olc-memo-state-and-local-law-enforcement-immigration-laws.
363 Id. at Section V.
364 The number of 287(g) agreements that were enacted between 2002 and 2008, was no fewer than 58. See the 
Migration Policy Institute’s Report “Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration 
Enforcement”, available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf. 
365 City of Ashland, Oregon, Resolution No. 2003-05 “Resolution to Protect Civil Liberties” (February 19, 2003), 
available at http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34866626. 
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most problematic provisions of the Patriot Act. Ashland argued that the Patriot Act was 
written in such a way that it could allow for violation of most of the civil rights guaranteed 
by the Bill of Rights.366 Having explained its concerns, the City of Ashland affirmed its 
commitment to preserve the constitutional rights of all people within the City. Other 
jurisdictions did the same.367
Before discussing the next major development in immigration enforcement – Secure 
Communities – it is worth mentioning that, in the midst of the growing subfederal 
opposition to federal laws and policies following September 11th, mid-2005 saw an early 
effort to defund sanctuary jurisdictions. In June of 2005, House Representative Tom 
Tancredo introduced an amendment regarding eligibility for receipt of the Edward Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program.368 To be clear, this was an effort by the 
legislative branch, and not the executive. The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grant Program (Byrne JAG Program), codified at 34 U.S.C. sections 10151-10158, is named 
after a fallen police officer; fittingly, the program “supports subfederal law enforcement 
efforts by providing additional funds for personnel, equipment, training, and other 
criminal justice needs.”369 The amendment sought to tie the receipt of Byrne JAG program 
funds to compliance with Section 1373, which prevents restrictions on communication 
between subfederal governments and the federal immigration authorities. The proposed 
amendment failed to pass. Opponents argued that “adding immigration enforcement to 
the responsibilities of local police would undermine community trust.”370
Secure Communities was the next major effort to further involve subfederal law 
enforcement in immigration enforcement. Piloted under the Bush administration in 
October of 2018, the program aimed to develop a system of information-sharing of 
biometric data between subfederal law enforcement agencies and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).371 Prior to the program, subfederal law enforcement agencies 
would share arrestees’ fingerprint data with the FBI. Under Secure Communities, 
the fingerprint data is also be transmitted from the FBI to DHS. DHS then checks the 
fingerprints against its database known as the Automated Biometric Identification 
366 For relevant full text, see annex.
367 See, e.g., City of Santa Cruz, California, Resolution No. NS-26,032 “Resolution of the City Council of the City 
of Santa Cruz Opposing the USA Patriot Act and Certain Justice Department Directive and Executive Orders 
that Prevent the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties” (November 12, 2002), available at: http://libguides.
law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=39154347; City Council of Baltimore, Bill. No. 03-1122 “A Council Resolution 
Concerning Preservation of Civil Liberties – USA Patriot Act” (May 19, 2003), available at: http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435679. 
368 151 Cong. Rec. H4580-02 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Tancredo).
369 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp.3d 933, 951-52 (N.D. Ill. 2017); 34 U.S.C. 10152.
370 Lai, A. & Lasch, C.N. (2017). Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 539, 553, FN 88 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. H4580-02 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statements of Reps. Mollohan 
and Serrano).
371 Kohli, A., Markowitz, P. L., & Chavez, L. (2011, October). Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of 




Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 147
System. The database contains data on travelers, applicants for immigration benefits, 
and immigrants who have previously violated immigration law.372 When there is a match, 
ICE examines its records to determine the deportability of the person and issues a 
detainer if it believes the person is deportable or if it wishes to investigate further.373 
Once the detainer is issued, the subfederal law enforcement officials could be required to 
detain the person beyond his or her scheduled release.
President Barack Obama took office just months after the Secure Communities pilot was 
launched, and his administration continued to expand the program to include more 
and more participating jurisdictions. Secure Communities was met with opposition by 
sanctuary jurisdictions. Some made it clear that they would not be participating in the 
program. For instance, the very title of the City of East Palo Alto’s July 2010 resolution was: 
Resolution of the East Palo Alto City Council encouraging the San Mateo Board of 
Supervisors to Uphold Public Safety and Affirm the Separation between County 
Services and the Enforcement of Federal Civil Immigration Law by Opting out of the 
Secure Communities Program.374 
Nonetheless, the program continued to expand, and consisted of 1,600 jurisdictions in 
44 states by October of 2011.375 
As the Secure Communities program grew, 287(g) programs came under the scrutiny 
of DHS. In March 2010, the DHS Office of the Inspector General found that ICE officers 
did not provide sufficient supervision, they failed to consider a jurisdiction’s civil 
rights record before concluding the 287(g) agreement, and did not properly implement 
federal immigration enforcement priorities.376 Moreover, studies found evidence of 
racial profiling in several jurisdiction.377 The Obama administration subsequently halted 
renewals of the “task force model” of the program.378 Though some 287(g) programs 
faced non-renewal, the Secure Communities program continued to grow for several more 
years, but it too did not evade criticism, both in and out of court. Because the program 
delegated immigration tasks to subfederal law enforcement, subfederal law enforcement 
agents essentially became immigration agents. One study found that this worsened trust 
relations between Latino communities and local police. The study found that 44 percent 
of the Latinos surveyed reported they are less likely to contact the police if they have been 
 
372 Id.
373 Id. at 2.
374 City of East Palo Alto, Resolution No. 3098 “Resolution of the East Palo Alto City Council encouraging the San 
Mateo Board of Supervisors to Uphold Public Safety and Affirm the Separation between County Services and 
the Enforcement of Federal Civil Immigration Law by Opting out of the Secure communities Program” (July 6, 
2010), available at http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=40999091. 
375 Kohli at 1.
376 See supra, Note 322, at 1726.
377 Id. at 1726-27.
378 Id. 
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the victim of a crime because they fear this interaction would be used to inquire into their 
immigration status.379 In addition to its negative impact on trust relations, another study 
found that the program did not actually reduce crime rates.380 The program’s detainer 
provisions also came under attack for being constitutionally unsound under the Fourth 
Amendment.381 Galarza v. Szalczyck held that detainers under the program are permissive 
rather than mandatory, and subfederal governments could be charged with violating 
the Fourth Amendment if they detain people without satisfying the requirements of 
that amendment, regardless of the fact they were issued a detainer from the federal 
government.382 
With these concerns in mind, former United States Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh 
Johnson ultimately halted the program in November of 2014, and replaced it with what was 
essentially a less onerous version of it: the Priority Enforcement Program. This program 
was less burdensome in two respects. First, only the fingerprints of arrestees who had 
convictions (as opposed to merely being arrested or charged) would be transmitted to 
DHS. Second, ICE detainers would no longer require the subfederal law enforcement 
officials to hold detainees past their scheduled release time. Notification to DHS/ICE of 
their release would suffice.
In 2015, the tragic death of a young white woman named Kathryn Steinle would give 
sanctuary opponents political ammunition to advance their interests of curtailing 
sanctuary cities. On July 1, 2015, Steinle was shot by a Mexican national who had been 
deported several times and had a hefty record of felony convictions. Only two days after 
her death, Trump began to extract political capital from the incident: 
This senseless and totally preventable act of violence committed by an illegal 
immigrant is yet another example of why we must secure our border immediately. This 
is an absolutely disgraceful situation and I am the only one that can fix it. Nobody else 
has the guts to even talk about it. That won’t happen if I become President.383
379 Theodore, N. (May 2013). Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in Immigration 
Enforcement, retrieved from https://perma.cc/ARA5-A5C2. 
380 Miles, T.J & Cox, A.B. (2014). Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities, 
57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 970.
381 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and sets the standard for issuing 
warrants: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”
382 Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014). The issue did not reach the Supreme Court.
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Trump, however, was not the only one crying for an end to sanctuary cities. 2015 
and 2016 saw no fewer than nine congressional efforts384 to end sanctuary cities by 
conditioning receipt of federal funds on compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. The first came 
from Republican House Representative from California, Duncan Hunter. In addition to the 
Byrne JAG program, his proposed legislation sought to condition the receipt of another 
program’s funds, those of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program385, 
on compliance Section 1373.386 This effort, along with all of the other ones in these years, 
failed to secure enough votes to pass.
While on the campaign trail in 2016, Presidential candidate Donald Trump continued to 
promise to end sanctuary cities. In a speech delivered in Phoenix in late August of 2016, 
he stated:
Block funding for sanctuary cities…no more funding. We will end the sanctuary cities 
that have resulted in so many needless deaths. Cities that refuse to cooperate with 
federal authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars, and we will work with Congress 
to pass legislation to protect those jurisdictions that do assist federal authorities.387
Trump’s promise was met with praise by his base, regardless of the questionable veracity 
of his statement that sanctuary cities have “resulted in so many needless deaths.” 
Indeed, an analysis of FBI crime data showed that counties designated as “sanctuary” by 
ICE388 typically experienced significantly lower rates of all types of crimes, including lower 
homicide rates, than comparable non-sanctuary counties.389 According to the study, there 
were on average 35.5 fewer crimes committed per 10,000 people in sanctuary counties 
compared to non-sanctuary counties.390
384 H.R. 3009, 114th Cong., (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr3009/BILLS-114hr3009ih.pdf (“Enforce 
the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act.”); H.R. 3002,114th Cong. (2015) (“Mobilizing Against Sanctuary Cities Act”); 
H.R. 3073, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Sanctuary City All Funding Elimination Act of 2015”); S. 1814, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (“Stop Sanctuary Cities Act”); H.R. 3437, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Protecting American Lives Act”); S. 2146, 
114th Cong. (2015) (“Stop Sanctuary Policies and Protect Americans Act”); S. 3100, 114th Cong. (2016) (“Stop 
Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act”); H.R. 5654, 114th Cong. (2016) (“Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act”); H.R. 
6252, 114th Cong. (2016) (“Ending Sanctuary Cities Act of 2016”). This list was taken from Lai, A. & Lasch, C.N. 
(2017). Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 Santa Clara L. Rev. 539, 547.
385 Established in 1994 with the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, COPS is a program 
that provides policing resources to states and local law enforcement agencies.
386 H.R. 3009, 114th Cong., (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr3009/BILLS-114hr3009ih.pdf (“Enforce 
the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act.”).
387 Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech, (2016, September 1). Retrieved from  https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html.
388 ICE designates counties that do not accept federal immigration detainers as “sanctuary counties”. More 
specifically, counties that do not hold people in custody beyond their release date on the basis of said 
detainers qualify as sanctuary counties.
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Statistics and facts aside, Donald Trump secured the presidency on November 8, 2016. 
A number of sanctuary resolutions were enacted in the time following the presidential 
election. For instance, less than a month after the election, the City of Richmond, 
California passed a resolution in response to the presidential election.391 The resolution 
was titled: 
A Resolution of the Richmond City Council in response to the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election: Reaffirming Support for our Sanctuary Policies; Condemning Violence, 
Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Against All Those Targeted for Their Ethnicity, Race, 
Religion, Disability, Gender, Sex and/or Sexual Orientation; and Reemphasizing Our 
Commitment to Combat Climate Change. 
The resolution’s clauses did not mince words regarding its position on the election of 
Donald Trump: 
“President-elect Donald Trump ran a campaign on a message of hate and bigotry 
which has caused numerous communities to express deep concerns about their safety 
and the direction of our country.”392
On January 25, 2017, just five days into his presidency, Donald Trump signed Executive 
Order 13768, titled “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the Unites States.”393 In 
this Order, President Trump ended the Priority Enforcement Program, and revived both 
the Secure Communities program and 287(g) program. These programs are addressed in 
Section 8 and Section 10 of the order.394 Opposition to the executive order was evident 
in the wave of sanctuary affirmations and reaffirmations that were passed in the months 
following the signing of the executive order.395 
What can then broadly be said about sanctuary jurisdictions? Sanctuary jurisdictions 
are not new; they have been around for about four decades. However, there are at least 
three significant novel aspects of sanctuary jurisdictions (and the related subfederal-
federal conflict) that have developed over the last decade: 1) the number of sanctuary 
policies has dramatically increased from under 200 in 2008 to over 500 in 2018, 2) the 
executive branch has attempted to defund sanctuary jurisdictions, and 3) these attempts 
to defund have reached numerous federal courts. With the criticisms noted above in 
mind, the definition I use for “sanctuary jurisdictions” in the sections that follow, unless 
391 City of Richmond, California, Resolution No. 106-16 “A Resolution of the Richmond City Council in response to 
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: Reaffirming Support for our Sanctuary Policies; Condemning Violence, Hate 
Crimes and Hate Speech Against All Those Targeted for Their Ethnicity, Race, Religion, Disability, Gender, Sex 
and/or Sexual Orientation; and Reemphasizing Our Commitment to Combat Climate Change” (December 6, 
2016), available at http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432066. 
392 Id. 
393 Executive Order 13768, 82. Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
394 For relevant full text, see annex.
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otherwise noted, is the following: subfederal governments that have policies or laws in 
place that limit their cooperation with the federal government in matters of immigration 
enforcement. The next section opens with a discussion of the immediate catalyst for the 
first defunding lawsuits: Section 9 of Executive Order 13768. 
5.3.2 | The Executive Branch Attempts to Defund Sanctuary Jurisdictions
President Trump signed an executive order on January 25, 2017 intending to, among 
others, withhold federal funds from noncomplying jurisdictions. According to it, the 
policy of the executive branch is to “[e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with 
applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.”396 
Section 9 of the Order, titled “Sanctuary Jurisdictions”, states that jurisdictions that 
willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 do not receive federal funding.397 
The key provisions of Section 9 are found in part (a). Essentially, part (a) conscripts the 
attorney general to ensure that jurisdictions that intentionally do not comply with 8 U.S.C. 
1373 do not receive funding. Of course, Section 9 must be read in conjunction with 8 U.S.C. 
1373, which, as discussed in Section 5.3.1 above, prohibits subfederal governments from 
restricting communication between subfederal government agencies and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. What is noteworthy about the president’s Executive Order is 
that it is the first time the receipt of any federal funding has been (attempted to be) made 
conditional on compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. While there have been cases that dealt 
with 8 U.S.C. 1373 prior to 2017, none of them dealt with it in this particular context of 
defunding. The bottom line is that, in the president’s view, sanctuary jurisdictions are 
simply those that do not comply with Section 1373, and they must be “ended.” What was 
less clear is what exactly “ended” would mean, and when federal funding would be cut. 
During a press briefing on February 1, 2017, then-Press Secretary Sean Spicer was asked 
when the White House would publish lists of municipalities subject to cuts, and when the 
cuts would happen. While Spicer thought that the “President’s goal in ending sanctuary 
cities is pretty clear”, he did not have an answer regarding timing: “As we continue to 
implement this executive order and fulfill the pledge that he made, we’ll have further 
updates on how we tend to — on how that list will come out and when it will come out.”398
5.3.3 | Sanctuary Jurisdictions Respond by Filing Suit399
Executive Order 13768 was immediately met with fierce resistance from sanctuary 
jurisdictions. On January 31, 2017, the City and County of San Francisco filed the first 
396 Executive Order 13768, 82. Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017), § 2(c).
397 Executive Order 13768, § 9(a). For text of Section 9, see annex.
398 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer: The White House. (Feb. 1, 2017). Retrieved from https://perma.
cc/KD8J-E64E.
399 From this Section 5.3.3 through the end of Section 5.3, I include arguments and rulings from relevant cases as 
necessary to explain the development of the defunding efforts. In Section 4.1, infra, I discuss the arguments, 
rulings, and reasoning from the relevant cases in detail.
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complaint challenging Section 9 of the executive order. It asked the court to grant a 
preliminary injunction barring the use of Section 1373 as a precondition to receive 
federal funding.400 In support thereof, it argued conditioning the receipt on funding 
violated the Constitutional separation of powers, the Spending Clause, and the Tenth 
Amendment. It also argued that 8 U.S.C. 1373 is unconstitutional on its face under the 
Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principles. On February 3, 2017, the County of 
Santa Clara filed a lawsuit with similar arguments.401 The County of Santa Clara raised two 
additional arguments. It argued that the 1373 conditions are 1) void for vagueness under 
the Fifth Amendment, and 2) violate due process under the Fifth Amendment. On April 
14, 2017, Judge Orrick heard arguments on the preliminary injunction from both Santa 
Clara and San Francisco.402 On April 25, 2017, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs 
and granted the preliminary injunction. The court found that the enforcement provision 
violated the Constitution’s separation of powers principles, the Spending Clause, the 
Tenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment due process requirements, and was avoid for 
vagueness under the Fifth Amendment.403 The preliminary injunction was nationwide 
in nature, meaning it would apply throughout the entire United States and not only in 
the Northern District of California. The president appealed the decision on September 
18, 2017; notwithstanding the pending appeal, the preliminary injunction was made 
permanent on November 21 2017. On August 1, 2018 the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion. It 
affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a permanent injunction, but not as to the nationwide 
scope of it.404
5.3.4 | The Executive Branch (Again) Attempts to Defund Sanctuary Jurisdictions
Only a week after the April 25, 2017 preliminary injunction, the Department of Justice 
sent letters to nine jurisdictions demanding documentation from them to show they have 
complied with 8 U.S.C. 1373 for the fiscal year 2016.405 Then, in late July 2017, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions announced that the next round of Byrne JAG program applications 
would have two additional requirements.406 This was another measure intended to further 
discourage subfederal governments from adopting or maintaining sanctuary policies. 
On August 3, 2017, the two new conditions for receipt of the Byrne JAG Program were 
400 City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017).
401 County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 5:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) Before the end of 
March, three more complaints were filed by other jurisdictions. See City of Chelsea & City of Lawrence v. 
Donald J. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10214 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 8, 2017); City of Richmond v. Donald J. Trump, No. 3:17-
cv-01535 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 22, 2017); City of Seattle v. Donald J. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00497 (W.D. Wash. filed 
March 29, 2017).
402 The two cases were related and heard by the same judge.
403 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F.Supp.3d 497, 530-36 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
404 City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1243-45 (9th Cir. 2018).
405 Fiscal year 2016 ran from October 1, 2015 to September 30, 2016.
406 Byrne JAG applications were already subject to compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. This was clarified in an October 
2016 Department of Justice letter, see Office of Justice Programs, Additional Guidance Regarding Compliance 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, U.S. Dep’t Just. (October 6, 2016).
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published in the FY (Fiscal Year) 2017 Local Solicitation.407 In addition to demonstrating 8 
U.S.C. 1373 compliance, subfederal governments would be required to fulfill both of the 
following conditions before receiving federal funds:
1) permit personnel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to access 
any correctional or detention facility in order to meet with an alien (or an individual 
believed to be an alien) and inquire as to his or her right to be or remain in the United 
States, and
2) provide at least 48 hours’ advance notice to DHS regarding the scheduled release 
date and time of an alien in the jurisdiction’s custody when DHS requests such notice 
in order to take custody of the alien pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act.408
Apparently, Jeff Sessions adopted an even broader view of sanctuary jurisdictions than 
the president did in his earlier order. Under the new conditions, even if a jurisdiction 
complied with the Section 1373 information-sharing requirements, it could still be 
denied federal funding if it failed to permit access and provide notice to ICE. With the 
two new contested conditions set forth, it is useful to understand how they can conflict 
with sanctuary policies. Rather than going into every sanctuary jurisdiction’s particular 
iteration of its law or policy, I address one here in an exemplary capacity to illustrate the 
conflict. Here I address Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance. The ordinance opens with a 
statement of purpose and intent. At the heart of the intent and purpose is the city’s belief 
that “cooperation of the city’s immigrant communities is essential to prevent and solve 
crimes and maintain public order, safety and security in the entire city.409 One of the city’s 
most important goals is enhancing its relationship with the immigrant communities, 
and to that end, this ordinance sets forth procedures regarding immigration status 
and enforcement of federal civil immigration laws.410 Below are key provisions of the 
ordinance: 
(b) (1) Unless an agency or agent is acting pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose that is unrelated to the enforcement of a civil immigration law, no agency or 
agent shall:
(A) permit ICE agents access to a person being detained by, or in the custody of, the 
agency or agent;
(B) permit ICE agents use of agency facilities for investigative interviews or other 
investigative purpose; or
407 See Byrne JAG Program, FY 2017 Local Solicitation, at page 30, available at https://www.bja.gov/funding/
JAGLocal17.pdf. 
408 Id. 
409 Chicago, Illinois Municipal Code § 2-173-005.
410 Id. 
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(C) while on duty, expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating 
with ICE regarding a person’s custody status or release date.411
Excluded from these prohibitions are classes of potentially dangerous people, including 
gang members and those with outstanding criminal warrants, felony convictions, or pending 
felony charges.412 On their face, the two new conditions conflict with the above prohibitions. 
The ordinance prohibits City of Chicago agents from responding to ICE inquires or 
communication with ICE regarding custody status or release date. Thus, they are prohibited 
from notifying ICE about an individual’s release date. And the prohibition on permitting ICE 
agents access to people who are held or detained by the city is self-explanatory.
5.3.5 | Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Again) Respond by Filing Suit 
On August 7, 2017, just four days after the publication of the two new conditions, the City 
of Chicago filed a seven-count complaint and moved for a preliminary injunction against 
the attorney general to enjoin the DOJ from enforcing all three conditions for receipt of 
the Byrne JAG Program.413 Before the end of August, three more lawsuits were filed.414 The 
arguments mirrored most of those made in the prior lawsuits challenging the president’s 
executive order. However, there were two additional arguments that were available to 
these plaintiffs due to the rules governing the attorney general’s power. First, Chicago 
argued that the attorney general’s imposition of the conditions was ultra vires – that it 
went above what the Byrne JAG statute permitted the attorney general to do.415 Second, 
it argued that the manner in which the conditions were introduced violated several 
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), including the requirement that 
legislative rules must be adopted through certain procedures.416
On September 15, 2017, the court granted the City of Chicago’s motion for preliminary 
injunction regarding the two new conditions, but denied the motion for preliminary 
injunction regarding the condition that the city must comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373. 
Conditioning receipt of the Byrne JAG Program on compliance with Section 1373 was a 
valid congressional choice and lawful, but the notice and access conditions exceeded 
the attorney general’s power. What this means is that funds could be withheld from a 
jurisdiction for its failure to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373, but could not be withheld for failure 
to give ICE notice and access to its jails. The attorney general appealed the decision, 
which was decided in April of 2018.
411 Chicago, Illinois Municipal Code § 2-173-042(b)(1).
412 Chicago, Illinois Municipal Code § 2-173-042(c).
413 City of Chicago v. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, No. 1:17-cv-05720 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 7, 2017).
414 City and County of San Francisco v. Jefferson B. Sessions III, et al., No. 3:17-cv-04642 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 11, 
2017); State of California ex rel. Xavier Becerra v. Jefferson B. Sessions, et al., No. 3:17-cv-04701 (N.D. Cal. filed 
Aug. 14, 2017); City of Philadelphia v. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, No. 2:17-cv-03894 (E. D. Pa. filed Aug. 
30, 2017).
415 City of Chicago v. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, No. 1:17-cv-05720, at paragraphs 77-85 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 
7, 2017).
416 Id. at paragraphs 142-155. The APA is discussed further in Section 5.4.
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On April 19, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit417 published 
its opinion regarding the attorney general’s appeal of the September 15, 2017 decision, 
which preliminary enjoined the DOJ from enforcing the two new conditions of the Byrne 
JAG Program. The court held that the attorney general exceeded his authority by imposing 
two new conditions on receipt of the grant.418 One of the three judges on the panel 
concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the majority’s opinion regarding the scope 
of the injunction: he did not believe it should have nationwide effect.419 The attorney 
general requested an en banc review420 regarding one issue: the nationwide scope of the 
injunction. On June 4, 2018, the majority of the judges in active service voted in favor of 
partially rehearing the case related only to the geographic scope of the injunction.421 On 
June 26, 2018, the Seventh Circuit, by a majority of judges participating in the en banc 
review of the geographical limitation aspect of the case, temporarily narrowed the scope 
of the nationwide injunction to include only Chicago, pending oral arguments scheduled 
for September 6, 2018. On July 27, 2018, the September 15, 2017 preliminary injunction 
was made permanent. The judge, acknowledging the Seventh Circuit’s narrowing of the 
nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, also stayed the scope of the permanent 
injunction.422 In that opinion, the court also held 8 U.S.C. 1373 to be unconstitutional in 
light of Murphy423, a Supreme Court case that was decided in May 2018 that dealt with 
the Tenth Amendment. This holding only applies in the Northern District of Illinois, not 
nationwide.
5.3.6 | ICE and DOJ Team Up Against Sanctuary Jurisdictions
Before the appeals discussed above were even decided, ICE announced that they had 
arrested almost 500 unauthorized stayers in a nationwide sweep.424 In fact, the first round 
of these raids occurred less than two weeks after the September 15, 2017 opinion. In a 
four-day sweep dubbed Operation Safe City, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations 
teams arrested 498 individuals from 42 countries for federal immigration violations 
 
417 In the American federal court system, the circuit courts hear appeals from the decisions of the district courts 
(trial courts) within their geographical area. The Seventh Circuit hears appeals from the District Courts sitting in 
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana. The 13 circuit courts are the federal intermediate appellate courts – between 
the district courts (trial courts) and the Supreme Court of the United States.
418 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018).
419 Id. at 299-300.
420 En banc review means that all judges of a court reconsider a case. Typically, an appeal from a federal trial court 
decision is heard by a three-member panel of judges, not all the judges of that court. En banc review is an 
exceptional measure reserved primarily for two situations: 1) when consideration by the full court is necessary 
to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or 2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional 
importance. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a).
421 City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 
WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018).
422 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 2018 WL 3608564, at *18 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2018).
423 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (2018). This case is discussed in Section 5.4.
424 Westervelt, E. (2017, September 29). ICE Raids Target Sanctuary Cities. Retrieved July 31, 2018, from https://
www.npr.org/2017/09/29/554424186/ice-raids-target-sanctuary-cities?t=1533056804663. 
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in multiple sanctuary cities, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and 
Washington D.C., across the United States.425 And, ICE was not shy about speaking about 
the sweep. ICE’s Acting Director Tom Homan stated the following:
Sanctuary jurisdictions that do not honor detainers or allow us access to jails and 
prisons are shielding criminal aliens from immigration enforcement and creating a 
magnet for illegal immigration. As a result, ICE is forced to dedicate more resources to 
conduct at-large arrests in these communities.426
In January of 2018, the Department of Justice sent 23 letters to various sanctuary 
jurisdictions, including cities, counties, and states, demanding that they prove 
compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. The City of Chicago, County of Cook, and the State 
of Illinois all received such letters. The relevant full text of the letter addressed to 
Superintendent Johnson can be found in the annex.427 There are two aspects of this 
letter worth noting. First, the DOJ acknowledges and thanks the superintendent of the 
Chicago Police Department for his ongoing response related to the Fiscal Year 2016 
grant award conditions, but remains concerned that the jurisdiction’s laws, policies, or 
practices may be inconsistent with, or in violation of, Section 1373. Second, should the 
superintendent fail to provide documents to the DOJ’s satisfaction within a month, it 
threatens to use subpoenas to attain said documents. These aspects are worth noting 
because despite the superintendent’s “ongoing response” to the DOJ’s inquiries, it 
nonetheless threatens him with subpoenas, further antagonizing the relationship 
between subfederal law enforcement and the federal government, cutting against the 
purpose of 8 U.S.C. 1373.
5.3.7 | Another Round of ICE Raids
In July of 2018, ICE completed another raid operation. This time, it was a two-phase 
operation that targeted workplaces in sanctuary jurisdictions. As with the September 
2017 raid targeting sanctuary jurisdictions, ICE published its efforts online immediately. 
The first phase of the raid was conducted between January 29, 2018 and March 30, 2018, 
and resulted in 61 arrests, according to ICE.428 The second phase, conducted between July 
16 and July 20, 2018 resulted in 32 arrests.429 Overall, 5,200 businesses received notices 
425 ICE arrests over 450 on federal immigration charges during Operation ‘Safe City’. (2017, September 28). 
Retrieved July 31, 2018, from https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-arrests-over-450-federal-immigration-
charges-during-operation-safe-city
426 Id. 
427 Letter retrieved from Justice Department Demands Documents and Threatens to Subpoena 23 Jurisdictions 
As Part of 8 U.S.C. 1373 Compliance Review. (2018, January 24). Retrieved August 1, 2018, from https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-demands-documents-and-threatens-subpoena-23-jurisdictions-part-8-
usc-1373. 
428 ICE delivers more than 5,200 I-9 audit notices to businesses across the US in 2-phase nationwide operation. 





Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 157
that they would be inspected, and were required to produce I-9 forms430 within three days 
of the notices. ICE Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Rodriguez indirectly referred to sanctuary 
cities: “[t]he increasing unwillingness of some jurisdictions to cooperate with ICE in the 
safe and orderly transfer of targeted aliens inside their prisons and jails has necessitated 
additional at-large arrests.”431
5.4 | Arguments
In this section I discuss the arguments used by subfederal governments in support of their 
sanctuary policies. The arguments I discuss here are distilled from in-court argumentation 
and sanctuary policy documents. Regarding in-court argumentation, I discuss federal 
court cases that have been decided through 2018 that dealt with the federal government’s 
attempts to defund sanctuary jurisdictions. Regarding the sanctuary policy documents, 
I rely on prior research that has distilled sanctuary rationales by analyzing the policy 
documents themselves. 
Despite the fact that sanctuary litigation is a new development that began in early 2017, 
it is quite voluminous. In this section, the goal is not to cover each and every case that 
has been filed. Rather, I endeavor to cover every argument that has been brought in court. 
Because arguments are repeated from case to case, it is not necessary to discuss each 
case that has been filed. There have been two major lines of litigation: those challenging 
the executive order and attorney general’s conditions discussed above. The first cases 
filed on these issues (and brought before the circuit courts) were brought in federal 
courts in San Francisco and Chicago.
As mentioned above, the litigation is quite voluminous, but that is simply the nature of 
it. On the other hand, the discussion on the Dutch counterpart in the following chapter 
(Chapter 6) is considerably shorter. This is because the minimum care issue in the 
Dutch context has not generated nearly as much litigation as the sanctuary issue in the 
American context. 
5.4.1 | Arguments in Litigation
While probably the most effective manner by which the federal government exerts 
influence on subfederal governments is through its ability to control the funding it 
provides, the federal government’s power to do so is checked against constitutional 
limitations. There are constitutional limitations on the federal government’s spending 
abilities, which have been raised in court. Here I discuss the arguments raised in the 
430 According to federal law, all employers must fill out I-9 forms for all employees. The purpose of such forms is to 
ensure that the individuals employed have work authorization in the United States.
431 Leonard, B. (2018, July 25). Numbers show ICE is using tougher tactics under Trump, says report. Retrieved 
August 1, 2018, from https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/numbers-show-ice-using-tougher-
tactics-new-york-under-trump-n893671. 
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federal cases that have dealt with these issues in the context of the federal government’s 
attempts to defund sanctuary jurisdictions.432 Before getting into the cases, it is important 
to understand the framework for granting the primary relief that the lawsuits have sought. 
The lawsuits discussed below initially sought preliminary injunctions. Preliminary 
injunctions are a form of equitable relief that require the offending party to do, or refrain 
from doing, a particular act. Injunctions and other equitable relief are distinguishable 
from legal remedies, which require the offending party to pay damages to the other. The 
Supreme Court has recited the requirements of a preliminary injunction as follows:
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed 
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 
public interest.433
While the courts consider all of these requirements, the first one is the most important 
and discussed most in depth. The only difference in requirements between a preliminary 
injunction and a permanent one is that the plaintiff has actually succeeded on the merits 
of the case, rather than showing a likelihood. 
5.4.1.1 | Constitutional Separation of Powers and the Spending Clause
One argument used by sanctuary jurisdictions in court deals with separation of powers. 
The separation of powers among different branches of government is set forth in Article 
1 (legislative), Article 2 (executive), and Article 3 (judiciary) of the Constitution. Each 
branch has specific powers granted to it by the Constitution. Congress is the legislative 
branch of the United States federal government.434 It is possible to deviate from the 
rule that Congress makes the law only if Congress chooses to specifically delegate this 
power to another branch.435 If another branch attempts to engage in lawmaking without 
Congressional authorization, it is considered an unconstitutional overreach of power, 
and not valid. 
One specific power given to Congress is the “power of the purse”, and can be found in 
two clauses of the Constitution. The first one is Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1. It is often 
referred to as the “Taxing and Spending Clause” or simply “Spending Clause” and reads: 
432 There are also cases between different levels of subfederal governments. For instance, the city of El Cenizo filed 
suit against the state of Texas because it enacted a law that forbade sanctuary policies. See City of El Cenizo, 
Texas v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). However, as the focus in Part Two of this dissertation is on the 
conflict between the subfederal and federal, and the subcentral and central, I do not discuss these in detail.
433 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
434 Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution reads: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”
435 See Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 488 (1998) (“Congress has frequently delegated the President the 
authority to spend, or not to spend, particular sums of money.”) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, 
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States.
The second one is Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7. It is often referred to as the “Appropriations 
Clause” and reads:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures 
of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
The first clause above explicitly names Congress as the competent branch to tax and 
spend. The second clause states that only the appropriations that are made by law 
(meaning Congress because Congress is the lawmaking branch) are valid. Congress 
is therefore the default exclusive authority for federal taxing and spending. If another 
branch, such as the executive, wishes to engage in taxing or spending, it must first obtain 
Congressional authorization. Secondly, even if Congress has delegated some power under 
the Spending clause to another branch, the taxing or spending by the other branch must 
not exceed the limitations of the clause itself. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
identified five limitations to the spending clause powers: 1) the exercise of the spending 
power must be for the general welfare, 2) any conditions placed on funds to the states 
must be set forth unambiguously, 3) conditions must be related to the federal interest 
Congress seeks to seeks to regulate with the funds, 4) there must not be an independent 
constitutional bar to the statute, and 5) “the financial inducement offered by Congress” 
shall not be “so great as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”436 
If there is no Congressional delegation to another branch to exercise taxing or spending 
powers, then the second question of validity under the Spending Clause is irrelevant.
This ‘separation of powers’ argument, and the related Spending Clause considerations, have 
been used against two executive branch actors’ actions: 1) the president’s executive order 
requiring subfederal governments’ compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373 as a condition to receiving 
any federal grants437, and 2) the attorney general’s attachment of two additional conditions 
to the receipt of certain federal funding438 – namely, Byrne JAG Program. At this point, it 
is important to recognize that the executive order stated that all federal grants would be 
subject to compliance with Section 1373, while the attorney general stated that specifically 
the Byrne JAG Program’s grants would be subject to compliance with Section 1373 (and 
the two new conditions). The difference is that the attorney general named a specific grant 
that has already a condition in it that requires “the applicant [to] comply with … all other 
applicable Federal laws.”439 I will discuss this impact of this difference in the cases below.
436 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 211 (1987).
437 For full text of the relevant provisions, see Section 5.3.2, supra.
438 For two new conditions, see Section 5.3.4, supra.
439 34 U.S.C. 10153(a)(5)(D).
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The separation of powers and related spending clause argument was used to challenge 
both the executive order and the attorney general’s imposition of additional conditions. 
The first case to challenge the executive order was City and County of San Francisco 
v. Trump, and the first case to challenge the attorney general’s conditions was City of 
Chicago v. Sessions. 
The Executive Order
On January 31, 2017, the City and County of San Francisco filed the first complaint 
challenging Section 9 of the executive order. One of its primary arguments challenging 
Section 9 was based on constitutional separation of powers and the spending clause. 
These arguments are most clearly seen in paragraphs 60-63 of the complaint:
60. The Funding Restriction440 imposes new funding conditions on existing federal 
funds that go beyond the statutory conditions imposed by Congress.
61. Also, the Funding Restriction imposes funding conditions that are not germane 
to the purpose of the funds insofar as it reaches funds that are unrelated to law 
enforcement or immigration.
62. The Funding Restriction also imposes conditions so severe that they cross the 
line distinguishing encouragement from coercion. The Funding Restriction threatens 
a significant percent of San Francisco’s overall budget, including virtually the entire 
funding stream for critical programs to its residents, such as Medicaid.
63. Finally, the Funding Restriction imposes new funding conditions that require 
jurisdictions to act unconstitutionally insofar as Defendants interpret Section 1373 to 
require San Francisco to detain individuals who would otherwise be released from 
custody. Such detentions would violate, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment.441
The argument in paragraph 60 is based on Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which 
vests the spending power in Congress: in this case, because Congress has neither 
included the conditions in the first place, nor delegated this power to another body, 
there is a violation of Article 1, Section 8. The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that 
the order ran afoul of “basic and fundamental constitutional structures.”442 The court 
first cited a prior decision that referred to such a fundamental constitutional principle: 
“Incident to [the spending power], Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives 
by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal 
440 Funding restriction meaning jurisdictions must comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 to receive funding.
441 City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485, paragraphs 60-63 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 
31, 2017).
442 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
160 chapter 5
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 161
statutory and administrative directives.’”443 The court added emphasis on the word 
“Congress” to make it clear that it is indeed not the president who, by default, may 
attach spending conditions. The court then went on to say that once a bill becomes a 
law, the president must “take Care that the Law be faithfully executed.”444 In cases where 
Congress has not given “the President discretion in allocating funds, the President has 
no constitutional authority to withhold such funds and violates his obligation to faithfully 
execute the laws duly enacted by Congress if he does so.”445 In essence, the president is 
bound by laws, as written by Congress, just as any other person in the country. Finally, 
the court noted that Section 9 is particularly problematic in light of the fact that all prior 
congressional attempts446 at defunding jurisdictions on the basis of noncompliance with 
Section 1373 have failed.447 
Having found that the attempt to place new conditions on federal funds likely violated448 
the constitutional separation of powers, the court did not need to consider the question 
of whether the spending clause itself was violated. However, it did so anyway. To pass 
constitutional muster, the spending power must adhere to the following limitations: 
1)  the exercise of the spending power must be for the general welfare, 
2)  any conditions placed on funds to the states must be set forth unambiguously, 
3)   onditions must be related to the federal interest Congress seeks to regulate with the 
funds, 
4)  there must not be an independent constitutional bar to the statute, and 
5)   “the financial inducement offered by Congress” shall not be “so great as to pass the 
point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”449 
Paragraph 61 of the complaint essentially argued that the third limitation had been 
ignored because conditioning all federal funds on compliance with Section 1373 
necessarily means that funds completely unrelated to immigration or law enforcement 
would also be reached. Paragraph 62 argued that the fifth limitation would be ignored 
if conditioning 1373 compliance on receipt of all funds would be permitted. This is 
because, from a practical standpoint, the county would not have a real choice other than 
to comply with the condition because it could not risk losing critical healthcare funding. 
This would make the condition coercive, which is prohibited by law, rather than merely an 
encouragement, which is permitted by law. Finally, paragraph 63 argued that there would 
be an independent bar to the imposition of the condition – namely that the condition 
could be incompatible with, for instance, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. And this would ignore the fourth limitation above.
443 Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
444 Id. citing U.S. Const. Art. II, Section 3, Clause 5.
445 Id. citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998).
446 See Section 5.3.1, supra.
447 Cty. of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 531.
448 Recall that a preliminary injunction requires likelihood of success on the merits.
449 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 211 (1987).
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The court agreed. It even found that Section 9 is incompatible with the second spending 
limitation regarding ambiguity. First, the court acknowledged that “[w]hen Congress 
places conditions on federal funds, it must do so unambiguously” so that states and 
local jurisdictions contemplating whether to accept such funds can “exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”450 These conditions 
were not part of the Byrne JAG funding at the time Congress made the appropriations, so 
it cannot be said that jurisdictions knowingly and voluntarily accepted them.451 Second, 
the court found that the condition ran afoul of the nexus requirement (the requirement 
that there must be some relation between the condition and the federal interest Congress 
is pursuing with the funds. Because the condition would reach wholly unrelated areas of 
funding, including, for instance, receipt of public health care funds, the nexus requirement 
was not satisfied.452 Third, the court found that condition impermissibly “coerces a State 
to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own”, and this “runs contrary to our system 
of federalism.”453 Thus, the court found that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on its 
allegation that the spending clause was violated.
The Attorney General’s Conditions
On August 7, 2017, the City of Chicago filed the first complaint challenging all three 
conditions for receipt of the Byrne JAG Program.454 In addition to certifying compliance 
with 8 U.S.C. 1373, jurisdictions applying for the grant would have to agree to provide 
notice and access. These conditions require “first, that local authorities provide 
federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release from state or local correctional 
facilities of certain individuals suspected of immigration violations, and, second, that 
local authorities provide immigration agents with access to City detention facilities and 
individuals detained therein.”455
The City of Chicago argued that all three conditions violated the separation of powers 
because Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the legislative power, and 
these conditions were not imposed by Congress but rather the Department of Justice.456 
Moreover, the city argued that even if Congress had imposed the three conditions, they 
would still be invalid because they do not adhere to the limitations of the spending 
clause. The city argued that the second, third, fourth, and fifth limitations were ignored.457
450 Cty. of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 203).
451 Cty. of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
452 Id. 
453 Id. at 533 (quoting Nat’l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577-78 (2012)).
454 City of Chicago v. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, No. 1:17-cv-05720 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 7, 2017).
455 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp.3d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
456 City of Chicago v. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, No. 1:17-cv-05720, paragraphs 87-92 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 7, 
2017).
457 Id. at paragraphs 95-122.
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In determining whether the two new conditions were valid, the court first looked at 
whether Congress had delegated authority and discretion to the executive branch through 
statute.458 The relevant statute is the one that has codified the Byrne JAG program: 34 
U.S.C. Sections 10151-10158.459 The court, by reference to the plain words of the statute, 
found that the authority given to the attorney general is rather limited. The court also did 
not find the authority to introduce new conditions in any applicable statute.460 In short, 
the notice and access conditions were found to likely violate the separation of powers 
and were ultra vires461 because Congress had not authorized the attorney general to 
impose additional substantive conditions.
The court then turned to the third condition: compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. The relevant 
portion of the Byrne JAG statute reads as follows:
Such application shall include the following:
[...]
(5) A certification, made in a form acceptable to the Attorney General and executed 
by the chief executive officer of the applicant (or by another officer of the applicant, if 
qualified under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General), that—
[...]
(D) the applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable 
Federal laws.462
The question for the court was whether 8 U.S.C. 1373 should be considered an applicable 
Federal law under (D). The court rejected the city’s argument that “all other applicable 
Federal laws” only encompass a narrow body of law governing federal grant-making.463 The 
court, relying on Supreme Court interpretations of “applicable laws”, found that a broader 
definition of applicable would be appropriate.464 The court thus held that the plaintiff was 
likely to prevail as to notice and access being unconstitutional under the separation of 
powers and spending clause, but not likely to succeed regarding compliance. 
458 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp.3d at 940.
459 Id. at 941.
460 Id. at 941-943.
461 Ultra vires refers to acts done outside of one’s authority.
462 34 U.S.C. 10153(a).
463 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp.3d at 944.
464 Id. at 945.
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5.4.1.2 | The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment argument is essentially another ‘separation of powers’ argument. 
However, this one deals with the separation of powers between the federal government 
and the states, rather than among the branches of the federal government. It reads:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
The essence of this amendment is that there are two sovereigns: the federal government 
and the states. Each has competence to govern over certain fields. As mentioned 
above, there can be overlap in the field of immigration because it is broad enough to 
be encompassed by the federal immigration competence but also the subfederal police 
powers. 
A core principle of the Tenth Amendment is known as the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
This doctrine emerged relatively recently from two Supreme Court cases: New York v. United 
States465 in 1992 and Printz v. United States466 in 1997. The facts of the cases are somewhat 
complex and I do not go into them here. Essentially, what the doctrine says is this: the 
federal government cannot compel the legislative or executive branches of subfederal 
government to implement federal regulatory programs.467 The anti-commandeering 
principle was used to challenge both the executive order and the attorney general’s 
imposition of additional conditions in both of the cases discussed above.
The Executive Order
In its January 31, 2017 complaint, the City and County of San Francisco relied on 
the Tenth Amendment for two arguments against 8 U.S.C. 1373. First, it argued that 
mandating compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373 for receipt of federal funds violated the Tenth 
Amendment.468 Second, it argued that under the anti-commandeering principle, 8 U.S.C. 
1373(a) is unconstitutional on its face (that is to say, it is unconstitutional by itself without 
being used as a condition):
102. On its face, Section 1373 commandeers state and local governments in violation 
of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution by, inter alia, regulating the “States in 
their sovereign capacity,” Reno, 528 U.S. at 151, limiting state authority to regulate 
internal affairs and determine the duties and responsibilities of state employees, 
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, and ultimately forcing States to allow their employees to 
use state time and state resources to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes 
465 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
466 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
467 Id. at 925.
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regulating private individuals, Reno, 528 U.S. at 151, and to provide information that 
belongs to the State and is available to them only in their official capacity, Printz, 521 
U.S. at 932-33 & n.17.469
The court held that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on this claim. While the federal 
government is free to incentivize subfederal jurisdictions to adopt programs voluntarily, 
“it cannot use means that are so coercive as to compel their compliance.”470 Here, the 
means were deemed unduly coercive because a jurisdiction would risk all federal funding 
if it does not comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.
The Attorney General’s Conditions
In its August 7, 2017 complaint, the City of Chicago relied on the Tenth Amendment to 
challenge all three conditions. The city argued that complying with the notice condition 
“would require Chicago to hold detainees longer than it currently does and would, at 
the bottom ‘command the States’ officers…to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.’”471 Complying with the access condition would require the Chicago Police 
Department to fundamentally restructure its procedures and functions in order to 
accommodate access to federal immigration authorities as they require. This would 
essentially result in an open-door policy for the federal immigration authorities to enter 
and interrogate local detainees, which severely displaces Chicago’s fundamental police 
powers.472 Finally, the city argued that 8 U.S.C. 1373 is unconstitutional on its face:
131. Congress enacted Section 1373 on the belief that “[e]ffective immigration law 
enforcement requires a cooperative effort between all levels of government.” S. 
Rep. No. 104-249, at 19 (1996). Specifically, Congress sought to ensure that “[t]he 
acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related information by State 
and local agencies” could be used to enforce federal law. Id. at 19-20. In doing so, 
it sought to “require [state and local officers] to provide information that belongs to 
the State and is available to them only in their official capacity”—in other words, to 
engage in unconstitutional commandeering. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 n.17.473
Although the city challenged the notice and access conditions under the Tenth 
Amendment in its pleading, the court did not consider whether they were constitutional 
under that amendment. Rather, the court found the notice and access conditions likely 
to be unconstitutional under separation of powers.474 However, the court held that the 
8 U.S.C. 1373 compliance condition was likely valid under separation of powers. Thus, 
469 Id. at paragraph 102.
470 Cty. of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
471 City of Chicago v. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, No. 1:17-cv-05720, paragraph 127 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 7, 
2017) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 935).
472 Id. at paragraph 128.
473 Id. at paragraph 131.
474 See Section 5.4.1.1, supra.
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it went on to consider the city’s argument that 8 U.S.C. 1373 is unconstitutional on its 
face under the Tenth Amendment. The court held that the city was unlikely to succeed on 
the merits of this challenge because under existing case law at the time of the decision 
(namely Printz and New York), only affirmative obligations on subfederal governments 
violate the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle.475 This would soon 
change.
It is important to recognize here that neither decision held that the plaintiff is likely to 
succeed in its allegation that 8 U.S.C. 1373 is unconstitutional on its face. Rather, the 
court in the first case held that conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance 
with Section 1373 is likely unconstitutional. The court in the second case did not find that 
the city would be likely to prevail on its allegation that 8 U.S.C. 1373 is unconstitutional 
on its face, nor did it find that the compliance condition was likely unconstitutional. 
However, both of these courts revisited the issue in light of a Supreme Court case decided 
in May of 2018, and held that Section 1373 is unconstitutional on its face. In fact, judges 
in at least three other cases did the same in 2018. I briefly discuss these decisions here.
The constitutionality of Section 1373 under the Tenth Amendment was in 1999 in the case 
of City of New York v. United States. In 1989, then-mayor of New York City Edward Koch 
issued an executive order that prohibited city officers and employees from transmitting 
information regarding the immigration status of any individual to the federal immigration 
authorities.476 8 U.S.C. 1373 became effective in 1997 and preempted the executive 
order.477 The city filed a complaint against the federal government claiming that this 
preemption was invalid because of the anti-commandeering principle as articulated in 
New York and Printz. The court distinguished those cases from this one because they 
affirmatively conscripted state officers into carrying out federal programs, whereas 8 
U.S.C. 1373 does not do so: 
“These Sections [434 and 642478] do not directly compel states or localities to require 
or prohibit anything. Rather, they prohibit state and local governmental entities 
or officials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration 
information with the INS.”479
It found no violation of the Tenth Amendment. This case did not reach the Supreme 
Court; it was decided on the federal appellate level. In any event, courts were reluctant to 
entertain anti-commandeering challenges to federal law despite the authority.
475 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp.3d at 949.
476 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999).
477 Federal preemption is a principle of U.S. constitutional law that invalidates subfederal laws or policies if they 
conflict with federal law.
478 Recall that Section 642 is 8 U.S.C. 1373.
479 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
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In May of 2018, the Supreme Court issued a landmark judgment regarding the anti-
commandeering principle. The case involved a challenge to a federal law that prohibited 
states from authorizing sports gambling.480 The court held that distinguishing between 
laws that affirmatively compel states to enact legislation or policies, and those that 
prohibit states from enacting laws, is an empty one.481 Neither is permissible under the 
Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle. Judges in at least five federal cases 
relied on this decision in 2018 to strike down 8 U.S.C. 1373.482 However, unless and until 
the Supreme Court affirms any of these decisions, they are valid only as to the territory 
within the respective federal court’s jurisdiction.
5.4.1.3 | The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment guarantees a number of rights:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Two arguments stemming from the Fifth Amendment have been used to challenge the 
funding restriction in the executive order signed by Trump. The Fifth Amendment has 
not been used to argue against the attorney general’s imposition of conditions. The 
first argument stems from due process, and the other argues that the restriction is void 
because it is vague (“void for vagueness”). The due process guarantee is found explicitly 
in the text of the Fifth Amendment. 
The City and County of San Francisco did not use the Fifth Amendment argument in their 
complaint filed on January 31, 2017. However, the complaint filed by the County of Santa 
Clara a few days later did. In its February 3, 2017 complaint, the County of Santa Clara 
argued that the enforcement of the compliance condition would deprive the plaintiff 
of due process.483 It argued that because the attorney general is given “unfettered 
discretion” to withhold funding from counties that he believes do not comply with 8 
U.S.C. 1373, without giving them an opportunity to review, challenge, or obtain notice, 
the county is deprived of its property interest in the federal funding without due process 
480 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478, (2018).
481 Id. 
482 See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2018); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. 
Cal. October 4, 2018); California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, WL 6069940 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018); States of 
New York v. Department of Justice, 343 F.Supp.3d 213 (S.D. N.Y. November 30, 2018).
483 County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 5:17-cv-00574, paragraph 144 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017).
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of law.484 Having found that the executive order indeed provides no process at all by which 
the counties would be notified and heard, it held that the counties are likely to succeed 
on the claim that the executive order fails to provide adequate due process.485 
The “void for vagueness” argument does not appear explicitly in the text of the Fifth 
Amendment. It is a product of case law interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees. 
The Supreme Court has held that a law is unconstitutionally vague under this amendment 
if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, 
or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
enforcement.”486 The county argued that the order failed to provide fair notice of the 
conduct it required from the county.487 For instance, key terms are not defined, including 
“sanctuary jurisdictions” and “Federal grants.”488 Because the order is open to subjective 
interpretation, it is not constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.489 The court held that 
the county would be likely to succeed on this claim as well because the order gives no 
clear guidance as to how to comply with its provisions, or what penalties would result 
from non-compliance.490 In short, it does not provide requisite standards against which 
conduct can be measured.
5.4.1.4 | Administrative Procedures Act
Arguments based on the Administrative Procedures Act arose in the complaint filed by 
the City of Chicago on August 7, 2017. As mentioned earlier, Congress is the legislative 
body of the federal government. However, Congress may choose to delegate some of its 
legislative function to agencies, such as the Department of Justice. If Congress delegates 
a function, it can give an agency the power to make rules. However, if an agency makes a 
legislative rule as opposed to an interpretive rule, it must abide by notice-and-comment 
process491 of the Administrative Procedures Act. Interpretive rules clarify statutory or 
regulatory terms, explain existing law, and remind parties of existing duties, while 
legislative rules do more. Legislative rules supplement a statute. The city argued that the 
DOJ’s initial announcement to require compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373492 was a legislative 
rule and thus subject to notice-and-comment requirements.493 Moreover, it argued that 
all three conditions were arbitrary and capricious, which is also a ground for permitting 
484 Id. at paragraphs 144-45.
485 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F.Supp.3d 497, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
486 U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
487 County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 5:17-cv-00574, paragraph 138 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017).
488 Id. at paragraph 139.
489 Id. at paragraphs 140-42.
490 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F.Supp.3d 497, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
491 This requires, among others, publishing a notice about the proposed rule and giving interested persons a 
chance to participate in the proceeding.
492 See, supra, Note 413.
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a court to invalidate an agency rule.494 The court did not, however, consider these 
arguments in its decision.
5.4.2 | Arguments outside of Litigation
To find substantive arguments, one must generally look outside of court. In the American 
context, they appear in the text of sanctuary policies. In their analysis of the hundreds of 
sanctuary policies across subfederal jurisdictions in the US, Lasch and others identified 
six types of legal and policy rationales.495 In identifying the rationales, they focused on 
expressly articulated in the language of the policies, including their preamble clauses, 
whereas clauses, and findings sections.496 The six rationales that emerged from their 
analysis were the following: 
(1) the conviction that localities (and not the federal government) should control their 
own criminal justice priorities and resources; (2) a desire to avoid unlawful arrests and 
detentions; (3) the concern that entangling police with immigration enforcement erodes 
trust among minority community members; (4) a commitment to preventing improper 
discrimination in policing based on race, ethnicity or national origin; (5) a desire to further 
diversity and inclusion; and (6) a wish to express disagreement with federal immigration 
policy.497
Of these, only the first one concerns the question of jurisdiction. Rationales (2) through (5) 
concern substantive arguments, including those based on constitutional rights (rationale 
(2) and (4)), those based on public safety concerns (rationale (3)), and those related to, 
but not directly based on, constitutional rights (rationale (5)). The sixth rationale itself, 
in my view, is not a direct argument in support of sanctuary jurisdictions but rather an 
acknowledgement that sanctuary policies serve as a medium of expressing some level 
of resistance to the federal government. Thus, for purposes of this research, the first five 
are understood as arguments in support of sanctuary jurisdictions. For the sake of clarity, 
I elaborate on these five.
The first rationale is the only one that is fundamentally a question of jurisdiction. It is 
founded on three principles: “a distinction between criminal and immigration law, an 
understanding that immigration is generally a federal responsibility, and the Tenth 
Amendment guarantee of freedom from federal commandeering of local resources”.498 
Rationales (2) and (4) are based on constitutional protections. Rationale (2) is directly 
based on the Fourth Amendment, which sets forth the requirements for arrests and 
494 5 U.S.C.A. 706.
495 See Note 359, supra. 
496 Id. 
497 Id. at 1753.
498 Id. at 1754.
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searches.499  Rationale (4) is based on the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments.500 It is also based on the Civil Rights Act, a federal law which prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin in federally assisted 
programs.501 At the heart of rationale (3) is a concern for public safety. Studies have 
shown that an unauthorized stayer is less likely to report a crime if she feels that such 
an interaction is likely to lead to questioning about her immigration status.502 According 
to this rationale, if a jurisdiction’s policy is not to question a victim’s immigration status, 
then it is more likely that a victim would report a crime, thereby fostering greater public 
safety. The goal of rationale (5) is to foster diversity and inclusiveness. While these are 
not constitutionally mandated ideals, they are related to the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection. To have both diversity and inclusiveness in a society, there must first be 
a guarantee that all people are equally protected by the law.503
5.5 | Conclusions
The groundwork for the subfederal-federal tension was laid in the early 1980s. Subfederal 
jurisdictions quickly followed in the footsteps of faith communities that assisted people 
fleeing certain Central American countries in search of safety in the United States. These 
jurisdictions, which would become known as “sanctuary jurisdictions”, commended 
the work of the faith communities, and expressed their solidarity in their sanctuary 
statements. From the time of the first sanctuary policies to today, subfederal jurisdictions 
have continued to issue and reaffirm their commitment to sanctuary principles. Usually, 
issuances and reaffirmations of sanctuary would occur shortly after substantial changes 
to immigration law and policy. These changes to law and policy included, among others, 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Secure Communities, 
and the federal government’s repeated threats to defund sanctuary jurisdictions. 
499 The Fourth Amendment reads: The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probably cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or things to be seized.
500 The Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the state governments and reads, in relevant part, “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.” The equal protection guarantee is applicable to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment.
501 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
502 See, e.g., Note 379, supra.
503 The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. In the decades that followed, segregation of blacks and 
whites was repeatedly upheld under the doctrine of “separate but equal” access to state facilities. It took the 
Supreme Court of the United States over 85 years to begin chipping away at this doctrine, recognizing that it 
does not comport with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. It can hardly be said that 
during this period the segregated society was inclusive. By definition it was the opposite. Before inclusiveness 
could be fostered, a more robust understanding of equal protection had to be reached.
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These laws, programs, and threats were not identical, but shared a common aspiration: 
procure subfederal cooperation in matters of immigration enforcement. The sanctuary 
jurisdictions’ refusal to acquiesce eventually culminated in litany of federal lawsuits 
between subfederal jurisdictions and the federal government that began in 2017. These 
lawsuits have generated, and continue to generate, many opinions by federal courts.
Though the case law is already quite voluminous, the essence of the arguments in 
litigation boils down to the fundamental questions of who and how. The separation of 
powers, spending clause, and Tenth Amendment arguments are at the heart of the power 
struggle regarding who – the federal government or those below – has legal competence 
to govern a certain field. In other words, it is generally a question of jurisdiction. The other 
arguments relate to the question of how said field can be legally governed: has the correct 
procedure been followed, and is the legislation clear enough. What is largely missing from 
the argumentation are considerations regarding the unauthorized stayers themselves. 
The rights of the people are essentially ignored as there is very little discussion regarding 
the content and substance of what they are entitled to, or should be entitled to. In the 
cases surveyed, the only argument relating to the rights of unauthorized stayers is the 
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. But even then, 
it is discussed from the standpoint of state liability: which government assumes liability 
for Fourth Amendment violations?504 There is no mention of Fourth Amendment violations 
as problematic for the person who has faced unconstitutional detention. Rather, Fourth 
Amendment violations are seen as problematic in terms of exposing the state to liability. 
At the heart of the conflict between sanctuary jurisdictions and the federal government is 
the unwillingness of the former, for one reason or another, to use local resources to assist 
the federal immigration authorities in identifying and apprehending people without 
authorized residence status. But this conflict could not exist if differences in status were 
irrelevant or if status were nonexistent. However, differences in status exist, and they 
exist because they were created through the legislative process. They are the product of 
efforts to create different statuses from both sides of aisle, and from sanctuary and non-
sanctuary jurisdictions alike. 
The arguments found in opinions of federal courts tend to focus on the question of 
which level of government has competence over a certain field, and to what extent. 
More superficially, it is a question of whether and to what extent, in a federalist system, 
subfederal governments can limit their cooperation with the federal immigration 
authorities. The question is decided by reference to various constitutional provisions that 
deal with separation of powers. These include provisions establishing the relationship 
among the branches of the federal government as well those establishing the legal 
relationship between the federal government and the states. 
504 ICE does not reimburse local jurisdictions for the cost of detaining individuals in response to a civil detainer 
request and does not indemnify local jurisdictions for potential liability they could face for related Fourth 
Amendment violations. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 511 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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These largely jurisdictional arguments can also be found in sanctuary jurisdictions’ 
policies. Indeed, many of them support their policies by reference to separation of 
powers and the Tenth Amendment. However, sanctuary policies also include arguments 
of a substantive nature. These include arguments directly based on constitutional 
protections, such as the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments, as well as arguments 
related to constitutional protections, such as diversity and inclusiveness. The policies 
also include an argument not patently based on constitutional guarantees: ensuring 
public safety.
The main difference between the arguments relevant in litigation and those found in 
sanctuary policies is that the former is narrowly focused on the question of jurisdiction. 
Sanctuary policies rely not only on jurisdictional arguments, but also on substantive 
arguments which focus on the rights of all people regardless of residence status. The 
substantive arguments seek to vindicate the rights of all people to be treated equally 
under the law, and to be free from unlawful arrests and detentions. They seek to foster 
an inclusive society in which diversity can be safeguarded. They desire to foster a greater 
degree of public safety. These arguments focus on the rights of people, regardless of 
status, rather than powers or rights of the state. However, only arguments relating to the 
latter have been adjudicated. Is this problematic? From a constitutional and precedential 
standpoint, it is. By the end of the 19th century, the Supreme Court had established that 
unauthorized stayers, just as those with authorized residence status, are at a minimum 
entitled to due process, a speedy trial, and equal protection of the laws. However, the 
sanctuary jurisdictions jurisprudence avoids these substantive rights when it considers 
only the jurisdictional aspect of the debate. This problem is further elaborated in Chapter 
8 (Section 8.3.2). Then, a new framework that is broad enough to permit consideration of 
the substantive arguments mentioned above is also explored.
172 chapter 5
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 173
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 174
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 175
chapter 6
The Municipal-Central Divide in 
the Netherlands
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 176
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 177
6.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
In the preceding chapter, I examined the debate between the subfederal sanctuary 
governments and the federal government in the United States. In this chapter, I discuss 
a related debate in the Dutch context between the municipal governments and the 
central government.505 In the American context, I relied on recent court judgments in 
cases between subfederal governments, on the one hand, and the federal government 
on the other. I also relied on literature that has identified the arguments raised within the 
sanctuary policies themselves. In this chapter, I rely on court judgments that consider the 
question of what unauthorized stayers are entitled to from the government. I rely also on 
literature that has identified the arguments raised by municipal actors in support of the 
decision to provide minimum care. 
The subject matter of the debate is government provision of, among other things, shelter 
to people who do not have authorization to remain in the Netherlands. The tension 
between the central and municipal governments arises from their disagreement as to 
what, if anything, unauthorized stayers, a large part of which is composed of rejected 
asylum seekers, should have access to from the government. This chapter addresses 
the following central question: why do municipal governments become involved in the 
assistance of unauthorized stayers? To that end, it identifies the arguments advanced by 
municipal governments to support their position and actions. Special attention is paid to 
the role of faith-based organizations in the debate. Chapter 3 discussed the motivations 
and limitations of faith-based organizations that help unauthorized stayers. This chapter 
identifies the arguments of municipal governments and explores what bearing, if any, 
faith-based organizations have on the arguments and actions of said governments.   
The chapter is structured as follows. I first outline the relevant basics of governance and 
immigration in the Netherlands. This is followed by an overview of the most salient events 
from the passage of the Linking Act in 1998 through the LVV scheme in 2018, focusing 
on events that specifically involved the debate between the central and subcentral 
governments. I then extract the arguments used by municipal governments to support 
their respective positions.
6.2 | The Basics of Governance and Immigration in the Netherlands
Before providing an overview of the subcentral-central debate in the last two decades, 
it is useful to understand some basics of immigration governance in the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands506 is typified as a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Rather than 
getting bogged down in interpreting that classification, it is more useful to break down 
the structure of governance, focusing on function. From central to local, there are three 
 
505 “Central government” and “national government” are used interchangeably. 
506 Officially: Kingdom of the Netherlands.
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levels of government: the national, the provincial, and the municipal. For purposes of this 
research, the provincial level is largely irrelevant. I focus on the other two.
6.2.1 | The National Level
The authority to legislate on immigration matters is vested in the central government of 
the Netherlands. Article 2(1) of the Dutch Constitution stipulates that “Dutch nationality 
shall be regulated by Act of Parliament” and in Article 2(2) that “[t]he admission and 
expulsion of aliens shall be regulated by Act of Parliament.”507 The reception and return of 
foreign nationals is thus a responsibility of the national government.508 Legally speaking, 
it is the central government that has competence over matters of immigration. There are 
no laws that explicitly vest authority to municipal governments in matters of immigration. 
However, in reality, the municipal governments are highly involved, especially when 
immigration law and policy also implicates the public order, the maintenance of which 
lies with the municipality.
6.2.2 | The Municipal Level and the VNG
The executive organ of a municipality in the Netherlands is the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen (College van Burgemeester en Wethouders). Aldermen are appointed by the 
municipal council, which is directly elected by the eligible voters of that municipality. The 
mayor is officially appointed by the central government, but usually the central government 
follows the recommendations of the municipal council. Municipal tasks are set forth in 
the Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet). Among other duties, the mayor is charged with 
maintaining the public order.509 The mayor is authorized to prevent and terminate violations 
of statutory regulations that relate to the public order. While public order is not defined, the 
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) has ruled that public order is implicated in cases where 
there is a significant disturbance of the normal course of affairs in public space.510 
The Netherlands is composed of many municipalities. Though the number of municipalities 
has been significantly reduced in recent years, there were still 355 in January of 2019.511 
While each municipality is itself free to communicate with the central government, it is 
more practical and effective in terms of policy and lawmaking if the municipalities can 
communicate through a single voice with the central government. This single voice 
is achieved through the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (Vereniging van 
Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG). In addition to the VNG, the four largest cities of the 
Netherlands (“G4”, or Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) communicate 
separately with the central government regarding their own affairs. According to its 
507 Chapter 1, Article 2, Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2008).
508 Kamerstukken II, 19 637, nr. 1944, 2014-2015.
509 Article 172, Municipalities Act.
510 HR 30 January 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ2104.
511 In 1900, there were 1,121 municipalities in the Netherlands, and the average size of a municipality was 4,000 
inhabitants. In 2019, the average size of a municipality is 48,000.
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website, the VNG’s mission is to work toward a powerful local government.512 To that end, 
it represents all municipalities, and facilitates among them the exchange of knowledge 
and experience regarding implementation of national and local policies.513 The VNG also 
“lobb[ies] on behalf of municipalities in numerous platforms.”514 The VNG communicates 
via letters to both the cabinet and parliament on a wide array of items, including proposed 
legislation and budget. One area of legislation and policy that the VNG has been 
particularly vocal with respect to is immigration. Since the turn of the century, the VNG 
has repeatedly communicated its views to the central government regarding appropriate 
provisions to unauthorized stayers. The following section provides an overview of major 
events regarding this topic between the municipalities and central government.
6.3 |  The Development of the Conflict: The Linking Act of 1998 to the 
LVV Scheme of 2018
6.3.1 | The Linking Act and Aliens Act 2000
With the roles of the central government, municipal government, and the VNG serving as 
backdrop, in this section I highlight the key events germane to the debate between the 
central government and the municipalities on the issue of assistance to unauthorized 
stayers. There is some overlap between the events discussed here and those discussed 
in Chapter 3, which deals with the role of faith-based organizations in the assistance 
of unauthorized stayers. There is overlap in several aspects. For instance, the changes 
to immigration law that were promulgated in 1998 (Linking Act) and 2000 (Aliens Act) 
generated responses from both faith-based organizations and municipal governments, 
and are therefore relevant in this discussion as well as in the discussion in Chapter 3. 
They are also relevant in the context of municipal governance because they resulted 
in the homelessness of significant numbers of unauthorized stayers. Another area of 
overlap concerns the CEC v. the Netherlands decision: although it was the Conference of 
European Churches that brought the lawsuit, its judgment would impact the relationship 
between the municipalities and central government. Events that are already discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 are not discussed in detail here, but references are included.
One of the main goals of both the Linking Act and Aliens Act 2000 was to exclude 
unauthorized stayers from access to basic provisions.515 The Linking Act excluded aliens 
without lawful residence (as defined in the Act) from a wide array of public services, 
including housing, welfare, medical care, and social security benefits. The exclusionary 
provision of the Aliens Act 2000 was more narrowly focused on rejected asylum seekers. 
It discontinued accommodation for unsuccessful asylum seekers four weeks after their 
 
512 Over ons. Retrieved from https://vng.nl/artikelen/over-ons. 
513 About VNG. Retrieved from https://vng.nl/artikelen/about-vng. 
514 Id. 
515 For more information, see Section 3.3.
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rejection. The idea behind both of these was that they would encourage those remaining 
in the Netherlands without authorization to leave the country. In other words, exclusion 
from basic provisions would serve as a push factor for unauthorized stayers. However, it 
became evident shortly after the promulgation of these laws that they did not have the 
desired effect: there were still people without authorization in the country who did not 
leave. 
Another effect of these legal changes was that a substantial portion of unauthorized 
stayers was now forced into homelessness. Municipalities quickly recognized that the 
situation could have grave implications on public order: unauthorized stayers who 
become homeless would sooner or later be forced to engage in criminal behavior just to 
survive.516 Municipalities then began to step in to provide them with emergency shelter. 
Municipalities argued that this was well within their power based on their autonomy to 
govern their internal affairs, which they derived from constitutional law in conjunction 
with municipal law.517 The resulting homelessness and threat of increased criminal 
activity was a major impetus for the Utrecht initiative.518
At the municipal level, Utrecht was far from alone in its efforts and convictions. At the time 
when the Board of Mayor and Aldermen voted in favor of implementing these shelters, at 
least 70 other municipalities were in conversations with INLIA regarding this issue. 30 
had already passed similar resolutions while ten had operationalized such shelters. All of 
them relied on the experience and expertise of a Christian organization (INLIA) that had 
resolved that Christian responsibility requires them to serve, among others, marginalized 
migrant populations.
At this point, it is useful to introduce a term that I use throughout the rest of this book. In 
the Introduction to Part Two, I mentioned that “sanctuary jurisdictions” do not exist, in 
name, in the Netherlands. However, we see that already in 2001, 70 municipalities were 
in the process of operationalizing shelters for people who became homeless as a result 
of the Aliens Act 2000. To refer to these municipalities, I introduce the term hospitable 
municipalities. This term refers to municipalities that finance the provision of minimum 
care to unauthorized stayers. I use hospitable municipal governments and hospitable 
municipalities interchangeably. 
516 Lange, Y. (2001, April 18). `De straat is een slechte oplossing’. Retrieved from https://www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2001/04/18/de-straat-is-een-slechte-oplossing-7538342-a339680; Hopkins, R. (2002, January 
14). Je kunt ze niet op straat laten. Retrieved from https://www.trouw.nl/home/je-kunt-ze-niet-op-straat-
laten~a7255f88/. 
517 This is elaborated further below.
518 In short, the Utrecht initiative was a cooperative effort on the part of municipal leaders and local organizations 
to organize a response to the rejected asylum seekers who were now homeless due to the passage of stricter 
laws vis-à-vis the asylum procedure. Shelters were set up to ensure that these people would not be hungry and 
homeless. For more information on the Utrecht initiative, see Chapter 3 and the Introduction to Part Two.
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6.3.2 | The VNG and Central Government’s Agreement Granting a Pardon
In 2007, the VNG and the central government concluded an administrative agreement that 
would grant pardons to certain groups of unauthorized stayers (which also cleared a huge 
backlog of immigration requests) in exchange for the municipalities’ closure of bed-bath-
bread facilities by January 1, 2010. 2007 also saw the introduction of the Social Support 
Act (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning, WMO). Among others, the WMO would ensure 
that all eligible people are guaranteed sheltered living. However, only aliens who are 
lawfully residing within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Linking Act would be 
eligible to receive benefits. This would not include unauthorized stayers. Notwithstanding 
the limited scope of the WMO’s application, municipalities still argued that they had a 
duty of care to ensure that people within the municipality, including unauthorized stayers, 
are provided with sheltered living. This argument was bolstered by a 2010 decision by the 
Central Appeals Tribunal.519 That case concerned the question of whether the municipality 
of Rotterdam was required to provide a rejected asylum seeker with shelter under the 
WMO.520 The court held that Rotterdam had a duty of care under the WMO based on Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), guaranteeing the right to respect 
for private and family life.521 The court used an international instrument to override the 
explicit limitation of the WMO’s scope, thereby widening its scope of application.
Despite the 2007 administrative agreement, the bed-bath-bread facilities in most 
municipalities were not closed by January of 2010 as most of the municipalities argued 
that the central government did not comply with its part of the deal. Between 2010 and 
November 2015, municipalities relied on a number of arguments to legitimize their operation 
of facilities that provided unauthorized stayers with WMO-like provisions, most notably 
sheltered living. Some arguments were based on Article 8 ECHR alone, and others were 
based on Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR, which prohibits discrimination.522 
A particularly effective argument based on the European Social Charter523 was used by the 
Conference of European Churches (CEC) in its 2013 complaint against the Netherlands.
519 “Centrale Raad van Beroep” in Dutch. It is the highest court in the field of social legislation in the Netherlands.
520 CRvB 19 April 2010, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2010:BM0956.
521 Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life  
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
522 Article 14 – Prohibition of Discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
523  The European Social Charter is a treaty adopted by the Council of Europe that guarantees social and economic 
rights. It broadly guarantees rights relating to employment, housing, health, education, social protection, 
and welfare. It [places special emphasis on vulnerable people, including children, the elderly, those with 
disabilities, and migrants. See https://www.co.int/en/web/european-social-charter. 
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6.3.3 | CEC v. the Netherlands
6.3.3.1 | Background
Before discussing the case itself, it is important to understand how the case came to 
be, and specifically how the religious community was involved. Though the CEC was 
the named complainant in the case, it would be incorrect to assume that it was the only 
driving force behind the complaint. Rather, the complaint was the result of a coordinated 
effort by a network of actors, both religiously-affiliated and not. As previously mentioned, 
FBOs became even more involved in assisting unauthorized stayers as the result of 
changes to immigration laws at the turn of the century. A greater number of people were 
forced into homelessness as a result of their asylum applications’ negative assessment 
by immigration authorities. The number of people who would need assistance increased, 
and, according to one respondent, faith-based organizations became concerned about 
their capacity to singlehandedly address the issue of homeless unauthorized stayers (a 
large portion of whom are unsuccessful asylum applicants).
The campaign that resulted in the decision by the ECSR524 was spearheaded by an attorney 
known for providing pro bono services to marginalized clients, including those without 
authorized residence status, and a key employee of the Kerk in Actie525 in the Netherlands, 
who had worked with this demographic. The attorney had already successfully represented 
many individual asylum seekers, but had grown increasingly apprehensive regarding the 
government’s policy on failed asylum seekers and its implication on human rights. He 
therefore sought to find a solution that would bring about systematic change, applicable 
to larger groups of people than only the individuals he had been able to represent. The 
employee of Kerk in Actie had also grown uncertain regarding the ability of the religious 
community to help everyone in need: because of limited funding and space, there had 
to be choices made regarding who and how many people could be helped. Essentially, 
their concerns were quite similar: the lawyer’s resource constraints limited how many 
individuals he could help at a given time, and the resource constraints of the Kerk in Actie 
employee’s network of FBOs limited how many people they could help. The concerns of 
the attorney and diaconal worker catalyzed their initial discussions.
The attorney and diaconal worker agreed that the best solution was a systematic change 
to the Dutch asylum policy, but the question was how. They were aware of the collective 





524 The ECSR is the European Committee of Social Rights. It is composed of 15 human rights experts charged with 
monitoring compliance with the European Social Charter.
525 Kerk in Actie (Church in Action) is the diaconal organ of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands.
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permitted to bring such a complaint are limited526, the first task was to find a potential 
complainant that was authorized and willing to lodge a complaint. The diaconal worker 
knew that the CEC enjoyed participatory status527 with the Council of Europe and could 
therefore lodge a complaint. However, the appropriateness of a group of FBOs bringing 
an action against the state is a divisive issue in the religious community, and such 
decisions are not taken lightly. Nevertheless, favorable conditions during the period of 
time preceding the complaint helped bring it to fruition. One such favorable condition 
was the birth of the WE ARE HERE528 movement in Amsterdam. 
In September of 2012, the WE ARE HERE movement was started with a handful of people 
and tents in the garden of the Protestant Diaconate in Amsterdam. Its goal was to bring 
visibility to the inhumane situation faced by rejected asylum seekers who are given 
neither shelter nor the right to work in the Netherlands.529 The diaconal worker used this 
opportunity to show leaders of her church the dire situation of certain populations in the 
Netherlands. She brought leaders there to meet people who had ended up on the street 
with nowhere to turn. These experiences were discussed in the meetings of the synod, 
and this is where scriptural reflection also played a role. The diaconal worker mentioned 
that leaders reflected on Matthew 25530 in support of the idea that the community must 
work to vindicate the rights of all people, not just those determined to be lawfully staying 
by the state. The effectiveness of the WE ARE HERE movement can be traced to the 
confrontation motivation that was discussed in Part One: essentially, the closer a person 
is to the situation of another, the more empathy is invoked, and the more likely he is to 
act in accordance with the empathy irrespective of laws and rules. This, coupled with 
526 This procedure was introduced by the Additional Protocol providing for a system of collective complaints 
in 1995, which was ratified by the Netherlands in 2006. Article 1 of this protocol permits national and 
international non-governmental organizations and organizations of employers or trade unions to file such 
complaints. According to the Council of Europe’s website, the aim of the procedure was to “increase the 
effectiveness, speed and impact of the implementation of the Charter.” See European Social Charter. Retrieved 
from https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/collective-complaints-procedure. 
527 Participatory status can only be given to international NGOs which 1) respect and defend the values and 
principles of the Council of Europe; 2) are able, through their work, to support the achievement of that closer 
unity mentioned in Article 1 of the Council of Europe’s Statute; 3) are created on the basis of a constitutive 
act adopted according to democratic principles; 4) have a democratic structure and governance; 5) are 
particularly representative in the field(s) of their competence, fields of action shared by the Council of Europe; 
6) are represented at European level, that is to say which have members in at least five member States of the 
Council of Europe; 7) were created and have implemented activities at least two years before the moment of 
applying for participatory status; 8) already have working relations with the Council of Europe; 9) are capable of 
contributing to and participating actively in Council of Europe deliberations and activities; and 10) are able to 
make known the work of the Council of Europe to society. See Appendix to Resolution 2016(3) of the Committee 
of Ministers, adopted 6 July 2016, concerning participatory status for international non-governmental 
organizations with the Council of Europe.
528 “WIJ ZIJN HIER” in Dutch.
529 OVER ONS / ABOUT US: (2017, April 9). Retrieved from https://wijzijnhier.org/who-we-are/. 
530 Matthew 25 is the 25th chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, consisting of three parables. The Parable of the 
Judgment is the one referenced here. In particular, 25:35-41: “…for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was 
thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me…” For more information, 
see the Introduction to Part One.
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fundamental biblical teachings, worked to overcome the initial reluctance of the religious 
community to step into matters usually reserved to the competence of the state – in this 
case, migration. 
Another favorable condition concerns the CEC’s diaconal organ: the Church and Society 
Commission (CSC). The CSC’s task was to link member churches and associated 
organizations of CEC with the institutions of the European Union as well as the Council of 
Europe, OSCE, NATO, and the UN.531 Serving as a liaison to these supranational bodies, its 
task was to help the churches study church and society questions from both theological 
and social-ethical perspectives, and present common positions to said bodies.532 What 
the attorney and diaconal worker wished to accomplish – to guarantee unauthorized 
stayers with access to minimum care – fell right in line with the mission statement and 
goals of the CSC. 
Undoubtedly helpful to this new complaint was the lawyer’s experience with the DCI v. 
the Netherlands case he worked on about several years before.533 In that case, he worked 
as Defence for Children International’s lawyer. Defence for Children International (DCI) 
is a nonprofit organization that strives to ensure effective implementation of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child at all levels of government.534 At the time, 
Dutch legislation and practice did not provide children without authorized residence 
social, legal, and economic protection, and housing. On the basis of the European 
Social Charter, DCI argued that Dutch legislation and practice violate Article 31’s right to 
housing535, and Article 17’s guarantee for children’s access to appropriate social, legal, 
and economic protection536 when they deny unlawfully present children such provisions.537 
The ECSR reasoned that the freedoms and rights in the European Social Charter must be 
interpreted in light of the various international instruments that have been influential 
in its creation.538 It must be interpreted in a way to give meaning to fundamental social 
rights, which are found in the Charter itself as well as its predecessors and other human 
rights instruments. The personal scope of the Charter should be read expansively when 
fundamental human rights and dignity are at stake. Thus, all children, regardless of 
residence status, are protected by the European Social Charter at least insofar as the 
531 Green, E. (2016, January 13). Church and Society Commission discuss the European Year of Citizens. Retrieved 
from https://www.ceceurope.org/church-and-society-commission-discuss-the-european-year-of-citizens/. 
532 Id. The CEC was later restructured and the CSC was dissolved. Subsequently, activities that would have been 
performed by the CSC were undertaken by CEC or the CCME.
533 Defence for Children International (DCI) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008, Council of Europe: 
European Committee of Social Rights, 20 October 2009, paragraphs 67-71, available at: https://www.refworld.
org/cases,COEECSR,4b9e37ea2.html [accessed 17 June 2019].
534 About us - Who we Are. Retrieved from https://defenceforchildren.org/about-us-2/. 
535 “Everyone has the right to housing.”
536 “Children and young persons have the right to appropriate social, legal and economic protection.”
537 DCI v. the Netherlands, paragraph 6.
538 For an excellent in-depth discussion of the DCI v. the Netherlands decision, see Minderhoud, P.E. & Larsson 
F.F. (2010), Case note on European Committee of Social Rights (2009, October 20), Defence for Children 
International / Netherlands. Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2010-6, 150, p. 804-808.
184 chapter 6
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 185
aforementioned guarantees —housing and social, legal, and economic protection— are 
concerned.
The new case would bring essentially the same allegations based on the same provisions, 
but this time on behalf of unlawfully staying adults rather than only children. The case for 
the children opened the door for the next logical step in which the rights of unlawfully 
residing adults could also be secured. In addition, the lawyer was willing to work on the 
case pro bono. The totality of these conditions culminated in the complaint that was 
lodged against the Netherlands in early 2013.
6.3.3.2 | The Decision of the European Committee of Social Rights
On January 17, 2013, the CEC lodged a complaint with the European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR) against the Netherlands, alleging that the termination of accommodation 
four weeks after asylum rejection violates the European Social Charter (ESC or Charter). 
The Charter guarantees a broad range of human rights including employment and working 
conditions, housing, education, health, medical assistance, and social protection. It 
emphasizes protection of vulnerable people, including elderly people, children, those 
with disabilities, and migrants.539 The ECSR monitors compliance with the Charter under 
two mechanisms: 1) through the collective complaints procedure, which social partners 
and NGOs with participatory status may utilize, and 2) through the reporting system, 
through which state parties submit national reports for review. This was the former: a 
collective complaint. In the complaint, the CEC argued that the Dutch law violated both 
Article 13, Section 4, guaranteeing the right to social and medical assistance, and Article 
31, Section 2, guaranteeing the right to housing.
The ECSR, as the supervisory body of the Charter, invited the government of the 
Netherlands to adopt immediate measures to redress its shortcomings in the reception of 
rejected asylum seekers.540 Immediately, State Secretary of Justice  Fred Teeven reacted to 
the preliminary decision, stating “It is not a legally binding decision, but the provisional 
position of a subcommittee. We will not spring into action and give everyone food and 
drink. We are studying it and are awaiting the final position.”541 The ECSR’s final decision, 
published on July 1, 2014, is discussed below.
539 The Charter in four steps. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/about-the-
charter. 
540 Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands (decisions on the merits), Complaint No. 90/2013, 
Council of Europe: European Committee of Social Rights, 10 November 2014, ¶ 12, available at: https://www.
refworld.org/cases,COEECSR,54e363534.html
541 Laan, S. V. (2016, February 16). Teeven niet blij met opmerking Raad van Europa over illegalen. Retrieved 
from https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/politiek/news/2013/10/teeven-blij-opmerking-raad-europa-illegalen-
1401471W/. 
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The Right to Social and Medical Assistance 
The ECSR first considered the alleged violation of Article 13, Section 4. Article 13, in 
relevant part, reads as follows:
“Article 13 – The right to social and medical assistance”
“Part I:   Anyone without adequate resources has the right to social and medical 
assistance.”
“Part II: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social and medical 
assistance, the Parties undertake:
1. to ensure that any person who is without adequate resources and who is unable to 
secure such resources either by his own efforts or from other sources, in particular by 
benefits under a social security scheme, be granted adequate assistance, and, in case 
of sickness, the care necessitated by his condition;
[…]
4. to apply the provisions referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article on an 
equal footing with their nationals to nationals of other Parties lawfully within their 
territories, in accordance with their obligations under the European Convention on 
Social and Medical Assistance, signed at Paris on 11 December 1953.”
The first issue the ECSR addressed was whether the group of people in question, migrant 
adults in an irregular situation staying within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands as 
undocumented migrants or asylum-seekers whose applications for protection have 
been rejected, falls within the scope of Article 13.542 The Netherlands argued that this 
group of people was not covered by the Charter because paragraph 1 of the Appendix 
to the Charter states that the persons covered by Articles 1 to 17 and 20 to 31 include 
“foreigners only insofar as they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working 
regularly within the territory of the Party concerned.”543 The ECSR reasoned that when 
human dignity is at stake, this restriction of the personal scope of the Charter should not 
be read in a way as to deprive irregular migrants of their most basic rights enshrined in 
the Charter.544 Additionally, the ECSR quoted a prior case, which stated that “the aim and 
purpose of the Charter, being a human rights protection instrument, is to protect rights 
not merely theoretically, but also in fact.”545 Finally, the ECSR recognized that the Charter 
542 Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 90/2013, decision on the merits of 1 
July 2013, ¶ 62.
543 Id. at ¶ 65.
544 Id. at ¶ 66.
545 Id. at ¶ 67, quoting International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Complaint No. 1/1999, decision on the 
merits of 9 September 1999, § 32).
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must be interpreted “in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms 
part”, referring then to Article H of the Charter (dealing with relations between the Charter 
and domestic and international law), “according to which the provisions of the Charter 
shall not prejudice the provisions of multilateral treaties, under which more favourable 
treatment would be accorded to the persons protected.”546 The ECSR then clarified that 
the applicability of the Charter to irregular migrants should be assessed on a case by case 
basis, and reserved for situations in which excluding them from the Charter’s protections 
would have serious implications on their fundamental rights.547
The ECSR then addressed the parties’ substantive arguments. The CEC’s main argument 
was that the legislation and policy in the Netherlands does not comply with the 
requirements of Article 13, Section 4 because adult migrants in an irregular situation 
“are not granted such emergency assistance as food, clothing and shelter when staying 
without adequate resources within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands.”548 Receipt of 
these provisions is made conditional upon a valid residence permit, and only a small 
minority of adult migrants in irregular situations are able to receive these provisions.549 
The CEC also argued that the denial of food, clothing and shelter is a disproportionate 
means for an objective of migration policy.550 The CEC then pointed out that a number of 
municipalities financially support private organizations that provide help to migrants in 
an irregular situation, and that the Netherlands should not “circumvent its obligation to 
provide social emergency assistance to everyone regardless of legal status by referring to 
help provided by private actors.”551 Finally, the CEC argued that need should be the sole 
criterion for eligibility for the distribution of emergency social assistance under Article 13, 
Section 4.552
The Netherlands explained that its immigration policy is “directed towards the 
encouragement of voluntary return” and “this is why reception services are only 
provided temporarily and only to certain groups.” Illegal residence is hereby meant to 
be discouraged.553 The Netherlands argued that a refusal to cooperate with authorities 
regarding their decision that the migrant must leave should not result in “situations 
where the irregular stay is continued and the persons concerned are tacitly permitted to 
stay in the country.”554 “Such circumstances would undermine the objectives of migration 
policy and enforcement of statutory obligations, as well as run counter to the right of a 
sovereign State to control the entry of aliens into its jurisdiction.”555
546 Id. at ¶68-69.
547 Id. at ¶ 70-71.
548 Id. at ¶ 77.
549 Id. at ¶ 79. See ¶¶ 80-84 for categories of adult irregular migrants who are eligible to receive the basic 
provisions.
550 Id. at ¶ 88.
551 Id. at ¶ 91-92.
552 Id. at ¶ 93.
553 Id. at ¶ 95.
554 Id. at ¶ 101.
555 Id. 
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The ECSR was not persuaded by the Netherlands’ argument that it lacked international 
obligations to offer protection to adult migrants in irregular situations, despite the 
personal scope of paragraph 1 of the Appendix to the Charter, because of the core 
obligations contained in international human rights instruments, including those of 
the United Nations and those of Europe.556 With regard to the Netherlands’ argument 
concerning state sovereignty and the rights of the state to control the ingress of people 
into its territory, the ECSR stated that it does not call into question the legitimacy of a 
state’s aim to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.557 However, the ECSR 
was “unable to consider that the denial of emergency shelter to those individuals who 
continue to find themselves in the territory of the Netherlands is an absolutely necessary 
measure for achieving the aims of the immigration policy.”558 Thus, the ECSR found a 
violation of Article 13, Section 4.
The Right to Housing
The ECSR then considered the alleged violation of Article 31, Section 2 of the ESC. Article 
31, in relevant part, reads as follows:
“Article 31 – The right to housing”
“Part I: Everyone has the right to housing.”
“Part II: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the 
Parties undertake to take measures designed:
[…]
to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination;
[…].”
The first issue the ECSR addressed was whether the same group of people addressed 
under Article 13, Section 4 falls within the scope of Article 31. Employing similar reasoning, 
the Committee concluded that the group is covered under Article 31.559 
The ECSR then addressed the parties’ substantive arguments. The CEC argued Article 
31, Section 2 was violated because “adult migrants in an irregular situation are denied 
unconditional access to emergency shelter.”560 The Netherlands argued, again, that adult 
556 Id. at ¶ 113-115.
557 Id. at ¶ 120.
558 Id. at ¶ 121.
559 Id. at ¶ 128-130.
560 Id. at ¶ 131.
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migrants in an irregular situation fall outside the personal scope of the Charter.561 The ECSR 
found that, in light of its established case law, that shelter must also be provided to adult 
migrants in an irregular situation even if they are requested to leave the country. The ECSR 
referred to its findings under Article 13, Section 4 and reiterated that the right to shelter is 
closely connected to the human dignity of every person regardless of residence status.562
In the end, the European Committee of Social Rights agreed with the CEC, concluding that 
the basic necessities of life must be provided not only to migrant children, but also adult 
migrants, even if they are legally required to leave the country according to that country’s 
law. This decision was adopted on July 1, 2014 and became public on November 10 of the 
same year. However, according to Article 8 of the 1995 Protocol to the Charter, the decision 
of the Committee is to be reviewed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.563
6.3.4 | The Central Appeals Tribunal Weighs In
About a month after the decision of the ECSR was made public, and months before the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had the opportunity to consider it,564 
the Central Appeals Tribunal ruled that the municipality of Amsterdam was required to 
provide rejected asylum seekers with the basic necessities of life – a bed, a bath, and 
bread.565 However, notwithstanding this judgment, which required compliance therewith 
from its publication on December 17, 2014 until at least two months after the forthcoming 
decision of the Committee of Ministers, the secretary of state stated that he was not 
prepared to finance the shelters until a decision from the Committee of Ministers.566
On January 19, 2015, State Secretary of Justice Klaas Dijkhoff and the VNG struck a deal 
whereby the municipalities would receive reimbursement for their costs of running the 
bed-bath-bread (BBB) shelters. The reimbursement procedure and amount are detailed 
in a July 20, 2015 letter from the Association of Netherlands Municipalities to the 
municipalities.567 It was agreed that 10.3 million Euros would be set aside to reimburse 
municipalities for their costs of providing BBB services from the date of the Central 
Appeals Tribunal’s decision on December 17, 2014 through July 15, 2015.568 
561 Id. at ¶134, ¶ 16.
562 Id. at ¶ 144.
563 See European Social Charter, 1995 Protocol, Article 8.
564 The collective complaints procedure requires the independent experts of the ECSR to transmit their report to 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, who are then to adopt a resolution. See European Social 
Charter, 1995 Protocol, Articles 8-10. The decision of the Committee of Ministers is discussed in Section 5.3.4, 
infra.
565 CRvB 17 December 2014, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2014:4178.
566 Uitspraak CRvB verplicht centrumgemeenten bed, bad en brood te bieden. (2014, December 17). Retrieved from 
http://www.inlia.nl/nl/nieuws/659/uitspraak-crvb-verplicht-centrumgemeenten-bed-bad-en-brood-te-bieden. 
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6.3.5 | The Committee of Ministers’ (In)Decision
After drawing up a report in which it describes the steps it took to examine the complaint 
and present its conclusions on whether the Contracting Party concerned has ensured 
the satisfactory application of the Charter provision at hand, the ECSR is to transmit the 
report to the Committee of Ministers.569 The Committee of Ministers must then adopt a 
resolution by majority vote, and, in the event of a negative resolution, a recommendation 
based on two-thirds majority vote.570 Though the Committee of Ministers cannot reverse 
the legal assessment of the ECSR, its “decision (recommendation or resolution) may be 
based on social and economic policy concerns.”571
On April 15, 2015, the Committee published its resolution on the case of the CEC versus 
the Netherlands. The Committee’s resolution572, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Having regard to the information communicated by the delegation of the Netherlands 
on 16 September 2014 (see appendix to the resolution),
1.  takes note of the report of the ECSR and in particular the concerns communicated by 
the Dutch Government (see appendix to the resolution);
2.  recalls that the powers entrusted to the ECSR are firmly rooted in the Charter itself 
and recognises that the decision of the ECSR raises complex issues in this regard 
and in relation to the obligation of States parties to respect the Charter;
3.  recalls the limitation of the scope of the European Social Charter (revised), laid 
down in paragraph 1 of the appendix to the Charter;
4.  looks forward to the Netherlands reporting on any possible developments in the issue.
Failing to take an explicit stance regarding the obligation of the Netherlands, the Committee 
of Ministers seems to have engaged in a sort of balancing act in issuing its patently weak 
recommendation. It “[took] note” of the ECSR’s decision, and it “look[ed] forward to the 
Netherlands reporting on any possible developments” but it also paid deference to the 
limitation of the personal scope of the Charter, and paid particular attention to the Dutch 
Government’s concerns. According to the interpretation of Jaspers573, while the Committee 
of Ministers cannot prosecute the Netherlands, the practical effect that this resolution will 
likely have is that the policy of municipal government provision of shelter will have to be 
569 See Article 8, 1995 Protocol.
570 Id. at Article 9.
571 Id. at Explanatory paragraph 46.
572 Resolution CM/ResChS(2015)5. (2015, April 15). Retrieved May 25, 2018, from https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/
result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805c40be
573 Teun Jaspers, Emeritus Professor of Law, Utrecht University.
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supported in some way by the national government.574 Moreover, Ulfstein575 adds that “[a]
ccording ‘great weight’ to the findings of treaty bodies in cases of individual complaints 
should…entail a presumption of the correctness of such findings, and require states 
parties, including national courts, to present good reasons for any conflicting opinions.”576 
Still others, including the VVD577, argued that the Netherlands does not have such an 
obligation to all irregular migrants. Immediately following the Committee’s resolution, the 
two parties comprising the Dutch national government coalition debated the issue. The 
VVD argued the provision of bed, bath, and bread acts as a magnet for asylum seekers, 
frustrating the return policy, and therefore believes it should be prevented.578 The PvdA 
argued that such people deserve these basic provisions.579 
6.3.6 | Landmark Decisions of November 2015
On November 26, 2015, the Council of State580 and Central Appeals Tribunal581 issued 
nearly simultaneous decisions regarding obligations arising from the July 1, 2014 decision 
of the ECSR. Both decisions centered around the sufficiency of a freedom-limiting location 
(vrijheidsbeperkende locatie, VBL) in light of the ECSR decision. The VBL scheme differs 
from a BBB reception facility in two main respects: 1) there would be only one reception 
location (from which people could not leave), and 2) to gain reception, a person would 
have to agree to cooperate with his or her return. 
The Council of State held that the state secretary may make the reception in a VBL of 
a person without lawful residence status conditional on the person’s willingness to 
cooperate with his/her return.582 Additionally, the Central Appeals Tribunal held that the 
574 Heck, W., & Kas, A. (2015, April 15). Onduidelijkheid over bed, bad en brood-verplichting. Retrieved from 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/15/onduidelijkheid-over-bed-bad-en-brood-verplichting-a1417049
575 Geir Ulfstein, Professor of Law, University of Oslo.
576 Ulfstein, G., & Keller, H. (2015). UN Human Rights Treaty bodies: Law and Legitimacy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 100.
577  The VVD is the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy). It is a 
major political party in the Netherlands on all levels of government. It is generally considered to be Center-
Right. It, along with the Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party), comprised the ruling coalition government between 
November 5, 2012 and October 26, 2017. It was known as the “Rutte II” cabinet (Rutte being the prime minister 
and party leader of the VVD).
578 Voogt, S. D. (2015, April 16). Nog altijd geen akkoord over asielopvang, vandaag weer overleg. Retrieved from 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/16/nog-altijd-geen-akkoord-over-asielopvang-vandaag-weer-overleg-a1417033. 
579 Id. 
580  “The Council of State has two primary tasks, carried out by two separate divisions. The Advisory Division, as its 
name implies, advises the government and Parliament on legislation and governance, while the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division is the country’s highest general administrative court. The basis for these responsibilities 
can be found in articles 73 and 75 of the Constitution.” See https:/www.raadvanstate.nl/talen/artikel/. 
581  The Central Appeals Tribunal is one of the four highest administrative courts in the Netherlands (next to the 
Supreme Court, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, and the Trade and Industry 
Appeals Tribunal). It is the highest court in the areas of social insurance, social welfare, and civil affairs. See 
https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Centrale-Raad-van-beroep. 
582 RvS 26 November 2015, ECLI:RVS:2015:3415. 
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VBL scheme, along with its requirement that the person cooperate with return, does not 
conflict with ECHR provisions.583 Critics of the rulings argued that many people would be 
excluded from reception in such centers due to their criteria for admission. An essential 
part of shelter in such a center is that the person must “work on departure.”584 Additionally, 
the departure must be realized in 12 weeks.585 A failure to establish any evidence showing 
that the person has been working on or cooperating on his or her departure results in the 
person’s removal from the center.586
There were two more decisions by the Central Appeals Tribunal on November 26, 2015.587 
In essence they drew the same main conclusion as the two decisions discussed above: 
taken together, these four landmark decisions foreclosed the possibility of relying on 
the Social Support Act to provide unauthorized stayers with the type of basic assistance 
covered by the Act. It is the responsibility of the state secretary of justice to decide 
whether an unauthorized stayer will receive such assistance.
6.3.7 | The Central Government Cuts off Funding
In a letter dated November 21, 2016, State Secretary of Justice Dijkhoff announced that, 
due to the central government’s inability to reach an agreement with the municipalities 
regarding the future of the BBB shelters, the central government would cease its financial 
support.588 More specifically, the proposal would have required all municipalities 
except for eight central municipalities to close their shelters.589 In exchange, the central 
government would have started funding so-called National Aliens Facilities (Landelijke 
Vreemdelingen Voorzieningen, LVV). These shelters would be different from the VBL in 
two respects: 1) there would be eight locations around the country rather than one, and 2) 
there would be a network of cooperation that involved NGOs in addition to the municipal 
and central governments. The end goal was still the same: remove unauthorized stayers 
from the country. In support of this proposal, Dijkhoff cited a number of recent court 
judgments. First, he cited the November 26, 2015 decisions by the Central Appeals 
Tribunal and Council of State (discussed above) which held the VBL scheme complies 
with treaty obligations. Second, he cited a June 29, 2016 decision from the Council of 
State, agreeing with the Central Appeals Tribunal’s ruling.590 Finally, he cited the July 28, 
2016 decision of Hunde v. The Netherlands by the European Court of Human Rights, in 
which the Court ruled that the VBL scheme does not violate Article 3 of the ECHR.591 
583 CRvB 26 November 2015, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2015:3803.




587 CRvB 26 November 2015, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2015:3834 & 4093.
588 Kamerstukken II 19 637, nr. 2259.
589 Id. 
590 RvS 29 June 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:1782 and ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:1783.
591 ECtHR 28 July 2016, 17931/16, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0705DEC001793116, ¶ 59 (Hunde/Nederland). Article 3 ECHR 
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In October of 2017, the central government renewed its offer to fund LVV shelters in eight 
municipalities in exchange for all other municipalities to close their shelters.592 This time, 
the central government offered a small concession: people requesting shelter at an LVV 
would not be required to immediately show willingness to cooperate with the return 
procedure; instead, they would be given a “pass” for the first two weeks of their stay. 
However, just as its predecessor, this offer did not materialize into a deal, and debates 
regarding the future of these shelters continued.
6.3.8 | The VNG and Central Government Reach an Agreement: the LVV Scheme
On November 29, 2018, the VNG and central government signed a cooperation 
agreement regarding the LVV scheme. The stated objective of the scheme is that the 
municipalities and central government work together to create a national network of 
counseling services to provide reception facilities with the aim of finding sustainable 
solutions for unauthorized stayers.593 These sustainable solutions are essentially either 
the legalization of residence or the return of the unauthorized stayer to his country of 
origin.594 The LVV scheme began in 2019 with a pilot phase after which the efficacy of the 
program would be evaluated by an “independent party” through “objective findings”.595 
According to the agreement, the program is expected to be so effective as to render the 
BBB shelters unnecessary.596 The LVV scheme is financed by the central government, 
European subsidies, and municipal funds. More than half of the municipal funds flow 
from the budget of the central government. 
The pilot phase is ongoing at the time of this writing. LVVs have been established in five 
major cities – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven, and Groningen.597 These are 
in addition to the VBL (freedom-limiting location) in Ter Apel. Assuming success with 
respect to the pilot phase, the LVV scheme will be expanded to three more cities.598 
While funding for LVVs comes from governments at different levels, FBOs are involved 
in the operations of these five LVVs. In Eindhoven and Groningen, the LVV schemes are 
administered by Vluchtelingen in de Knel and INLIA, respectively. In Rotterdam, the LVV 
scheme is administered by the ROS foundation and the Pauluskerk (St. Paul’s Church). 
These organizations are all FBOs that have operated BBB shelters years before the advent 
592 Bed-bad-broodregeling/Landelijke Vreemdelingen Voorzieningen (LVV’s). Retrieved from https://vng.nl/
onderwerpenindex/asiel/asielbeleid-en-integratie/bed-bad-broodregelinglandelijke-vreemdelingen-
voorzieningen-lvvs. 
593 Cooperation Agreement National Aliens Facilities (Samenwerkingsafspraken Landelijke Vreemdelingen 
Voorziening), 29 November 2018, p. 1, available at: https://vng.nl/files/vng/brieven/2018/
attachments/20181130_getekende-samenwerkingsafspraak-lvv.pdf. 
594 Id. at 3.
595 Id. at 1.
596 Id. at 2.
597  Minderhoud, P. (2020, March 9). Obligations to accommodate irregular migrants: will the local bed-bath-
bread facilities survive? Retrieved from http://blog.renforce.eu/index/php/en/2020/03/09/obligations-to-
accommodate-irregular-migrants-will-the-local-bed-bath-bread-facilities-survive/. 
598  Id.
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of the LVV scheme. In all of these instances, the LVV scheme’s shelters are in the same 
physical location as where the BBB accommodations have been located. Therefore, it 
is perhaps more useful to think of LVVs not so much as a physical location, but as an 
idea. The idea is that unauthorized stayers join the LVV scheme in order to gain access 
to resources (including that of government agencies and NGOs) that will help secure a 
permanent solution to their situation – whether departure or authorized residence status. 
In these cities, the FBOs hold biweekly meetings with civil servants from the municipality 
to discuss progress and issues related to cases of the unauthorized stayers whom they 
are assisting.599 Representatives from the IND600 and DT&V601 are also present at these 
meetings. 
Whereas the administration of LVVs in Rotterdam, Eindhoven, and Groningen is performed 
predominantly or exclusively by one or two FBOs, the administration of LVV schemes in 
Amsterdam and Utrecht is shared among a number of organizations, including FBOs. FBOs 
there also have a role outside of the administration of LVV schemes. For instance, in 2019 
in Amsterdam, the Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches) persuaded local government 
to begin offering day care to unauthorized stayers.602 Up until then, there was provision 
only for overnight care. During the day, unauthorized stayers would have to leave the 
shelters. In Utrecht, the SNDVU and a number of other organizations are involved in the 
administration of the LVV scheme.603 
When the concept of the LVV was first conceived, the idea was that a permanent solution 
for every participating unauthorized stayer must be found within 12 weeks. This is no 
longer the case. As the details of the LVV scheme were negotiated, it was decided that 
municipalities could determine their own time limits for how long a person could be in 
the LVV scheme, as well as whether the municipality’s LVV scheme participates in forced 
returns (that is, the immigration service tracking down and deporting unauthorized 
stayers). Today, only Rotterdam has a time limit maximum of six months; the rest have 
not adopted time limits. Moreover, not each municipality has agreed to participate in 
forced returns, so the immigration service does not carry them out in such municipalities. 
LVV participants in municipalities that have decided against forced returns being a part 
of the scheme do not have to worry about the possibility of being deported. Groningen 
has agreed to forced returns, and a number of representatives from the IND and DT&V are 
present at the biweekly meetings. Eindhoven has not, and this is perhaps best reflected 
by the presence of only one DT&V representative at the biweekly meetings.
599  Source: representatives from INLIA and Vluchtelingen in de Knel.
600  Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalization Service).
601  Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek (Repatriation and Departure Service).
602  Source: INLIA representative.
603  See Section 3.2.3.
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6.3.9 | Summary
There is a discernible theme that underpins the actions of the central government 
during the time period herein described. The theme is that the central government 
wants to reduce the number of unauthorized stayers, primarily through returns by way 
of discouraging their stay. While the central government has avoided en masse physical 
coercion (deportation), it has engaged in other coercive conduct that has made it more 
and more difficult for people without status to remain in the Netherlands. Two major steps 
in this direction were the Linking Act and Aliens Act 2000, which, taken together, made it 
impossible for unauthorized stayers to receive even the most basic life necessities, such 
as food and shelter. However, this failed to push unauthorized stayers out of the country, 
as municipalities saw it as their task to ensure the basics of survival for everyone within 
their borders. 
Another coercive attempt is the concept of the freedom-limiting location, or VBL. Meant to 
replace the reception offered by municipalities, this scheme limited the physical freedom 
of unauthorized stayers while also conditioning reception on willingness to return. This 
also proved ineffective: because of its difficult-to-meet criteria, people would be denied 
access and therefore return to a BBB reception. Or, people would gain access but could 
not realize return due to circumstances not within their control. The central government’s 
next step was to introduce a new scheme that was marginally less coercive than the VBL. 
The LVV can be viewed as a more inclusive approach to finding a solution, as it involves 
a network of actors including social organizations as well as faith-based organizations 
with expertise in working with such populations. The outcome of the LVV scheme remains 
to be seen. Throughout these events, municipalities have relied on various arguments in 
support of their positions. These are discussed in the next section.
6.4 | Arguments
The arguments used by municipalities can be broadly divided into two categories: 
duty and power. In this context, the first concerns a legal obligation on the part of the 
municipality to provide certain services to people within its borders. The second concerns 
the legal competence to decide what, if anything, it will provide to unauthorized stayers. 
The distinction is that the former describes tasks that a municipality must discharge, 
whereas the latter describes tasks that a municipality may engage in. Both are used to 
justify municipalities’ positions on the issue at hand. I will first discuss the duties of 
care (Section 6.4.1) and public order (Section 6.4.2), both of which concern tasks that 
must be discharged, and then the power associated with municipal autonomy (Section 
6.4.3), which relates to tasks that may be engaged in. To complicate matters further, 
arguments stemming from a combination of both powers and duties are articulated 
by representatives of hospitable municipalities. This is discussed in Section 6.4.4. In 
Section 6.4.5, I discuss the arguments advanced by contributors to a religious political 
party’s journal in the Netherlands.
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6.4.1 | The (Municipal) Duty of Care
The VNG and municipalities argue that municipalities have a duty of care to the people 
within their borders, irrespective of residence status.604 The source of the duty is not 
always clear, as aldermen sometimes contend that there is a duty, but do not specify 
where it comes from. For instance, in 2010, alderman Victor Everhardt stated simply “As 
a municipality, we have a duty of care.”605 He then went on to explain that often there are 
people on the streets in need of help, but still did not explain where the duty of care is 
grounded. Another example is a policy document from the City of Utrecht, which states 
that the “council decided in the council agreement for 2010-2014 that the municipal 
government is actively fulfilling its duty to care for the homes, (failed) asylum seekers and 
refugees.”606 Again, the source of the duty is unclear. The duty of care, however, can find 
support in both domestic and international law. I start with the Social Support Act.
6.4.1.1 | The Social Support Act
One source of support for the contention that the state must provide the basic life 
necessities to all people within their borders irrespective of residence status is the 
Social Support Act (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning, WMO). The WMO was first 
introduced in 2007 as part of an ongoing decentralization policy, whereby certain tasks of 
the central government are increasingly relegated to subcentral governments, primarily 
municipalities. One of these tasks, as the name of the Act suggests, is the provision of 
social support, defined in Article 1.1.1 as the following:
1)   promoting social cohesion, informal care and voluntary work, the accessibility of 
facilities, services and spaces for people with disabilities, the safety and quality of life 
in the municipality, and preventing and combating domestic violence,
2)   supporting the self-reliance and participation of people with a disability or with 
chronic psychological or psychosocial problems as much as possible in their own 
living environment, and
3)   providing sheltered living and reception.607
The third point above is the one most germane to the question of what unauthorized 
stayers are entitled to. Article 2.1.1 names the municipal administration as the entity 
responsible for the provision of this social support:
604  Pluymen, M.H. (2008). Niet toelaten betekent uitsluiten. Boom Juridische uitgevers: The Hague, the 
Netherlands, 327-28.
605 Kreekel, A. (2010, June 14). Gemeente knel tussen wet en zorgplicht. Retrieved from https://www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2010/06/15/gemeente-knel-tussen-wet-en-zorgplicht-11906237-a753469 
606 MUNICIPALITY OF UTRECHT. Opvang en integratie van asielzoekers en vluchtelingen in de gemeente Utrecht. 
[Reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees in the municipality Utrecht]. Municipality of 
Utrecht, Utrecht (2010).
607 Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning 2015, Chapter 1, Section 1, Article 1.1.1.
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1) The municipal administration is responsible for social support.
2) The municipal authority ensures the quality and the continuity of the facilities.608
The question of the applicability of the WMO to unauthorized stayers was first put forth 
to a court in 2010. The argument for its applicability was advanced by the plaintiff in 
the case, who was an unauthorized stayer in the city of Rotterdam in need of shelter. As 
mentioned above, this argument was initially persuasive to the Central Appeals Tribunal 
in 2010, when the court held that the municipality of Rotterdam has a duty of care under 
the WMO based on Article 8 ECHR. However, the decisions from November 26, 2015 
foreclosed the possibility of relying on the WMO to provide assistance to unauthorized 
stayers. The most recent decision on the issue was published in 2017. It confirmed the 
decisions of November 26, 2015:  the WMO does not extend to people without lawful 
residence status under the meaning of the Aliens Act 2000.609 Article 1.2.2 of the WMO 
stipulates that only foreign nationals who are lawfully resident under Article 8 (a) to (e) 
and (l) of the Aliens Act 2000 can benefit from the provisions of the WMO. Unauthorized 
stayers are excluded. The case also illustrates that not all municipalities took the position 
that they are required to provide assistance to unauthorized stayers on the basis of the 
WMO.
6.4.1.2 | International Laws and Treaties
In 2012, the VNG and Amnesty International published a report discussing the meaning 
of international human rights treaties vis-à-vis the duties of municipalities. The central 
argument of the report is that the Dutch municipalities have their own independent 
obligation to ensure that human rights are protected and respected.610 The point of 
departure is recognizing that Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution mean that any 
national law of the country that is in conflict with an international treaty obligation is void. 
After this assertion, the report lists the most important international documents relevant 
to the issue at hand. The first are human rights treaties and declarations of the United 
Nations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The second is 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and the third is the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
The report mentioned generally the European Convention on Human Rights as a source 
of binding international law. In cases, courts have considered specifically Articles 3, 
8, and sometimes 8 in conjunction with 14 as bases for the provision of minimum care 
for unauthorized stayers. The utilization of Article 3 as a mechanism of providing social 
assistance was considered in the case of Hunde v. The Netherlands.611 The ECtHR held 
608 Id. at Art. 2.1.1.
609 CRvB 23 February 2017, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2017:1.
610 Goed bezig over mensenrechten. Retrieved from https://vng.nl/files/vng/publicatie_goed_bezig_over_
mensenrechten.pdf. 
611 This is the case referred to by State Secretary of Justice Dijkhoff in Section 6.3.3, supra.
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that neither Article 3 nor any other provision of the ECHR requires a state to provide 
social assistance, and even if there were such an obligation in cases of extreme poverty, 
the Netherlands has fulfilled this obligation with its establishment of freedom-limiting 
locations and the provision of free emergency medical treatment.612 As mentioned above, 
the 2010 case of the Central Appeals Tribunal613 held that an unauthorized stayer can 
receive minimum care under the WMO on the basis of Article 8. In 2015, the WMO path 
was closed, but there was still the possibility left open that the state secretary of justice 
can, on an individual basis, consider providing minimum care to certain unauthorized 
stayers on the basis of Article 8 or Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.
The city council of the municipality of the Hague has argued that the Council of Europe’s 
Resolution 1509614 also mandates the provision of minimum care. It deals with the human 
rights of irregular migrants. Paragraph 13.1 states unequivocally that “adequate housing 
and shelter guaranteeing human dignity should be afforded to irregular migrants.”615
6.4.2 | Duty to Maintain the Public Order 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter (Section 6.2.2), domestic law prescribes a 
specific duty of public order maintenance to the mayor. Under the Municipalities Act 
(Gemeentewet), the mayor is charged with maintaining the public order. To that end, 
the mayor is authorized to prevent and terminate violations of statutory regulations that 
relate to the public order. Aldermen, such as Marco Florijn of Leeuwarden, recognize 
that not providing minimum care can result in “a problem for safety.”616 According to 
Pluymen’s research, the public order argument is often used to support the decision to 
“locally assist centrally excluded migrants.”617
6.4.3 | Municipal Autonomy
At its core, municipal autonomy deals with the powers of the municipality rather than its 
duties. They are distinguishable from duties because they concern what a municipality 
is allowed to do as opposed to what it is required to do. The starting point for municipal 
autonomy is in the Dutch Constitution. Autonomy, as well as co-governance, are 
established in Article 124 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
612 ECtHR 28 July 2016, 17931/16, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0705DEC001793116, ¶ 59 (Hunde/Nederland).
613 CRvB 19 April 2010, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2010:BM0956. 
614 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1509 on human rights of irregular migrants (adopted by 
the Parliamentary Assembly on 27 June 2006 at the 18th sitting).
615 Zorgplicht uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers. (2013, January 11). Retrieved from https://denhaag.raadsinformatie.
nl/document/3342460/1/530RIS254621 Zorgplicht uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers. 
616 Kreekel, A. (2010, June 14). Gemeente knel tussen wet en zorgplicht. Retrieved from https://www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2010/06/15/gemeente-knel-tussen-wet-en-zorgplicht-11906237-a753469 
617 Pluymen, supra Note 604, at 328.
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1)   The powers of provinces and municipalities to regulate and administer their own 
internal affairs shall be delegated to their administrative organs.
2)  Provincial and municipal administrative organs may be required by or pursuant to Act 
of Parliament to provide regulation and administration.618
Another provision concerning municipal authority can be found in Article 108 of the 
Municipalities Act, which reads in relevant part:
1)   The authority to regulate and control the household of the municipality is left to the 
municipal administration.
In addition to this general establishment of municipal autonomy, more specific powers 
of municipal governments are contained in, among others, the General Administrative 
Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht). This Act gives municipalities the power to grant 
subsidies.619 Article 4:23(1) reads, in relevant part, 
An administrative authority only provides a subsidy on the basis of a statutory 
regulation that regulates the activities for which a subsidy can be granted.
Under this provision, there must be some other regulation that identifies the activities 
for which subsidies can be granted. These activities are identified in both provincial 
and municipal subsidy regulations. For instance, the regulations for the municipality 
of Nijmegen can be found in the Nijmegen Framework Regulation for Subsidy Grants 
(Nijmeegse Kaderverordening Subsidieverstrekking).620 Article 3(1) of this regulation 
enumerates the activities that may be subsidized: 
The competent administrative authority only grants subsidies for activities in the field 
of care and welfare, education, sports, culture, living climate, social climate, work and 
economy, accessibility and mobility, management of public space, the environment, 
combating unemployment, integration, [], promoting equality, assistance, security, 
urban promotion, international cooperation and general administrative matters.
Of course, there are rules regarding application procedures and requirements, but this 
list of qualifying activities provides a sense of just how broad powers under municipal 
autonomy are. Therefore, the argument under municipal autonomy is that municipalities 
have broad authority to subsidize organizations that are involved in these activities, and 
so organizations that provide care and welfare to marginalized persons can lawfully be 
given grants.
618 Chapter 7, Article 124, Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2008).
619 See, generally, Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht, Chapter 4.2.
620 This is just one example of a municipal regulation on subsidies; many municipalities have similar regulations.
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6.4.4 | Legitimacy
In this section, I discuss the arguments that have been articulated by representatives 
of hospitable municipalities. The arguments tend to include elements of both duty and 
power, usually with respect to broader legitimacy arguments. In other words, they do not 
fit neatly into either category exclusively. I rely primarily on prior qualitative research which 
has revealed the arguments municipal representatives from hospitable municipalities 
have used to justify their provision of minimum care to unauthorized stayers. 
Sanctuary jurisdictions, in name, do not exist in the Netherlands. As such, written 
documents detailing a “sanctuary municipality’s” policies and practices vis-à-vis 
unauthorized stayers also do not exist. However, Kos and others have, on the basis of 
interviews with municipal actors621 of hospitable municipalities, identified the arguments 
relevant to justifying the provision of minimum care to unauthorized stayers.622 The 
research of Kos explores how politics can explain the gap between national immigration 
policy and its implementation. Their article posits that the gap can be understood as a 
product of the tension between the central and municipal governments. The root of this 
tension is the belief (held by some municipal actors) that the national government’s 
immigration policy is illegitimate.623
Legitimacy can be further disaggregated. Kos identifies three types of legitimacy claims: 
democratic, constitutional, and output legitimacy.624 Whether a policy is democratically 
legitimate is fundamentally a question of procedure: have the relevant stakeholders had 
an opportunity to voice concerns, deliberate, and negotiate in a fair forum? Whether a 
policy is constitutionally legitimate is fundamentally a question of content: does the 
policy comport with domestic and international legal and human rights norms?625 Whether 
a policy enjoys output legitimacy is fundamentally a pragmatic question: does the policy 
solve the problem it purports to address in ways citizens experience as adequate?626
Some examples help to illustrate how challenges to the central government’s policy on 
the basis of these types of legitimacy are conveyed. Regarding output legitimacy, one 
municipal policy advisor said “As long as the Minister fails to deliver a conclusive return 
policy, the municipality is legitimized to offer emergency reception.”627 This is where 
duty and power blend: because the central government has failed to fulfil its duty, the 
 
621 This includes municipal governments and politicians, as well as officials, bureaucrats, and professionals.
622 Kos, S., Maussen, M. & Doomernik, J. (2015). Policies of Exclusion and Practices of Inclusion: How Municipal 
Governments Negotiate Asylum Policies in the Netherlands in Territory, Politics, Governance.
623 Id. at pp. 5-6.
624 Id. at p. 6.
625 It is worth stressing that “constitutional” here is understood in broad terms. It refers not only to the written 
constitution of the Netherlands, but also to any applicable legal and human rights norms. This can refer to, for 
example, to the protection of public order, including public safety and health.
626 Kos et al at p. 6.
627 Id. at p. 10.
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municipalities now have the power to step in. This can also be viewed as a pragmatic 
approach by which municipal actors create solutions for situations that result from poor 
execution of national immigration policies.628 Regarding constitutional legitimacy, the 
municipal council of Utrecht stated that it is fulfilling its duty to care for the homeless 
by continuing to provide emergency reception.629 A municipal official of Utrecht put 
it succinctly: “It is not in the interest of the community and the state to oblige these 
people to live in poverty and let them be susceptible to all sorts of diseases.”630 Finally, 
the response to a lack of democratic legitimacy can be seen in the way in which the 
various municipal actors organize networks. By forming networks between themselves 
and officials at the IND631 and DT&V632, they have gained a certain amount of lobbying 
power vis-à-vis individual asylum cases, and influence policy-making processes on the 
national level.633 In Pluymen’s research, democratic legitimacy emerged in interviews 
with representatives of four major municipalities that were part of the research. In her 
words, “by publicly lending aid in ‘protest’ to the central measures of exclusion, the 
municipalities try and persuade their government to reverse or change certain aspects 
of its migration policy.”634 Thus, these municipalities attempted to effectuate change by 
voicing their disagreement through actions contrary to national policy with which they 
disagreed.
6.4.5 | Christian Political Parties in the Netherlands
None of the arguments above have a patent religious basis; they are grounded in domestic 
and international law without a link to, or mention of, religion. But the Netherlands 
does have political parties with a religious affiliation, and it is worth exploring whether 
these parties are informed by their religious convictions in migration matters. In the 
Netherlands, there are three political parties with an explicit affiliation with Christianity 
that hold seats in the House of Representatives: the Christian Democratic Appeal (13%), 
Christian Union (3%), and Reformed Political Party (2%). Based on its representation in 
the House of Representatives, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) has the capacity for 
exerting the greatest influence of the three. 
The CDA publishes a semiannual journal, the Christian Democrat Survey635, on a wide 
variety of topics including migration. The authors who publish in the journal are not 
necessarily CDA members, and come from a variety of backgrounds, including law, 
politics, and academia. To find articles dealing with immigration, we conducted a manual 
search through all of the issues published in the Christian Democrat Survey between 
628 Id. at p. 12.
629 Id. at p. 11.
630 Id. at p. 12.
631 Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalization Service).
632 Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek (Repatriation and Departure Service).
633 Kos et al at p .14.
634 Pluymen, supra Note 604, at 328.
635 Christen Democratische Verkenningen.
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1981 and 2019. I used the following keywords: asielzoeker,636 kerkasiel,637 relatie kerk 
en migratie,638 (uitgeprocedeerde) vreemdelingen,639 illegalen,640 barmhartigheid,641 
minderhedenbeleid.642 This yielded 15 articles. These articles were then summarized in 
English.
There are three observations that can be drawn from analyzing these articles from the 
Christian Democrat Survey. The first is that the viewpoints expressed are not always 
harmonious. The second is a general avoidance of specific reference to scripture in 
support of a stated policy position. The third is a tendency to take a center position on 
migration issues.
One area of discord among authors of the Christian Democrat Survey is the correct 
application of the concept of mercy vis-à-vis asylum seekers. The authors do not supply a 
definition of mercy, but it is most commonly understood as compassion or forbearance.643 
One argument advanced by a judge is that even though mercy is undeniably a Judeo-
Christian concept, it is risky to import it into the political realm and use it as a guiding 
principle in crafting refugee policy. This, he argues, is because people with nonreligious 
backgrounds are compromised.644 A local politician from Oosterhout disagrees: according 
to him, mercy is a concept that is not reserved only for religious people. It is a concept that 
pervades all of the various religious or irreligious persuasions alike.645 A third argument 
advocates for a bounded concept of mercy: employing the concept of mercy as a guiding 
principle is not objectionable, so long as there is also a fair application of (legal) rules 
and criteria.646 A related second area of discord is the question of what exactly it means to 
be a stranger. From a biblical perspective, multiple authors disaggregate the “stranger” 
into three categories: travelers who are merely passing through a land, foreign nationals 
who wish to settle in a new land but do not wish to adopt its faith, and foreign nationals 
who wish to settle in a new land and also seek to adopt its faith.647 One author goes a step 
further and uses these biblical categories as a potential basis for creating different levels 
636 Asylum seeker.
637 Church asylum.
638 Relations church and migration.




643 Mercy. 2019. In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mercy. 
644 Schaaf, R. (2015, Fall). Barmhartigheid is geen bruikbaar politiek begrip in het vluchtelingenvraagstuk [1], Eens, 
hoedt u voor de barmhartige overheid. Christen Democratische Verkenningen, p.10-11.
645 Kamps, A. (2015, Fall). Barmhartigheid is geen bruikbaar politiek begrip in het vluchtelingenvraagstuk [2], 
Eens, hoedt u voor de barmhartige overheid. Christen Democratische Verkenningen, p.12-13.
646 Wienen, J. (2019, Spring). Evenwichtig asielbeleid kan niet op een koopje. Christen Democratische 
Verkenningen, p. 26-29.
647 See, e.g., te Velde, R. (2016, Spring). De actualiteit van Thomas van Aquino. Christen Democratische 
Verkenningen, p. 174-178; van Iersel, B. (1992). Vreemdeling en tolerantie. Christen Democratische 
Verkenningen, p. 120-123. 
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of citizenship: those who fall into the third category as opposed the second could be 
given only some elements of citizenship, without offending Catholic social teaching.648 
In other words, citizenship could be conditioned on the extent of the willingness on 
the part of the stranger to integrate. It is worth pointing out that the biblical guidance 
deals with integration with the new country’s religion, and it may be difficult to import 
such teachings into the modern world in which integration means something completely 
different. At least one author takes a wholly different approach, arguing that because 
all people are created in the image of God, and because the earth is actually God’s, all 
people are strangers.649
In the articles that deal with the topic of migration, there is very little reference to God 
or religion, and no specific reference to scripture whatsoever. For instance, the articles 
mentioned above refer to the concept of mercy, and one state that mercifulness is a 
concept from the Bible. However, none of the authors point to any specific text within the 
Bible to support this vague notion. Another author states that, regardless of the political 
system one finds herself in, as a Christian, she must stand up for the weak.650 Again, 
the idea that the Christian must stand up for the weak is assumed; there is no specific 
reference to scriptural text dealing with treatment of the weak. Another article states 
that Christianity has specifically introduced solidarity as a core value, but again does 
not explain where solidarity is derived from specifically.651 On the whole, the references 
to religion are vague, and only broad themes emerge. Arguably, these broad themes – 
showing mercy, caring for the weak, and solidarity – are also core principles of many 
systems of government. It is possible they were chosen so as to be able to connect with 
a broader audience than only those who are well-versed or even interested in scripture. 
The third observation is the tendency of the viewpoints expressed in the articles to take 
a center position on migration issues. For instance, the authors in one article argue that 
Christian Democrats are bridge builders who do not opt for extremist positions but rather 
try to bridge differences.652 The authors want strict border control, but must keep in mind 
the humanitarian responsibility owed.653 A similar view was expressed in the article 
mentioned above in the discussion on mercy. Mercy is desirable but must be balanced 
against the rules and interests of the state.654
Overall it is difficult to comment on the importance of religion and religious beliefs for 
Christian political parties in the Netherlands. On the one hand, many articles published in 
648 van Iersel, F. (2016, Spring). Een barmhartige overheid?, Christen Democratische Verkenningen, p. 57-63.
649 Vroom, H. (1995). Vreemdelingen en bijwoners, Christen Democratische Verkenningen, p. 532-538.
650 Fountain, A. (Fall, 2015). Dan kraak je toch een kerk?, Christen Democratische Verkenningen, p.124-125.




654 Wienen, J. (2019, Spring). Evenwichtig asielbeleid kan niet op een koopje, Christen Democratische 
Verkenningen, p. 26-29.
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the Christian Democrat Survey do make references to God, religion, and religious values. 
On the other hand, such references are so vague that it is difficult to ascertain whether 
the views are religiously-based or just a reflection of what have become universal human 
rights as recognized by European and international treaties. In other words, the concepts 
chosen for discussion in the articles are those that are common to both the Bible and to 
generally accepted standards of human rights as codified in numerous treaties. 
6.5 | Conclusions
Tensions between hospitable municipal governments and central government arose 
when the Linking Act and Aliens Act 2000 were promulgated around the turn of the 
century. Faith-based organizations were involved from the outset as they warned 
municipalities what they should expect once the Aliens Act 2000 came into force: 
homeless rejected asylum seekers. FBOs, particularly INLIA, provided blueprints for the 
shelters that (hospitable) municipalities would finance to ensure that homeless rejected 
asylum seekers would receive minimum care. These shelters were contrary to the central 
government’s laws and return policy. And, in a centralized system of government such as 
the one in the Netherlands, the municipalities have little room, legally speaking, to act 
in ways contrary to law and policy of the central government.655 This is one reason that 
municipalities usually financed the provision of minimum care indirectly. 
Hospitable municipalities looked for a solution that was both legally practical and legally 
permissible. They found that existing laws could provide them with a mechanism through 
which they could address their moral and practical issues with the return policy. The 
basis for this mechanism is the municipalities’ legal competence to grant subsidies, in 
particular, to organizations engaged in activities in the fields of, among others, care and 
welfare, social climate, and promoting equality.656
The first step was finding a legal mechanism. The next step was to find organizations 
equipped to handle such a task. This did not prove to be difficult, as it was often faith-
based organizations themselves that reached out to municipalities. Many already had 
experience providing shelter in the 1980s and 1990s. Hospitable municipalities worked 
with, and continue to work with FBOs in the provision of minimum care. Though faith 
communities were crucial to the operationalization of shelters to provide minimum care, 
 
655 There is no explicit constitutional provision that prohibits subcentral governments from acting in ways 
contrary to law and policy of the central government. However, such a prohibition can be deduced from certain 
provisions of constitutional and administrative law. If a municipality acts contrary to law and policy of the 
central government, the central government can annul the decision. This is known as spontane vernietiging. 
See Art. 132, Par. 4, Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; Arts. 268-281a, Municipalities Act; Arts. 
10:33-10:45, General Administrative Law Act. Additionally, the central government can step into the shoes of 
a lower level of government to properly implement its law and policy. This is known as taakverwaarlozing. Art. 
132, Par. 5, Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; Art. 124-124h, Municipalities Act.
656 See Section 6.4.3, supra.
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the arguments municipalities rely on in defense of said provision have not been of a 
religious nature.
Outside of the Christian Democrat Survey, it is difficult to find municipal actors arguing 
migration-related matters on the basis of religion in any capacity. Rather, the arguments 
focus on the municipal duty of care stemming from domestic and international laws, the 
duty to preserve the public order, and the principle of municipal autonomy that permits 
municipalities to govern their own affairs. Prior research has revealed that a number 
of municipal actors argue on the basis of legitimacy: because the central government 
has acted illegitimately in some capacity, the municipality has wider latitude to act to 
ameliorate the results of the illegitimate actions. Ultimately, these legitimacy arguments 
are rooted in a combination of power and duty. In any event, the arguments are very much 
outside of the realm of religion. Even within the Christian Democrat Survey, the religious 
link is vague. While some articles mention God and the Bible, references are made to 
basic fundamental concepts like mercy and solidarity, rather than specific reference or 
analysis of scripture. There is also a tendency to avoid definitive stances, and a propensity 
to avoid extreme positions. 
The legal cases which have dealt with which rights unauthorized stayers are entitled to 
have been of a jurisdictional and substantive nature. The string of cases regarding the 
Social Support Act considered whether the substantive provisions of the Social Support 
Act apply to unauthorized stayers. While the content of unauthorized stayers’ rights 
vis-à-vis the Social Support Act is a question of substance, the ultimate result from the 
cases was that the State Secretary of Justice would decide whether the Act can apply to 
unauthorized stayers. The presumption is that the Act does not apply to such people. 
DCI v. the Netherlands and CEC v. the Netherlands considered substantive questions of 
whether children and adults without authorized residence can avail themselves of certain 
protections of the European Social Charter: sheltered living and medical assistance. In 
short, some decisionmakers in these cases (which considered the rights of unauthorized 
stayers) have been willing to rule on questions of substance, and not solely jurisdiction.
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7.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
In Chapter 5, I analyzed tensions between the subfederal and federal government in 
the United States. In Chapter 6, I analyzed tensions between the municipal and central 
government in the Netherlands. The tensions show that there are disagreements 
regarding what the relationship between the governments ought to be in the governance657 
of immigration, and there are disagreements regarding the appropriate course of 
government conduct vis-à-vis unauthorized stayers. In those chapters, I extracted the 
arguments that drive these tensions, focusing on the role of faith-based communities 
within that tension. 
In this chapter, I compare the two situations. I first compare the roles that have been 
assumed by subfederal and municipal governments, and then examine the roles that 
faith-based organizations have played in the context of the intragovernmental tension. 
I then compare the arguments that are used by the governments in the conflict, 
referencing also arguments of faith-based organizations insofar as they are relevant 
to this intragovernmental conflict. I distinguish between arguments of a substantive 
nature and arguments of a jurisdictional nature. The findings suggest that there is a 
difference between having legal competence to govern a field (in this case immigration), 
and in practice governing the field. In other words, other actors besides the federal and 
central government play a substantial role in the actual governance of immigration. The 
subfederal and municipal governments are two types of actors in a broader network that 
works together to provide assistance. Assistance as a network process is discussed in the 
final part of this chapter. 
7.2 | The Roles of Governments and Faith-Based Organizations
7.2.1 | The Subfederal and Municipal Governments
While a number of both American subfederal governments and Dutch municipal 
governments aid unauthorized stayers, the primary type of assistance provided in the two 
countries differs substantially. In the United States, subfederal jurisdictions have enacted 
laws and policies that limit the extent of their cooperation with federal immigration 
authorities. While the majority of such jurisdictions embraces the “sanctuary” label, not 
all have adopted it in their laws and policy statements. For instance, some have opted 
for “Inclusive City”, “Human Rights City”, or “Welcoming City” instead. But irrespective 
of the label, they share one thing in common: a level of resistance to assisting in 
federal immigration enforcement. This resistance manifests itself in two principal ways. 
 
657 I use governance in the broadest sense to include “all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a 
government, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization, or territory, and 
whether through laws, norms, power or language.” See Bevir, M. (2012). Governance: a very short introduction. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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First, sanctuary jurisdictions refuse to share information regarding the release of an 
unauthorized stayer from a subfederal jail (such as a county jail). Second, they refuse 
to detain such people past their release for the purpose of allowing federal immigration 
authorities access to subfederal facilities for purposes of further detention and/or 
eventual deportation. Limited cooperation with the federal immigration authorities, 
including restricted information-sharing and access, is the cornerstone of sanctuary 
jurisdictions.
In the Netherlands, hospitable municipal governments658 assume a different function. 
The role that hospitable municipal governments have assumed vis-à-vis unauthorized 
stayers is that of facilitating minimum care. Efforts to ensure that all people within the 
borders of a particular municipality have access to food, hygiene, and shelter have been 
at the forefront. While at least one Dutch city – Utrecht – has adopted the label of “Human 
Rights City”, the type of assistance offered by Utrecht has nothing to do with limiting 
cooperation with the central government. In function, Utrecht is like other hospitable 
Dutch municipalities: it finances minimum care for unauthorized stayers, and does so 
through a network of FBOs and other NGOs. So, in the United States, the primary role 
of sanctuary jurisdictions is to restrict information-sharing and access, while in the 
Netherlands, the primary role of hospitable municipal governments is the facilitation of 
minimum care, primarily by providing financing to other organizations that operate the 
minimum care shelters.
The question then becomes: why do sanctuary jurisdictions and hospitable municipalities 
have different primary roles in the two countries? To answer that question, it is necessary to 
consider each country’s policy regarding unauthorized stayers, and how it is effectuated. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the development of sanctuary jurisdictions in the United 
States, with particular attention to changes in the legal landscape of immigration 
law. Starting in the mid-1990s, several major pieces of legislation and programs were 
promulgated, including section 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 1373, and Secure Communities. The goal 
of these was essentially the same: increase information-sharing between subfederal 
law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement to make it easier for the latter to 
identify unauthorized stayers for purposes of deportation. Identification of deportable 
people was the starting point, and actual deportations quickly followed. Deportations 
reached record levels during the Obama administration, and threats to further ramp up 
deportation efforts intensified during Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign trail. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducted numerous raids in 2017 and 2018, with more 
raids announced at the time of this writing.
In the Netherlands, the Linking Act and Aliens Act 2000 were seen as capstones to 
exclusionary policies aimed at pushing unauthorized stayers out of the country. Even 
658 As explained in Chapter 6, I use “hospitable municipal governments” or “hospitable municipalities” to refer to 
those that have undertaken efforts to assist unauthorized stayers despite the central government’s position. 
The term is the Dutch counterpart for “sanctuary jurisdictions”. 
210 chapter 7
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 211
when an organ of the Council of Europe (the European Committee of Social Rights) 
decided that the Netherlands was not fulfilling its duties with respect to unauthorized 
stayers, the central government refused to accept the determination.659 Though it did 
begrudgingly provide minimum care, it did so with conditions, such as the requirement 
a person comply with his return, as well as limitation of physical freedom of movement, 
in hopes of driving people without authorization out of the country. Rather than focusing 
primarily on physical removal of unauthorized stayers,660 the Netherlands has sought 
to push them out by excluding them from the labor market and social benefits, and 
restricting their freedom of movement.
The policy regarding unauthorized stayers in both countries is effectively the same: 
ensuring that people without the authorities’ permission to remain in fact do not remain 
within the territory of the country. It can be said that both countries have attempted 
to effectuate a return policy. However, the primary way in which each country has 
attempted to effectuate this return policy is different. The United States has focused 
on deportation while the Netherlands has focused on excluding unauthorized stayers 
from the labor market and social benefits, and restricting their freedom of movement. 
Because the means of effectuating a return policy are different between the American 
federal government and Dutch central government, the primary response from subfederal 
and municipal governments is also different. The response is tailored to counteract 
the chosen means of effectuation pursued by the federal and central governments. Put 
simply, the provision of minimum care would not deter deportations in the United States, 
and limiting information-sharing would not ameliorate the exclusionary effects of the 
Linking Act, Aliens Act 2000, and other measures in the Netherlands. 
The system of government in the two countries also has bearing on the federal and 
central government’s primary chosen means of effectuating a return policy. Due to the 
lack of a centralized system of registration in the US, it is less difficult for unauthorized 
stayers in the US to work and receive certain benefits. Moreover, under principles of 
federalism, states have a certain amount of discretion to decide which state benefits 
they wish to provide and to whom. Because access to work and certain benefits is less 
restricted, unauthorized stayers can support themselves and need not rely on minimum 
care provisions. Thus, exclusionary matters vis-à-vis benefits and employment has a 
much more limited role. In the Netherlands, the centralized system of registration has 
allowed government authorities to restrict unauthorized stayers’ access to the labor 
market and nearly all state benefits. In the Netherlands, each resident is required to 
register his residence within the municipality. Failure to do so can result in substantial 
fines. Each municipality has a Register Office (Burgerlijke Stand) which records births, 
659 See Chapter 6.
660 Of course, this is not to say that Dutch immigration authorities do not forcefully expel unauthorized 
stayers. In the 2016-2018 period, there were roughly 6,000 such expulsions per year. See Rapportage 
Vreemdelingenketen, periode januari-december 2018, Ministerie van Justitie & Veiligheid, 2019; Rapportage 
Vreemdelingenketen, periode januari-december 2017, Ministerie van Justitie & Veiligheid, 2018; and 
Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen, periode januari-december 2016, Ministerie van Veiligheid & Justitie, 2017.
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deaths, marriages, partnerships, and divorces. All municipalities’ Register Offices are 
connected, and information is readily available to the municipality through an automated 
network system.661 Because of this strict monitoring and connectedness, it is easier to 
devise an effective exclusionary policy vis-à-vis benefits and employment. 
The subfederal and municipal response has been largely determined by the conduct of 
the federal and central governments. In short, sanctuary jurisdictions and hospitable 
municipalities respond in different ways to the same policy because the means of 
effectuating that policy differ.
7.2.2 | Faith-Based Organizations
At first impression, one may wonder how a discussion on the role of faith-based 
organizations is germane to the tensions between different levels of government. After all, 
Part Two of this book is dedicated to governments as the actors. However, this research 
has revealed the impossibility of analyzing tensions with which the efforts of the faith-
based community are so interwoven. In this section, I compare the roles of FBOs within the 
context of the intragovernmental tension. This section does not explore the broader roles 
and motivations of FBOs vis-à-vis unauthorized stayers, as this is dealt with in Part One.
7.2.2.1 | The FBO as a Catalyst
In the United States, the groundwork for the subfederal-federal tension was laid down in the 
early 1980s. Following the efforts of the faith-based community in assisting unauthorized 
stayers (mostly asylum seekers) from Central America, subfederal jurisdictions began to 
adopt their own policies and laws in solidarity with FBOs and migrants.662 The number 
of sanctuary jurisdictions gradually grew over the years, culminating in a litany of 
lawsuits between sanctuary jurisdictions and the federal government beginning in 2017. 
While it cannot readily be said that the effort of FBOs at the beginning of the sanctuary 
movement in the early 1980s is an indispensable cause of the intragovernmental tension 
we see today, it is most certainly a catalyst. This is evidenced by the names, contents, 
and references of policy documents.663 But jurisdictions sympathetic to the Sanctuary 
Movement cause did not adopt sanctuary in writing only; as time went on, more and more 
jurisdictions undertook measures to limit the ability of the federal government to locate 
and deport unauthorized stayers – primarily through limiting information-sharing and 
access, as described above. The birth of the sanctuary jurisdiction was thus catalyzed by 
the faith-based community, and the sanctuary jurisdiction, of course, is one of the two 
principal actors in the intragovernmental tension today. Again, it would be too bold to 
contend that the 1980s’ effort of FBOs is the sole indispensable cause of the sanctuary 
jurisdiction and its eventual tension with the federal government. This is because it is 
certainly possible that subfederal jurisdictions could have, at a certain point, decided 
661 See Dutch Civil Code, Book 1, Title 4. https://www.weten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006493/2020-01-01. 
662 See Introduction to Part Two.
663 See Introduction to Part Two and Chapter 5.
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to resist the federal government’s policies vis-à-vis Central American asylum seekers 
without any effort on the part of faith communities. However, the documents of sanctuary 
jurisdictions from the early to mid-1980s demonstrate an explicit connection to the 
efforts of faith communities. 
In the Netherlands, certain faith-based organizations, most notably INLIA, foresaw the 
consequences of the Aliens Act 2000 before it came into force. As discussed earlier, one 
primary aim of the Act was to end accommodation to rejected asylum seekers, in hopes 
that they would voluntarily leave the country. INLIA was aware of this, and consequently 
aware that the provision of minimum care to rejected asylum seekers would be directly at 
odds with the aim of the Act. Nonetheless, INLIA reached out to municipalities to apprise 
them of the upcoming situation. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, INLIA had shared its 
blueprint for reception shelters with dozens of municipalities that were already in some 
stage of implementation when the Act came into force. Through its experience, it advised 
municipalities how to deal with the situation of homeless rejected asylum seekers. By 
helping municipalities arrange shelters before and after the entry into force of the Act, 
INLIA accelerated the tension between the central government’s return policy, and the 
hospitable municipalities’ stance that everyone within their borders should receive 
minimum care. And, as more and more municipalities faced similar problems and saw 
that there was an existing solution that worked, they arranged similar shelters, thereby 
providing care to a greater number of unauthorized stayers, and thereby also intensifying 
the intragovernmental tensions.
In both countries, faith-based organizations acted as catalysts in the intragovernmental 
tension. However, it is crucial to point out that without the highly restrictive American asylum 
policies of the early 1980s, and without the exclusionary amendments to immigration law 
in the Netherlands around the turn of the century, tensions would likely have not emerged 
or developed the way they did. While these types of policies and laws were indispensable 
to the creation of the tension, the actions of FBOs accelerated and intensified the conflict. 
7.2.2.2 | The FBO as an Implementer
FBOs can also function as an implementer of the very assistance at stake in the tensions 
between different levels of government. This implemental role was observed with respect 
to the Dutch situation. As discussed above, INLIA had initiated conversations with 
municipalities prior to the new law taking effect in 2001 to warn them of the consequences 
and explore possible solutions. But its role did not end there. The end result of the 
conversations between it and municipal governments was the arrangement of shelters 
to accommodate rejected asylum seekers. It, along with its network of FBOs, set up these 
shelters, which were usually funded in whole or in part by municipalities.664 Though the 
decision to finance shelters (for the provision of minimum care) was reached in an official 
setting by votes undertaken by the municipal governing bodies, the implementation of 
664 It is within the power of a municipality to subsidize organizations carrying out social purposes. See Section 
6.4.3.
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them was largely left to FBOs that had experience dealing with rejected asylum seekers in 
the past. This is true also with respect to the ongoing LVV scheme: in at least three major 
cities, FBOs are heavily involved in the administration and operation of LVVs.665
7.2.2.3 | The FBO as a Liaison
FBOs can serve as a liaison between the faithful on the one hand, and judicial and 
supervisory bodies on the other. In so doing, they express the viewpoints of religious 
communities in legal cases. This function of faith-based organizations was observed 
in both the United States and the Netherlands. In the United States, faith-based 
organizations have availed themselves of the amicus curiae brief as a vehicle by which 
to express the views of its constituents. In at least two high-impact federal cases, groups 
of FBOs have submitted their arguments in support of subfederal jurisdictions in their 
litigation against the federal government.666 Some arguments are of a religious nature 
while others are more legally driven. These are discussed further in Section 7.3.1 below.
In the Netherlands, faith-based organizations have availed themselves of the Collective 
Complaints procedure of the European Social Charter as a vehicle by which to express 
the views of their constituents. As described in Chapter 6, the Collective Complaints 
procedure allows non-governmental organizations to lodge complaints with the European 
Committee of Social Rights, arguing that the rights guaranteed under the European Social 
Charter have been violated. Important also to note is that only certain parties are eligible 
to lodge complaints with the ECSR, including European social partners, international 
NGOs with participatory status, and some employers’ organizations. The Conference of 
European Churches (CEC) enjoys participatory status, which means that it has been able 
to fulfill the demanding criteria set forth by the Council of Europe. The initial hurdle is 
quite high: only organizations with democratic values that work on the European level 
and are extremely competent in their fields can be considered for this status.667 The CEC 
has met this demanding test. 
665  See Section 6.3.8.
666 Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellees (2018 WL 986584), filed 
in City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018); Amici Curiae Brief of Faith-Based 
Organizations in Support of Appellees (2018 WL 5907108), filed in United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th 
Cir. 2019).
667 Participatory status can only be given to international NGOs which 1) respect and defend the values and 
principles of the Council of Europe; 2) are able, through their work, to support the achievement of that closer 
unity mentioned in Article 1 of the Council of Europe’s Statute; 3) are created on the basis of a constitutive 
act adopted according to democratic principles; 4) have a democratic structure and governance; 5) are 
particularly representative in the field(s) of their competence, fields of action shared by the Council of Europe; 
6) are represented at European level, that is to say which have members in at least five member States of the 
Council of Europe; 7) were created and have implemented activities at least two years before the moment of 
applying for participatory status; 8) already have working relations with the Council of Europe; 9) are capable of 
contributing to and participating actively in Council of Europe deliberations and activities; and 10) are able to 
make known the work of the Council of Europe to society. See Appendix to Resolution 2016(3) of the Committee 
of Ministers, adopted 6 July 2016, concerning participatory status for international non-governmental 
organizations with the Council of Europe.
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Being able to act as liaison is the starting point; the logical follow-up question is: what 
do faith-based organizations accomplish by exercising their role as a liaison? In other 
words, what does the expression of viewpoints of the faith community achieve? One 
thing they are able to do is demonstrate their solidarity with marginalized populations – 
in this case, unauthorized stayers. Recall that solidarity is a major biblical theme when it 
comes to discussions regarding migrants and their relationship to natives.668 This theme 
underlay the CEC v. the Netherlands case, pursuant to which the Dutch government was 
required to provide the essentials of human existence – shelter, food, and hygiene—to all 
people within its borders, irrespective of the artificially-created label branded on them by 
the immigration authorities. Religion and scripture are not specifically referenced in the 
CEC case, but the idea of solidarity is certainly present. Solidarity, as described earlier 
in Part One, is a bedrock principle of Christianity. By introducing solidarity, religion is 
also tacitly injected, albeit through a principle common to both religion and international 
law. The American case is more explicit; that is, scripture is expressly recited to express 
solidarity. Indeed, both of the amicus briefs mentioned above open with references to 
scripture that espouse the fundamental principle of helping those in need.669 What the 
faith communities as liaisons are thus able to do is insert Christian principles, whether 
tacitly or expressly, into a legal setting, and express solidarity in so doing. And, the 
principles tend to overlap with general fundamental human rights principles, which have 
the ability to arouse sympathy from the religious and irreligious alike.
Second, FBOs exercise their liaison role to apply pressure to federal and central 
governments. The amicus briefs are filed by numerous amici from many and diverse 
religiously-affiliated groups. When these diverse groups come together, agree on 
content, and file briefs, they signal to the federal government that its actions are contrary 
to the shared views of many diverse people. This, in turn, signals that the actions are 
so fundamentally unethical that virtually all people, irrespective of religious persuasion, 
disagree with them. In the Netherlands, the pressure exerted by faith-based organizations 
such as the CEC is arguably broader and more direct than in the American context. It is 
broader in the sense that the efforts of the CEC and other FBOs have exposed the Dutch 
situation not only to the Dutch courts, but to all 47 countries that are members of the 
Council of Europe. It is more direct in the sense that, while decisions of the ECSR are 
not binding, they do require a good-faith effort on the part of the offending party to 
report on what it is doing and plans to do to ameliorate the conditions that gave rise to 
the complaint. Essentially, a part of the faith community has undertaken to expose the 
Dutch situation to all of Europe, in hopes of holding Dutch authorities accountable for 
their infractions. This leads to a third accomplishment resulting from the role as liaison: 
publicity. 
The amicus briefs filed in the federal cases in the United States tend to highlight the 
negative effects of federal laws and policies. They likely focus on the negative effects 
 
668 See Introduction to Part One.
669 See Note 666, supra.
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because, as described in Chapter 5, the legal arguments used by the parties in court 
tend to be of a technical nature regarding who has the power to legislate over a certain 
area, not what should the content of that legislation be. They bring transparency to the 
plight of the people affected by laws and policies, and in so doing, are able to inject a 
human element, filling the content void created by exclusive focus on the more formal 
who question by the parties in litigation.
7.2.3 | Summary
Both the United States and Netherlands have been attempting to effectuate a return policy 
regarding people without authorized residence status. The response of the subfederal 
and municipal governments, however, has been different because the manner in which 
the federal and central governments have attempted to effectuate their return policies 
are different. The United States has pursued a physical removal policy (deportation), 
while the Netherlands has attempted to remove unauthorized stayers by excluding them 
from social benefits and labor participation, and limiting their freedom. Understandably, 
the response from the subfederal and municipal governments has been tailored to 
these specific means of effectuation pursued by the federal central governments. In the 
United States, limiting information-sharing and access have been the cornerstones of the 
subfederal response; in the Netherlands, the provision of minimum care has been the 
focus.
Faith-based organizations have influenced the intragovernmental conflicts in various 
stages of its development, and on different stages. In the course of the conflict’s 
development, they act as both catalysts and implementers. In the United States, FBOs 
started the movement that eventually became a battleground between subfederal 
jurisdictions and the federal government. In the Netherlands, FBOs foresaw the 
consequences of upcoming exclusionary immigration legislation and worked with 
municipalities to arrange shelters before the law even entered into force, thereby 
accelerating the municipal-central tension. Additionally, in the Netherlands, while 
municipalities voted in favor of shelters, it was the expertise of FBOs that was sought after 
in the implementation of such shelters. FBOs in both countries have acted as liaisons 
between the faithful on one hand, and judicial and supervisory bodies on the other, 
permitting them to express their viewpoints on different stages, including American 
federal courts and the Council of Europe.
Having considered the roles of governments and faith-based organizations, I turn to 
the arguments used to justify said roles. In the next section, I compare and analyze the 
arguments germane to the intragovernmental tensions in both countries. I focus mainly 
on arguments advanced by the governments, but include argumentation from faith-based 
organizations to the extent it is relevant to the intragovernmental tension.
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7.3 | Arguments 
7.3.1 | The Limited(?) Influence of Religious Arguments
While faith-based organizations have played a demonstrable role in the tensions, the 
same cannot readily be said regarding the influence of religious arguments.670 Arguments 
explicitly based on religion are largely absent from the subfederal/federal and municipal/
central debates, and when present, their importance and influence have proven very 
difficult to gauge. In this section, I discuss the religious arguments, and explain why their 
importance overall is far from self-evident.
As mentioned above, the faithful in America have used the vehicle of amicus curiae briefs 
to inject their stances on sanctuary jurisdictions in court cases. The stances are very 
much informed by reference to scripture and other authoritative church documents. Both 
of the amicus briefs referenced above open with the statement that religious texts across 
major religions preach an obligation to serve those in need.671 They then quote religious 
text relevant to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Regarding Christianity, the following are 
specifically mentioned: Leviticus 19:18, 19:33 – love the stranger as yourself, and John 
13:12-14 – the parable of the feet washing. Both briefs start by highlighting the most 
obvious passages that instruct people to express utmost solidarity with the stranger. One 
of the briefs goes further and cites to a specific Catholic catechism that obliges the citizen 
“in conscience not to follow the directives of civil authorities when they are contrary to 
the demands of the moral order…”672
While faith-based groups in the United States have expressed their religious beliefs 
through the amicus brief, the extent of the influence of these briefs is difficult to measure. 
In high-profile federal cases, many groups submit such briefs, while the paperwork of the 
parties alone can already be overwhelmingly voluminous. In other words, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent these are read by judges and clerks, and even more uncertain 
whether they are in any capacity influenced by them. Nonetheless, the arguments are 
expressed and available to judges, parties, and non-parties. And assuming that some 
judges actually do read these briefs, it still remains unclear what their impact is. Still, it 
should be noted that while judges generally refrain from commenting on religious and 
scriptural arguments in their opinions673, it cannot be readily said that such arguments 
bear no influence on their eventual decision. To this end, it is important to bear in mind 
670 When the phrase “religious argument” is used, it is referring specifically to arguments that are explicitly tied to 
religious text.
671 Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellees (2018 WL 986584), at *4, 
filed in City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018); Amici Curiae Brief of Faith-Based 
Organizations in Support of Appellees (2018 WL 5907108), at *7, filed in United States v. California, 921 F.3d 
865 (9th Cir. 2019).
672 Amici Curiae Brief of Faith-Based Organizations in Support of Appellees (2018 WL 5907108), at *7.
673 Indeed, it would be a clear overstep of jurisdiction for any United States judge to interpret scripture and decide 
legal issues based on it.
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that nearly three-quarters of Americans identify as Christians.674 Surely, that means 
that at least some federal judges also identify as Christians, and even those who may 
not sympathize with Christianity (or any religion at all) can find the ethical principles 
appealing. Thus, the impact of arguments that have the capacity to appeal to the 
upbringing, socialization, and identity of judges should not be ignored. Measuring this 
impact, however, goes beyond the scope of this study.675 The point to be made here is 
that just because religious arguments do not end up in the discussion section of a court’s 
opinion does not mean they bear no influence on the reasoning and decision-making 
processes a judge undertakes in arriving at her judgment.
In the Netherlands, religious argumentation is wholly absent from both the Dutch court 
cases that deal with the topic of assistance to unauthorized stayers, as well as the CEC v. 
the Netherlands decision of the European Committee of Social Rights. In the complaint 
of the latter, there is reference only to provisions of the European Social Charter; there 
is no reference to obligations stemming from religious text. However, even though the 
arguments were not of a religious nature, they shared common ground with basic religious 
teachings. For instance, the CEC argued that the European Social Charter’s guarantees 
to housing, social, and medical assistance extend to people whose presence is not 
authorized by the country in which they find themselves. Essentially, the CEC argued 
that all people regardless of residence status can avail themselves of these guarantees. 
Underpinning this argument is a sense of equality among people, which falls in line with 
two of the biblical themes that were discussed in the Introduction to Part One: solidarity 
and equality. The idea is that the stranger should be treated equally and fairly by the 
natives, and this idea can be transposed from the religious texts to the ECSR with the help 
of the relevant provisions of the European Social Charter (as well as other human rights 
instruments).
At first glance, there may seem to be a substantial difference in the manner in which 
faith-based organizations in the two countries have chosen to present their viewpoints. 
The reason for the different arguments, however, can be traced to the contrasting role of 
the amici in the American context compared to the CEC in the Dutch context. Recall that 
in the former, all legal arguments have presumably been put forth to the court through 
the parties’ briefs. Thus, the only need is to introduce arguments not presented in those 
briefs. In the latter, the CEC, as a party, is responsible for argumentation, and, as such, 
must follow the rules of the relevant framework, in this case the European Social Charter, 
if it expects the ECSR to entertain its arguments. It would defy common sense to put forth 
religious arguments that are simply not within the jurisdiction of the ECSR. In any case, 
the amici probably would have also focused on legal arguments rather than religious 
ones, were they party to the sanctuary jurisdiction cases rather than mere friends of the 
court. 
674 Newport, F. (2016, December 23). Five Key Findings on Religion in the U.S. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.
com/poll/200186/five-key-findings-religion.aspx. 
675 It could very well be a worthwhile endeavor to explore this impact from a multidisciplinary approach.
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To conclude, religious argumentation (that is, explicitly formulated written argumentation 
referencing religious text) is largely absent from the intragovernmental debate in both 
countries. In the United States, religious argumentation appears in a small number 
of amicus briefs filed in federal cases dealing with some aspect of the sanctuary 
jurisdictions conflict. Because judges have not opined on the religious arguments raised 
in those briefs, it is difficult to gauge those arguments’ influence. Still, it would be hasty 
to conclude that they exert no influence considering that the arguments are based on 
widely accepted ethical principles and thus have the ability to appeal to Christian and 
non-Christian judges alike. Because the appeal manifests in one’s mind, it is difficult to 
gauge it from a legal perspective. In the Netherlands, religious argument is absent from 
court cases, but principles that are found also in religion have been presented before 
supranational supervisory bodies by faith-based organizations. Religious arguments 
do appear in a journal published by the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)676, but their 
influence is difficult to gauge because they tend to be vague, the level of the journal’s 
readership is uncertain, and the medium of argumentation lies at the periphery of the 
intragovernmental debate: it does not appear in court or in communications between 
the central and municipal governments. Again, none of this should be interpreted to 
mean that such arguments do not have influence. The influence could perhaps be better 
explored from a psychological and behavioral angle rather than a legal angle.
7.3.2 | Supranational Law
A salient difference between the intragovernmental conflict in the United States and 
the Netherlands is the role of international law. The Conference of European Churches 
successfully argued before the European Committee of Social Rights that the Netherlands 
was in violation of two provisions of the European Social Charter. In the American 
context, judges have not considered international law in their decisions in the sanctuary 
jurisdictions cases. This is not to say that there are no relevant international treaties 
or declarations to which the United States is a signatory. For instance, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights offers, at least arguably, several guarantees germane to 
the subfederal-federal debate. For example, Article 22 states that everyone is entitled 
to realization of his or her economic, social, and cultural rights through national effort 
and international cooperation.677 Article 23 guarantees everyone the right to work. Taken 
together, these would, at the very least, strongly caution against the deportation of a 
person to a place where neither article’s guarantees can be realized. Notwithstanding the 
potential applicability of such arguments, they have not yet been considered.678 So far, 
arguments based on international law have only played a role in the Dutch context.
676  The Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl) is a center-right political party in the 
Netherlands.
677 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22.
678 American courts are generally quite reluctant to look to international law as guidance in, among others, 
immigration cases. Consultation with learned colleagues has revealed only two cases in which the court did so. 
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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7.3.3 | Substantive Arguments
By contrast to the question of jurisdiction, which is concerned with who has the 
competence to govern a certain field, substantive arguments are content-based and 
tend to implicate human rights. In the American context, substantive arguments are 
predominantly found outside of litigation, whereas in the Dutch context, they appear also 
in court judgments. For instance, the argument that a municipality has a duty of care 
for all people within its borders was considered by national and supranational courts. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Central Appeals Tribunal was initially convinced that the 
Social Support Act provided an avenue for unauthorized stayers to receive minimum care. 
However, it ultimately decided that the Social Support Act does not apply to unauthorized 
stayers, and any decisions regarding whether to provide an unauthorized stayer with 
minimum care would be left to the discretion of the State Secretary of Justice. 679 The duty 
of care was also the subject of the case of Hunde v. The Netherlands, in which the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the VBL scheme680 does not violate unauthorized stayers’ 
Article 3 ECHR guarantee to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment. The argument 
that a municipality has a duty of care to the people within its borders did not surface in 
the sanctuary jurisdictions cases in the United States.
Substantive arguments are more readily found outside of litigation in both countries, 
particularly in the United States. Here I compare the arguments found in sanctuary 
jurisdictions’ policies to the arguments used by Dutch municipal actors in hospitable 
municipalities. In the American context, there were five arguments used repeatedly in 
sanctuary policies that can be sorted in three categories: those based on constitutional 
guarantees, those based on public safety concerns, and those related to (though not 
strictly mandated by) constitutional guarantees.681 In the Dutch context, the fundamental 
point of contention was the municipal actors’ perceived lack of legitimacy of the 
central government’s policy. This lack of legitimacy was manifested in three subtypes: 
constitutional legitimacy, output legitimacy, and democratic legitimacy.682 For ease of 
comparison, I structure the discussion around these subtypes.
7.3.3.1 | Constitutional Rights
There is significant overlap in arguments that stem from constitutional rights. However, I 
note at the outset that the phrase “constitutional guarantees” that I use in my categorization 
of the arguments in the American context means strictly those explicitly found in the text 
of the Constitution of the United States. In the Dutch context, “constitutional legitimacy”, 
679 See Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.6
680 The VBL scheme is a national reception center that provides minimum care to unauthorized stayers if they are 
willing to cooperate on their return, and willing to give up substantial physical freedom of movement. For more 
information, see Sections 6.3.6-6.3.9.
681 See Section 5.4.2.
682 See Section 6.4.4.
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as used by Kos, refers broadly to legal and human rights norms.683 This conceptualization 
of constitutional rights is broad enough to cover the argument that the government is 
charged with ensuring public order, which includes public health and safety. In the 
American context, public safety is separately articulated as an argument by the sanctuary 
jurisdictions. It does not stem from notions of constitutional rights. In other words, the 
first two categories in the American context (constitutional guarantees and public safety) 
would fall under the constitutional legitimacy typology that Kos employs. 
While both sanctuary jurisdictions and hospitable municipalities argue for their respective 
types of assistance to unauthorized stayers by reference to constitutional rights, 
sanctuary jurisdictions have a tendency of referring to explicit constitutional provisions. 
For instance, they refer to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful arrest, 
or the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to equal protection of the laws. The municipal 
actors in the Dutch context tend to more broadly refer to their duty of care, or duty to 
preserve the public order (which includes safety and health), or even just broad notions 
of humanitarianism. This greater degree of generality in the Dutch context has another 
effect. By referring to public order, there is no differentiation between authorized and 
unauthorized stayers. It is the safety and health of the public at large that is used as 
grounds for the provision of minimum care. In the American context, the argument is that 
the unauthorized stayers’ rights to equal protection and freedom of unlawful attention 
are grounds for sanctuary policies. Even when it comes to public safety, the focus is still 
on unauthorized stayers. The focus is on their trust of local police. Thus, in the American 
context, there is more focus on the rights of unauthorized stayers rather than the public 
at large when it comes to arguments based on constitutional rights. Focus on the public 
at large, as in the Dutch case, rather than unauthorized stayers themselves also calls into 
question the exact motivation. Are unauthorized stayers helped so that the authorized 
population is safe from violence and disease? Are unauthorized stayers helped because 
they are deserving of minimum care? Or are they helped so everyone, whether authorized 
and unauthorized, is entitled to minimum care? These are questions that go beyond the 
scope of this research but may be suitable for a follow-up study. 
7.3.3.2 | Democratic Legitimacy
What is not readily apparent in the sanctuary jurisdictions’ written declarations 
are justifications for their policies based on democratic illegitimacy of the federal 
government’s actions. In other words, the declarations do not argue that, because 
subfederal governments and the people have not had a sufficient opportunity to 
deliberate and influence the policy making process, the federal government’s policy is 
illegitimate and therefore does not have to be followed. However, sanctuary jurisdictions 
do make use of their declarations as a medium for expressing disagreement with the 
federal government’s policy. Perhaps this is also a way for the sanctuary jurisdictions to 
 
683 Kos, S., Maussen, M. & Doomernik, J. (2015). Policies of Exclusion and Practices of Inclusion: How Municipal 
Governments Negotiate Asylum Policies in the Netherlands in Territory, Politics, Governance.
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(indirectly) participate in the democratic process. After all, the sanctuary declarations 
exist in the public forum. They may thus serve as a way to initiate or continue the public 
discussion regarding the desirability and legality of sanctuary policies compared to the 
federal government’s exclusionary policy.
7.3.3.3 | Output Legitimacy
The lack of output legitimacy on the part of the federal government is also not explicitly 
found in sanctuary jurisdictions’ declarations. In the Dutch context, Kos found that 
minimum care provisions are “by and large justified by pointing to the lack of output 
legitimacy of national policies (the mere fact that these people continue to live in Dutch 
cities is pointed to as evidence that policy implementation is ‘unsuccessful’)”.684 In the 
United States, sanctuary jurisdictions do not justify their policies because the federal 
government has been unsuccessful at removing unauthorized stayers from the country. 
This of course would run counter to the central purpose of sanctuary jurisdictions, which 
is to avoid mass deportations of unauthorized stayers living in their communities.
7.3.4 | The Question of Jurisdiction
The arguments I discussed above in Section 7.3.3 dealt with substance. In this section, 
I turn to the question of jurisdiction. Most of the arguments that have reached the 
courtroom in the intragovernmental conflict in the United States are fundamentally of a 
jurisdictional nature. This is less true for the Netherlands, but jurisdictional arguments 
are found in the Dutch context as well. By jurisdictional arguments, I mean those that 
address the question of who has the power to govern over a field. Jurisdictional arguments 
can also be found outside of court, but the tendency is that the majority of arguments 
outside of court are substantive. 
7.3.4.1 | Arguments in Litigation
The main arguments in the sanctuary jurisdictions cases center around separation of 
powers among branches of the federal government, and separation of powers between 
the federal government and the states.  Essentially the question is the following: under 
principles of federalism, when does the level of pressure from the federal government 
to the states reach the threshold measure of coercion? When this pressure reaches that 
level, the federal government is intruding into the autonomy of subfederal governments 
and should legally be enjoined from doing so.
Questions of (municipal) autonomy are less central to the debate in the Netherlands. In 
deciding the question of what the Netherlands must provide to unauthorized stayers, 
most courts and supervisory bodies have looked to national and supranational laws. 
These have included the Social Support Act, the European Social Charter, and the 
 
684 Id. at pp. 15-16.
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European Convention on Human Rights. Common to the provisions interpreted within 
these laws is that they dealt with the content of the rights of unauthorized stayers. In 
other words, central to the courts’ and supervisory bodies’ resolutions of cases have been 
questions of substance rather than jurisdiction. However, the jurisdictional question was 
not completely avoided. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Central Appeals Tribunal ruled 
that it is the responsibility of only the central government (and more specifically the State 
Secretary of Justice) to decide what an unauthorized stayer receives from the state. It is 
thus not the responsibility of a municipality or any other government actor. 
In both scenarios, courts have reached decisions regarding who has the competence 
to govern this specific field. In the United States, sanctuary jurisdictions have retained 
autonomy as a result of their successful legal cases. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
courts have affirmed that the power to decide whether minimum care should be provided 
for unauthorized stayers is solely that of the State Secretary of Justice. Notwithstanding 
these judgments, municipalities continue to finance minimum care for unauthorized 
stayers in need. There is a difference between having legal competence to govern a field, 
and actually governing that field in reality.  The reality is better understood when the 
assistance effort is analyzed as a network process. This is discussed in section 7.4 below.
7.3.4 2 | Arguments outside of Litigation
Outside of litigation, arguments on the basis of (subfederal) autonomy are found only 
in the American context. Indeed, the idea that the resources of subfederal governments 
should be used for local rather than federal priorities. This is based on, among others, 
the separation of powers inherent in the federalist system of government. In the 
Dutch context, however, none of the municipal actors surveyed in prior research have 
argued in favor of their provision of minimum care by reference to the municipality’s 
autonomy in governing its affairs. It would be conceivable to argue this based on the 
Dutch Constitution’s grant of power to municipalities and provinces to govern their 
own affairs.685 But perhaps the autonomy afforded to subcentral governmental entities 
in a centralized form of government is not sufficiently robust to substantiate a claim by 
municipalities that they may deviate from the central government’s clearly stated laws 
and policies.
7.4 | Assistance Networks
In Part One, I discussed the work of faith-based organizations in assisting unauthorized 
stayers. In Part Two, I switched focus to another set of actors: governments. Both of these 
types of actors comprise only a part of the complex network of actors relevant in governing 
the field of immigration. Scholars have already applied the network governance theory 
to describe the situations in the United States and Netherlands. In essence, network 
 
685 See Section 6.4.3.
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governance theory argues that governmental entities, and in particular one level of 
government, do not have monopoly over a particular field.686 Rather, according to the 
theory, many types of actors exercise authority over a particular field in loosely connected 
networks.687
In the American context, Villazor and Gulasekaram argue that public and private 
sanctuaries are best understood as a system of legal resistance to federal immigration 
enforcement.688 They refer to this system as “sanctuary networks”.689 Sanctuary networks 
consist of numerous types of actors, including legislatures, government agencies, 
corporations, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and other informal 
associations.690 Together, they form a system that “collaborates, formally in some 
contexts and informally in others, to collectively challenge the federal government’s 
claimed monopoly on setting immigration policy”.691 
In the Dutch context, Kos and others argue that, while immigration is officially a policy 
domain relegated to the national government, other types of actors are substantially 
involved as well.692 One could also argue that while immigration is indeed the sole 
competence of the central government, taking care of its citizens is the competence of 
the municipal government. The grey area results where the two overlap, as in this context. 
The manner in which one frames the context (immigration versus care for citizens) can be 
an additional source of contention informing the debate.
Pluymen argues that strict exclusionary immigration measures (including the Linking 
Act and Aliens Act 2000) have created a “shadow-network of municipalities, private 
organisations, churches and individual citizens that provide these immigrants with 
alternative means of reception.”693 Kos and others expand on the networks’ membership: 
it can include political actors, such as the mayor and municipal council members, as 
well as officials, administrators, bureaucrats and professionals, such as migration 
policy advisors and school staff.694 All of these actors “operate in a network [] that has 
developed in relation to the presence of irregular migrants, homeless people, and other 
people in need”.695 
The American and Dutch lines of argument are similar in that they suggest that 
immigration policy and enforcement, in reality, are not monopolized by the federal and 
686 Villazor, R.C. & Gulasekaram, P. (2018). Sanctuary Networks, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1209, 1252.
687 Id. 
688 Id. at 1214.
689 Id. 
690 Id. at 1252.
691 Id. at 1214.
692 Kos, supra Note 683, at 3.
693 Pluymen, supra Note 604, at 314.
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central governments. Governments below these levels, as well as actors outside of a 
governmental capacity, work together and play a part in shaping the reality of policy and 
enforcement. Both lines of arguments are fundamentally based on network governance 
theory. A difference between the two lines of argument is that the one advanced by 
Kos and others in the Dutch context nuances the classification of the networks’ efforts. 
Rather than asserting that the networks challenge the national government (as Villazor 
and Gulasekaram do), Kos identifies different ways in which they interact with the 
national government: cushioning, bypassing, resisting, and counteracting.696 However, 
these four ways of interacting are really just gradations of the more general word used 
by Villazor and Gulasekaram: challenge. The interesting question is then the following: 
when are networks likely to form, and, in some capacity, challenge the federal and 
central government? A brief historical synopsis of sanctuary jurisdictions and hospitable 
municipalities can elucidate certain patterns and indicators.
In the United States, scholars have identified four waves of sanctuary policies.697 
The first came in the 1980s and can be seen as subfederal governments’ expression 
of solidarity with the faith community that had pioneered the Sanctuary Movement of 
that decade. The second wave came after two significant changes to immigration law in 
1996, which allowed subfederal cooperation agreements between the attorney general 
and subfederal jurisdictions, and prevented restrictions on communication between the 
federal and subfederal governments. The third wave came after the introduction of Secure 
Communities in 2008, which aimed to further bolster the 1996 changes by facilitating 
the information-sharing of biometric data between the subfederal governments and 
federal immigration authorities. The fourth and most recent wave followed the election 
of Donald Trump, who repeatedly promised to end sanctuary jurisdictions and deport 
people without authorized residence. The common thread among the waves is that they 
occur after the (federal) government has engaged in conduct or rhetoric that threatens to 
remove unauthorized stayers from the country.
Similar to the United States, municipal governments in the Netherlands first became 
involved when the faith community did. In the Netherlands, this was in 2001. In the 
Dutch case, this initial involvement does not appear to be an expression of solidarity with 
the religious community but rather a realization that there would be homeless people 
wandering their streets. Beside the moral question of whether this should be allowed, 
this situation had the potential to place public order at risk. This realization, though 
not necessarily an expression of solidarity, was a product of informed communication 
between the faith communities and the municipalities.698 In the Netherlands, there 
are not readily discernible waves, though, likely due to the fact that a permanent and 
workable solution to homeless (rejected) asylum seekers has not yet been found. In other 
words, there is an ongoing municipal response.
696  Id. at 2.
697 See Section 5.3.1
698 See Chapter 6.
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So, the responses tend to occur when there is a threat of physical removal of unauthorized 
stayers (United States), and when the provision minimum care is jeopardized or 
terminated for unauthorized stayers (Netherlands). The responses are justified by various 
arguments, most of which are broadly related to the question of the legitimacy of the 
federal and central governments’ actions. That is, the response occurs when the federal 
and central government are perceived as engaging in illegitimate behavior. The power of 
an institution, whether it is an arm of the government or a nongovernmental organization, 
relies substantially on the acquiescence of its constituents. In this case, the federal 
and central governments’ powers (to govern the field of immigration or the field of care) 
appear to weaken as their constituents question the legitimacy of their actions. This leads 
to a situation in which the roles of the federal and central governments blur not only with 
lower governments, but with nongovernmental actors as well. That is, the actual roles 
assumed by lower governments do not correspond with their constitutionally prescribed 
functions, and instead begin to correspond more to the will of the constituents who have 
begun to perceive the federal and central governments’ actions as illegitimate. These 
actions pursuant to the will of constituents are not necessarily legally prescribed, but 
this detail becomes less important when subfederal and municipal governments have 
a certain level of support from their constituents. This paves the way for subfederal and 
municipal governments to play a part in fields legally relegated to the federal and central 
government. 
7.5 | Conclusions
A discussion on the intragovernmental tension regarding assistance to unauthorized 
stayers would be incomplete without recognizing the significant role of faith-based 
organizations within that tension. Faith-based organizations offer their insights on issues 
germane to this tension in various fora before bodies that actually have the jurisdiction 
to effectuate these insights. These include courts such as American and Dutch national 
courts, as well as supranational supervisory bodies, such as the European Committee of 
Social Rights. In so doing, they are able to express the will of their constituents, which 
include the faithful. This allows FBOs to appeal to religion both expressly and tacitly. 
FBOs, especially in the Netherlands, also offer their expertise vis-à-vis migration-
related issues to bodies that possess financial resources but lack practical experience: 
municipalities. In so doing, they are able to establish themselves as an indispensable 
actor in the network of assistance.
The arguments vis-à-vis assisting unauthorized stayers are found in legal cases in 
both countries, as well as policy documents of sanctuary jurisdictions (US) and prior 
qualitative research for which municipal actors of hospitable municipalities were 
interviewed (NL). The arguments can be broadly divided between those of a jurisdictional 
nature and those of a substantive nature. Jurisdictional arguments involve questions of 
who has the competence to govern a field. Substantive arguments focus on the content of 
rights, often referencing constitutional rights and human rights. Jurisdictional arguments 
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lie at the core of the sanctuary jurisdictions cases. In essence, courts have analyzed to 
what extent the principles of federalism can permit subfederal governments to limit their 
cooperation with the federal government. Jurisdictional arguments are also found outside 
of court in the American context, such as in policy documents of sanctuary jurisdictions, 
but said policy documents tend to focus more on substance. In the Netherlands, the 
jurisdictional question has been tested in court, but most of the arguments surrounding 
the appropriateness of minimum care center on human rights and public order, both in 
court and out of court.
Regarding the substantive arguments, there is significant overlap between the United 
States and the Netherlands. The emphasis is placed on constitutional rights (in a broad 
sense). These include the rights of both unauthorized and authorized stayers, though 
there tends to be more emphasis on specifically unauthorized stayers’ rights in the 
American context. The principle of equality, in particular, plays an important role in 
subfederal and municipal actors’ justifications.
This chapter has focused on subfederal and municipal governments as the actors. As 
explained earlier, it is difficult to discuss the role of these governments without a reference 
to FBOs, whose efforts have become integrated within the intragovernmental tensions 
and actions. This integration illustrates that the assistance effort is the product of a multi-
actor network of both governmental and non-governmental actors. Within the multi-actor 
network, the roles between government and nongovernment are scarcely well-defined. 
The tendency is that nongovernmental organizations, and in particular FBOs in this 
context, fulfill functions legally relegated to the federal and central government, resulting 
in a network governance of immigration. This network, and in particular its implication on 
church-state relations, is further explored in the next and final chapter.
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8.1 | Introduction and Chapter Structure
The central question of this thesis asks how and why Christian faith-based organizations 
in the United States and the Netherlands, in the expression of their faith and in 
conjunction with local governments, challenge the central government’s legal monopoly 
over migration. The central question implicates a number of actors, including those in the 
faith community, those of the state, and the unauthorized stayers themselves. Because of 
the numerous actors relevant to the central inquiry, I have formulated two sub-questions 
to address it in two separate parts of the thesis. The first sub-question, which was 
addressed in Part One, asked why certain Christian faith-based organizations become 
involved in the assistance of unauthorized stayers, and to what extent their involvement 
impacts church-state relations. The second sub-question, which was addressed in 
Part Two, asked why subfederal and municipal governments become involved in the 
assistance effort, and to what extent Christian faith-based organizations play a role in the 
tensions between different levels of government. 
In Part One, I investigated, through a series of interviews with representatives of Christian 
faith-based organizations (FBOs) in the United States and Netherlands, why they assist 
unauthorized stayers. One initial assumption was that scripture would likely play an 
important role in the decision-making process. However, it quickly became apparent that 
scripture is only one of numerous factors relevant to an FBO’s decision to get involved 
in this type of work. I identified a number of normative considerations undertaken by 
FBOs in the decision-making process. These can be understood as the motivations for the 
work performed. I then identified a number of practical considerations that were relevant 
into actualization of the motivations. These can be understood as the limitations to the 
work that could be actualized. This analysis also revealed two aspects about church-state 
relations. First, church-state relations are better understood when both the church and 
the state are disaggregated into constituent parts. Second, church-state relations are 
better understood as a dynamic process.
In Part Two, I investigated, primarily through a comparative analysis of case law and 
academic literature in the United States and the Netherlands, the tensions between 
different levels of government. I paid particular attention to the role of faith-based 
organizations within this tension. The analysis revealed that FBOs played a number of 
roles in the intragovernmental tensions, including roles as a catalyst, implementer, and 
liaison. It also revealed that the focus of the tension was resolved through primarily 
jurisdictional frameworks that paid little attention to the substance of the law. Further 
conclusions regarding both parts of the thesis are discussed below in Section 8.2 and 
Section 8.3.
In both parts, it became clear early on in the research that a tension existed between the 
respective actors dealt with. In Part One, the tension was between the faith community 
and the (federal/central) government. In Part Two, the tension was between certain 
subfederal/municipal governments and the federal/central governments. The tension 
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in both situations arose from disagreement over the same key question: what should 
people without authorization to remain in a country be entitled to? This tension was 
addressed through different legal frameworks.
With respect to Part One, the faithful who help unauthorized stayers despite immigration 
laws that arguably prohibit such conduct, the main framework of analysis used by 
the American courts was religious free exercise based on the First Amendment.699 The 
question that courts were faced with was whether religious free exercise can be used to 
circumvent generally applicable immigration laws. The ultimate answer was “no”. Dutch 
and European courts have not yet considered whether a religious free exercise claim can 
be used to circumvent the application of a given immigration law. With respect to Part 
Two, the intragovernmental conflict, the main framework of analysis in the American 
courts has been separation of powers.700 Courts were tasked with answering the question 
of which level of government had legal competence over certain issues relating to 
unauthorized stayers. The question of what unauthorized stayers are entitled to, however, 
was largely ignored. This has been less true in the Dutch context, as substantive rights 
(of unauthorized stayers) have been considered, for instance, in the Social Support Act 
(WMO) litigation, and the CEC v. the Netherlands decision. However, the WMO litigation, 
though initially concerned with the question of whether unauthorized stayers are entitled 
to provisions of the WMO, ultimately resulted in a number of decisions that essentially 
declared the State Secretary of Justice as the decision-maker regarding the applicability 
of the WMO. The conclusion however was that the WMO did not, as a general rule, apply 
to unauthorized stayers.
Both of the existing legal frameworks for analysis are problematic for a number of reasons. 
The framework for resolving the tension in Part One is constitutionally problematic, at 
least with respect to the American context, because it purports to grant religious people 
additional guarantees that are unavailable to non-religious people.701 Second, in both the 
American and Dutch context, the framework inevitably invites the court to examine the 
content of religion, which has serious implications for the principle separation of church 
and state. The framework for resolving the tension in Part Two is problematic from a 
constitutional/human rights aspect because it tends to ignore the rights of unauthorized 
stayers, particularly in the American context.
The problems associated with the existing frameworks invite exploration into a new 
framework for resolving the tensions analyzed in Parts One and Two. A new framework 
could be desirable if it is able to remedy at least some of the problems associated with 
the current legal frameworks of resolution. The starting point is to look to the very system 
of government of the two countries to ascertain what these systems of government value 
most. The systems of government at their most fundamental level are democracies. 
699 See Section 2.2.3.
700 See Section 5.4.
701 At least arguably, the guarantees of Article 9 ECHR extend to belief and conscience, and are not solely reserved 
for religion as the First Amendment is. See Section 8.2.1, infra.
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The framework is thus one based on principles arguably indispensable to a democratic 
system of government: pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness. In Section 8.4, I 
elaborate on the problems associated with the existing legal frameworks of resolution, 
and then expound the new pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness framework. In 
Section 8.5, I apply the new framework of resolution to see whether any of the problems 
associated with the existing frameworks can be remedied.
8.2 | Conclusions on the Central Question and Sub-Questions
In this section, I provide conclusions on the central question and sub-questions of this 
thesis. The conclusions I draw from this research are organized below thematically. First, 
I reflect on the broad values of equality, solidarity, and liberty, and the part they played in 
both FBOs’ and subfederal/municipal governments’ work vis-à-vis unauthorized stayers. 
Second, I discuss how these actors are willing and able to utilize Christianity’s visibility to 
actualize their convictions. Third, I reflect on the conditions that tend to be present when 
these irregular immigration actors become involved in immigration matters. Finally, I 
explain how this research affirms and develops the findings of prior literature which posit 
that assistance (to unauthorized stayers) is most accurately understood as a network 
process.
8.2.1 | Equality, Solidarity, and Liberty
In the Introduction to Part One, I discussed the biblical treatment of the migrant under 
three broad themes: equality, solidarity, and liberty. These themes were extracted from 
Article 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). I chose 
to extract themes from the UDHR because of its status as a landmark human rights 
instrument that was approved by both of the countries studied in this thesis. I now reflect 
on these themes and explain how they underpinned many of the FBOs’ and subfederal/
municipal governments’ work. Though FBOs and subfederal/municipal governments 
draw their arguments from different sources, the underlying principles effectuated by 
their actions are the same.
8.2.1.1 | Equality
Representatives of various FBOs draw on scripture for their motivations based around the 
concept of equality. They reference biblical instructions mandating one law for both native 
and alien.702 Moreover, they point to biblical instructions that natives must love the alien 
just as they do other natives. Still others do not point to specific biblical instructions; 
instead they simply say that “people are people”. Subfederal and municipal governments 
ground their equality arguments in constitutionally recognized rights. In the United 
States, the equality principle is espoused in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. In 
 
702 See Introduction to Part One.
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the Netherlands, though not always expressly mentioned by municipal representatives, 
the principle is enshrined in the very first article of the Dutch Constitution, which deals 
with equal treatment.
Whether derived from biblical passages or constitutional protections, the principle 
is given credence by both governmental and nongovernmental actors. It is interpreted 
inclusively so as to ensure that all people’s fundamental rights, regardless of residence 
status, are safeguarded. The fact that different types of actors rely on various sources to 
find the same guiding principle speaks to the universality of that principle. 
8.2.1.2 | Solidarity
Solidarity703 is exemplified by FBOs’ frequent reference to the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. The proposition is that all people, even those may be considered enemies 
by a society, should be given basic assistance. Matthew 25 was also frequently cited in 
support of the idea that everyone, native or stranger, deserves a level of basic help in 
times of need. Not all representatives of faith-based organizations cited scripture, but the 
notion of solidarity came up nonetheless. For instance, some simply thought that those 
who have less than you should be helped. FBOs were often motivated by the members of 
their congregation and community who, through family relationships with unauthorized 
stayers, are closer to their plight. This motivation by the congregation and community 
illustrates not only solidarity among members of the congregation, but among the 
broader community as well.
The principle of solidarity was visible within the efforts of sanctuary jurisdictions as well. 
While equality tended to be the dominant constitutional argument relied on in sanctuary 
policies, solidarity could also be seen in the numerous references to ensuring an inclusive 
society that cares for everyone, not just those who have the federal government’s 
blessing. Inclusivity is the cornerstone of a robust understanding of solidarity.
8.2.1.3 | Liberty
The concept of liberty was readily apparent as a guiding principle in a number of FBOs’ 
stated reasons to assist unauthorized stayers. It was most clearly expressed as liberation 
theology: the religiously motivated belief that all people should be free from oppression 
in the broad sense. This can include the freedom from economic or political oppression, 
as well as violence. In their efforts, FBOs have worked to increase unauthorized stayers’ 
liberty. For instance, the INLIA organization began issuing an identification card that 
would allow unauthorized stayers the freedom to walk around town without having to 
worry about being detained if asked for a government-issued residence permit. In the 
United States, churches that provide sanctuary to unauthorized stayers also provide 
 
703 I use “solidarity” rather than “brotherhood” as it appears in the text, but the meaning is the same as 
understood in Article 1.
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them freedom from deportation. Additionally, they act as a platform from which the 
unauthorized stayer can speak publicly about his or her situation, which not only 
raises public awareness, but also gives credence to the unauthorized stayer’s freedom 
of expression. FBOs in both countries also facilitate access to public services that are 
extremely limited or completely unavailable to unauthorized stayers. This includes 
access to legal and medical aid.
The concept of liberty also appears in numerous relevant legal texts. In the American 
context, liberty is safeguarded by the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery and 
involuntary servitude. Also, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures. In the Dutch context, several ECHR articles deal with liberty. Article 3 prohibits 
torture, Article 4 prohibits slavery and forced labor, and Article 5 guarantees the right to 
liberty and security. The effectuation of the principle of liberty can be observed in the 
actions of both the American sanctuary jurisdictions and the hospitable municipalities 
in the Netherlands. In sanctuary jurisdictions, the refusal to share information with the 
federal government allows unauthorized stayers who may be victims of a crime to report 
these crimes to the local police without fear of deportation. In other words, sanctuary 
jurisdictions’ policies increase unauthorized stayers’ freedom to actually report crimes, 
which increases their participation in the justice system. Moreover, unauthorized stayers 
who are released from custody are free to return to their community. They are not detained 
further until the federal immigration authorities clear their release.
8.2.1.4 | Summary
While the sources of the principles may differ, and sometimes a source is not explicit, 
the content is fundamentally the same. Whether it is the true intention of FBOs or 
governments to effectuate these three principles in all situations is up for debate. What is 
clear is that their actions and policies usually have the effect of increasing one or more of 
these types of rights for the unauthorized population.  In Section 8.2.1, I have explained 
the key motivations and arguments of FBOs and subfederal/municipal governments, and 
how they relate to the themes discussed in the beginning of the book. 
8.2.2 | Visibility and Recognition of Christianity
As mentioned in Chapter 7, about 72 percent of Americans identified as Christians in 
2016. In the Netherlands, that figure was about 39 percent in 2015.704 While there is 
evidence in the literature regarding a trend toward increasing secularization, particularly 
in the Netherlands, a substantial percentage of people in both countries still identify with 
Christianity. Perhaps these figures indicating substantial identification with Christianity 
are understandable considering its deep historical and cultural roots in both countries. 
These roots have, over time, resulted in Christianity’s visibility in society. Evidence of this 
 
704 Schmeets, H. (2016). De religieuze kaart van Nederland, 2010-2015, available at: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/
publicatie/2016/51/de-religieuze-kaart-van-nederland-2010-2015. 
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recognition can be found in both policy and law. For example, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) does not, absent exigent circumstances, enter sensitive locations 
for purposes of removing unauthorized stayers. Sensitive locations include places of 
worship, schools, and hospitals. In the Netherlands, the immigration authorities will not 
enter a place of worship during services, as there is a law prohibiting entry into such a 
place.705
The recognition of Christianity is relied on by both FBOs themselves as well as subfederal/
municipal governments. As discussed in the Introduction to Chapter One, church asylum 
is an ancient practice. While it has evolved over time in purpose and in form, it has not 
disappeared. During the 1980s, hundreds of churches assisted tens of thousands of 
people coming into the United States from Central America. Though the government was 
aware of the magnitude of the effort, it largely stayed out of the churches’ affairs. One 
notable exception to this general rule was the Operation Sojourner, a sting operation 
during which government informants infiltrated a faith community for a ten-month period 
for purposes of identifying illegal conduct.706 Still, only a handful of people who helped 
unauthorized stayers during the 1980s actually faced trial; these were generally either 
those whose activities were uncovered as a result of Operation Sojourner, or people who 
had been questioned at border checkpoints. And, while some of them were convicted of 
various offenses, the majority did not serve time in prison.707 Today, there are about 50 
people publicly known to be in church sanctuary in the United States. Even though the 
identity of the churches is readily identifiable, ICE has not attempted to enter any of them. 
In the 2018-2019 case of church asylum in the Netherlands, various preachers were able 
to hold an uninterrupted, round-the-clock service for nearly 100 days.708 Not once did the 
immigration authorities attempt to enter and remove the family who was seeking refuge 
inside. Indeed, there is a degree of recognition on the part of the government that allows 
FBOs to enjoy a relaxed application of the law in certain circumstances. This relaxed 
application of the law enables FBOs to protect people not only on an individual level 
through church asylum, but also on a broader policy level, as illustrated by the recent 
case of Dutch church asylum that resulted in pardons not only for the family, but paved the 
way for other similarly situated individuals and families to have their cases reevaluated.
Regarding subfederal and municipal governments, the recognition of Christianity does 
not necessarily lead to a relaxed application of the law regarding their activities. In this 
context, the recognition of Christianity has a more nuanced role. In the United States, the 
first sanctuary jurisdictions’ declarations explicitly commended churches for their work in 
helping unauthorized stayers. Some, such as New Mexico’s Sanctuary Proclamation, cited 
705 Article 12(b)(3), Algemene wet op het Binnentreden (Dutch General Law on Entry).
706 For more information on Operation Sojourner, see Section 2.2.3.
707 Notable exceptions include Stacey Lynn Merkt and Lorry Thomas. For more information, see Cunningham, H. 
(1995). God and Caesar at the Rio Grande: sanctuary and the politics of religion. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, p. 43.
708 See Section 3.2.
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explicitly to biblical verses relating to the topic of sanctuary/church asylum. At the time of 
these declarations in the mid-1980s, nearly 90% of Americans identified with Christianity. 
Thus, it is likely that the sanctuary jurisdictions used Christianity as the common ground 
upon which to build solidarity among people not only in sanctuary jurisdictions, but 
across the United States. In the Netherlands, hospitable municipal governments utilized 
the recognition of Christianity in a more concrete way. They knew that both Protestant and 
Catholic churches have always had a policy of aiding the underserved: most generally, the 
destitute. Having historically worked with underserved people, the churches and other 
FBOs affiliated with the churches gained expertise and built networks toward achieving 
that end. The missing puzzle piece was a legal route to help said churches and other FBOs 
continue this work for more and more people. They were able to find this route within the 
law: municipalities are free to subsidize organizations working toward social purposes.709 
With these two pieces of information, they were able to circumvent the prohibition against 
providing aid directly to unauthorized stayers. In other words, the municipalities were 
able to use the law’s permission to aid organizations that work toward social purposes, 
many of which tend to be FBOs because they have historically performed this type of work 
and gained expertise and recognition. Indeed, they labeled their work not as immigration 
governance, but as caring for people (which is a legal competence of municipalities). 
8.2.3 |  FBOs and Subfederal/Municipal Governments as Irregular Actors in 
Immigration
As explained in earlier chapters, neither faith-based organizations nor subfederal/
municipal governments enjoy legal competence over immigration law and policy. In other 
words, neither the American nor the Dutch constitution or other law confers any powers to 
govern immigration to faith-based organizations or subfederal/municipal governments. 
Such powers are relegated to the federal and central authorities, respectively. Therefore, 
FBOs and subfederal/municipal governments can be seen, from a legal perspective, 
as irregular actors in immigration. However, as this research has shown, faith-based 
organizations and subfederal/municipal governments do become involved in immigration 
matters in response to certain conditions. Though they may be irregular actors, they are 
not necessarily infrequent or inconsequential actors.
While it is challenging to expound the conditions that stimulate responses with scientific 
certainty or detail, general conclusions can be drawn as to when responses are likely 
to occur. By looking at when and under which circumstances FBOs and subfederal/
municipal governments have become involved, we can attempt to understand, typically, 
the conditions usually present for such involvement. This is discussed below.
709 See Section 6.4.3.
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8.2.3.1 | Faith-Based Organizations
In the United States, we saw a large-scale response by the faith community in the early 
1980s. At that time, Central American asylum seekers were systemically denied asylum 
by the United States. Faith communities, particularly those near the Southern border, 
were the first to aid these asylum seekers, as they were the first to hear first-hand 
accounts of the harrowing stories told by asylum seekers. The veracity of these first-hand 
accounts of the situations in the asylum seekers’ home countries was further bolstered 
by the willingness of people to traverse perilous terrain in search of safety. One such 
example is the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument incident, where more than a dozen 
people died from hyperthermia in the desert. The stories told by asylum seekers, and 
incidents like the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, made it clear to members of the 
faith community that the people migrating north of the border were in dire need of safety. 
This reality, in the views of the first sanctuary proponents, made the systematic denial 
of asylum by the government all the more egregious. They decided that somebody must 
step in to remedy the effects of the government’s conduct.
The next major wave of support for church asylum and immigrants came following the 
election of Donald Trump as president in November of 2016. The number of churches 
that expressed their desire to serve as sanctuaries doubled between November 2016 and 
January 2017.710 Though the number of people in public sanctuary has not nearly reached 
the numbers that we saw in the 1980s, the fact that the number of churches willing to join 
the cause doubled sends an important message.
In the Netherlands, the faith community became more actively involved in 2001 when 
recent changes to immigration law resulted in the homelessness of rejected asylum 
seekers, as well as the denial of nearly all social benefits.711 The response of the faith 
community was not, however, focused on church asylum. Rather, FBOs focused on 
ensuring that minimum care – meaning food, shelter, and hygiene – were provided for all 
people within the country, regardless of status. They focused on minimum care because 
it was access to these provisions that was cut off by the changes to immigration law. 
However, as discussed in Section 8.2.2 above, the faith community did engage in church 
asylum for a family as recently as 2019, when this family was threatened with deportation. 
8.2.3.2 | Subfederal/Municipal Governments
Regarding the subfederal and municipal responses, the initial substantial involvement 
in both countries followed the involvement of faith-based organizations in each country. 
In the United States, the first wave of sanctuary policies came in the 1980s, and can be 
seen as subfederal governments’ expression of solidarity with the faith community. In 
 
710 Planas, R. (2017, January 17). Number Of Sanctuary Congregations Doubles Since Trump’s Election. Retrieved 
from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sanctuary-churches-double-trump_n_587e5220e4b0aaa36942b647. 
711 There were also some cases of church asylum in the Netherlands before this time. See Section 3.2.
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Netherlands, the municipal response occurred shortly after changes to immigration law 
were promulgated in 1998 and 2001. Before these changes came into effect, it was certain 
faith-based organizations, most notably INLIA, that reached out to municipalities to warn 
them of the likely consequences of the new laws. While the responses of subfederal and 
municipal governments in both countries followed the faith community’s efforts and 
guidance, the response in the Netherlands has not taken place in waves. Rather, there 
has been an ongoing response since the changes in immigration laws entered into force. 
This ongoing response is likely due to the fact that a permanent and workable solution to 
homeless (rejected) asylum seekers has not yet been reached with the central government. 
8.2.3.3 | Conclusion
The exact circumstances in which FBOs and subfederal/municipal governments become 
involved in this area of immigration differ. For instance, each wave of sanctuary policies 
did not necessarily correspond with a measurable response by the faith community. 
However, general conditions when a response is likely to occur can be identified. Generally 
speaking, when the federal or central government engages in, or threatens to engage in, 
conduct that has a likelihood to result in the deprivation of certain fundamental human 
rights, including but not limited to safety, food, shelter, and hygiene we can expect a 
response. The question of when a response is likely to occur seems generally predictable. 
The same cannot be said regarding the question of what motivates that response. For 
example, it is difficult to say whether a response of a sanctuary jurisdiction or hospitable 
municipality was driven by its interpretation of its (legal) duty of care, or a majority 
conviction on the part of the mayor and aldermen that the municipality must act in a way 
to ensure that no one is deprived of the fundamental human rights mentioned above.
In short, because they lack legal competence to govern immigration, FBOs and 
subfederal/municipal governments are irregular actors in the field. However, this does 
not mean they are infrequent actors, or that their actions are negligible. The frequency 
and extent of their involvement depends on the degree of threat or actual infringement 
of fundamental human rights, including safety, food, shelter, and hygiene. Generally, the 
greater the threat or infringement on human rights, the greater the involvement. Through 
this involvement, subfederal and municipal governments act as a check on the federal 
and central governments’ powers and conduct.
8.2.4 | Assistance as a Network Process
This research focused primarily on the efforts of two types of actors: faith-based 
organizations and subfederal/municipal governments. As I conducted more and more 
interviews with representatives of FBOs, it became apparent that FBOs are only one, 
albeit an important one, type of actor relevant in this field. The second part of the 
thesis was driven in part by the discovery of the extent to which FBOs cooperate with 
subfederal/municipal governments in their assistance efforts. FBOs and subfederal/
municipal governments are undoubtedly important actors in this field. However, there 
conclusions and a new framework of resolution 241
548890-L-bw-Dario
Processed on: 28-9-2020 PDF page: 242
are other types of actors relevant to this topic. Existing literature has already posited that 
assistance can be understood as a network process, which involves many types of actors.
In the American context, scholars have posited that these many types of actors form 
“sanctuary networks”. The efforts of these networks challenge the federal government’s 
monopoly over immigration. Similarly, in the Dutch context, Kos and others argue that 
even though governing immigration is the responsibility of the central government, the 
reality is that immigration governance is subject to many actors’ efforts working together. 
These numerous actors  challenge the central government’s constitutional monopoly 
over immigration in various ways.
The results of this research suggest that assistance is a network process. Nearly every 
representative who was interviewed alluded to at least one other actor in explaining 
the work of his or her respective FBO. In the American context, lawyers working pro 
bono and local politicians were cited. In the Dutch context, the Dutch Refugee Council, 
municipal aldermen, and immigration lawyers were just a few examples of the key 
types of actors with whom the FBOs engaged in the process of assisting unauthorized 
stayers. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 7, FBOs continue to be very much involved 
in the subfederal-federal and municipal-central debates: they serve as catalysts 
and implementers of the assistance efforts, and they serve as a liaison between faith 
communities and governments. The growth of these networks can be explained at least in 
part by the discussion in 8.2.3, above: the greater the degree of perceived threat or actual 
infringement of fundamental human rights, including safety, food, shelter, and hygiene, 
the greater the response from society as a whole. 
Thus, the efforts of these networks illustrate a tendency toward a less defined and 
less structured immigration governance in times of a threat or actual infringement to 
fundamental rights. As I have shown in Chapter 7, this raises numerous constitutional 
implications and questions. The blurring of roles, in particular between faith-based 
organizations and governments, also invites discussion on church-state relations.
8.3 | Church-State Relations
Faith-based organizations (and other actors within assistance networks) are spurred into 
action when there is a perceived threat or actual infringement of fundamental human 
rights. They assume roles as catalysts, implementers, and liaisons. But does faith-based 
organizations’ assumption of these roles have implications on church-state relations? I 
do not wish to take a normative stance regarding the appropriate degree of separation 
between the church and state. I merely wish to raise three points relevant to whether 
there are indeed any implications stemming from this assumption of roles. 
First, religious argumentation within the intragovernmental debate is sparse. Any explicit 
argumentation based on religion is found, at best, at the periphery of the debate. In the 
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American context, it is found in amicus briefs, which are far from central to the resolution 
of a case. In the Dutch context, they are found in Christian Democrat Survey, which is also 
far from central to the intragovernmental debate. In essence, both methods of expression 
of religious argumentation are just that: an exercise of free speech. It would be quite a 
stretch to argue that the amicus briefs and Christian political journals somehow inject 
religion into the state’s affairs.  Second, even when religious arguments are used, they 
tend to be of a nature so general that they essentially mimic what can be found in a 
number of domestic and international legal instruments in both countries. The arguments 
used by the amici and by the authors of the Christian Democrat Survey can all be traced 
to principles found in legal instruments wholly outside of religion: equality, solidarity, 
and liberty. So, if religious argumentation is based on the same principles as state and 
international laws, can it really be said that there is an injection of religion into the state? 
Third, assuming that all that FBOs are doing when they assume these roles is ensuring 
that the government’s obligations are fulfilled, it is far from clear that the church is 
impermissibly crossing the church-state barrier. 
What this research has shown in the context of migration and care is that the relationship 
between the church and state is dynamic. When there is a threat or infringement of 
fundamental rights, perceived legitimacy of the state decreases within assistance 
networks. The state’s weakened (perceived) legitimacy allows FBOs to step into an arena 
in which they do not function as regular actors from a legal perspective. FBOs’ efforts are 
in fact a response to conditions, which change from time to time, and are by definition 
dynamic. But whether this dynamic nature actually carries implications on the separation 
principle is certainly up for debate.
8.4 | Frameworks of Resolution
8.4.1 | Introduction
In this final substantive section, the goal is to examine how courts have dealt with 
religious free exercise within the context of assisting unauthorized stayers, and whether 
a different approach could offer advantages. First, I discuss how American courts have 
handled this issue. Though Dutch and European courts have not yet faced the same issue, 
I explain how the analysis may proceed if a claimant (who was penalized for assisted 
unauthorized stayers) seek an exemption on the basis of Article 9 ECHR. I discuss two 
approaches advocated by scholars. The first is essentially an argument in favor of the 
status quo, under which a court resolves the conflict by reference to a specific guarantee 
for religious freedom and free exercise (such as the First Amendment or Article 9 ECHR). 
The second approach abandons reliance on a specific religious freedom guarantee in 
favor of other fundamental protections found in the ECHR. Observing the benefits and 
drawbacks of these approaches, I offer a third approach and explore its potential utility in 
addressing the tensions between the faithful and the government.
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8.4.2 | Existing Frameworks
In the American context, when a person of faith engages in conduct motivated or required 
by his faith, but proscribed by the law, the person may attempt to avail himself of the 
religion free exercise protection of the First Amendment.712 The relevant clause of the 
First Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise 
[of religion] …”. In 1963, the Supreme Court held that laws which substantially burden 
religion must pass the “strict scrutiny” of the reviewing court. This means that there must 
be a compelling state interest, and more than “merely a rational relationship” between 
the law burdening religion and the compelling interest.713 The religious free exercise 
argument in the context of circumventing immigration laws was tested in (federal) courts 
in 1986 and 1989, and again in 2020.714 The courts in 1986 and 1989 rejected the free 
exercise claims, holding that the immigration laws pass constitutional muster even under 
the patently demanding strict scrutiny analysis. The argument was first tested in U.S. v. 
Merkt. There are two notable judicial appellate opinions stylized U.S. v. Merkt. The one 
I discuss here is referred to as Merkt II because it came after the 1985 opinion which is 
referred to simply as Merkt. Merkt, however, did not deal with religious free exercise, so it 
is irrelevant for this discussion. I turn to Merkt II.
In the 1986 Merkt II order, the court considered the appellants’ (religious workers’) 
argument that their convictions for bringing in and transporting “illegal aliens” were 
“barred by their religiously motivated ‘sanctuary activities’ for El Salvadorans, which 
give rise to first amendment immunity from punishment”.715 The court was unpersuaded. 
As an initial matter, the court found it unclear how the relevant immigration law against 
harboring, sheltering, and transporting illegal aliens burdened the free exercise of 
religion, as the law related “only to conduct that aids or shelters illegal aliens and contains 
no explicit prohibition on religious practices or beliefs.”716 Second, the court found that 
there is a compelling government interest in the government’s uniform enforcement of 
border control law. Finally, the court rejected the appellants’ argument that there are 
less restrictive means to achieve enforcement of border control. The appellants argued 
that rather than criminalizing their efforts to help Central Americans, the government 
could have simply confiscated their vehicles or deported the people being transported. 
The court, however, concluded that such an alternative policy would be futile in the 
 
712 There is no comparable case law in the Dutch context, so it is unclear which framework would be used in 
adjudicating a similar case in the Netherlands. However, below I discuss how the inquiry would be assessed 
under Article 9 ECHR, assuming that would be the framework adopted by the ECtHR in a similar case arising in 
the Netherlands.
713 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
714  As I finalized this book, a new decision on religious free exercise and migration was published. This decision 
is discussed below after Merkt and Aguilar.
715 U.S. v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1986). For more information about the events giving rise to the Merkt 
litigation, see Section 2.2.3.
716 Id. at 956.
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government’s compelling interest of enforcing border control.717 The court thus rejected 
the religious free exercise argument. In the 1989 appellate opinion in the case of U.S. 
v. Aguilar718, appellants made the same argument, which was summarily dismissed by 
the judge who referenced the Merkt II decision that she found persuasive. In neither 
case have the defendants successfully availed themselves of the free exercise of religion 
clause to circumvent immigration laws prohibiting the sheltering and transporting of 
unauthorized stayers.
On February 3, 2020, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona published 
an order in the case of United States v. Hoffman.719 The events giving rise to the case 
are as follows. On August 13, 2017, four volunteers for the faith-based organization No 
More Deaths entered the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge (CPNWR) in Arizona with 
the intention of leaving food and water for people crossing the harsh desert.720 No More 
Deaths is a volunteer organization founded in 1999 with the specific purpose of providing 
food, water, and medical care in the desert.721 Due to stricter border enforcement in 
Texas and California, the migrant path from Central and South America has shifted to 
Tucson, Arizona.722 A permit is required to enter the CPNWR. As the volunteers drove out 
of the CPNWR, they encountered a Fish and Wildlife Officer who did not issue a citation of 
violation despite knowing the volunteers did not have a permit.723 On December 6, 2017, 
the volunteers were charged with entering the CPNWR without a permit, and abandoning 
property. Both of these were violations of federal regulations. They were subsequently 
convicted on all counts, and appealed their convictions.724 On appeal, the court considered 
their argument based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). RFRA provides 
“very broad protection for religious liberty” to religious believers by allowing them to 
claim exemptions from generally applicable laws that substantially burden their exercise 
of religious beliefs.725 Such a claim can be brought as a defense to criminal charges, as 
in this case.726 The initial burden is on the claimants to show 1) the governmental action 
burdens a sincere exercise of religion, and 2) the burden is substantial.727 If the claimant 
can make these showings, the burden shifts to the government to show that its action 
both 1) furthers a compelling government interest, and 2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering such interest.728 If the government cannot make these showings, the claimant 
is granted an exemption.
717 Id. at 957.
718 U.S. v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 694-96 (9th Cir. 1989).
719  U.S. v. Hoffman, 2020 WL 531943 (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2020).
720  Id. at *1.
721  Id. 
722  Id.
723  Id. at *2.
724  Id.
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The court first considered whether the four defendants have demonstrated that their 
prosecution is the result of actions that constitute a sincere exercise of religion.729 The 
court seemed to adopt a rather expansive view of religion to include “moral, ethical, 
or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong.”730 In essence, the court found that 
though the defendant volunteers did not necessarily subscribe to traditional notions of 
religion or identify with a mainstream or organized religion, they shared substantially 
the same views as Reverend John Fife, a retired Presbyterian minister and founder of 
No More Deaths, who explicitly cited the Last Judgment as inspiration for him and the 
organization.731 Concluding that the defendants’ beliefs are indeed religious, the court 
then considered whether the defendants sincerely held said beliefs.732 The prosecution 
(federal government) argued that the defendants’ activities are actually of a political 
nature and disguised as religious in an attempt to avail themselves of RFRA protections.733 
The court did not find this persuasive: religious beliefs can still be protected even if 
they overlap with secular beliefs, and nothing in the record suggested that defendants 
are motivated by purely secular considerations.734 Additionally, the court found the 
defendants’ willingness to traverse remote desert in temperature exceeding 100 degrees 
Fahrenheit persuasive.735 Finally, the court considered whether the CPNWR regulations 
constitute a substantial burden on the defendants’ ability to exercise their religious 
beliefs. The court found that because the regulations threaten to coerce defendants via 
criminal sanctions in abandoning conduct that constitutes an exercise of religion, the 
substantial burden (on religion) test is met.736 The prosecution then attempted to show 
that the burden on defendants’ ability to exercise their religious beliefs is justified 
because the government had a compelling interest to further with its CPNWR regulations. 
The government argued that it has a compelling interest to keep the CPNWR in pristine 
condition. However, this argument was unpreserved because the CPNWR, absent the 
defendants’ conduct, was far from pristine: it had been the site of military testing with 
unexploded munitions strewn about.737 Moreover, the record showed that the defendants 
made efforts to clean up trash each time they left supplies out.738 Finally, the court noted 
that even if the government was able to demonstrate a compelling interest (which it had 
not), it would still not meet its burden under the “least restrictive means” prong of the 
test because it could, for example, require defendants who leave water and food to do 
 
729  Id.
730  Id. at *4.
731  Id. at *5-*6.
732  Id. at *7.
733  Id.
734  Id. Prior case law in a number of federal circuits has held that “purely secular philosophical concerns” are not 
protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981); Mason v. General 
Brown Cent. School Dist., 851 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1988).
735 Hoffman at *8.
736  Id. at *9.
737  Id. at *10.
738  Id. at *11.
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so as long as they maintained a practice of removing all trash they encountered.739 Thus, 
these defendants were able to rely on the free exercise of religion protection to avoid 
criminal convictions, and the court ordered any fines paid by defendants to be returned 
to them.740
Whether successful or unsuccessful in court, arguments based on a specific guarantee 
for religious free exercise are problematic. From a constitutional standpoint, a specific 
guarantee for religious free exercise is problematic because the same guarantee is not 
codified for beliefs that are not rooted in a religion.741 Indeed, the volunteer defendants in 
Hoffman tied their beliefs to the religious beliefs of the founding Presbyterian minister of 
No More Deaths in order to attempt to avail themselves of First Amendment protections. 
By protecting only those beliefs which are part of (or closely enough tied to) a religion, 
there is a risk of religious belief gaining an exalted status over non-religion. This is 
problematic because religious people can avail themselves of protections unavailable to 
nonreligious people, which is contrary to the principle of equal protection enshrined in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.742 There is no hierarchy among 
the guarantees of the Constitution and its amendments; all must be treated on equal 
footing. Granting one segment of the population additional rights is contrary to the equal 
protection guarantee. 
Another problem lies in the application of the test itself. The Supreme Court has stated 
that “it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the 
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common 
faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”743 Nonetheless, the courts in 
the three cases discussed above did just that. The Merkt II and Aguilar courts concluded 
that Christian belief does not mandate participation in the “sanctuary movement”,744 
while the Hoffman court found that the volunteers’ conduct was required by their spiritual 
beliefs.
These courts’ applications of the test under religious free exercise illustrates the difficulty 
in evaluating a claim without (impermissibly) adjudicating what a religion is or is not, or 
does or does not require. That is, courts are expounding the content of a religion. Despite 
the principle that it is not within the jurisdiction of the court to arbitrate on religion and 
739  Id. at *12.
740  Id.
741 “Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.” Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 
707, 713 (1981).
742 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from denying any person within their jurisdiction “the 
equal protection of the laws.” This principle is applied to the federal government as well through the Fifth 
Amendment.
743 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). This same rule applies in the Dutch and European context. 
In Kimlya and others v. Russia, the ECtHR stated that “it is clearly not the Court’s task to decide in abstracto 
whether or not a body of beliefs and related practices may be considered a ‘religion.’” See ECtHR 1 October 
2009, 76836/01 and 32782/03, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1001JUD007683601, ¶79 (Kimlya/Russia).
744 Aguilar, 794 F.2d at 956.
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religious text, it appears unavoidable in such cases. This is problematic because it is 
a branch of the state – albeit an ostensibly independent one – exercising jurisdiction 
over religion. In short, this would be an overreach by the state that runs contrary to the 
principle of separation of church and state.
8.4.3 | The Argument in Favor of a Specific Religious Freedom Guarantee
Despite these constitutional issues, the argument that laws burdening religion should 
be analyzed under strict scrutiny, and additionally the conviction that religious freedom 
deserves a separate and distinct guarantee, are not without support among legal 
scholars. For instance, Durham argues that “the better view is that freedom of religion 
claims should receive protection at least as strong as that provided by freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and equal protection norms.”745 Four principal arguments as to 
why freedom of religion deserves separate and distinct protection can be distilled from 
Durham’s essay. Below I set forth his arguments, and provide criticism. 
First, he argues that secularity is better promoted with a specific religious freedom 
guarantee. In other words, pluralism is safeguarded when people’s religious beliefs are 
specifically protected. But is it not also the case that providing only certain people with 
rights unavailable to others creates a social hierarchy, which offends modern notions 
of equality? Is it desirable from a constitutional standpoint to grant certain people 
exemptions from the law because they happen to be religious, while not providing 
analogous guarantees for nonreligious people? 
Second, he argues that jettisoning specific guarantees for religious freedom would 
result in coverage shortfalls, meaning that certain religious thought and action may 
not be protected if we relied only on other fundamental rights. However, there is no 
guarantee even under strict scrutiny that all exercises of religion are protected. In fact, 
there are numerous examples of religious free exercise claims that could not meet 
that test and were not protected. Moreover, not all purportedly religious free exercise 
should be protected. There must be a balancing act of interests considering neither the 
United States nor the Netherlands are socially or culturally homogenous countries. It is 
conceivable, though, that certain exercises of religion may not readily fall under the ambit 
of another constitutional protection, and may thus fall outside of protection.
Third, he contends that freedom of religion guarantees place restraints on the social 
contract. The argument appears to be that if religious freedom is not specifically 
protected, then the state is free to coerce its constituents. While this may have been true 
before sophisticated and robust human rights instruments had been adopted, the ability 
to rely on a variety of codified fundamental rights today places a check on the state’s 
power.
745 Durham, W.C. (2011). Religious Freedom in a Worldwide Setting: Comparative Reflections. “At least as strong 
as” would indicate strict scrutiny analysis.
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Fourth, Durham argues that religion simply deserves to be revered. Durham does not 
define reverence. He explains anecdotally what reverence is not, but there is no clear 
definition of what it is. According to Webster, reverence is “honor or respect felt or shown; 
especially: profound adoring awed respect.”746 The argument that religion should be 
revered can lead to undesirable outcomes. Why ought religious conduct be protected 
through some vague notion of reverence? Reverence, if it has a place in this inquiry, 
should be reserved for values that are compatible with the hallmarks of a democratic 
society. This is more constitutionally and ethically sound. There is no objective reason to 
revere an institution, as a whole, when an inquiry of its actions through history reveals 
a mix of desirable and undesirable actions, both from a constitutional and ethical 
perspective. The better view, I contend, is to give reverence to beliefs and actions that 
withstand constitutional and ethical muster, not to beliefs and actions just because they 
are attributable to an institution that has withstood the test of time.
8.4.4 | The Argument against a Specific Religious Freedom Guarantee
The idea that religious freedom should have separate and distinct protection is not 
without opposition. There is support for another approach that jettisons specific 
religious freedom, and argues instead for the utilization of other protections found in the 
ECHR. In his essay Belief and Conscience, Murdoch advocates for “pluralist utilitarian” 
approach.747 He argues that when an exercise of religion conflicts with another law or 
the rights of others resulting in a dispute, the case ought to be resolved by asking the 
question of which side’s position in the dispute better advances pluralism, tolerance, 
and broadmindedness.748 These principles are taken from two landmark ECtHR 
decisions:  Kokkinakis v. Greece and Bayatyan v. Armenia. In the former, the court 
found pluralism is indissociable from a democratic society. 749  In the latter, the court 
746 Reverence. 2020. In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
mercy.
747 Murdoch, J. (2018). Belief and Conscience. In: Grütters, C. and Dzananovic, D. (eds.). Migration and Religious 
Freedom: Essays on the Interaction Between Religious Duty and Migration Law. Wolf Legal Publishers: 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, pp. 151-176, p. 162. For more literature on the topic of protecting religious rights 
through nonreligious guarantees, see works of William Marshall, Mark Tushnet, and James Nickel.
748 Id. at 170.
749 ECtHR 25 May 1993, 14307/88, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1993:0525JUD001430788 (Kokkinakis/Greece). Kokkinakis 
involved a Jehovah’s witness who had been imprisoned for proselytism, an offense prohibited by the Greek 
Constitution and by statute. As an initial matter, the court recognized that the Article 9 guarantee is broad 
enough to protect conduct aimed at converting others to one’s own religion and beliefs. Though the prohibition 
(against proselytism) was clearly prescribed by law and had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others, the court was unpersuaded that the state had met its burden of justifying the prohibition as being 
necessary in a democratic society. In arriving at its decision in favor of the Jehovah’s witness, the court drew 
a line between proper (and protected) proselytism, and improper (and unprotected) proselytism. The latter 
(unprotected) category of proselytism referred to instances in which conversion was sought through coercion, 
brainwashing, or even violence. Because that was not the case here, the Jehovah’s witness prevailed. See 
below for discussion on the relevant questions under an Article 9 inquiry. See also Murdoch, J. (2012). 
Protecting the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Series: Human Rights Handbooks. Council of Europe, p. 47.
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“further reiterate[d] that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a 
‘democratic society’.”750
Murdoch argues that Europe can do without a specific guarantee for religion or religious 
free exercise. Religion is addressed in Article 9 of the ECHR:
Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2.  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
As an initial matter, he argues that provisions other than Article 9 ECHR, when taken 
together, are sufficiently robust to safeguard thought, conscience, and religion, and the 
manifestations thereof. Before examining those other provisions, it is useful to understand 
what the current framework of analysis would look like if the ECtHR entertained a person’s 
reliance on Article 9 ECHR in defense of his assistance to unauthorized stayers.751
750 ECtHR 7 July 2011, 23459/03, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0707JUD002345903 (Bayatyan/Armenia), ¶ 126. Bayatyan 
involved a Jehovah’s witness who had been imprisoned for refusing to perform military service. Before and 
during his trial, he repeatedly explained that his refusal was based on his deeply held religious beliefs, and 
offered to perform alternative service. Nonetheless, he was imprisoned for about ten months. Though the 
ECtHR could not derive an express protection for conscientious objectors from the text of Article 9, it reasoned 
that “opposition to military service where it is motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between 
the obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his deeply and genuinely held religious or 
other beliefs, constitutes a conviction or belief of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance 
to the attract the guarantees of Article 9. ¶ 110. Further “the imposition of a penalty on the applicant, in 
circumstances where no allowances were made for the exigencies of his conscience and beliefs, not be 
considered a measure necessary in a democratic society.” ¶ 124. In other words, the court could not find 
justifications that justified the government’s interference. See also Murdoch, J. (2012). Protecting the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the European Convention on Human Rights. Series: Human 
Rights Handbooks. Council of Europe, p. 46.
751 As mentioned before, no one in the Netherlands has been prosecuted for assisting unauthorized stayers 
without financial gain. Recall though that in theory, it would be possible for the government to decide to do so, 
at least with respect to a person who has transported an unauthorized stayer. This is made possible by Article 
197A of the Criminal Code. There are three assumptions made here: 1) the government would penalize the 
assister (likely based on Article 197A), 2) the person would rely on Article 9 to be exempted from the penalty, 
and 3) the court would actually decide the case under Article 9.
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The text of Article 9 ECHR is the basis for the framework, and can be broken down into 
five questions. First, does the complaint fall within the scope of Article 9? Second, has 
there been any interference with the right guaranteed? Third, does the interference have 
a legitimate aim? Fourth, is the interference prescribed by law? Fifth, is the interference 
“necessary in a democratic society”?
The first two questions correspond with the first paragraph of Article 9 and aim to 
determine whether the right at hand is protected by Article 9, and whether there has 
been an interference of the right. The next three questions correspond with the second 
paragraph of Article 9 and aim to determine whether the interference is actually a 
violation of the Article, or whether it remains solely an interference because sufficient 
justification exists to support it. Once the applicant has established that there has been 
an interference with the right guaranteed under Article 9, the burden of justification shifts 
to the state, which must lend sufficient support to answer questions three, four, and five 
in the affirmative to show there is no violation.  
The third question is usually not a heated point of contention because legitimate aims, 
according to the second paragraph of Article 9, include public safety, public order, health, 
or morals, and the rights and freedoms of others. The real inquiry thus focuses on the 
fourth and fifth questions. Two requirements flow from the fourth question of whether the 
interference is in accordance with the law: first, the law must be adequately accessible, 
meaning that each citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the 
circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case, and second, a norm cannot be 
regarded as a law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to 
regulate her conduct accordingly.  Finally, the fifth question of whether the interference 
is necessary in a democratic society can be broken down into three considerations. First, 
does the interference correspond to a pressing social need? Second, is the interference 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursed? Third, is the interference justified by relevant 
and sufficient reasons? So, to pass muster under Article 9, the interference, if it exists, 
must correspond to a pressing social need, be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, and is justified by relevant and sufficient reasons. This is the current framework 
for religious claims.
Murdoch argues, however, that other provisions of the ECHR are sufficient to protect 
what Article 9 purports to protect. Article 9 purports to offer absolute protection for the 
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forum externum (manifestations of belief). The forum internum, is safeguarded by Article 
8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and Article 10 (Freedom of expression).752 
Certain aspects of the forum externum are safeguarded by Articles 8 and 10 as well, 
but also by Article 11 (Freedom of assembly and association) and Article 14 (Prohibition 
of discrimination) either standing alone or in conjunction with another article.753 But 
besides there being other provisions to protect what Article 9 protects, Murdoch argues 
that additional benefits ensue from using those rather than Article 9.
First, he argues that applying other guarantees will lead to more consistent jurisprudence.754 
He admits, though, that it is uncertain whether the eventual conclusion of a case would 
change if analyzed under other protections. If a case results in the same conclusion under 
different approaches, is there really a problem regarding jurisprudential consistency? 
Second, he argues, applying other protections will avoid the court assessing the relative 
value of particular faiths.755 That may be true, but the court will have to assign value to 
determine which exercises or manifestations are deserving protection. Third, he argues, 
such an approach will result in a society with greater degrees of pluralism, tolerance, and 
752 Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
  1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
  2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
  Article 10 – Freedom of expression
  1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or 
cinema enterprises.
  2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
753 Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association
  1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
  2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
  Article 14 – Prohibition of discrimination
  The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
754 Murdoch, J. (2018) at 156, 170.
755 Id at 170.
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broadmindedness.756 This final argument is difficult to contest in the abstract because 
the very test advocated by Murdoch requires the decision-maker to favor the side whose 
position better advances these principles.
Neither Durham nor Murdoch have argued their positions specifically in the context of 
invoking religious exemptions to generally applicable laws prohibiting the assistance 
of unauthorized stayers. The arguments they use are of a general nature. Regarding 
the approach advocated by Durham, there are two additional drawbacks to point out 
based on the case law. First, as mentioned above, American case law in this context has 
revealed that in practice, it is unavoidable that the court assess religion and conclude 
what is required by it. Second, there is no evidence that the application of an exemption 
test based on a specific religious freedom guarantee results in case law consistency. To 
the contrary: though Aguilar, Merkt, and Hoffman were decided under materially similar 
facts, the court in the latter reached the opposite conclusion. Regarding the approach 
advocated by Murdoch, there is a serious question of whether there exists any other 
ECHR protection broad enough to encompass this specific scenario. In other words, it is 
far from certain that Articles 8 or 10 (alone or in combination with others) were intended 
to be broad enough to cover this claim, and more importantly, whether a court would 
entertain such a proposition. With these potential drawbacks in mind, perhaps a third 
approach can provide a remedy.
8.4.5 | A Third Approach
As an initial matter, I assume incompatibility. With “incompatibility”, I mean there is a 
conflict between a law and the belief an individual wishes to exercise. In other words, the 
exercise of one violates the other, or, inversely, the application of one penalizes exercise 
of the other. Assuming incompatibility, my proposed third approach has three main 
elements. They are each tailored to address the potential shortcomings that may result 
from one of the two approaches discussed above. 
First, because of the likelihood that not all exercises of religion would fall under the 
ambit of fundamental guarantees other than the religious freedom guarantee, a specific 
religious freedom guarantee is retained. However, the protection is extended to safeguard 
also conscience, and the exercise thereof. By conscience, I refer broadly to beliefs of a 
philosophical and secular nature, rather than those more clearly linked to religion. This 
has the advantage of avoiding equal protection issues: people exercising their secular 
or philosophical beliefs can avail themselves of the same protection as those exercising 
their religious beliefs. To be sure, this does call for an expanded understanding of the 
First Amendment, which, in current form, does not mention conscience. However, several 
early drafts of the First Amendment included a specific guarantee for conscience. For 
instance, James Madison (often credited as the father of the US Constitution) proposed 
the following text on June of 1789: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account 
 
756 Id. 168-170.
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of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the 
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”757
Ultimately, “conscience” did not pass both houses of Congress. Nonetheless, perhaps 
it is time to reconsider the utility of a conscience guarantee, particularly in light of the 
Hoffman decision in which the court struggled to bring the claimants’ actions under 
the ambit of First Amendment guarantees by linking them, somewhat tangentially, to 
traditional notions of what constitutes religious belief. My suggestion to expand the 
scope of the First Amendment guarantees is not supported solely by reference to earlier 
drafts of the text, however. Crucially, an expanded understanding of the First Amendment 
protections is supported by the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees: 
all people must be on equal footing before the law. In the European context, expansion 
would entail only giving due credence to the language already in Article 9 ECHR, which 
protects conscience and the manifestations thereof. No reformulations of text would 
be required; only a more robust application of the already-existing Article 9 guarantees 
would be required.
Second, we presume that the exercise in question is inspired by the claimant’s religious 
beliefs or conscience. There is no assessment of a person’s beliefs (whether based on 
religion or conscience), nor whether said beliefs inspire the exercise in question. This 
avoids the prohibited inquiry of adjudicating the content of a religion and determining 
what it requires. In turn, this also avoids assessing the relative value of religions, or the 
relative value of religious belief compared to non-religious belief. 
At this point, it may appear that this approach is quite expansive and deferential to the 
claimant: beliefs based on both religion and conscience are safeguarded, the exercise of 
both are potentially safeguarded, and there is no need to demonstrate that these beliefs 
mandate the exercise in question. The third element is the pluralism, tolerance, and 
broadmindedness inquiry taken from ECtHR case law and supported by Murdoch in his 
suggested approach. In order for the claimant to prevail, the court must be convinced that 
the claimant’s position is more conducive to pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness. 
If so, then the claimant prevails and is granted an exemption. To be sure, this approach 
affords decision-makers a substantial amount of discretion, as there may be a multitude 
of factors relevant to the pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness inquiry. This is 
explored further in the next section in which I apply this approach.
8.4.6 | The Third Approach Applied
To test this third approach, I propose a scenario based on the tensions described in 
Part One. The sanctuary trials of the 1980s illustrate these tensions well.758 And, while 
there have not yet been similar cases in the Netherlands, the same cannot be said about 
757 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison. Retrieved from https://www.constitution.org/bor/amd_
jmad.htm. 
758 See Section 2.2.3.
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other European countries. For instance, in March 2016, a Danish couple was fined some 
$5,000 for transporting a group of six asylum seekers to Copenhagen, and purchasing 
them tickets to Sweden. In January 2017, a French court acquitted a French researcher 
who had planned to give three Eritrean women shelter who were on their way to Marseille. 
In February 2017, another court in France convicted a French olive grower who has been 
assisting migrants’ journeys by helping them enter the country, and providing them 
with housing. Initially he was fined $32,000; this was later reduced to $3,200 pending 
good behavior. In February of the same year, a Swedish court convicted three reporters 
for human trafficking. They had aided a 15-year-old Syrian boy in his journey to Sweden 
to seek asylum.759 In all of these cases, the defendants stated they had acted on 
humanitarian grounds, but only one court gave credence to this defense. No one had 
claimed a religious exemption. These are just a few examples of the cases in Europe.760
The scenario is the following. Suppose a country makes it unlawful for a person to assist 
another person, who does not have prior authorization, to enter the country. Suppose 
also that a person, motivated by his beliefs (whether based on religion or conscience), 
chooses to assist a person (without prior authorization) to enter the country. Suppose 
finally that the government penalizes the assister for violating the law. The case is now 
before a decision-maker.
Under the First Amendment framework in the American context, we know how the above 
scenario would be analyzed. What is not clear, in light of the recent Hoffman decision, 
is which side would prevail. Again, under materially similar fact patterns, judges in the 
1980s and a judge in 2020 came to a different conclusion. In the Netherlands, it is unclear 
which framework a court would use to address the above scenario, and I do not wish to 
speculate on this issue. Rather, I analyze how a decision-maker would go about deciding 
a case in the scenario proposed above, under the third approach.
As an initial matter, it must be determined whether the assumption of incompatibility is 
met in this scenario. In this case, the person has, on basis of his conscience, assisted 
a person without authorization, which has in turn resulted in a violation of a law. The 
assumption is therefore met. We presume that the claimant’s actions are inspired by his 
religious beliefs or conscience. The inquiry is then: which side’s position better advances 
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness? In answering the question, the decision-
maker ought to look at all aspects of the case that bear on these principles. Of course, 
the decision-maker has a substantial degree of discretion in determining which aspects 
are relevant, as well as their relative importance. For instance, the decision-maker 
could consider what it means for tolerance and pluralism if the assister is forbidden 
759 For more information about these cases, see Dzananovic, D. (2017, February 27). European Courts and Citizens 
Struggle to do “What’s Right” Amidst Reactionary Migration Law and Policy. Retrieved from https://cmsny.org/
publications/dzananovic-eu-courts-and-citizens/. 
760 For a comprehensive overview of cases through December 2018, see Carrera, S., Vosyliute, L., Smialowski, S., 
Allsopp, J., & Sanchez, G. (2018, December). Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation 
of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 Update. Retrieved from  http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/608838/IPOL_STU(2018)608838_EN.pdf. 
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from exercising his beliefs. The decision-maker could also consider whether it furthers 
pluralism to admit a person into the country. Another consideration could be whether the 
law does anything to safeguard these values. For instance, the decision-maker could find 
that the law is intended to protect people in the country by keeping out criminals. The 
decision-maker should have enough discretion, though, to be able to fine tune the extent 
to which the assister is allowed to exercise his beliefs. For example, the assister could be 
prohibited from assisting someone whom she knows, or should know, to be associated 
with criminal activity. 
This approach, regardless of which side the decision-maker eventually concludes has the 
better argument, results in a number of benefits. The first benefit is a greater degree of 
equality between religious and non-religious people. In the currently-existing American 
framework, the First Amendment extends only to religiously-motivated conduct. Thus, 
people who do not draw motivation for their conduct from a religion simply cannot 
avail themselves of the religious protections of the First Amendment. In effect, religious 
people have an additional constitutional guarantee that non-religious people do not. In 
the Netherlands (and in Europe), the protection is arguably greater, as “thought” and 
“conscience” appear in the text of Article 9 ECHR. However, there is no evidence suggesting 
that a person who, motivated by his conscience, has ever successfully availed himself of 
Article 9 protections regarding manifestations. Because this approach does not require 
a belief to be of a religious basis, it offers a greater degree of inclusiveness and equality. 
This brings me to the second benefit of this approach: the decision-maker does not need 
to decide whether the claimant’s purported religion or belief requires him to engage 
in certain conduct. The question is not whether a claimant’s set of beliefs are part of 
a religion; it is whether the claimant’s conduct, compared to the other side’s, is more 
conducive to a pluralistic, tolerant society. So, the second benefit is that the decision-
maker need not decide on the content of a religion or belief, or whether they mandate 
certain conduct. This brings us closer to a principle proclaimed by courts on both 
continents: it is not within the jurisdiction of a court to decide what religion is. By ensuring 
courts are not acting as arbiters of religious doctrine, we also arrive closer to separation 
of church and state. Whatever one’s normative stance on separation is, the United States 
and Netherlands are constitutionally required to uphold a degree of separation.761 
A third benefit to this approach is that it gives credence to the principles of federalism and 
subsidiarity. Federalism is a core tenet of American governance, and subsidiarity is a core 
tenet of the European Union’s governance. Central to both of these principles is the idea 
that political and legal decisions should be made as close to the people as possible. In 
this scenario, what that means is deciding the case not only through blanket application 
of a national law that broadly prohibits certain conduct, but by also considering the 
different aspects and interests at play in the case. Considering the interests of all of the 
actors affected in a particular situation enables the decision-maker to dilute some of the 
 
761 See Section 4.2.
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power of the federal and central governments, and increase the power of the people to 
shape political and legal decisions in a direct manner. 
The fourth benefit is specific to this scenario. It concerns the rights of the people being 
assisted; in this case, it concerns the rights of the migrant crossing a border. The existing 
framework under the First Amendment concerns only two actors: the individual wishing to 
avail herself of First Amendment protections, and the state, which has allegedly infringed 
on said protections. In this case, the person being assisted is not considered: the rights of 
that person are not safeguarded when the framework considers only the other two actors’ 
interests. This, of course, is problematic because migrants, with or without authorized 
status, have rights under national and international instruments.
Critics of this approach may argue that it allows individuals to gain exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. There are two things to consider regarding this criticism. 
First, exceptions to laws are no strangers to the legal order. Laws are embedded with 
exceptions to adequately respond to the nuances of a society. Moreover, this approach 
is less problematic than the First Amendment test (as it currently stands) because 
it allows all people – not just religious people – to apply for exemptions under the 
right circumstances. Secondly, exemptions to generally applicable law would only be 
permitted, by the very nature of this framework, if they lead to greater pluralism and 
tolerance. And these are, as already mentioned, hallmarks of a democratic society.
Critics may also argue that this approach may not protect all exercises of religion. This is 
true, but neither the First Amendment nor Article 9 ECHR protect all exercises of religion 
ipso facto. Indeed, under the current First Amendment and Article 9 tests, there is a 
balancing act between government interests and the interests of individuals and groups. 
Under this new approach, the decision-maker looks at the belief of the individual, and 
how and if the exercise of that belief harmonizes with pluralism and tolerance. This is 
different from the existing framework where the decision-maker decides whether a 
religion is a religion, and whether that religion mandates certain conduct. By looking 
at the substance of an individual’s action and measuring it against the benchmarks of 
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness, we avoid the myopic inquiry of whether 
some belief, regardless of its relative value and congruence with societal values, can be 
attributed to a religion (and therefore potentially protected).
8.5 | Concluding Remarks
This thesis has explored how faith communities and different levels of government 
interact with one another regarding unauthorized stayers in the United States and 
Netherlands. The rights of unauthorized stayers can be viewed through the lens of 
migration law, which the federal and central governments govern, or through the lens of 
caring for people, which is something that subfederal and municipal governments are 
charged with administering.  
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In particular, I focused on faith communities that choose to assist unauthorized 
stayers. Faith communities that choose to assist unauthorized stayers challenge the 
government’s legal monopoly over immigration through legal avenues and moral 
principles. They rely on a variety of arguments, many of which can be connected also to 
modern understandings of fundamental rights as codified in domestic and international 
instruments like constitutions and treaties. 
Apart from relying on a variety of arguments in support of their work, faith-based 
organizations also fulfill various roles. They act as catalysts and implementers of migration 
policy, as well as liaisons between their constituents and the broader community. They 
make use of the legal and political system in their efforts, and a discussion on faith-
based organizations’ work is incomplete without at least a mention of a number of other 
actors, both governmental and nongovernmental. Though faith communities are an 
irregular actor in migration, they are not infrequently present and influential in the arena. 
They tend to become involved when there is a perceived or actual threat to human rights. 
They are critical actors in a network which effectively shapes how migration is governed 
in practice. 
The judiciary has played a substantial role in the American context. In the sanctuary 
trials of the 1980s, courts were generally very reluctant to sentence people (who helped 
unauthorized stayers) to jail time, even though such conduct was formally against the 
law. That same reluctance has been seen over the years, as prosecutors have remained 
wary of bringing similar suits against civilians. Reluctance to punish conduct that aims 
to protect unauthorized stayers can also be seen in the sanctuary jurisdictions cases. 
Judges have refused to withhold money from jurisdictions that place limits on subfederal 
governments’ cooperation with federal immigration authorities. 
Though this thesis focused on faith-based organizations, the analysis quickly revealed 
numerous links to subfederal governments in the United States, and municipal 
governments in the Netherlands. As such, the arguments and motivations of these 
governments were also distilled and compared to those of faith-based organizations. 
Interestingly, when reduced to fundamental principles of equality, solidarity, and 
liberty, the arguments proved to be substantially similar. Still other actors, including 
non-religiously-affiliated humanitarians helping unauthorized stayers, should not be 
ignored. They would be an excellent candidate for further study. Moreover, an inclusion 
of other countries would be a logical next building block in this increasingly complex and 
immensely fascinating area of study.
258 chapter 8
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Summary
In this study, I compare the role of Christian faith-based organizations (FBOs) in migration 
in the United States and the Netherlands. More specifically, I examine FBOs’ assistance 
efforts to people without authorized residence status in the two countries. 
Since the end of World War II, FBOs have been instrumental in assisting migrants at various 
junctures of their journeys. In the post-war era, their efforts were largely concentrated 
on assisting migrants with resettlement. In more recent decades, however, the efforts 
have shifted to other forms of help. Beginning in the early 1980s, Central Americans 
from certain countries were systemically denied asylum in the United States. In fact, 
many did not even apply for asylum because they knew such an effort would have been 
futile. Finding the federal government’s immigration policy unjust, churches organized 
a response. The response became known as the Sanctuary Movement. At its core, the 
Sanctuary Movement was a concerted effort to assist people who were not welcome 
by the American immigration authorities. In this dissertation, I refer to such people 
as unauthorized stayers: people who do not have, or no longer have, the authorities’ 
blessing to remain in the country. FBOs’ assistance efforts ranged from providing shelter, 
to finding employment, to connecting people with legal advice. The movement that was 
started by the faith community did not operate in a vacuum, and was soon joined by 
local governments, universities, and other institutions sympathetic to the cause. The 
movement has waxed and waned over the years, due to geopolitical developments, but 
has seen a resurgence in the latter half of the 2010s when Donald Trump was elected 
president and vowed to deport unauthorized stayers. Nowadays, the tensions are 
primarily between FBOs and subfederal governments on the one hand, and the federal 
government on the other hand.
Though the Netherlands did not experience an en masse church asylum movement, it 
certainly did see a powerful response on the part of FBOs when the central government 
introduced restrictive immigration measures around the turn of the century. In 1998 and 
2001, two cornerstone pieces of legislation were passed aimed at keeping unauthorized 
stayers out. The former, known as the Linking Act, disallowed most types of government 
aid to unauthorized stayers. The latter (Aliens Act 2000) would end government 
accommodation for an asylum seeker four weeks after his or her application for asylum 
was denied. Before these changes were even implemented, FBOs had already planned 
a response to organize shelters for unauthorized stayers who would soon be rendered 
homeless. Recognizing the threat to public order, health, and safety that destitution 
would bring about, municipalities quickly became involved in funding shelters that 
were run in conjunction with, and primarily by, the churches that had had experience 
in assisting asylum seekers for years. Thus, here too, the tension became one between 
FBOs and municipalities on the one hand, and the central government on the other.
It has become clear that due in large part to trends toward restrictive immigration policies 
in both countries, FBOs have been stepping in to fill the gaps left by such measures. But 
why? This is explored in Part One, which comprises Chapters 2, 3, and 4. American FBOs’ 
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motivations in assisting unauthorized stayers are dealt with in Chapter 2. Dutch FBOs’ 
motivations are dealt with in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 compares the American and Dutch 
motivations, and discusses their implications on church-state relations. Even in the 
initial phases of the research, it became clear that FBOs do not function in a vacuum. As 
mentioned, there is a close link between FBOs and local governments in both countries. 
Thus, these governments’ motivations are explored in Part Two. Part Two comprises 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Subfederal governments’ motivations and tensions with the federal 
government are dealt with in Chapter 5. Dutch municipal governments’ motivations and 
tensions with the central government are dealt with in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 compares 
the two cases, with particular attention paid to the role of FBOs within the local-central 
tensions. Finally, Part Three comprises Chapter 8. In Part Three, I draw conclusions and 
offer a new framework of resolving the tensions described in Parts Two and Three.
From the outset, the assumption was that scripture likely play a role in the motivations of 
FBOs. Thus, before delving into the research of Chapter 2, I examined how migration and 
migrants are dealt with in the Christian biblical canon. I organized the discussion into 
three themes: equality, solidarity, and liberty. I chose these themes because they appear 
in Article 1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which both countries of 
this study are signatories. In the Old Testament, the term ger appears at least 92 times. 
Ger is the closest approximation to the modern concept of the immigrant. The principle 
of equality can be found in many national and international documents relevant to both 
the American and European context, though both the US and EU continue to differentiate 
between citizens and non-citizens (or immigrants). The solidarity instruction is perhaps 
most succinctly captured by Matthew 25’s famous line: “I was a stranger and you welcomed 
me.” Finally, liberty is exemplified by the very life of Christianity’s habitual migrant Jesus 
Christ. There is also a basis for church asylum to be found in the Old Testament, which 
crates temporary places of refuge for those accused of murder. It is worth noting that 
there is a minority of scholarship that argues for a nuanced interpretation of these 
instructions, differentiating between the ger (migrant) and nekhar (stranger). However, 
most scholarship argues against this approach, citing a lack of historical foundation. 
Tensions arise when the state enacts a law that curtails the faithful’s ability to carry out 
the instructions discussed above, such as Matthew 25. Then the question becomes “do 
I follow my faith, or do I follow my state?” There is further guidance provided by Romans 
13: ‘Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities’. However, this scriptural 
consideration is only one relevant factor. The next chapters explore other relevant 
considerations. 
Chapter 2 opens with a discussion on church asylum in the United States. It is discussed 
through the lens of the Sanctuary Movement, which is dealt with in greater detail here. The 
central question of this chapter is: what are the motivations and limitations that explain 
why faith-based organizations assist unauthorized stayers? In the American context, I 
identify three motivations and two limitations which inform a faith-based organization’s 
decision to assist unauthorized stayers. FBOs were motivated by (a) scripture, (b) 
government accountability, and (c) confrontation. Scripture is self-explanatory. With 
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government accountability, I refer to a collective sentiment felt by an FBO’s members that 
the government is not abiding by a variety of domestic and international laws, and should 
be held accountable for its actions. With confrontation, I refer to any communication 
that brings the person of faith closer to the plight of unauthorized stayers. This includes, 
first-person meetings with unauthorized stayers, hearing stories about unauthorized 
stayers’ experiences, and biblical teachings retold during weekly worship services in 
church. These motivations can also be viewed as relevant normative considerations. In 
other words, should an FBO engage in this type of work. FBOs were limited by resources 
and organizational structure. These can be viewed as practical considerations: can this 
type of work be done? None of the motivations or limitations function in a vacuum; they 
must be considered holistically. They are interdependent. The results of the research 
conducted for this chapter have revealed that scripture is just one relevant consideration 
in an FBO’s decision to assist unauthorized stayers. 
Chapter 3 discusses the Dutch situation. The central question of this chapter is: what 
are the motivations and limitations that explain why faith-based organizations assist 
unauthorized stayers? First, I provide an overview of FBO involvement in migration, 
particularly asylum, from the late 1970s through the late 2010s. I pay particular attention 
to the efforts of FBOs beginning around the turn of the millennium, when significant 
changes to asylum law left failed asylum applicants destitute. In the Dutch context, 
I identify three motivations and three limitations that inform FBOs’ decisions to assist 
unauthorized stayers. One new limitation emerges in this chapter that was not present 
in the interviews conducted with representatives of American faith-based organizations. 
This limitation is the unauthorized stayer’s religious conviction. A number of FBOs’ 
representatives interviewed for this chapter stated that, for one reason or another, they 
help only those unauthorized stayers who were already Christian or wished to convert. 
As in the American chapter, the interdependence of the motivations and limitations is an 
important aspect to consider in answering the research question.  
Chapter 4 compares the American and Dutch cases to draw broader implications 
regarding church-state relations. In this chapter, I look at the implications of the 
motivations and limitations that were revealed in the previous two chapters. I discuss 
their bearing on church-state relations and the related principle of separation of church 
and state. Drawing on the research data, I explain how existing models of church-state 
relations could be improved. First, I posit that there is a utility in the disaggregation of 
“church” and “state”. Rather than thinking of these two as conglomerations, a closer 
look at the many and varied constituent parts of each paints a more accurate picture of 
the relationship. Second, existing models do not take into account the dynamic nature 
of church-state relations. The relationship between church and state is rather fluid, and 
evolves in response to certain stimuli. These stimuli can be understood through the lens 
of the motivations and limitations described in Chapters 2 and 3. The vast majority of said 
motivations and limitations overlapped between the two countries, and help explain why 
and when FBOs may become involved in the assistance of unauthorized stayers.
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Part Two examines another set of actors relevant in the assistance efforts and tensions. 
These are the subfederal and municipal governments in the United States and the 
Netherlands, respectively. Almost immediately after the Sanctuary Movement began 
in the early 1980s, subfederal governments in the US began to support the efforts 
of FBOs. Since the early 1980s, more and more subfederal governments have aligned 
themselves with the Sanctuary Movement. This eventually led to the ongoing legal battle 
that dominated the courts beginning in 2017. In the Netherlands, municipal governments 
became involved in assistance efforts at the turn of the millennium, also shortly after 
the faith community became involved. The goal of Part Two is to identify the arguments 
used by these governments to justify their positions and efforts. It also pays attention to 
the role of faith-based organizations in this context. Part Two comprises three chapters. 
Chapter 5 examines the American case, Chapter 6 examines the Dutch case, and Chapter 
7 compares and analysis the two cases.
Chapter 5 addresses the following central question: why do subfederal governments 
become involved in the assistance of unauthorized stayers? Before answering that 
question, it is necessary to understand the basics of immigration and governance 
in the United States. Thus, the chapter starts with a brief discussion on these topics 
before turning to the development of the conflict between subfederal governments 
and the federal government. The conflict is traced through 2017, when the defunding 
litigation began to dominate the legal immigration debate. Defunding litigation refers 
to the cases resulting from the federal government’s threats to withhold funding from 
subfederal governments which declared solidarity with the Sanctuary Movement 
as sanctuary jurisdictions. The first set of arguments I analyze are taken directly from 
the parties’ arguments in the sanctuary jurisdiction litigation. The arguments, at their 
core, are grounded in federalism principles and the separation of powers. Thus, the 
vast majority are largely procedural rather than substantive in nature. The second set of 
arguments were gleaned from existing literature that analyzed sanctuary jurisdiction’s’ 
policies. These documents, on the other hand, included more substantive arguments. 
For instance, equal protection, community trust, and public safety were often cited in 
subfederal documents to support the concept of sanctuary jurisdictions. At the end of the 
chapter, I question whether there is a better framework to resolving the issues in court 
that also takes into account arguments of a substantive nature (such as those found in 
policy documents).
Chapter 6 addresses the same question as Chapter 5, but in the Dutch context. That is: why 
do municipal governments become involved in the assistance of unauthorized stayers? 
In structure, it is also similar. First, I provide an overview of the basics of immigration 
and governance in the Netherlands. This is useful in understanding the municipal-central 
divide that I discuss in the following section. Because there has been considerably less 
litigation concerning the issues stemming from this divide, this chapter relies less on 
legal decisions and more on and existing literature. I discuss one especially important 
case in detail as a I provide an overview of the municipal central divide over the past 
two decades. This is the CEC v. the Netherlands case, also known as the BBB (bed, bath, 
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bread) decision in which the European Committee of Social Rights ruled that unauthorised 
stayers who had exhausted all legal procedures had to be provided with so-called ‘Bed, 
Bath and Bread’ facilities. Following this overview, I discuss the arguments that have 
been used by municipalities and their representatives to justify their decisions to provide 
unauthorized stayers with minimum care, despite the central government’s position 
strongly against this. I also pay attention to the arguments advanced by people who have 
published in Christian academic journals in this arena (unauthorized immigration) to 
explore how these compare to the arguments used by municipal representatives. While 
the arguments in the Dutch context could perhaps be seen as leaning more substantive 
than in the American context, there is still room for improvement under a new framework 
of resolving the tensions described herein.
In Chapter 7, I compare the findings from chapters 5 and 6. First, I compare the roles that 
have been assumed by subfederal and municipal governments, and then examine the 
roles that faith-based organizations have played in the context of the intragovernmental 
tension. Faith-based organizations act as catalysts and implementers of assistance 
efforts, as well as liaisons between the faith community and the broader legal order. 
I then compare the arguments that are used by the governments in the conflict, 
referencing also arguments of faith-based organizations insofar as they are relevant 
to this intragovernmental conflict. I distinguish between arguments of a substantive 
nature and arguments of a jurisdictional nature. The findings suggest that there is a 
difference between having legal competence to govern a field (in this case immigration), 
and in practice governing the field. In other words, other actors besides the federal and 
central government play a substantial role in the actual governance of immigration. The 
subfederal and municipal governments are two types of actors in a broader network that 
works together to provide assistance.
Part Three comprises Chapter 8. In Chapter 8, I draw broader conclusions about the 
findings of Parts One and Two, and offer a new approach to resolving the tensions 
analyzed in those parts. Many of the FBOs’ motivations and subfederal/municipal 
governments’ arguments identified earlier in the thesis are grounded in the fundamental 
three principles discussed at the beginning of Part One:  equality, solidarity, and liberty. 
Though both sets of actors – FBOs and subfederal/municipal governments – are irregular 
actors in the field of immigration from a legal perspective, they are far from infrequent 
or inconsequential. They tend to become involved in assistance efforts when there is a 
substantial threat to fundamental human rights. Moreover, Christianity’s prominence 
is visible in both countries, as even governmental actors rely on religious teaching to 
support their efforts. In this context, assistance of unauthorized stayers can be perhaps 
best understood as a network process involving many different types of actors.
As mentioned earlier, the current framework of resolution for the tensions between faith 
communities and the state tend to take into account mostly procedural arguments, 
especially in the American context. At the end of Chapter 8, I explore the possibility of 
another, new approach that adopts a broader reading of the First Amendment free exercise 
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clause. This new framework allows the decision-maker to apply a broader set of factors in 
determining which side should prevail in a free exercise case. Adopting such a test could 
ameliorate the deficiencies inherent in a religion-only protection understanding of the 
First Amendment.
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Samenvatting
In deze studie vergelijk ik de rol van christelijke levensbeschouwelijk geïnspireerde 
organisaties (LGOs) op het terrein van migratie in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika 
en Nederland. Meer specifiek onderzoek ik de inspanningen van LGOs om mensen 
zonder rechtmatig verblijf in deze twee landen te helpen. Sinds het einde van de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog hebben LGOs een grote rol gespeeld bij de hulp aan migranten 
op verschillende momenten tijdens hun reis. In de naoorlogse periode waren hun 
inspanningen grotendeels gericht op het ondersteunen van migranten bij hervestiging. 
In meer recente decennia zijn die inspanningen echter gericht op andere vormen 
van hulp. Vanaf het begin van de jaren tachtig werd inwoners afkomstig uit bepaalde 
Midden-Amerikaanse landen systematisch asiel geweigerd in de Verenigde Staten. In 
de praktijk vroegen velen helemaal geen asiel aan omdat ze wisten dat een dergelijke 
poging zinloos zou zijn. De kerken vonden het immigratiebeleid van de federale overheid 
onrechtvaardig en organiseerden een reactie daarop. Deze werd bekend als de Sanctuary 
movement. In de kern was de Sanctuary movement een gezamenlijke inspanning om 
mensen te helpen die niet welkom waren bij de Amerikaanse immigratiedienst. In dit 
proefschrift noem ik zulke mensen unauthorized stayers: mensen die geen toestemming 
hebben, of die niet meer hebben, van de autoriteiten om in het land te blijven. De 
hulpverleningsinspanningen van LGOs varieerden van het bieden van onderdak tot 
het vinden van werk en het regelen van rechtsbijstand. De beweging die door geloofs-
gemeenschappen was begonnen, opereerde niet in een vacuüm en al snel sloten lokale 
overheden, universiteiten en andere instellingen die welwillend stonden tegenover het 
doel, zich daarbij aan. De beweging is in de loop der jaren zowel gegroeid als afgenomen, 
als gevolg van geopolitieke ontwikkelingen, maar kende een duidelijke opleving na 2016 
toen Donald Trump tot president werd gekozen en beloofde om unauthorized stayers te 
deporteren. Tegenwoordig bestaan de spanningen vooral tussen de LGOs en subfederale 
overheden enerzijds en de federale overheid anderzijds.
Hoewel Nederland geen soortgelijke Sanctuary movement kent, was er wel een krachtige 
reactie van LGOs toen de centrale overheid rond de eeuwwisseling restrictieve immigratie-
maatregelen invoerde. In 1998 en 2001 werden twee hoekstenen van wetgeving 
aangenomen om unauthorized stayers buiten de deur te houden. De eerste, bekend als de 
Koppelingswet, verbood de toegang tot de meeste soorten overheidsvoorzieningen aan 
unauthorized stayers. De tweede maatregel, de Vreemdelingenwet 2000, zorgde ervoor 
dat vier weken na de afwijzing van een asielaanvraag de opvang van een asielzoeker 
werd beëindigd. Nog voordat deze veranderingen werden doorgevoerd, hadden LGOs 
al een reactie gepland om opvang te organiseren voor unauthorized stayers die op het 
punt stonden dakloos te worden. Omdat gemeentelijke overheden de bedreiging van de 
openbare orde, gezondheid en veiligheid onderkenden die dit ‘klinkeren’ met zich mee 
zou brengen, raakten gemeenten al snel betrokken bij het financieren van opvangcentra 
die werden beheerd samen met en vooral door de kerken die al jarenlang ervaring hadden 
met het begeleiden van asielzoekers. Zo ontstond ook hier een spanning tussen LGOs en 
gemeenten enerzijds en de centrale overheid anderzijds.
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Voornamelijk ten gevolge van een toenemend restrictief immigratiebeleid in beide 
landen, vullen de LGOs de lacunes op die door dergelijke maatregelen ontstaan. Maar 
waarom? Die vraag wordt onderzocht in deel één, dat de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 omvat. 
De beweegredenen van Amerikaanse LGOs om unauthorized stayers te helpen, worden 
behandeld in hoofdstuk 2. De beweegredenen van Nederlandse LGOs worden behandeld 
in hoofdstuk 3. Hoofdstuk 4 vergelijkt de Amerikaanse en Nederlandse beweegredenen, 
en bespreekt de implicaties voor de relatie tussen kerk en staat. 
Al in de beginfase van dit onderzoek werd duidelijk dat LGOs niet in een vacuüm opereren. 
Zoals gezegd, is er in beide landen een nauwe band tussen LGOs en lokale overheden. 
Daarom worden de beweegredenen van deze lokale overheden in deel twee onderzocht, 
bestaande uit de hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7. De beweegredenen van Amerikaanse subfederale 
overheden en de spanningen met de federale overheid komen aan bod in hoofdstuk 
5. De beweegredenen van Nederlandse gemeenten en de spanningen met de centrale 
overheid komen aan bod in hoofdstuk 6. Hoofdstuk 7 vergelijkt de twee situaties, waarbij 
met name aandacht is voor de rol van LGOs binnen de lokaal-centrale verhoudingen. Ten 
slotte trek ik in deel drie (hoofdstuk 8) enkele conclusies en bied ik een nieuw kader voor 
het oplossen van de spanningen die zijn beschreven in de delen een en twee.
Bij de start van het onderzoek was de veronderstelling dat de Bijbel een rol speelde in de 
beweegredenen van LGOs. Dus heb ik eerst onderzocht hoe er met migratie en migranten 
wordt omgegaan in Bijbelse teksten. Ik heb hierbij de discussie in drie thema’s verdeeld: 
gelijkheid, solidariteit en vrijheid. Ik koos voor deze thema’s omdat ze voorkomen in 
artikel 1 van de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens uit 1948, die beide 
landen van deze studie hebben ondertekend. 
In het Oude Testament komt de term ger minstens 92 keer voor. Ger komt het dichtst in 
de buurt van het moderne concept van de immigrant. Het gelijkheidsbeginsel is terug 
te vinden in veel nationale en internationale documenten die relevant zijn voor zowel 
de Amerikaanse als de Europese context, hoewel zowel de VS als de EU onderscheid 
blijven maken tussen staatsburgers en niet-staatsburgers (of immigranten). De plicht tot 
solidariteit wordt misschien het meest beknopt weergegeven in de beroemde regel van 
Mattheus 25: “Ik was een vreemdeling en je verwelkomde me.” Ten slotte wordt vrijheid 
geïllustreerd door het leven van de bekendste migrant van het christendom zelf: Jezus 
Christus. In het Oude Testament is een grondslag voor kerkasiel te vinden, een tijdelijk 
toevluchtsoord voor degene die van moord wordt beschuldigd. Het is vermeldenswaard 
dat een minderheid onder de wetenschappers pleit voor een genuanceerde interpretatie 
van deze instructies, waarbij onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen de termen ger 
(migrant) en nekhar (vreemdeling). De meeste wetenschappers zijn echter tegen deze 
benadering, daarbij verwijzend naar een gebrek aan historische basis. Er ontstaan in 
ieder geval spanningen wanneer de overheid een wet uitvaardigt die de mogelijkheid 
van de gelovige beperkt om de hierboven besproken instructies uit te voeren, zoals 
geformuleerd in Mattheus 25. De vraag wordt dan: “volg ik mijn geloof of volg ik mijn 
overheid?”. Romeinen 13: ‘Iedereen moet het gezag van de overheid erkennen’, geeft 
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daaraan nadere invulling. Deze Bijbelse overweging is echter maar één relevante factor. 
In de volgende hoofdstukken worden ook andere relevante overwegingen onderzocht.
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een discussie over kerkasiel in de Verenigde Staten. Het wordt 
besproken vanuit het perspectief van de Sanctuary movement, die hier in meer detail 
wordt behandeld. De centrale vraag in dit hoofdstuk is: wat zijn de beweegredenen en 
beperkingen die verklaren waarom LGOs unauthorized stayers helpen? In de Amerikaanse 
context identificeer ik drie beweegredenen en twee beperkingen die de beslissing van een 
LGO vormen om unauthorized stayers bij te staan. LGOs werden gemotiveerd door: (a) de 
Bijbel, (b) verantwoordingsplicht van de overheid en (c) confrontatie. De Bijbel spreekt 
voor zich. Met de verantwoordingsplicht van de overheid verwijs ik naar een collectief 
gevoel dat door de leden van een LGO wordt gevoeld, als de overheid zich niet houdt aan 
een verscheidenheid aan nationale en internationale wetten en verantwoordelijk moet 
worden gehouden voor haar daden. Met confrontatie verwijs ik naar situaties waarin een 
gelovige oog in oog komt te staan met de benarde situatie van unauthorized stayers. 
Dit laatste omvat één-op-één ontmoetingen met unauthorized stayers, het horen van 
verhalen over ervaringen van unauthorized stayers en de Bijbelse leer die naverteld 
wordt tijdens wekelijkse erediensten in de kerk. 
Deze beweegredenen kunnen ook worden gezien als relevante normatieve overwegingen. 
Met andere woorden, moet een LGO zich bezighouden met dit soort werk? LGOs zijn 
beperkt door hun middelen en organisatiestructuur. Dat betekent dat ze kunnen worden 
gezien als praktische overwegingen: kan dit soort werk worden gedaan? Geen van de 
beweegredenen of beperkingen functioneert in een vacuüm; ze moeten holistisch worden 
beschouwd: ze zijn onderling afhankelijk. De resultaten van het onderzoek dat voor dit 
hoofdstuk is uitgevoerd, laten zien dat de Bijbel slechts één relevante overweging is bij 
de beslissing van een LGO om unauthorized stayers te helpen.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op de Nederlandse situatie. De centrale vraag in dit hoofdstuk is: 
wat zijn de beweegredenen en beperkingen die verklaren waarom LGOs unauthorized 
stayers helpen? Eerst geef ik een overzicht van de betrokkenheid van LGOs bij migratie, 
met name asiel, vanaf eind jaren zeventig tot 2019. Ik besteed met name aandacht aan de 
inspanningen van LGOs rond de millenniumwisseling, toen ingrijpende wijzigingen in de 
asielwetgeving ervoor zorgden dat uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers zonder voorzieningen 
werden ‘geklinkerd’. In de Nederlandse context onderscheid ik drie beweegredenen en 
drie beperkingen die bepalend zijn voor de beslissingen van LGOs om unauthorized 
stayers te helpen. In dit hoofdstuk komt een nieuwe beperking naar voren die niet 
voorkwam in de interviews met vertegenwoordigers van Amerikaanse LGOs. Die beperking 
is de religieuze overtuiging van de unauthorized stayer. Een aantal vertegenwoordigers 
van LGOs die voor dit hoofdstuk werden geïnterviewd, verklaarden dat ze om de een of 
andere reden alleen unauthorized stayers hielpen die al christen waren of zich daartoe 
wilden bekeren. Net als in hoofdstuk 2 over de Amerikaanse situatie, is de onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid van de beweegredenen en beperkingen een belangrijk aspect om 
rekening mee te houden bij het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvraag.
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Hoofdstuk 4 vergelijkt de Amerikaanse en Nederlandse situaties om bredere verbanden 
te leggen met betrekking tot de relaties tussen kerk en staat. In dit hoofdstuk kijk ik naar 
de bredere implicaties van de beweegredenen en beperkingen die in de vorige twee 
hoofdstukken aan het licht kwamen. Ik bespreek hun invloed op de relaties tussen kerk 
en staat en het daarmee samenhangende principe van scheiding van kerk en staat. Aan 
de hand van de onderzoeks-gegevens leg ik uit hoe bestaande modellen van relaties 
tussen kerk en staat verbeterd zouden kunnen worden. Ten eerste stel ik dat er een 
praktisch nut is voor het opsplitsen van ‘kerk’ en ‘staat’. In plaats van beide entiteiten als 
conglomeraties te beschouwen, kan een nadere beschouwing van de vele en gevarieerde 
samenstellende delen van elk ervan een nauwkeuriger beeld van de relatie schetsen. 
Ten tweede houden bestaande modellen geen rekening met de dynamische aard van 
de relaties tussen kerk en staat. Die is namelijk nogal vloeiend en evolueert in reactie 
op bepaalde prikkels. Deze stimuli kunnen worden begrepen vanuit het perspectief van 
de beweegredenen en beperkingen die zijn beschreven in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3. Er is 
een vrij grote overlap tussen de genoemde beweegredenen en beperkingen van beide 
landen, die kunnen verklaren waarom en wanneer LGOs betrokken kunnen raken bij de 
hulp aan unauthorized stayers. 
Deel Twee onderzoekt een andere reeks van actoren die relevant zijn bij de hulpverlening 
en de onderlinge spanningen. Dit betreft de subfederale of gemeentelijke overheden in 
respectievelijk de Verenigde Staten en Nederland. Vrijwel onmiddellijk nadat de Sanctuary 
movement begin jaren tachtig van start ging, begonnen subfederale overheden in de 
VS de inspanningen van LGOs te steunen. Sindsdien hebben steeds meer subfederale 
overheden zich aangesloten bij de Sanctuary movement. Dit leidde uiteindelijk tot 
een nog voortdurende juridische strijd die sinds 2017 de Amerikaanse rechtbanken 
domineerde. In Nederland raakten gemeentebesturen rond de millennium-wisseling 
betrokken bij hulpverlening, ook kort nadat LGOs erbij betrokken raakten. Centraal in 
deel Twee staat het vaststellen van de argumenten die door deze overheden worden 
gebruikt om hun standpunten en inspanningen te rechtvaardigen. Ook wordt aandacht 
besteed aan de rol van LGOs in deze context. Deel Twee bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 
5, 6 en 7. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de Amerikaanse situatie, hoofdstuk 6 behandelt de 
Nederlandse situatie en Hoofdstuk 7 vergelijkt en analyseert beide situaties.
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de vraag: waarom raken subfederale overheden betrokken bij 
hulp aan unauthorized stayers? Alvorens die vraag te beantwoorden, is het noodzakelijk 
om de basisprincipes van immigratie en bestuur in de Verenigde Staten te verduidelijken. 
Daarom begint het hoofdstuk met een korte bespreking van deze onderwerpen, alvorens 
in te gaan op de ontwikkeling van het conflict tussen subfederale overheden en de 
federale overheid. Het conflict gaat terug tot 2017, toen het proces van het intrekken 
van geldelijke steun door de federale overheid het debat over legale immigratie begon 
te domineren. Geschillen over het stopzetten hiervan hebben betrekking op die zaken 
die het gevolg zijn van de dreigementen van de federale overheid om financiering in te 
trekken van subfederale overheden die zich solidair hadden verklaard met de Sanctuary 
movement en zich betitelden als sanctuary jurisdictions. De eerste reeks van argumenten 
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die ik analyseer, is rechtstreeks ontleend aan de argumenten die door partijen zijn 
aangevoerd voor de rechter. Die argumenten zijn in essentie gebaseerd op de principes 
van het federalisme en de scheiding der machten. De meerderheid is derhalve 
grotendeels procedureel en niet materieel van aard. De tweede reeks van argumenten 
is ontleend aan bestaande literatuur waarin het beleid van sanctuary jurisdictions is 
geanalyseerd. Deze documenten bevatten juist meer inhoudelijke dan procedurele 
argumenten. Rechtsgelijkheid, gemeenschapsvertrouwen en openbare veiligheid, 
bijvoorbeeld, werden vaak genoemd in subfederale documenten om het concept van 
sanctuary jurisdictions te onderbouwen. Aan het einde van het hoofdstuk stel ik ter 
discussie of er wellicht een ander en beter kader is om de genoemde kwesties op te 
lossen waarbij niet alleen rekening wordt gehouden met argumenten van procedurele 
aard (zoals aangevoerd voor de rechter) maar ook met argumenten van inhoudelijke aard 
(zoals aangetroffen in beleidsstukken).
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt dezelfde vraag als hoofdstuk 5, maar dan in de Nederlandse 
context. Dat wil zeggen: waarom raken gemeenten betrokken bij de hulp aan unauthorized 
stayers? Qua structuur is hoofdstuk 6 vergelijkbaar met hoofdstuk 5. Allereerst geef ik 
een overzicht van de uitgangspunten van immigratie en bestuur in Nederland. Dit is van 
belang om het verschil van inzicht tussen gemeenten en centrale overheid te begrijpen 
dat ik daarna bespreek. Omdat er in Nederland aanzienlijk minder rechtszaken zijn 
gevoerd over de kwesties die uit deze verschillen voortvloeien dan in de VS, steunt dit 
hoofdstuk minder op jurisprudentie en meer op bestaande literatuur. Ik bespreek daarbij 
wel een bijzondere casus in detail, die belangrijk is voor het overzicht van de verschillen 
van inzicht tussen gemeenten en centrale overheid in de afgelopen twee decennia. Dat is 
de zaak CEC tegen Nederland, waarin het Europees Comité voor Sociale Rechten (ECSR) 
Nederland verplichtte tot zogeheten bed, bad en brood opvang van uitgeprocedeerde 
vreemdelingen. Uitgaande van dit overzicht bespreek ik de argumenten die gemeenten 
en hun vertegenwoordigers hebben aangevoerd ter rechtvaardiging van hun besluit om 
unauthorized stayers basale zorg te verlenen, ondanks het standpunt van de centrale 
overheid die hier sterk op tegen was. Ik besteed ook aandacht aan de argumenten die 
worden aangevoerd in publicaties in christelijk georiënteerde academische tijdschriften 
over het thema van ongeoorloofde immigratie om te onderzoeken hoe deze zich verhouden 
tot de argumenten van gemeentelijke vertegenwoordigers. Hoewel de argumenten in de 
Nederlandse context wellicht als inhoudelijker kunnen worden beschouwd dan die in 
de Amerikaanse context, is er mijns inziens nog ruimte voor verbetering om binnen een 
nieuw kader de hier beschreven spanningen op te kunnen lossen.
In Hoofdstuk 7 vergelijk ik de bevindingen uit de hoofdstukken 5 en 6. Eerst vergelijk ik 
de rollen die zijn vervuld door subfederale en gemeentelijke overheden, en vervolgens 
de rollen die LGOs hebben gespeeld in de context van de spanningen tussen overheden. 
Het blijkt dat LGOs fungeren als katalysatoren en uitvoerders van hulpverlening, en als 
liaisons tussen de geloofsgemeenschap en de rechtsorde in ruimere zin. Vervolgens 
vergelijk ik de argumenten die door de overheden in het conflict worden gebruikt, 
waarbij ik ook verwijs naar argumenten van LGOs voor zover ze relevant zijn in dit 
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intergouvernementele conflict. Ik maak daarbij onderscheid tussen argumenten van 
materiële en procedurele aard. De bevindingen suggereren dat er een verschil is tussen 
het hebben van de juridische bevoegdheid om beleid te formuleren op een bepaald 
terrein (in dit geval immigratie), en het in de praktijk uitvoeren van dat beleid. Met andere 
woorden, naast de federale en centrale overheid spelen andere actoren een substantiële 
rol in de daadwerkelijke beheersing van immigratie. De subfederale en gemeentelijke 
overheden zijn twee soorten van actoren die in een breder netwerk samenwerken om 
hulp te verlenen.
In deel Drie (hoofdstuk 8) trek ik bredere conclusies naar aanleiding van de resultaten 
van deel Een en deel Twee. Daarbij stel ik een nieuwe benadering voor, voor het 
oplossen van de spanningen die ik eerder heb gesignaleerd en geanalyseerd. Veel van 
de beweegredenen van de LGOs en de argumenten van subfederale of gemeentelijke 
overheden die eerder in dit proefschrift werden genoemd, zijn gebaseerd op de drie 
fundamentele principes die aan het begin van deel Een zijn besproken: gelijkheid, 
solidariteit en vrijheid. Hoewel beide groepen actoren (LGOs en subfederale of 
gemeentelijke overheden) vanuit juridisch oogpunt ongewone actoren zijn op het gebied 
van immigratie, zijn ze verre van zeldzaam of onbeduidend. Deze actoren raken veelal 
juist betrokken bij hulpverlening aan unauthorized stayers wanneer er een substantiële 
bedreiging is van fundamentele mensenrechten. Daarnaast is de prominente invloed van 
het christendom zichtbaar in beide landen, onder meer omdat zelfs overheidsactoren 
verwijzen naar Bijbelse regels om hun inspanningen te ondersteunen. In die context kan 
hulpverlening aan unauthorized stayers misschien het best worden begrepen als een 
netwerkproces waarbij veel verschillende soorten actoren betrokken zijn.
Zoals eerder vermeld, houdt het huidige kader voor het oplossen van de spanningen 
tussen geloofsgemeenschappen en de staat doorgaans rekening met overwegend 
procedurele argumenten, vooral in de Amerikaanse context. Aan het einde van hoofdstuk 
8 onderzoek ik de mogelijkheid van een andere benadering: een nieuw kader. Centraal 
hierbij staat een bredere interpretatie van de het recht op godsdienstvrijheid zoals dat 
onder meer in het Eerste Amendement van de Amerikaanse grondwet staat. In dit door mij 
voorgestelde nieuwe kader, kan de besluitvormer een bredere reeks factoren toepassen 
om te bepalen welke argumenten het zwaarste moeten wegen in zaken waarbij het recht 
op godsdienstvrijheid een rol speelt. Het hanteren van dit kader zou de tekortkomingen 
kunnen verminderen die inherent zijn aan de huidige, alleen op bescherming van religie 
gerichte benadering van het recht op gods-dienstvrijheid.
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Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or 
local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government 
entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, 
of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency 
may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing 
any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful 
or unlawful, of any individual:
1  Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
2 Maintaining such information.
3 Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity.
(c) Obligation to respond to inquiries
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, 
or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration 
status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized 
by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.
City of Ashland, Oregon, Resolution No. 2003-05 “Resolution to 
Protect Civil Liberties”
J. Federal policies adopted since September 11, 2001, including provisions in the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56) and related executive orders, regulations and actions 
may threaten fundamental civil rights and liberties by being interpreted as:
1  Authorizing the indefinite incarceration or deportation of non-citizens even if they 
have not committed a crime (USA PATRIOT Act, Sections 411 and 412);
2  Limiting judicial supervision and civil liberties protections in the application of 
telephone and internet surveillance (USA PATRIOT Act, Section 216);
3  Expanding the authority of federal agents to conduct secret searches so that the 
subject of a search warrant is unaware that the property has been searched (USA 
PATRIOT Act, Section 213);
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4  Granting law enforcement and intelligence agencies broad access to sensitive 
medical, mental health, library, business, financial, educational, and other records 
about individuals without first showing probable cause or evidence of a crime (USA 
PATRIOT Act, Sections 215,218,219, 358,507, and 508);
5  Limiting constitutionally protected speech through unchecked authority of the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of State to designate domestic groups as “terrorist 
organizations” using overbroad definitions of “terrorism” (USA PATRIOT Act, Section 
411 );
6  Authorizing the indefinite incarceration of citizens designated by the President as 
“enemy combatants” without access to counsel or meaningful recourse to the federal 
courts (see Hamdi and Padilla cases);
7  Authorizing the FBI to conduct surveillance of religious services, internet chatrooms, 
political demonstrations, and other public meetings without evidence that a crime has 
been or may be committed (Attorney General’s guidelines and procedures relating to 
criminal investigations and national security, issued May 30, 2002);
8  Limiting the disclosure of public documents and records under the Freedom of 
Information Act (“Memorandum for Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies,” 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Oct. 12, 2001);
9  Permitting wiretapping of conversations between federal prisoners and their lawyers 
(28 CFR 501.3); and
10  Establishing secret military tribunals for terrorism suspects (Military Order, Nov. 13, 
2001).
Executive Order 13768, 
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the Unites States.” 
Sections 8, 9, 10.
Sec. 8. Federal-State Agreements. It is the policy of the executive branch to empower 
State and local law enforcement agencies across the country to perform the functions 
of an immigration officer in the interior of the United States to the maximum extent 
permitted by law.
(a) In furtherance of this policy, the Secretary shall immediately take appropriate action 
to engage with the Governors of the States, as well as local officials, for the purpose of 
preparing to enter into agreements under section 287(g) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1357(g)).
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(b) To the extent permitted by law and with the consent of State or local officials, as 
appropriate, the Secretary shall take appropriate action, through agreements under 
section 287(g) of the INA, or otherwise, to authorize State and local law enforcement 
officials, as the Secretary determines are qualified and appropriate, to perform the 
functions of immigration officers in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or 
detention of aliens in the United States under the direction and the supervision of the 
Secretary. Such authorization shall be in addition to, rather than in place of, Federal 
performance of these duties.
(c) To the extent permitted by law, the Secretary may structure each agreement under 
section 287(g) of the INA in a manner that provides the most effective model for enforcing 
Federal immigration laws for that jurisdiction.
Sec. 9 Sanctuary Jurisdictions. It is the policy of the executive branch to ensure, to the 
fullest extent of the law, that a State, or a political subdivision of a State, shall comply 
with 8 U.S.C. 1373.
(a) In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary, in their discretion 
and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse 
to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal 
grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney 
General or the Secretary. The Secretary has the authority to designate, in his discretion 
and to the extent consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction. The 
Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against any entity that 
violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a statute, policy, or practice that prevents or 
hinders the enforcement of Federal law.
(b) To better inform the public regarding the public safety threats associated with 
sanctuary jurisdictions, the Secretary shall utilize the Declined Detainer Outcome Report 
or its equivalent and, on a weekly basis, make public a comprehensive list of criminal 
actions committed by aliens and any jurisdiction that ignored or otherwise failed to honor 
any detainers with respect to such aliens.
(c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is directed to obtain and provide 
relevant and responsive information on all Federal grant money that currently is received 
by any sanctuary jurisdiction.
Sec. 10. Review of Previous Immigration Actions and Policies. (a) The Secretary shall 
immediately take all appropriate action to terminate the Priority Enforcement Program 
(PEP) described in the memorandum issued by the Secretary on November 20, 2014, and 
to reinstitute the immigration program known as “Secure Communities” referenced in 
that memorandum.
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Abbreviations
ABC case American Baptist Churches v. Meese
BBB bed, bath, and bread accommodation
CCC City Church Chicago (US)
CDA Christian Democrat Appeal (Dutch political party)
CEC Council of European Churches
COA Central Agency for Reception of Asylum Seekers (NL)
COPS Community Oriented Policing Services (US)
CPNWR Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge
CRLN  Chicago Religious Leadership Network on Latin America (US)
CRTF Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (US)
CSC Church and Society Commission
CWS Church World Service
D66 Democrats 66 (Dutch political party)
DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (US)
DCI Defence for Children International
DHS Department of Homeland Security (US)
DT&V Repatriation and Departure Service (NL)
DOJ Department of Justice (US)
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECSR European Committee of Social Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
ESC European Social Charter
EU European Union
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FBO faith-based organization
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (US)
IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (US)
IND Immigration and Naturalization Service (NL)
INLIA International Network of Local Initiatives with Asylum Seekers
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service (US)
JAG Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (US)
LPPC Lincoln Park Presbyterian Church (US)
LUMC Lincoln United Methodist Church (US)
LVV national aliens facility (NL)
NGO non-governmental organization
OLC Office of Legal Counsel (US)
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCN Protestant Church in the Netherlands
RFRA Religious Freedom Restoration Act (US)
SCOTUS Supreme Court of the United States of America
SNDVU Foundation for Emergency Reception of Homeless Aliens in Utrecht (NL)
STIL Support Center for Illegal Immigrants in Utrecht (NL)
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TECTF Tucson Ecumenical Task Force on Central America
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TRP The Resurrection Project (US)
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMC United Methodist Church
UN United Nations
UPEC United Pentecostal and Evangelical Churches
USC United States Code
VBL freedom-limiting location (NL)
VNG Association of Netherlands Municipalities
VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Dutch political party)
WAUCC Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ (US)
WMO Social Support Act (NL)
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